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A B S T R A C T 
This study examines the.seminal thought of a leading Protestant exponent 
of Latin American liberation theology, Jose Miguez Bonino. It shows thAt, 
by a dialectical use of Marxist theory he is able to rediscover a basic 
and essential Christian understanding of history which requires that 
Christians be actively engaged in its shaping. Miguez Bonino's choice 
of the biblical c2tegory of the Kingdom of God examined and is seen 
to constitute a departure from and an improvement on the conventional 
model of the Exodus used by most liberation theologians. 
The Marxist critique: of idealism in traditional theology is accepted 
and serves as a starting point for a revised Christian interpretation 
of history. The unity of history is traced as originating in the prophetic 
teaching which linked political happenings with ciivine sovereignty. The 
crucial rediscovery of apocalytic in contemporary European political 
theology is seen as an important step in the <lire.ction taken by Miguez 
Bonino as is the theological reflection on 11 thinking J.n two spheres" 
by Dietrich BonLoeffer. 
The use which Miguez Bonino makes of tLc. concept of the Kingdom of God 
to emphasize the eschatological significance of hu1nan historic:aJ. action 
l.s also outlined. The Marxist emphasis on human resronsibility for 
historic.al initiative is taken as the point from which to expound an 
understanding of the Kingdom. of God in which the acccunt of t~1e tension 
between the present age .s.n.d the future age. in apocalyptic is important 
as is the contrast between continuity and discontinuity in the Pauline 
concepts oF nbody", "Resurrection" and 11wc)rks". Ag2in, Miguez 13<,nino 1 s 
inde.bte.dnes•; tc' P.onh~·2ffe.r, this tim·~ in his polarity of the ultimate 
and penulthcatc is acknowledged. 
Miguez Bonino's ~isti~ctive exposition of the Kingciom as a call to 
effective action to artic:Jlate Christian love i.s also ex3mined and 











mediations in the form of rncial analysis, theological interpretation 
and ideolog~;. Sacraliz&tion and fanaticism are avoided by the application 
of ethical criteria and the submission of the mediations to divine 
judgement. In this regard Mjsuez Bonino's preference for Marxism is 












The aim of this thesis is to set out the results of an examination of 
three themes around which Jose Miguez Bonin.o builds the main structure 
of his l~.....ration theology. It is therefore essentially thematic in 
its treat::nent. 
n:. is the opinion of the writer that Miguez Bonino's attempt to develop 
1 
a theology of historical engagem:mt represents a significant contribution 
to the contercporary theological debate, and that the crux of his theolo-
gical thought is to be found in his understaT'ldi..T'lg of t11e category of the 
Kingdan of Q:d as he reinterprets it by means of a dialectical use of 
Marxist theory. 
This basic starting point leads him to explore the qiiestion of idealism cmd 
the dualistic nature of reality to which idealism gives rise. The Marxist 
critique of religi:)n takes issue with traditional (August.L'1ian) theology 
at this point. Miguez Bonino accepts the Marxist criticism and his dis-
cussion of the unity of history provides us with O'...T first major explora-
ti.on with his thj_'lking. Because his style is so concise· and he expresses 
himself in almost sumnary fashion 1 much of our study takes the fonn of an 
elucidation or expansion of Miguez Bonino's i:J.~ought. 
In our treat.mal'lt of this first major theme therefore we find it necessa:r.y, 
for example, to delve into the Augustinian and Pla~nlc roots of much 
western theology aT'ld to trace its develoi;xuent through Luther and Galvin. 
A second m8thodological procedure we have adopted alongside this thematic 
tr-:atrcent is to explore the work of other theologians for ccrriparative pur-
poses. Thts we feel enables us to highlight the significance of !-1..iguez 
Bonino's distinctive contribution to the de.bat~ and also furnishes us 
with .lnsights :i.r.to tb.e points of departure he irekes v.ne..11 he concurs with 












difference when. he takes issue with the.in. Consequp..ntly our examination in 
this first theme leads us, for example, to canpare the usage of apocalyptic 
by Panenberg and of eschatology by MJltrnan.i-i with Miguez Bonino' s reflections. 
We also take note of the contrasting emphasis of Bultmann in his existenti-
.all.st interpretation of history and this throws into bold relief the point 
which the political theologians of Europe as well as the liberation theo-
l~ians are making. 
OUr project necessarily involves a description and analysis of the Marxist 
interpretation of history at the points where Miguez Bonino engages in 
dialogue with it. Here again we find it useful to canpare the thought of 
Emst Bloch' with that of the theologians w"ho have discovered in his philO-
sophy points of convergence and divergence.both with orthodox Marxism and 
with biblical faith. 
A further step in this ca:rparative style of proceerungs is taken when we 
examine the way in which Miguez Bonino uses the w:>rk of Dietrich Bonhoef fer 
upon whan, as we shall see, he relies very heavily, if indirectly. 
The thesis then, sets out to elucidate and explain the seminal thought of 
a theologian whose own style is so succinct as to appear alrrost disjointed 
in places. At times we may even be seen to take the debate further t.11.an 
does Miguez Bonino. Ha.-Jever in addition to being expository, thernat:'..c 
and corrparative in rrethod an attempt is also rnr:i.de to evaluate critically 
the selected therres wi:1ich lv1'iguez Bonino outlines. These :rrethodological 
features are repeated throughou~ t.lie study and, having acquainted the 
reader with the signposts he may expect to find, we do not consider it 
necessary to elatorate further at tr.is point on the way in which they have 
beo....n used through the second and third themes (which deal witL historical 
engage.rrent and ideological rrediations respectively). 
·However, the reader -may well re ·wondering at t11is poi..11t v;hy, of all the 











have chosen a short section from t...ti.e work of Jose r.-'..iguez Bonino as the 
subject for this study. One reason is that we consider Miguez Bonino' s 
theology generally to represent a way of dealing creatively with the 
challenge which Marxism presents to theology today and the selected 
pas~ge constitutes a particularly significant attempt on hi:.:. part 
3 
to address the crucial question of historical engagem:mt as it has errerged . 
in Christian theology and Marxist theory. Lri. this respect Miguez Bonino 
shares in the liberatio:q theology project with other La.tin Arcerican 
scholars who are working in situation which bears sare reseillblance to 
the South African context. Recently attempts have been made to relate 
Marxian type analyses of the Southern African situation to the task of 
theology in this part of the world, (1} and this ·.:"leveloprrP_nt highlights 
the ilrportance of liberation theology for Southern Africa. Miguez Bonino 
adopts a dialectical.approarl- to Marxism and consequently ccmes to the 
conclusion that - as with the .Ma...."'Xist view of the role of philosophy -
the task of theology is ''not merely to interpret the world but to change 
it". It is important t~1erefore that any attempt to do theology in Southern 
Africa has to take note of the efforts of theol1...XJi&1s iI1 similar situations 
in other parts of the wurld. 
Then secondly, iri Miguez Bonino' s interpretation primacy of place is giv=Jl 
to the kingdom of God. By adopting-this central biblical category he repre-
sents sanething o.f a departure from the majority of Latin Arrerican libera-
tion theologians. 
A rec.ent critical evaluation of sare of these theologians by J.A.Kirk (2) 
has sha...m that liberation t.11.eolOlJY seems to regard the Exodus as a 
"privileged ta~". Kirk has derronstrated that this approach leads to a 
distortion of the biblical view of :rr.an. He concludes that a greater 
emphasis on the finality of Christ - derived from the o::>-Iltrality of the 












lead to a liberation theology with a nore canprehensive concept of libera-
tion. ~ believe tbat Miguez Bonino makes good this deficiency in 
~passage w-e have chosen to· study. 
; 
' 
In the third place \'le take issues raised in Miguez Bonino' s theology . 
tO explore because he is one of the leading Protestant thinkers in 
the Latin l\rrerican liberation theology novement. He believes he has 
a distinctive contribution to make fran this Protestant perspective and 
it is our contention that he is justified in this claim. 
~t is also of sane interest tbat Miguez Bonino is a president of the 
World Council of Churches and it would appear that the standp::>int he has 
articulated has influenced contetrporary ecumei.-Ucal theology and policy. 
Furtherrrore Miguez Bonir::J· is a .Methodis.t, and since the present writer 
belongs to that cx::mnunion he feels a certain sympathy towards the writing 
of a person fran his own ecclesiastical family. There is perhaps more 
significance in Miguez P.onino' s denominational allegiance than. !night 
appear at first. In the Republic of Sc'..lt."1 Africa ~thcv'lism is one of· 
the largest Chrir+-..ian denc:minations and it may well therefore be expected 
to produce theolcgians who will look to Miguez Bonino as a pioneer 
... ·thinker for guida.11ce and orientation. His h.andli.11g of the crucial thPJne 
of historical engage.Inent in tams of the p::>li ti cal invol vernent required 
by t.11e Kingdom could well therefore exercise a gra.<l..11g influence on those 
who seek to do theology in this sub-continent. 
This leads us to a further consideration. The church-state tension which 
has existed int.he Republic of South Africa.'.fv..c sare years has resulted 












theology. In other words the writer sees a great need for serious theo-
logical reflection on the historical situation in which he lives. 
Such reflection appears to have advanced rrore rapidly in Latin America 
than it has here and the seminal thought of a leading theologian fran 
that continent may well provide prophetic insights which are so neces-
s'ary in this conte."Ct since it has both similarities with and differences 
fran the Latin American scene. Except in the brief postscript, however, 
we confine our attention to Miguez Picmino' s exposition in the hope that 
other students and theologians will develop the relevai1t themes in 
relation to the Southern African conteht in the future. 
The quintessence of Miguez Bonino's atterrpt to fonnulate a theology of 
historical engagement is found in the seventh chapter of his book 
L'oing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation •... ~!fere, under the heading 
"Kingdan of God, TTtopia and Historical Engagernent 11 (3) he sets.dov.111 the 
three themes which have been selected as the subject of this study. We 
believe that this passage constitutes the focal point for his exposition 
. c£ liberation theology, a contentio~ which is further substantiated by 
the fact that this chapter, in a revised and somewhat expanded fonn was 
selected for publication in the composite volurre Frontiers of Theology 
in Latin America. Its title here is "His'!::.orical Praxis and Christiari 
Identity" (4) and in the course of our present project we will have 
frequent cccasion to refer.to this version of Miguez Bonino's presenta~ 
tion. 
OUr objective then, is to derronstrate that in the category of the King-
da:n of God as J:i.e interprets it in the above section Miguez Bonino has 
found a biblicaJ. therre within which to work out .:m a'-.!Ceptable theology 

















tcx:>l he has re-interpreted the Kingdom of.God in a way which maintains 
both the Christian identity of liberation theology arid the cont~rary 
relevance of the iressage of the Kingdom. Put in another way, by using 
this thematic centre Miguez Bonino has been able to develop the basis 
for a liberation theology which, without surrendering the tension be-
tWeen them, holds together creatively the priority of divine initiative 
on the one hand and human engagerrent on the other. 
F\u:thennore the re-interpretation of the Kingdan theme enables him to 
ireet the Marxist criticism of religion at three ilTlportant poi.11ts. L-i 
the first of these, the question of historical dualism, Miguez Bonino 
6 
claims that a distinctively Christian view that history is one is better 
maintained by understanding that God opens history to the future arid 
involves himself with man in a polemical and dyr.1imlic engagerrent and 
. 
interaction. An exarnina_ion of this claim fo:rms the basis of our second 
chapter. 
Then secondly where .Marxism alleges.that Christianity only offers a sig-
nif icant future after death and therefore r:rinimizes present human suffer-. ~ 
ing which leads to despair and resignation Miguez Bonino asserts that 
because the Christian concept of the future envisages a consUrn:nation in 
... the Kingdom it underlines the significance of present deeds which are 
integral to that Kingdom since it has already begun. Our third chapter 
develops this therre. 
In our fourth chapter we set out Miguez Bonino's response to the Marxist 
claim that Christianity is ideologically bound to capitalism and there.l:>y 
... supports the oppression and exploitation of t:ha p:x:>r by the. rich. He 



















about t1'.e Kingdan bj which to evaluate any given praxis, and delineating, 
the difference between the absoluteness of the final Kingdan,and the 
relativity of the present human endeavour which seeks to set up signposts 
:i;ointingto that Kingdan in the fonn of ideological and political 
nediations. 
·. 
Our final chapter seeks to evaluate some of the main issues raised by 
Miguez Bonino in the c~pter under review and concludes with sare indi-
cations.of the directions in which a theology of historical engagement 
would need to go. 
A short postscript will suggest sare very tentative ways in which this 
theology of engagement could relate for a background to "doing t1'.eology" 
in the crisis of Southern Africa ·today. The conterrporary liberation 
struggle here certainly has its counterpart in the field of t.l-ieological 
reflectiono Before embarking on the main themes of our study, hcwever, 
it is necessary to sketch sarce of the background to Miguez Bonino's theo-
logy and his dialectical response to Marxism. We turn, then, ·in our 
first chapter to this nore general picture of Miguez Bonino and his 













MIGUEZ BONINO AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY 
The contemporary movement amongst liberation theologians in Latin 
America to create a theology from within !:"1eir socioeconomic situation 
of oppression and exploitation represents one of the major trends in 
present-day theological debate. Indeed, so radically different are its 
presuppositions, categories and methodology, that any student familiar 
with traditional theological thought is innnediately struck by these 
dissimilarities. 
The Lat.in Americans have deliberately and self-consciously chosen their 
path of divergence. Although most, if not alls of them are familiar with 
the work of the major Catholic and Protestant theologians of Europe and 
North America they have put their efforts into a theological enterprise 
which is distinctly new and different. Because of this, they are in the 
'\ 
' 
- • I process ot creating a theology which promises to become the first major 
theological development of the Christian era to emanate from outside the 
traditional home of theology in Western Europe or North America. 
Liberation theology is essentially a response to and reflection on a human 
historical situation which is very different from that pertaining on either 
side of the North Atlantic •. It purports to be a· theology "from below11 
by which it means from the point of view of the poor and exploited masses as 
a group or class. The questions it sets out to answer therefore are 
posed not so much by people who are finding it difficult to believe but 
by those who are finding it difficult to accept that their lot must be 













squalor and poverty, This difference has ~een well described by 
Gutierrez when he said: 
"A goodly part of contemporary theology seems to 
take its start from the challenge p0sed by the nonbeliever. 
The nonbeliever calls into question our religious world, 
demanding its thoroughgoing purification and revilatiza-
tion. Bonhoeff er accepted that challenge and incisively 
formulated the question that underlies much contemporary 
th~ological effort: How are we to proclaim God in a 
WG~ld come of age ? In a continent like Latin America, 
however, the main challenge does not come from the non-
believer but from the nonhuman - i.e. the human being 
who is not recognized ass;-:,ch by the prevailing social 
order." (1) 
In this chapter we try~ firstly, to sketch very briefly the main features 
of this Latin American context out of which liberation theology arises 
and the consequent rationale for its methodology. 
In the second section we will outline the way i~ which Miguez Bonino him-
self conceives his theological task before going on to a brief surn..~ary 
of the chapter from his work which we have.selected as the focal point 
for this study. 
-' 
In a situation where the burning questions are being formulated in rela-
tion to the economic dynar::ics at play rather than the rationality of 
belief the leaven in the lump comes from the Marxist interpretation of 
society. Our fourth section seeks to spell out the way in which Miguez 
Bonino responds to this Marxist challenge. This will give us a broad 
perspective from which, in the subsequent chapters, we will move on to 
explore the main issues which Miguez Bonino's tht::'Jlogy raises. 
1. . THEOLOGY. AS . REFLECTION ON · PRlL".:lS 
The concern of liberation theologians is to establish a different purpose 













Hebblethwait~ when he said that for the theologians of liberation, 
"Theology is not just something that goes on in the head. It is 
not a theology ~bout liberati~n; it is a theology for liberation." (2 
It arises therefore not so much over the coffee cups in u::iversity 
.~eminar rooms. but rather in the slums and back streets of the sprawling 
cities of Latin America. Here a growing number of Christians have 
become involved in the struggle for political liberation. These Chris-
tians, writes Miguez Bonino have "interpreted their Christian obedience 
in terms of a whole-hearted and passionate participation in a socio-
political-cultural process which we call 'the struggle for liberation'. 
(3) 
The struggle arises from the conditions of poverty, disease, illiteracy 
exploitation, social and educational discrimination and political opprel-
1 
sion which prevail in varying degrees i~~ different parts of Latin ! 
America. (4) According to Miguez E.:mino (who is clearly indebted to 
Marxist analysis) this state of affairs has been brought about by its 
historical _developmer.t since the era of Spanish colonial rule when the 
semifeudal form of society that pertained in Spain was extended to Latin. 
I 
America. The pattern ensured that the vast proportion of fertile I 
land was owned by a small elite of rich families. It also led, 
inevitably, to a situation where the vast majority of the population were 
and remain excluded from property ownership. The result was the creatiln 
of a two-class society of lords and servants T..,rith the addition in more 
recent times of a de?endent middle-class generated by modernization. 
I 
(~) 
In the nineteenth century Latin America went through a neo·-colonial 
when, under the influence of Western industrial expansion it became 
involved in supplying raw materials for the markets of Western Europe and 
I 













corned as a concomitant component of this economic development, and it 
also served as a stimulus to the urge for emancipation from Spanish 
domination. In this shift from Spanish political control to economic 
interaction, Latin American countries became economically dependent on ' 
The needs and preferences of the new economi:' r the nations of the West. 
partners (or ~nasters) determined the development and modernization of 
I 
Latin America. (6) 
I 
As a further consequence Miguez Bonino argues, "democracy" became a hoaJ 
I 
for the majority of the peasant and Indian workers who were 
"simply incorporated as cheap labor for production. 
Their condition was, if anything worse than it had 
been before under a sometimes more or less lenient 
paternalistic system. A free press, free trade, 
education, politics - all the 'achievements' of 
liberalism - were the privilege of the elite. For 
the growing.Latin American masses, undernourishment, 
slavery, illiteracy, and later on forced migrationt 
unemployment, exploitation, crowding, and finally 
r2pression when they claim their rights - these are 
i.:lle harvest of one century of 'liberal democracy' " (7) 
The conclusion to which the liberativn theologians have come is that 
Latin A.111erican underdevelopment is the inevitable corollary of the ind1s-
1 
trial and economic expansion of North America and Western Europe. In-· · 
Cate-11 .. deed, development and underdevelopment are now seen as inadequate 
gories for describing the Latin American reality. (8) The preference 
is for the terms "domination" and "dependence". (9) 
The failure of development prograrmnes has added further to the sense of 
frustration experienced by Latin At!lericans. Bei1:..6 under United Nationl 
leadership. in the nineteen fifties, these programmes were based on thel 
belief that third world countries could solve their problems by means 
accumulating capital and utilizing technology and planning. In fact 












increased and with serious results. As Miguez Bonino describes it: 
"Social unrest is rampant on the continent, and 
populist regimes h2ve been replaced, with the aid 
and support of the il.S.A. by military, repressive 
governments which can guarantee the stable condi-
tions required by foreign investment. 11 (10) 
The relationship of dependence and domi11ation is exacerbated by the mani·-
' pulation of military and political power on the part of the North Atl&d.tic 
countries in the pursuit of their economic interests. The total pr.ocels 
is seen as due not so much to the wickedness or evil intent by the morl 
• I 
powerful nations but rather as "the normal and unavoidable consequence~ 
' 
of the basic principles of capitalist production as they work themselv~s 
out in our global, technological time11 • (11) This system demands 
by its very nature, increasing profits, the concentration of economic 
power and the need to discover cheaper labour in order to reduce costs. 
I 
What has happened is that as the work force of the powerful nations ha~ 
' 
enhanced its own bargaining power and thus developed its political and 
economic muscle, the continued growth of these countries has been madel 
possible by the discovery and use of the much cheaper labour force avail-
able in the third world. 
This whole historical development h.::i.s had its counterpart in the religious 
consciousness of Latin America. (12) The colonial age was dominated , 
by traditional Roman Catholicism and the indigenous folk-religion whijh 
grew up under its influence. Using popular motifs which were predomijantly 
magical and mythical its objective was to enable its followers to copl 
I 
with natural eveni...~ and historical occurrences. These were interpretJd 
I 
as the outworking of such supernatural forces as saints, God, demons and 
spirits. Religious activities such 
• I 
as prayers, pilgrimages and rituals 
were the praxis appropriate to this understanding. The new shift in 
emphasis under the impact of the neocolonial age with i~s religious 












new consciousness centred on individual subjectivity and personal rela-
tions, with a strong emphasis on moral considerations. It aimed to 
offer the individual personal integration as well as inner harmony and 
peace. (13) 
In the most .recent history of Latin 
i 
AmeriLa, the disillisionment followl 
to "produce the goods" has led to tlle ing the faiiure of developmentalism 
search for liberation. Boldly adopting a Marxist social analysis the 
proponents of liberation have perceived that 
"Only a radical break from the status quo, that is 9 
a profound transformation of the private property 
system, access to power of the exploited class, and 
a social revolution that would break this dependence 
would allow for the change to a new society, a socia-
list society - or at least allow that such a society 
might be poss~ble." (14) 
The values and attitudes of capitalist society are, moreover, seen to 
I 
be creating a culture characterized by artificiality, the drive to I succ~ss 
' 
accompanied by a dehumanizing effect on those pursuing it, economic I 
responsibility wealth as the yardstick of success "and the resignation of 
for the world and one's neighbour" (15). The effect of this latter 
characteristic is that it dulls the sensitivity and awareness of the 
people concerned to their own condition of exploitatior1 and dependence.! 
It furthermore drains away any sense of need to affirm their authenticifty 
as self-respecting masters of their own fate. Indeed, nit destroys thJ · 
very core of their humanity: the decision to stand up and become agentls 
of their own history, the will to conceive and realize an authentic J 
·historical project." (16) This has given rise, however, to a new con! 
sciousness in which mr:.:•. are dissatisfied with their situation of depenl 
dence and passivity. They are no longer prepared to accept a condition 
in which they are reduced to merely responding to the needs and.historJcal 












This reactior. has been manifest in three directions. The first has 
been the disillusionment of the petit-bourgeoisie of the towns following 
the failure of economic"progre~s 11 to provide them with the consumer 
products of the modern age. The second has been the developing conflict 
of interests between the local middle and small industry wi1ich is non- . 
monopolistic on the one hand and the larz.~ monopolies on the other. The 
third component has been lhe rising sense of 'anger at the injustices of 
the system growing in the minds of the younger professionals, students 
and academics, to which we have referred earlier. Together these constir 
tute an incipient revolutionary consciousness which has been taking shapb 
in the struggle for liberation. 
According to liberation theology the proper Christian response to this 
consciousness is to chalienge both the colonial and neo-colonial inter-
pretations of religion. It has to affirm that 
.{f" 
"life is not any more lived in the dichotomy of a 
natural and a supernatural worid; historical 
facts can and must be modified through historical 
action. Individual and interpersonal conditions 
and relations are shaped and find significanc.e in 
a·p6lis, a total, organized and intentional social 
formation. A·meaningful Christian faith, therefore, 
has to be mediated through historical and political 
participation." (17) 
Liberation theology has arisen as the rational reflection on this politi-
cal engagement. Basic to its methodology is the awareness that historiial 
praxis precedes the reflective process which relates the Christian faith 
I 
to conc,:ete politir::al action. The perspective 5 therefore, for theologidal 
reflection ::.s this historical engagement on the part of Latin American 
Christians in response to the suffering and oppression of the poor. In 
what has now beeome a, well-known passage; Gutierrez -;,,as described this __ 
process: 
"The point of departure of our theological reflection 
is the process of liberation in Latin America. More 












Latin Americans are assuming. Even more precisely: it 
is the engagement of Christians in the process of libe-
ration. This I would call the major fact 6f life of 
the Latin American Church in recent times.I? (18) 
The development of Christian awareness to this point in Latin A..merica 
followed by a process of searching for an authentic Christian response 
the apalling socio-economic conditions prevailing i~ the continent. h 
began with a vague and generalized concern with social issues which led 
i 
on to active engagement in works of social service. From the experience~, 
insights and frustrations derived from social'activity there developed j 
the awareness that structural factors were conditioning the social forc 0 , - -~·1 
at work in the situation. There followed the realization that the politi-
cal realm was the primary determinating structure and that socio-politicll 
I 
I 
analysis was a necessary prerequisite for any theological reflection whi~h 
sought to come to grips with the complex socio-economic and political 
situation. (19) 
2. MIGUEZ BONINO'S THEOLOGICAJ~ ENTERPRISE -----·----
Miguez Bonino has indicated how he became involved in this theological 
enterprise. In 1971 he was invited to speak on "New Theological Perspecl 
tives 11 at an ecumenical conference in Peru. (20) In presenting this 
paper he.crystallized for himself the basic lines of the new theology 
and posed some critical questions of ~.is ovm. The reaction from some 
foreign theologians was quite strongly critical. They found the "new 
positioning of theology" involved in formulating the theolOgy of 1 .. . I. 1oerat:ron 
I 
I 
to be unacceptable. But Miguez Bonino confesses to having found himself' 
unable to do theology from any other perspective. (21) He states his 













A. "There is no direct route from divine revelation to theology; the 
mediation of ~ome praxis is inevitable.'' (22) This cuts right across 
the traditional "idealist" methodology of theology. Any th~,1logy which 
purports to work out its formulations first and to prescribe action 
arising from those theoretical positions is thus disqualified. In this 
way "it mark" the end of any theology that claims to be self-nurturing 
and self-sufficient or to operate in some autonomous sphere detached 
from historical praxis. 11 (23) This assertion can be seen to have 
implications in that (a) on the epistemological level it utilizes the 
sociology of knowledge; (b) on the historical level it draws atten-
tion to the relationship between the church or the individual Christian 
and the processes of theoretical thought that are taking place in the 
Christian community; and (c) with regard to biblical theology it 
explores ~uch important issl!es as the relationship between faith and 
obedience and also between truth and knowledge. In a further elaboration 
of this in::;ight Miguez Bonino declares: 
11Latin American theology of liberation is beginning 
t·o emerge (as all theology ?) after the fact, as 
the reflection about facts andexperiences which 
have already evoked a response from Christians. 
This response, undertaken as Christian obedience, is 
not the mere result of theological deduction, or of 
political theory. It is a total, synthetic act, 
many times going far beyond what one can at the moment 
justify theologically. Thro, as one is called to 
explain, to understand the full meaning or to invite 
other Christians to follow the same path, a theology 
is slowly born". (24) 
·Stated in other terms$ "theology is properly the critique of the praxis 
of the life of the believing community." \25) 
B. · "The·area·that defines this praxis, and hence the critical plane 
· ·on V1hich reflecti~n is. projected~ is the· socio-~olitical one." (26) 
The church has traditionally concentrated on relating the biblical 
witness to the individual and spiritual realm to the exclusion of the 
whidh 
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people assume responsibility in shaping the world and directing history.[ 
Again there are three consequences which follow: 
(a) Theology works within the political realm and is conditfoned by 
ding to the ideological background of the theologian, and an admission 
of suspicion on this count. "Very 
theological interpretation coming 
correctly, we cannot receive the . l' 
from the rich world without suspect1.n 
it and, therefore, asking what kind of praxis it supports, reflects or 
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legitimizes. 11 (27) 
· such a suspicion in 
As we shall see, Miguez Bonino g~we expression. tJ 
his treatment of Moltmann's political theology. c2L, 
(b) Theological reflection utilizes socio-political tools and categori~s 
. . . I . h h l' . 1 h . . I in its operation. t recognizes t at t e oo itica sp ere invoJ.ves struc-
tures, ideologies and power and these ere ~nalyzed and studied in partit 
cular by the social sciences. Indeed it is the evolution of these sciehces 
that has given impetus to the liberation theology movement by discoverilg 
cat~gories previously closed to theological thought. The voice of the 
social sciences is thus the first and preliminary theological word of I 
But whilst it accepts the validity of these scienbes · liberation theology. 
as theological data it only accepts them critically and dialectically. 
They provide theology with a more complete and critical view of history! 
together with a set of analytical and diagnostic instruments which unc,l.rer 
hidden dynamics and structural processes. They .?.~.so describe how systems 
work and relate to each others. (29) 
The liberation theologians are by no means unaware of the debate over Jhe 
impartiality of science. Their choice of Marxism as a rational analys~s 











tion that if it provides an accurate and functional description of 
the contemporary Latin American reality then it is a useful tool for 
a Christian since he is committed to a life.of "efficacious 1.ove" 
(Miguez Bonino). In order to understand the dynamics that are the. 
causes of oppression and suffering he must use the most effective analv-; 
sis available. 
(c) We have to discard the notion that theology can opt out of the task 
of reflecting on political responsibility and be n.ontemporal. It has 
at the same time to make some concrete commitment. In the Latin American 
situation it chooses the struggle for liberation. The reason for this 
is made clear in the chapters that follow in this study. (30) 
C. "Starting from this basic outlook, we m~st critically reread and 
· repossess biblical and theological tra.diti~and also the Christian 
community to which we belc:mg". (31) The perspective arrived at 
after opting for a definition of theology ~s reflection upon praxis, and 
after delineating the socio-·political realm as the sphere of that praxis, 
is a vantage-point from which to re-interpret the scriptures and 
re-evaluate previous theological positions. Three tasks suggest them-
selves. (a) The examinarion of scripture and theological thought 
becomes an ongoing task. The socio-political standpoint and the history-
creating engagement provide new hermeneutical ins-ights which continually 
need to be applied in this ref le«tio~ Such a project will use the diag-
nostic criteria thus discovered, and uncover the hidden ideological pre-
suppositions of the participants in the debate. (32) (b) This will 
also bring to light the emphasis on liberation in both the Bible and ' 
theology and will thus open up new interpretive possibilities for the 
current liberation project. (c) A new study of Latin American religious 















to find the root. causes of the factors which both impede and encourage 
the dynamics of libevation that are operative in present day Christianity." 
(33) 
3. "KINGDOM OF GOD~ UTOPIA AND HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT" 
Miguez Bonino outlines the task he sets for himself when he declares: 
"the issue is how we are to understand the active and 
dynamic presence of God~s kingdom in our history so that 
we can adapt out witness and activity to it, particularly 
at this concrete moment in world history when we must 
profess our faith and serve the Lord in Latin America." (34) 
Here he innnediately focusses the thrust of his theological reflection on 
the Kingdom of God in relation to the Latin A~erican historical context. 
In preparation for our detailed examination and critique of the three 
major sections of this chapter we will now· take a preliminary look at 
Miguez Bonino's exposition. 
In the introductory paragraphs to the chapter he notes the claim made by 
Engels that Christianity began with a socialist ethos but, because of its 
religious origins, lost its way in other-worldliness. The need for his-
torical engagement contained in the eschatologj_cal hope of the Kingdom 
gave way to a "spiritualized and individualistic hope for immortal, 
celestial life." (34) The presupposition on which this hope was based 
was the dualistic belief in two worlds. The earthly life of the believer 
was seen·as merely a preparation for the "heavenly" life, and human com-
munity existence was an incidental structure necessary to provide the ways 
and means of achieving this. This focus on a pe:r.son"l afterlife in 
Christianity led to the passive acceptance of and resignation to the 
contemporary historical and political condition::; however unjust or inhuman 
these might have been. This attitude was :i..n sharp contrast to the Marxist 












which prevented human liberation in history. 
Miguez Bonino asserts that such accommodation to circumstanc':!s is not 
an essential consequence of the gospel and proceeds~ in three important 
steps, to map out a theological route which leads away from resignation 
towards creai:.ive historical engagement. 
The first of these {which we look at in our next chapter) is the rejec-
tion of dualism, or the idea of two histories, one sacred and the other 
secular or profane. In the Old Testament God's action and man's combine 
to create history. God's sovereignty is not coterminous with history, 
but it acts and reacts polemically with man's co-operative will and also 
his st?ubhorn!'l.ess. Here history "is precisely, this conflict between God 
and his people in the midst and in relation to all pe9ples. 11 (36) 
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Miguez Bonino points out two further factors in this regard. The one is 
that prophetic interpretation is part of God's call and invitation rather 
than a commentary on it. The second is that this single historical thread 
is political in character. God is conflictively and assertively involved 
in the total life of the individual and the community and consequently he 
is busy "erecting the signs and the road of his coming final victory, His 
kingdom." (37) 
Miguez Bonino believes that the change in climate which appears in the 
transition from the Old to -the New Testament derives from the problems 
which the Gentile Christians had (and have) of r~1ating their £aith 
(which is grounded in the historic.al events recorded in the £ible) to their 
own national historical traditions. A duality of histories is thus involved 
and whilst we Gentiles can perceive God's saving action at work in Israel's 
history and in .Jesus Christ it is a much more complex and difficult act of 












distinct dualism appears with Augustine who identifies the Kingdom of God 
with the history of faith and relegates the secular history to "a general 
episodic framework devoid of eschatological significance: a. mere stage". 
(38) Miguez Bonino rejects this dualistic line and affirms the eschatologi-
cal significance of general human history and goes on to cite Gutierrez, 
Moltmann and Metz as contemporary examples of "moni.st 11 responses which 
assert the cruciality of historical action. His formula is that God acts 
and calls within the whole of history and man responds in tbe secular 
structures, his faith providing the motivation. 
In the second step (which we shall examine at greater length in our third 
. chapter) Miguez Bonino deals with the problem of having to maintain a 
Christian identity while seeing the Kingdom of God in general history 
as a whole. European theologians generally refrain from ascribing any 
causal connection between socio-political <:1.ction and the Kingdom of God. 
Miguez Bonino refers to the Pauline concepts of "body" and "resurrection" 
and shows how these imply a pob.rity of ccntinui.ty bet1veen the present 
and the eschatological future. In this tension he discerns a model for 
the relationship between history and the Kingdom of God. The latter, from 
this perspective, can be seen to be fulfilling and perfecting general 
history and eliminating it~ sin. If the Kingdom moreover, is a call to 
connnitment the question then arises as to how we can most effectively 
produce the quality of life which has eschatological reality. 
The answer to this question (which comprises his third step and our chapter 
four)~ lies in historical mediations, by which he means making a choice for 
and conunitment to a specific political ideology, and utilizing the best 
socio-political analytical tools that are available. In working out this 
position he takes issue with Moltmann who, in .. The Crucified God had 












had done this by interpreting the cross as God's self-identification 
with oppressed and destitute man and also as his call to men to identify 
themselves with him in his identification with Godforsaken man. 
Although Moltmann 1 s five "dE.;~:.onic circles of death" - namely poverty, 
violence, rc::cial and cultural deprivation, pollution and meaninglessness -
involve responses of identification. which J.re political in nature, Miguez 
Bonino contends that he finishes with a "political theology of the cross 11 
whose only role is the critical function of de-sacralization. Miguez 
Bonino feels that this is insufficient. Theology must not sit on the 
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fence, ideologically speaking, or take refuge in a mere "critical function". 
He allow~ that there is a danger of sacralizing a socio-political ideology, 
but he nevertheless claims that by opting for historical, analytical and 
ideological mediations ~ secularization of politics is possible and the 
danger of sacralization can thus be avoided. In fact, he concludes, the 
European political theologians have succumbed to the temptation to sacralize 
the "critical freedom" of their theology and have thus failed to recognize 
their own captivity to the western liberal ideology. 
He claims, furthermore, that the liberation theologians have recognized 
these dangers in their open choice of the Marxist analysis and socialist 
system for Latin America. The Christian faith which kindles imagination 
can therefore be said to have a "utop:Lan functior." in that the eschatolo-
gical vision provides a stimulus and challenge to seek to establish 
historically the provisional and temporary signposts of the Kingdom. 
Because of the eschatological significance of historical action a Christian 
can engage in the driv 0 , to bring in a socio-political order that is more 
consistent with the Kingdom. The background against which these issues 
must be set is the dialectical use which Miguez Bonino makes of Marxism. 











between Marxist doctrine and Christian theology that has taken place 
in the pest-Stalin era. (39) 
4. MIGUEZ BONINO ON CHRISTIANITY AND MARXISM 
In the conte~:t of the Latin American situation the Christian alliance 
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with Marxism has arisen from the painful fact of the prevalence of poverty 
and the awareness that this has aroused the need for purposeful remedial 
action. The situation was summed up aptly by Kirk when he said, 
"Marxism seemed to speak most cogently to the stark economic contrasts 
and deplorable social conditions encountered by young priests and laymen 
in their contact with the poor areas of the continent". (40) It also 
"offered a complete interpretation of the La.tin American scene." (41) 
In addition because of its colonial history, Christianity, in Latin 
America has become almost the only religion to claim any widespread. 
allegiance with the three hundred million people who constitute its popu-
lation. In this respect it is unique in the third world.· With 90 per 
cent of Latin America being at least nominally Catholic and with the 
existence of a small Protestant following in addition, the continent can 
be described as "Christian". But Christians find it difficult to reconcile 
their religion with the tragically miserable circumstances in which so 
many of them live. Hence there is the quest for an alternative to the 
capitalist economic system. 
Similarly it is this same combination of factors which can lead Lawrence 
Bright to declare that in Latin America 11 to be a Christian and a Harxist 
is normal enough". (42) People have turned to revolution in response to 
the intolerable situation of oppression, and they have done so "without 
waiting for justification from the Christian gospel or Marxist philosophy". 











age to Marxi<:"m" (44) does not begin in a.n intellectual debate about 
the structural similarities of Marxism and Christianity or about the 
philosophical points of contac~. It begins in the commitment to a 
revolutionary project. Whilst the Christian-Marxist dialogue in Europe 
may have begun "over the coffee-cups." and issued in joint action from 
there, in Latin Amer::.ca that order is reversed; co-operatioh in action 
has come first and dialogue has ensued. This has happened because "the 
circumstances that condition the situation of individuals, not communist 
ideology, constitute the true challenge for the church.'' (45) 
(a)· The Christian Involvement i~ a Revolutionary Project. 
· Miguez Bonino begins his rationale for his espousal of a limited form of 
Marxism from the fact of this engagement by a significant number of 
Christians in a revolutionary project. He states with emphasis: 
"It is my thesis that, as Christians, confronted by 
.the inhuman conditions of existence prevailing in 
the continent, they have. tried to make their Chris-
tian faith historically relevant, they have been 
increasingly compelled to seek an analysis and 
historical programme for their Christian obedience. 
At this point, the dynamics of the historical process~ 
both in its objective conditions and its theoretical 
development, have led them, through the failure of 
several remedial and reformist alternatives, to dis-
cover the unsubstitutable relevance of Marxism." (46) 
The commitment to a revolutionary project in league with Marxists has 
been brought about by the petit bourgeoisie not as a result of their own 
experience of poverty and destitution but out of a sense of solidarity 
with the poor combined with a theoretical understanding of the socio-
economic dynamics ::i.t work in Latin America. These .people had tried to 
use conventional methods of offering charity and had campaigned for 
reform. Both of these efforts had proved irrelevani.. in tbe fact of the 
powerful economic structures ranged against them. They concluded that 
24 
only a structural and political approach would be effective. Furthermore 












"third way" between capitalism and Marxism. Their decision to align 
themselves with Marxist movements "is therefore an option for structural 
over against purely individual change, for revolution over against refor-
mism, for social over against capitalis~ development or 'third' solutions, 
f6r 'scientific' over against idealistic or utopian socialism.'' (47) 
The choice for Marxism comes from the desire by these people to make 
their action historically effective, It stems from their belief that in 
order to put into effect the command to love they have to base their effort 
on the best available analysis of suffering and oppression. This they 
believe is provided in Marxism. Miguez Bonino is at pains to emphasize 
. that "they were not looking primarily for a theoretical answer to 
philosophical or existential problems" (48) and hence they are free to 
pick and choose those components of Marxism which are helpful to them 
in their enterprise. 
(b) · Marxism as a Her~eneotical T6ol 
Miguez Bonino however, is clear in his assertion that Marxism can be of 
assistance to the Christian in more than just his revolutionary stance. 
"It seems to me", he writes, "that translated to the area of Biblical 
study~ the Marxist insights are a powerful instrument to free interpreta-
tion from its idealist presuppositions and capt:Lvity." (49) He goes on 
to show that the Marxist claim that religion serves an ideological func-
tion can be applied in the sphere of interpretation. Marx taught that 
Christianity provides religious sanction to the capitalist bourgeois 
system, and Miguez Bonino ~is convinced that the principle of "ideological 
suspicion" inherent in this teaching is justified. Indeed he sees it as 
providing a "fundamental critic.al tool for interpretation." (50) Because 
all interpretation is carried out within a tradition "We modify, correct, 











almost incorporated into the texts." (51) This is seen in our under-
standing of what Jesus taught about "riches" and "the rich". In the 
Protestant tradition we interpret the hard sayings of Jesus about these 
things in "inner" or "spiritual" ways. We.imply that 
"riches (in themselves) are good - therefore Jesus 
could not have condemned them as such - consequently 
the ~ext must mean something else. This s0mething 
else must be found in the 'subjective' sphere (i.e. of 
intention, attitudes, motivations). Once this frame-
work of interpretation is in operation, all texts 
gather around it in one coherent whole." (52) 
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An example of this is the way in which many have traditionally spiritualized 
the Lucan beatitude about the poor. 
"The ideological function of such interpretation is 
evident (how~ver different the intention of the 
interpreter may have been): you can rest assured 
in your capitalist accummulation of wealth (or your 
attempt to reach it); religion (reverence for God) 
legitimizes and blesses your effort ! " (53) 
This process can further be seen in the habit of treating historical events 
such as the crucifixion, Parousia, or mission of Jesus - as if they were 
individualistic and inward 'existential' moments, experiences or appro-
priations. 
Another ·way in which Marxist criticism of religion is useful is in the 
determination of the infle3nce on the biblical texts of the socio-economic 
matrix in which the writings were born. Marxism has understood religion 
as the projection of man's misery and protest against it. Man finds a 
''(substitutionary) satisfaction in the hope of an apocalyptic (and later 
otherworldly) vindication". (54) Ernst Bloch has .Perceived the dynarnism 
in that hope and has asserted that the religious and mythical garb in 
which it is clothed needs to be stripped off. If it is to be realized 
in history then it must be incorporated into a historic - scientific pro-· 
ject. Allowing that there are deficiencies in this Marxist prcssntation 
Miguez Bonino is nevertheless convinced that in the field of biblical in-











religious outlook which finds expression in texts expresses the socio-
economic relations and circumstances of a given society." (55) 
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This question can be seen to relate in particular to the Old Testa.111ent 
social pr6phets. Ins~ead of trying to progress to a new order of society 
they are usually looking back, seeking for a return to some pre-agricultu-
ral or even nomadic way of life. The Mar::ist analysis enables Miguez Bonino 
to see that their message is precipitated by the crisis of social change. 
From the simple nomadic order their society progresses to a more differen-
tiated system in which class relationships replace interpersonal and inter-· 
familial ones. "Their prophecy" he writes with insight, "is indeed 'the 
sigh of the oppressed creatures' alienated in thia change and 'the protest' 
of that creature." (56) 
However the significance and importance of the prophets' protest is that 
it takes the form of a utopian hope for a previous real or imagined 
harmony. The prophetic message should t-"!lerefore be interpreted not as a. 
call to a voluntaristic trcmsposition of its demands. No moralizing of 
the message to make it into an appeal to those in power to repent is suf-
ficient. What is needed in the contemporary historical situation is 
rather to make heard the prophetic protest against the disruption of human 
life which is caused by the capitalist system. In addition we need to give 
expression to the prophetic hope that human life and society will be 
reintegr~ted in justice and solidarity. 
This type of analysis should be applied, Miguez Bonino believes, to 
"the 'eschatological reversal' of rich and poor •••• 'the thaumaturgic 
(healing) expectations and performances, (and) the forms of conununal 
solidarity which we find both in the Old and New Testaments." (57) 
However, the problem then iC'rises as to whether, in the Christian interpre-












biblical writers locate God in this "mythical11 or "utopic" space. On 
the contrary, claims Miguez Bonino, the biblical witness tends to "histori-
cize the space of God's intervention" (58) because "God judges and 
liberates 'in, with and und-:r' historical, worldly events." (59) Thu.s, 
by bringing to light the socio-economic matrix Miguez Bonino believes we 
can deepen the insights of biblical intert-"retat.ion. 
"Using the terms of the Marxist analysis the Bible 
is not satisfied with expressing hu,.-nan misery, nor 
with protesting against it, nor with projecting its 
overcoming into the otherworldly or subjective 
realm, it announces, narrates and demands historical 
events which, at least in principle and initially, 
overcome hi reality this misery," (60) 
A further critical tool is provided by the Marxist understanding of the 
relationship between theory and praxis, Marxism claims that the praxis 
out of which any theore'tical position is evolved and into which it is 
.read has a determinative influence on that theory. Miguez Bonino believes 
that this holds good in the interpretation of the biblical message. If 
the word of God is understood as a statement of what God is or does 
then the subjectivistic inversion of liberal hermeneutics is valid. But 
he conceives the biblical message itself to be a call which is made in 
order to elicit certain actions and to create situations. This then means 
that God is not so much the content of the message btt: t!1e originator and 
the motivator of the actions and situations - "the wherefrom and the where-
··to". (61) It follows that hearing the message means in some way becoming 
involved in the action and in creating the events and situations. 
"By defining the event as 'God's action', the Bible 
is not withdrawing it from history - even if the. 
ideological framev:ork used is mythical ·- but in ) 
pointing to ti-- 0 . divinely wrought and revealed back--
ground and pm~:!r of the hw""Uar.. action demanded. This 
is even so in the New Testament reference to Christ's 
resurrection: mission, the new life, community 
active love, are the human historicai content of 
which Christ's resurrection is the ground and power." (62) 











one in creating the situation c_alled for which is the equivalent of 
praxis in the Marxist understanding. And this praxis will influence 
our interpretation of the text (or, in Marxist terms, our theory). 
Miguez Bonino goes on to explain that 
nThe relation between theory and praxis - to which 
Marxist thinking has called our attention - is by 
no means simple. It does not deay that any sourc.e 
of action already incorporate~ (conscious or uncon-
scious) theoretical presuppositions. It underlines 
the importance of theoretci.cal thinking which examines 
the practical course of .. action in terms of its rele-
vance to the goals of the process and criticizes the 
theoretical presuppositions in terms of the develop-
mant of the process. There is, in this respect, a 
constant relation between theory and praxis." (63) 
In Miguez Bonino's understanding this becomes fundamental for the very 
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nature of theology itself. Accepting this view of the relation between 
interpretation and praxis uill demand the utilization of whatever analy-
tical tools are avails.ble in order to understand the present praxis, 
to interpret the texts, and to work out the conditions for a new praxi::;. 
"This is precisely the wtheoretical' wvrk. And this is the only justifi-
cation of theology •••. when it fulfils its task ! " (6!t) 
Miguez Bonino readily faces the fact that Marxism also has limitations 
in the field of biblical interpretation. It is limited by its rejection 
of theism and therefore by its insistence on human acLion as the ultimate 
causative power of history. Hum.an creativity - highlighted in Marx by 
his predilection for Prometheus - is the sole locus and origin of histori-
cal engagement. What the Christian perceives as the dynamic an~. source 
of his praxis is, for the Marxist, an ultimate alienation. Miguez Bonino 
claims that the rejection of the idealist interpretation of the scriptures 
results in a wholes011.2 correction of the disttlrtior1s arising from the 
modern liberal subjectivistic interpretation which had reversed the direc-
tion of the incarnation. This is because "while God's Word becomes hi.story, 












Marxist critical tools in the interpretation of the Bible, one can further-
more understand God's Word as a dynamic reality and not merely as a static 
formula. The Bible is a norm2dve witness to the dynamic purpose. of God 
(/ 
and ·"has a 'reserve of meaning' which becomes concrete as men read it in 
obedience within the conditions of their own history." (66) Because the 
interpreter must also be involved in a p~axis which is the locus of know-
ledge we can agree with Miguez Bonino when he concludes "Not the mere 
'hearer' but only the 'doer' can understand God's Word.1: (67) 
(c) The C~ncept of Liberation 
A further insight used by Miguez Bonino and illuminated by its development 
.in Marxism is ihe notion of liberation, The Latin American theologians 
regard this as a basic key for interpreting the message of the Bible today. 
Marx set out his vision of liberated man in the Par~s Manuscripts of 1844. 
"Conununism as the positive transcendence of private 
property, as human self-estrangement, and th·e~refo~ 
as the real appropriation of the l:~timan essence by 
and for man; communism therefore as the complete 
return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) 
being - a return accomplished consciously and. embra-
cing the entire wealth of previous development. 
This communism, as fully developed naturalism~ equals 
humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals 
naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the 
conflict between man and nature a.r..d between man and 
man - the true resolution of the strife between 
existence and essence, between objectification and 
self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, 
between the individual and the species. Communism 
is the riddle of history solved, and it knows it-
self to be this solution". (68) 
When M.~:..·x later evolved his theory to postulate the proletariat as the 
bearer of liberation he still envisaged that the working class would 
bring this about for and on behalf of all mankind. Kolakowski claims 
that"Marx continued throughout his life to regard CC'":J.Uunism a.s the libera-
tion of the whole of mankind; the prole.tariat was to be the conscious 
instrument of that liberatim1, as being the class which had suffered the 











Miguez BoniP0 and the liberation theology school have, by their use of 
this category asserted that it is one of the central themes of the 
biblical witness and a crucici.J. one for interpretation. In summarizing 
Gutierrez 1 treatment of this aspect he iiotes that although the notion of 
liberation is not a new one in theological tradition it has, by way of 
its application in t~e socio-political tield, acquired a new dimension. 
"The value of a term such as this is that it makes 
. it possible to understand the aspiration of peoples 
and social classes, to conceive history as a process 
and to speak of man's relation to God as one and the 
same reality, although differentiated in three levels 
of meaning; socio-political liberation, humanization 
as a historical process of· man's self-realizatio , and 
deliverance from sin (fellowship between man and man 
and man and God). The originality of this theology 
is not to have discovered these three levels of mean-
ing but to have started frcm their unity e.s the 
fundamental point of departure." (70'5-·-
The use of the concept of liberation as a fundamental category for the 
interpretation of the Bible is seen most especially in the significance 
which the liberation theologians accord the event of the ex0dus. Thls 
is seen as a paradigm of socio-political liberation and also as a 
pointer to the unity between the socio-political and the redemptive 
dimensions of liberation. (71) The weakness of this motif has been 
demonstrated by Yoder who points out that 
"The Exodus is not a revolution. The model of 
revolution called 'liberation' most currently 
in our time is for the subject peoples (or more 
accurately for a minority group acting in their 
:·rn.me) to seize sovereignty within the land with-
in which they are oppressed, taking tl1at sovereignty 
away from a foreign powe:r or from a feuda.l minority in their 
own society.. This is very strikingly not what the Exodus 
did." (72) 
Miguez Bonino has chosen the Kingdom of God as his central biblical theme 
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and this has several a.dvantages over the Exodus theme. As the main keynote 












into sharp focus the Christian need to empha.size the priority and initia-
tive of God in the establishment of liberation, and thus harmonizes with the 
biblical and Reformed emphasis on the sovereignty of God. It therefore 
singles out a motif which highlights the Christian belief =n transcendence 
as an indispensable component of faith and action and does this without 
in any way compromising the need to stress _the cruciality of human actiun 
in historical initiative. The category of the Kingdom used by Miguez 
Bonino enJoys the further advantage that it is thoroughly eschatological 
in its perspective, as we shall see later in chapter three. 
As additional models of liberation Miguez Bonino uses the New Testament 
images of "body" and "resurrection". In a typical sentence he suates 
"since Christ has risen and inaugurated a new realm of life, man's exis-
tence in love bears the marks of this new <::ge and will find lasting ful-
filment when this new age will become an unresisted and total realization". 
(73) He further rnakes use of the ap0calyptic imagery of eons or ages 
in which to work out the historicization of God's libei;ating activity. 
(d) · Class Struggl~ 
Yet another feature whi-'.!h Miguez Bonino finds ready to hand in Marxism 
is the concept of the class struggle. He claims that this category 
of Marxist thought is decisive for the task of theology. Its use by 
Christians does not imply a complete and unquestioning acceptance of 
Marxism -as a world view. Nevertheless it does represent a clear break 
from humanist inspi.a:ation for social concern and a decisive shift in 
favour of a stance involving political engagement "mediated through a 
scientific (}1arxist) analysis." (74) 
The "Christians for Socialism" movement has accepted an orthodox Marxist 











what it is, an instrument of liberation, for the final elimination of 
oppression and also as an evil that must be overcome. The conce.pt of 
class as such can therefore be accepted by Christians since it is purely 
a result of scientific analysis. Miguez Bonino believes that Marx's 
anthropology which describes man as a worker has its counterpart in 
the true Biblical understanding of man. ':l:'he'traditional Christian 
view has been distorted by id.ealist presuppositions and has thus concen-
trated. on man in philosophical, cultural and religious terms. The true 
picture should be otherwise. As Miguez Bonino has put it: 
"Whether one deals with the creation stories, with the 
law, or with the prophetic message, there seems to be 
in the Bible no relation of man to himself, to his 
neighbour or even to God which is not mediatt:d in 
terms of man's work. His dignity i.s located in his 
mission to subdt:i'eand cultivate the world. His wor-
ship is related to the fulfilment of a law in which 
the whole realm of his economic and political. activity 
is taken up •••• " (75) 
However, Marxism sees man in his working role as alienated man. The 
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Christian view agrees but goes beyond this assessment, discerning a deeper 
and more total alienation than that which arises from the economic cor,di-
tions pertaining in capitalist society. This is the state the Christian 
calls sin. 
Class, however, is a sociological category and finds its nearest parallel 
in. the Bible with the designation of "the poor". When this refers to 
those who are weak, destitute and oppressed it constitutes a condition 
against which the prophetic witness is raised. Miguez Bonino says 
"Poverty is not a hazard of fortune or a fact of nature 
but the result of certain people's greed and injustice. 
It is intolerable because it contradicts the very purpose 
of God's mighty act of deliverance - to rescue his people 
from the slavery 0£ Egypt. It robs 1:ian of his humanity as 
a steward and transformer of the world and therefore it 
contradicts the mandate of creation. Finally, it breaks 
solidarity, and consequently it destroys fellowship among 
men and with God. Poverty in this sense, is a scandalous 











the struggle against it; he is clearly and uniqui-
vocally on the side of the poor." (76) 
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Miguez Bonino concurs with Gutierrez in his opinion that Christian poverty 
involves a stance which, out of love, expresses solidarity with the poor 
in order to protest against it. However he cautions that it is too 
simplistic to equate the Marxist proletariat with the Biblical catego:ry 
of the poor. The former is part of the more rigorously scientific analy-
sis which, as part of revolutionary theory, goes much further. In parti-
cular it seeks to offer an in-depth analysis of the dynamics, causes, and 
nature of the proletariat and its role, besides offering a highly organi~ 
zed and well-planned strategy for changing the present conditions. Class 
struggle as such is viewed by Miguez Bonino as a much deeper and more 
realistic way of describing the inevitability of conflict in the overcoming 
of evil and the establishment of a better order. For him class struggle is 
a fact, and as such it was not discovered by Marx. "Even Calvin11 , he 
says, 11with keen realism describes the economic and social realms~ under 
the sway of sin, as a battlefield in ·whicJ:1 greed and self-seeking have 
destroyed an original community of justice and introduced exploitation, 
injustice, and disorder •••.• " (77) 
Harxist analysis is of va}ue in codifying and systematizing this economic 
conflict. It teaches that class struggle is to be regarded as a bitter 
contest motivated by greed and power. It especially describes the present 
capitalist system as an effort on thi; part of the rich and powerful to 
maintain the status quo for their ov.."'Il advantage. Class struggle is, more-
over, the determination of the poor to break up the present economic sys-
tern and to replace it with one in which work will be creative of a more 
humane condition both for the individual and society. In short it is 
part of the struggle to achieve liberation by the oppressed. Miguez 












tinn with a choice because "a love which i:-.tends to be effective in terms 
of God's Kingdom cannot avoid taking sides." (78) In defending the need 
for a revolution which might involve force ancl violence MigPaz Bonino 
points out that since man is involved in the ongoing struggle of creation 
- and creation always involves some exertion of violence on things as 
they are - tben the introduction of anything new will inevitably involve 
the disruption to some degree of the existing order. Indeed "it is 
possible to conceive history as a dialectic in which the negation through 
which the new can emerge implies always a certain measure of violence." (79) 
It is a false assumption, furthermore to claim that the Christian ethic 
calls f:or ~reconciliation at any price." The Biblical teaching points 
to the new age overcoming the old age through struggle. In addition 
Christvs love for all men as depicted in the Gospels did not mean an easy-
going tolerance, nor _an acceptance of evil with equanimity. Indeed 
"love must be interpreted in such a way that it may include condemnation, 
criticism~ resistance and rejection." (80) 
This is not to say that Miguez Bonino is an advocate of violenc.e. He 
does discern, however, that the Marxist category of class struggle pro-
vides an insight that penetrates far deeper into the reality of the human 
situation than a superficial neutrality advocated in the cause of 
Christian peace conceived in the sense of the. absence of conflict. 
(e) · Mari~$ the subject 6f his 6-V:rr'l history. 
A final plank in the Marxist platform which Miguez Bonino feels he can 
stand on is the emphasis on the need of man to become the subject of 
his own history. In Marx, this was expressed in his preference for Prome-
theus, the god who stClle fire from heaven and gave it to man. Marx's 












create his own history by means of his self-realization and his contempt 
for the fetters imposed by tradition and the past. 
Liberation theologians, accepting the ineffectiveness of developmen-
talism and reformism to bring about any significant social change in 
Latin America went on to side with those who saw in the striving for 
liberation by the oppressed peoples of the continent the legitimate 
aspirations of those people to shape their own political history. To-
gether with the groups amongst whom there arose the revolutionary conscious-
ness we have previously alluded to~ the liberation theologians perceived 
that there was a genuine need for the J.iberatinn of people as individuals 
and as groups in order for them to beco!Tle the subjects of their own history. 
Developmentalism had only perpetuated the situation where the poor of 
Latin America· had been the object of other people's history. Liberation 
was therefore proposed as the antithesis to development, (81) and it i's 
to take the form of a "historical project." which Miguez Bonino defines as 
"an expression frequently used in our· discussions 
as a midway term between an utopia, a vision 
which makes no attempt to connect itself histori-
cally to the present and a programme, a technically 
developed model fer the organization of society. 
A historical project is defined enough to force 
options in terms of the basic structures of society. 
It points in a given direction, But frequently its 
contents are expressed in symbolical and elusive 
forms rather than in terms of precise technical 
language." (82) 
This historical project envisages (i) the casting off of the relation-
ship of dependence on thd Western economic empires, (ii) a revolution 
to eliminate elitism in th.O! social structure by the mobilization of those 
people with a revolutionary awareness, (iii) the establishment of a 
strong centralized state, (iv) th~·t6rt~~ierttitation or politicization 
of the people so that they become true 11protagonists of their OYm history", 
(83) (v) emphasizing the primacy of the political dimension in the 












Latin Americ.::n socialism with which is combined the rejection of "Marxist" 
dogmatism", (vii) the emergence of a humane order which will allow 
for a genuine liberation which is seen as "the process through which and 
in.which a 'new man' must emerge, a man shaped by solidar:ity and creativity 
over against the individualistic, distorted humanity of the present system." 
(84) This project is to be undertaken by ma.n come-of-age as he takes 
responsibility for the fashioning and direction of his own history. 
By adopting this aspect of the Marxist position Miguez Bonino has to walk 
something of a theological tightrope. Before him, Gutierrez had fallen 
into the trap of claiming on the one hand that liberation is a gift of God 
·to be received and on the other that it is man who liberates himself. (85) 
Miguez Bonino is able to avoid this dilemma by using the biblical notion 
of the Kingdom as his key category, and b~ carefully choosing his words. 
He says 
"God calls his Kingdom from and within human history 
in its entirety; his action is a constant call and 
challenge to man. Man's response is realized in the 
concrete arena of history with its economic~ politi-
cal, ideological options 11 • · (86) 
For Miguez Bonino, therefore the action of God and the creative co-opera-
tion of man correspond in the call-challenge and respond-obey sequence. 
Man 1 s historical project the17efore coincides with God's initiative in 
history. 
Miguez J3onino is also able to link up this understanding of historical action 
with a correction of Marx's Prometheanism. He declares: 
" •••• in Christian terms God himsel.f is the. Prometheus 
he himself undertakes on the side of man ~nd in the 
utter solidarity of love the restoration ~t man's 
right and power to be free in the world: he himself 
fights for man 1 s lordship and, 'although we do not 
yet see that all things have been subjected to him (man), 
we see him (Jesus Christ) crowned with honour and glory 
(Heb. 2:86-9), the promise and assurance of man 1 s final 












(f) Limitations on the use of Marxism 
The alliance between Christianity and Marxism is set within limits •. 
Miguez Bonino's acceptance of Marxist insights to illuminate Christian 
theological pathways is a selective exercise. For Miguez Bonino and the 
other theol.ogians of liberation the use of Marxism is really a means 
to an end and the motivation is that of trying to make their Christian 
commitment effective in the complex tangle of economic, social and 
political circumstances which constitute the Latin American reality. 
The appeal of Marxism is that it purports to give a systematic and plausible 
account of the nature and origin of the woes the people suffer. At the 
same time it offers a radical new order to replace the old. The attraction 
of the Marxist analytical tools consists in the objective and ideologically 
disinterested way in whi~h Marxism accounts for the causes of the basic 
injustice inherent in the economic order throughout Latin America. Unlike 
capitalist and liberalist descriptions, Marxism can show that it is not 
influenced in its analysis b  its own vc~ted economic interests. By 
appealing to the notion of objective laws at work in historical change 
Marxism is able to point to the feasibility of its claims. These laws 
will lead to the establishment of justice not as an expression of a 
beautiful ideal but because it will be the inevitable result of the ::-evo-
lutionary activity in which the oppressed people will engage in order 
to steer the course of history in a direction which will promote their 
own interests. The Marxist account is both all-embracing and suff_;_ciently 
radical to offer a plausible alternative in distinct conflict with the 
previously accepted norms. It appeals because it adjudges the present 
system to be "rotten f:.-.'m top to bottom, impossible to justify on any 
grounds, and impervious to any reforms which do not set out to change 
h • • i·· • 1 d 1. ] • ' ~ II t e entire econom:tc, po 1.t:J.ca , an .. ega .. structures 1nv0Lvea. (88) 












Miguez Bonino, a pragmatic and dialectical one, and Christian theology 
has to retain a critical distance. 
For one thing, the question of the ide.ntity of the Church qua Church 
of Jesus Christ is important. This is the problem which Moltmann high-
lights in the first chapter of The Crucified God. (89) He spells out 
there the tension between relevance and icl.ontity. If the Church is 
deeply involved in historical action it is inclined to lose its identitys 
whilst if it concentrates on maintaining its identity within the specifi-
cally Christian tradition it tends to lose out in becoming isolated from 
the contemporary issues of mankind's ongoing str.uggle. Miguez Bonino 
is well aware that by allying itself with Marxist revolutionary 
activity as well as utilizing its analytical and ideological insights 
the Church is in danger of losing its vocation. He says 
"When the cause of Jesus Christ (and consequently 
The Church in any missionary unde.rstanding of it) 
is totally and without rest equated with the cause 
of social and political revolution~ either the 
Church and Jesus Christ are made redundant or the 
political and social revolution is clothed in a 
sacred or semi-sacred gown. 11 (90) 
He affirms the necessity for a clearer definition of the identity of the 
Churchboth in the interests of the Church itself and also for the sake 
of the autonomy of the human struggle for liberation. I~ this way the 
danger of paternalistic imperialism on the Churchvs side will be solved. 
To do this he believes a restatement of the Christian understanding of 
creation is necessary. When creation is thought of as the invi tat;_on to 
man to create his own history and culture and creatively to transform the 
world then the traditional understanding of soteriology can be seen as 
Christ's coming in ord<":.· to "reopen for man the will and the power to 
fulfil his historical vocation" {91) - which is to become really and 
truly man. The Church can proclaim this salvation and ,,1itness to this 












the historical situation and not merely a verbal affirmation. The Church 
therefore can maintain its identity by celebrating, reflecting and pro-
claiming the freedom which th':! saving activity of Jesus Christ effects in 
human history. Eschatologically there will be full humanity and no dis-
tinction. "But we live before the millenium. In Marxist terms we would 
say: we live in the pre-history of mankind". (92) 
A second area where Miguez Bonino sees the relation between Christianity 
and Marxism inevitably involving tension and a critical distance on the 
part of theology is in relation to materialism and theism. Most Marxists 
claim a determinative role for material forces which is supreme. They 
thereby deny the reality and possibility of any transcendent power. 
Christians have to take issue with Marxists here, claims Miguez Bonino 
"Not because they speculatively pose the existence 
of a realm of the 'spirit' but ·aecause they have 
been grasped by the reality of the living God who 
is beyond history and the universe as well as 
active in history and the universe, the living 
God who in faith they know to be true, nay, to be 
·the true and ultimate reality in which everything 
has meaning and existence." (93) 
In the third place Marxism and Christianity differ on their understanding 
of the source and power of solidary love. Despite their connnon ethos in 
terms of human solidarity and their commitment to making their love 
historically efficacious they see this love as emanating from distinctly 
different sources. The Marxist locates this love in man's love for him-
self and in his self-affirmation. In his revoluticmary activity man puts 
into practise his 1.ove for.his fellow-man, but he does this in his basic 
self-love and assertiveness. (94) For the Christian this love originates 
in God. Man's solidarity with man derives from the. very nature of his 
inherent relationship to God and his neighbour. He loves, because he has 











corrur,unity of love. 
Then fourthly, the end attaiird by·empirical Marxist socialist movements~ 
Miguez Bonino admit<), does not provide a promising record. Host liberation 
theologians, and this includes Higuez Bonin:::i in much of his writings, 
concentrate on pointing out the inequit~as and injustices that are brou~ht 
about in the Latin America of capitalist development. Poverty~ unemployment, 
poor housing and inadequate education are the features of this condition. 
But Miguez Bonino is too careful and pa5.nstaking a thinker to overlook the 
discrepancies between Marxist pre.mises and Communist fulfilments. The 
regimes these have ushered in have shovm scant regard for "personal freedom., 
popular participation, the control. of power or the ability to overcome 
discriminationn (95). For this reasor! the Christian must r.emain cr:ixical 
·and uneasy since, in allying himself ·with . .::.uch a movements he must be aware. 
that he is helping to bring in a social order which is far frcm satisfac.-
tory. Nevertheless he believes that this attgches to all ethical action 
La life 11 this side of the Farousia11 (%), In other words the Christian 
has to recognize the ethical relativity and compromise in the goals 
likely to be achieved in the hi.storied project he embarks on. Indeed, 
Miguez Bonino declares that the Christians ·who are ncommitted to revolu-
tion must openly reject these fascist tr.c:nds in social ism". (97) 
In the fifth place whilst the Cbristian will have to be aware of his involve-· 
ment in action which is likely to include the use of violence~ Higuez 
Bonino does not believe that this is the most serious problem confronting 
t11e Cl1ristian. embarkiI1g on r~-... roluticnary acti\7 it)' \-,."'ith f19.r:-::istsf He points 
out that the statement by Harx that "violence is tb~ midwife of history" 
is not a gJorification cf violer:ce but an 2mph:ical observation - that 
where revolutions have taken placA and violancc has occurred then history 
has been made. Ee goes on to claim that l.n Scripture tbe word 'Jiolen-:::e 











oppression of the people. (98) He believes nevertheless that a 
Christian may participate in a struggle which may ,require violent methods 
for its resolution provided he does so in the full awareness of his 
responsibility to keep that violence to the minimum. Miguez Bonino also 
points out that a Christian will be wise to the ideological justification 
of violence on the part of those Christian ethicists who wish to retain 
the status quo. 
Finally the relationship between Mar,xism and Christianity will consist 
of dialectical interaction in the field of reflection on ethical consi-
derations. Miguez Bonino believes there i.s a "peculiar insight which is 
born of faith" (99) and that the Christian point of view has some-
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thing to contribute to the revolutionary movement. One of these consider-
·at ions is the question of means and en<ls. Whilst Marx ·was deeply interested 
in this problem Miguez Bonino believes it has n0t been sufficiently 
explored in Marxist thinking. It is from the perspective of the insi~ht 
of faith that he can support Rube1. 1 s claim that "neither Marx nor Lenin 
carried far or deeply enough the consideration of the quality of action 
which corresponds to the nature sf the society which they discern for 
the future. 11 (100) 
Then again~ the relationship between solidarity and hatred in revolution-
ary activity needs to be understood. Christians will avoid self-righteous-
ness i~ this issue, but because of biblical insights as to the nature of 
love they will enter the alliance with "something to give". Miguez Bonino 
does not off er any solution to this question but nis point is that the 
engagement in the praxis together provides a stimulPs and a challenge 
to Christians to prove in the· revol11t:i.onary s:i.tuation that evil can b·e 
overccme with good and that rejection and C?pusition caa become instrurn.e.nts 











on the revolutionary cornb.:ita.nt Miguez Bonino believes that the Christian 
will have an understanding of the dynamics at work and this will open 
up opportunities for bringing to bear the active power of the gospel, 
especially in the post-revolutionary era. 
One aspect of this, Miguez Bonino believes~ i.s the Marxist intention of 
establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. He emphasizes that 
all revolutionaries should recognize the transitoriness of this phase 
and obviously the Christian partners of the Marxist revolutionaries 
43 
will take their part in minimising what he calls the "objective inequality 
which a revolutionary process creates, 11 (101) 
Miguez Bonino is further convinced that Marxist thinking and polid.cal 
theory have not yet developed adequate safeguards ·with regard to the 
control of power. These inadequacies have been shom1 up by the appear·-
ance. in sor.ialist states of 11 ?..rbitrarinGss, the 1 cult perscnalit)11 , 
the appropr~ation by a clique er a bureaur.racy of a total contr61 of 
society, the exclusion of the very proletariat from the shaping of the 
process and the determination of its direction. 11 (102) It is the Chris-
tian's duty, affirms Higuez Bonino, to :r:aise this whole problem and to 
struggle for a more adequate solution.. Again an ansuer is not offered 
but the significant point is that, because of its critical distance and 
the "insight of faith" the ChristiarL can and should pose the question to 
the Mc.:.:: xi st. 
We can now see tha;_, whilst Miguez Bonino is p1·epared to e.ccept and make 
use of important parts of Marxist doctrine in orde~:. ':o enable the Chris-
tian to reflect crec.tively on any proposed revolutiona17 involvement with 
Marxists to establish a more just societys ne i)y no rneaas 11 sells out;r to 












nation he is advocating a deepening of theory and a more huraane and better-
motivated revolutionary praxis for both Christians and Marxists. Because 
of the wide divergence on some crucial points and the mutual agreement on 
others the relationship between them will be "a tense and mutually challen-· 
ging one." (103) We are also in a position now to underline the conclu-
si.on to which de Grur.hy comes when he so.ys.that Miguez Bonino 
"is not trying to do a 'deal' with Marxism through 
reducing the Biblical message to fit Marxist 
analysis.or theory; but he finds that at certain 
points, Biblical faith and obedience relates 
positively to certain Marxist insights in his 
situation." (104) 
One of the major aspects of Marxist teaching which Miguez Bonino finds 
challenging to Christian theology is its insistence that the "otherworldli-
ness" implied or expressed in much Christian teaching leads to withdrawal 
from political engagement. Marxism is categorically and uncomp:comisingly 
an affirmation of man's responsibility for shaping history. Roger Garaudy 
has even described it as a "methodology for historic initiative". (lnS) 
Accepting the validity of the Marxist claim that historic Christianity 
has frequently been an "opiate" of the people the political theologians 
in Europe and Latin American liberation theologians are trying to explore 
ways of ascribing significance to human action whilst at the same time 
upholding the sovereignty of God and h:i_s initiative. Christians have come 
to face the painful truth in Garaudy's criticism: 
"Religion is an 'opiate' whenever, in affirming 
that an eternal life beyond history and beyond 
this life is what is essential, it devalues the 
problems of this life and the struggles of history. 
It is an opiate whenever it conceives of the rela-
tion bet,;een m&n and God as mall. enccu.ntering God 
only to make up for his own weaknesses or the 
failures of h:i.s thought and action, 'at th,3 limits' 
rather than 'at the centre', as Bonhoeffer wrote. 
It is an opiate when it assumes the form of an 
ideology, a metaphysic rather-than an act, a deci-
sion, a creative way of living. In sum, it: is an 











dualisms by conceivJ.ng the world in a dualist fashion, 
acting, in Nietzsche 1 s expression as 'a Platonism for 
the people' " (106) 
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Miguez Bonino believes that the philosophical presupposition underlying 
this dualistic approach to reality derives from Platonic idealism and 
that a theology of bistorical engag<~ment must meet the Marxii:::t criticism 
















"HISTORY IS ONE" 
In "Historical Praxis" Higuez Bonino says, "The unity of God's work and 
human history constitutes the inescapabl~ starting point for any theol~-
gical reflect:ion. 11 (1) In making this statement he .is re-affirming 
the belief, widely held amongst theologians of liberation, that "History 
is one". (2) This slogan is used to correct the widespread assumption 
in theology that "secular'' history is in some way different from "relig-
ious" or "salvation history". (3) 
Liberation theologians emphasize that the everyday real of human exis-
tence, conceived in such categories as political activity, economic 
forces and social configurations, is the true and proper sphere of God's 
saving action, They vigorously reject any presuppositions which would 
so distinguish between the sacred and the profane that the latter is 
denied as a valid area in which God's rule and therefore his redeeming 
presence and liberating power apply. For them, the term "salvation 
history" would not be used validly if it denoted a particular strand of 
religious events within ge·ueral history. It might apply rather to the 
salvation of history, "seen as the subverting by the power of the gospel 
of all those structures which are obstacles to the full human and spiri-
tual development of the human commun~ty. 11 (4) For these theologians 
theg,God's activity in history is thus not to be confined to the history 
of the Israelites, the life, death and rcsurrecticn of Jesus, the ongoing 
histoiy of the church and the inner spiritual life of the believer. In. 
short, the rea:tn of huma.n life commonly designated a.s political, or public 
in the sense that it embraces the totality of the life of mankind, is 











One of the reasons for this assertion is that these theologians have 
discerned the deep rad.icality of sin in the "public" structures. This 
understanding of sin perceives it as a social and historical fact 
which is revealed in the absence of brotherhood and love in human rela-
tionships, in the alie.nation between Goel and man and hence also as an 
interior, personal di~organization. Lib~ration theology, in short focusses 
primarily on the coilective and corporate dimensions of sin. (5) 
By the same token the universality, the totality and the radicality of 
the salvific process affirm the oneness of history and the need to trans-
cend the way of thinking which regards reality as divided into two 
separate orders. The redeeming activity of God in the whole of human his--
tory is all-embracing. The action of Christ and the gift of the Spirit 
extend to the whole human activity and history and it is this action 
which gives history its unity. Salvation is a u11iversal process which 
may not be reduced by being limited to the strictly religio"Js sphere. 
Any notion that the work of Christ applies to the social life of man c::-ily 
in an indirect way, or by 11 iri.1plication11 , is foreign to this conception 
of the gospel. (6) 
The belief that history is divisible into two strandss one sacred an<l the 
other profane, is derived from Platonic idealism where it is assu.~ed 
that reality consists of two aspects - the spiritual or invisible, and 
the material or visible. These two supposed levels, when transposed 
into theological and biblical interpretation constitute a distinction 
between what is tho 1}ght. of as "God's realm" on. the one sic"ie. and ma.n's 
on the other. T:1e "spiritual" is thus regarded as superior to its 
"material" or nearthly11 counterpart. 
When idealism is applied to biblical history the Old Testament. texts a;:e 












to be interpreted in a spiritual s0nse. Because of their "carnal" 
point of view the Jewish people were prevented from understanding the 
special figurative sense of tl.ese promises. In __ the New Testament the 
inner meaning was clearly revealed, (7) It is to this d-...::1listic way 
of approaching reality that Miguez Bonino addresses himself in the first 
section of his chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engage·_ 
ment". In this section his purpose is to show that Christianity must 
accept the Marxist criticism of religion when religion is interpreted in 
idealist categories. He affirms that a historical dualism is not only 
not of the-esse of the Christian understanding of history, but is in 
fact the root cause of the withdrawal by Christians from historical 
engagement. If such idealist: presuppositiom" and hermeneutical approaches 
can be disposed of, then the way will be open to establish the validity 
of Christian participation in historical action. 
In order to study Miguez Bonino' s interpretations of his tor>:~' we will begin 
then by examining the duai:Lstic interpretation which developed in the Aug:c::.s·· 
tinian tradition. This tradition, which has so profoundly influenced Chris-
tian thought and practice through the centuries had its roots in Plal;onism 
as well as in Scripture and is severely c1·iticizcd by Miguez Boaiao and 
other liberation theologians. We will trace its development beginning w:i th 
Plato, proceeding through Augustine himself. We will also consider bow 
Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms is shaped by it, and conclude by looking 
at how the doctrines of Providence and Predestination emerged within 
this tradition and ~ave in turn influenced it. This is followed by a study 
of the Old Testament prophetic view of history and New Testament escha-
tology. We also take a brief look at the existentialist interpretation 
of eschatology as taught by Rudolf Bultmann. !3y examining the redi_:;covcry 
of Apocalypticism we are provided with an entr& to the d~velopment of the 











for understanding both contemporary political'and liberation theologies. 
Finally, we consider Miguez Bonino 1 s mvn contribution to the debate, and, 
with some recourse to Bonhoeffer and Panµenberg, we attempt to evaluate 
that contribution. 
1. THE DUALISM OF THE AUGUSTINIAN TRADITION 
The dualism which Miguez Bonino attributes ::o Augustine is really a mam. -
festation of a long t_radition which has its origins in the classical 
philosophy of ancient Greece, and especially in the. thought of Plato. 
(a) The Idealism of Plato 
Previously, Ionian thinkers had endeavoured to determine the original 
cause or source of reality (the arche). Thales had postulated ·water, 
Anaximenes claimed that it was air~ Heraclitus that it was fire, whilDt 
Ananimder plumped for a basic eleme.nt underlying all matter, the 
1 bound1.Less 1 , ("pei."-on) - a. . L • But more was necessary if t11e n:.:Lnd of man wa.s 
to pen~trate beyond surface appearances. None of these postulated prin-
ciples accounted for the element of purpose or underlying unity in the 
universe. Accordingly Greek thought evolved a theory in whicb reality 
was conceived in a two-fold way, that of matter which was itself formless} 
and form which organized and gave existence to matter. ~orm was the 
constitutive principle of the universe. Plato used this pattern in for.nu-
lating the principles of the ideal State in his Re.Public. The perfect 
or ideal state existed or so he contended, only in the eternal world cf 
ideas which men were to contemplate if they sought to achieve true 
statesmanship. One of these eternal ideas was that of justice. A nan 
must study the ideal or archetype of justice in. order to know the meaning 
of justice and to practise it. 
The ultimate reality, lies, for Plate, in this e.tern.al world of ideas. (8) 















the individual which correspond to the idea are only approximate. The 
ideas are, moreover real, as opposed to the shadows or imperfect like-
nesses which go to make up the world of sense. The highest of these 
ideas is the Good. Eros is the desire for the Good, or the urge for 
knowledge. (9) 
In Platonic idealism, then, the focus is not on this world of time and 
events, but on that other world of eternity. It follows that if reality 
is conceived of dualistically, and more significance is ascribed to the 
one world than to the other, then the first of those two entities will 
be the one to receive emphasis and attention whilst the other will be 
neglected. Platonism elevates eternity at the expense of time and history, 
and Plato reveals the indifference of the Greek mind towards time and 
history as well as the low regard in which he held historical action 
and event. In his thought there is no philosophy of history as we know it 
today. Such a notion of ·history as it had stressed the endlessly repi-
titive cyclical process of birth, growth, decay and death. Han and the 
events of hi::; life are seen as part of, and patterned upon, the recurring 
processes of nature, and meaning was found, not in apy sort of tr.anscen-
dence but in each e ent, incident, or story itself. (10) Rudolf Bult-
mann summed up the Greek understanding of history aptly when he wrote 9 
"For Platonic idealism empirical history is a story of decline and fall, 
not an occasion for the exercise of responsibility, in which new situations 
present man with new duties". (11) 
From this brief outline wt: can see the pattern of dualism emerging which 
was to influence philosophical and theological thinking for centuries. 
The identification of the ideal world with God and bi:aven was easy to 
make when early Christian theologians were seeking for a hermeneutical 
key with which to interpret the faith to the classical world. Indeed it 













masterly treatment had synthesized the biblical and classical traditions 
in the fourth and fifth centuries. 
The elements which Miguez Bonino is at pains to counteract are clearly 
visible in Plato's throught. Time is of no significance as 
compared wi·::h eternity. Time indeed is cyclical and this only serves 
to underscore the relative insignificance of the material, temporal, 
earthly world. Consequently the irruption of the new and the challenge 
which this affords.to man is to be seen merely as the repetition of 
something already experienced. Historical responsibility is of no 
consequence as compared with the attairunent of true being which is to 
be achieved by spiritual contemplation of the eternal and unchanging 
ideas. It was left to Augustine to transpose these fundamental philosophical 
presuppositions into theological and biblical categories, 
St. Augustine's dualistic thought can be traced to the three systern.s which 
had most influence on his early development. These were Donatism, Manichaeism 
and Neoplatonism. (12) The Donatists had maintained the primitive Christiari 
emphasis on apocalyptic expectations which embodies a cosmic dualism between 
the personified forces of good and evil. Manichaeism had similarly propounded 
a radical cosmic dualism between good and evil. (13) Whilst he claims not 
to have read many of Plato's writings (14) the influenc·e of Plato upon 
his thought is manifest. Portalie's explanation is that "a closer examina.-
tion will show that the imprint left on Augustine's soul derives from 
the fundamental Platonic doctrine rather than from Neoplatonic variations 11 • (15) 
Augustine's use of Plato's idealism can be seen in a statement made early 
in his literary ca.teer: 
"It is quite enough for my purpose that Plato 
felt that there are two worlds,the one intelli-
gible in which truth dwells, the other sensible 













As we shall '.:ee later, Augustine broke through some aspects of the 
classical approach to history and in his theology of Providence es-
tablished the principles that '.vere to be the foundation of the Chris-
tian understanding of history for centuries. 
In De Civitate Dei (17) Augustine seeks to answer the criticism of 
opponents of the faiLh, such as Porphyry and the Manichee Faustus. In l::rying 
to set down the essence of Christianity he sought to delineate this in 
terms of the disordered relationship between created beings and their 
creator. This implied a disorder too, between the created beings them-
selves. Augustine sought to show that two fields of force, which he 
designated as the "earthly" and "heavenly11 cities respectively, represented 
this deranged relationship and that the limits of this division could 
be seen throughout the history of the huraan race. (13) This divison he 
discerned in the fratricidal struggle of Cain and Abel in Genesis (19) 
whom he characterizes as the fathers of the two cities. 
These two cities, or societies, are universal - as is the tension existing 
between them. Furthermore, it extends throughout history. The dualism 
from the various traditions we have outlined above is revealed in the 
description Augustine gives of the two cities. 
"We see then that the two cities were created 
by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created 
by self-love reaching the point of contempt for 
God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried 
as far as any contempt of self. In fact the 
earthly city glories in itself, the Heavenly City 
·glories in the Lord. The former looks for glory 
from men, the witness of a good conscience". (20) 
The Platonic :i.dea that human life: is lived on two planes, emerges from 
his further description of the two cities: 
"Scripture tells us that Cain founded a city whereas 
Abel, as a pilgrim, did not found one. For the 
City of the saints is up above, although it produces 
citizens here below, and in their persons the Cicy 













comes. At that time it will assemble all those 
citizens as they rise again in their bodies; and 
then they will be given the promised kingdom, 
where with their Prince, 'the king of ages', they 
will reign, world without end". (21) 
1hus the final separation between the two is conceived of as taking 
place beyond history. On th~ historical level they remain merged 
together with frontiers which cut across th<! sociological boundaries 
of church and state. 
In this formulation Augustine can be said to have established theologi-
cally a valid realm of the secular, political sphere (for him the 
Roman Empire), Its task was to achieve and maintain political and 
economic well-being, ends which could be regarded as good and legiti-
. mate, provided they were not absolutized and thus idolized, thereby 
becoming evil. In doing f;O he recognized and distinguished three dif-
ferent dualisms which ha·d becom.e confused in early Christian thinking. 
These were (a) the dualism between Israel or the church and the 
empire as sociological entities, (b) that between obedience and apos-
tasy and (c) the dualism between time and eternity. 
The ultimate destiny of the obedience - apostasy dualism was on the trans-
cendent plane in eternal life and damnation. But there is a distinction 
between this dualism and that·of the finite and the eternal. In its mm 
terms the finite can be good and reflect the purpose of God. On the 
other hand, when wrongly absolutized, it can become a vehicle of damnation. 
Augustine makes both a distinction and a connection between the apocalyptic 
dualism of good and evil on the one hand and the Platonic dualism of 
spiritual anci material on the other. The empire is legitimate in its ow-n 
proper secular realm but only serves the lower needs of man. The destiny 
of those who know only this realm is death on earth (the temporal realm) 












and are misconstrued when considered self~·suff icient. (22) 
Augustine, however so accepted the Platonic dualistic categories of 
time - eternity and matter - sp).rit to the degree that he failed to see 
the connection between earthly, political, secular activity and the 
realm of the divine, eternal and spiritual. The civitas terrena 
therefore had no esch&tological significance and 'secular' history had 
no meaning beyond itself. It served as an infrastructure for the 'real' 
history - sacred history, or the City of God. The question of the ulti-
mate meaning of the human historical project was left unanswered. Rosemary 
Ruether has sunnned up the Augustinian position: 
"For Augustine, man sojourns within history, but it 
is not his true home. What he does here to serve 
strictly temporal ends has no eternal sigi.1if icance 
in a positive sense. Eternal life is che ultimate 
destiny of the human spirit. It in no way develops. 
in and through material history but must seek only 
to keep itself pure from the world. And against 
those.distractions which.might seduce the soul to 
turn to love of self and concern for the material 
universe in place of God, it must cultivate that 
pure knowledge of God". (23) 
The unintentional effect of this separation of the two spheres has 
been to remove the state from moral responsibility and significance, 
a.nd to divorce political action and progranr.nes from theological criti--
cism. Messianic hope is separated from social and historical creativity, 
the latter being placed beyond the scope of divine activity and judgment 
and the former becoming privatized and otherworldly. The State's role 
is seen to be the maintenance of law and order and the pr.emotion of 
prosperity, whilst the church is assigned a spiritual task confined to 
the realm of the in.i:!ividual and private morality. The kingdom of God 
is not seen as having any correlation with the political arena. 
In the West,_,the eff.ect has b_een .. that. the ... cs_t,~_bJis.he~. c.hurct;e.s have .. adqpted 
a "kind of residual. Coustant:in:l.anism" (Ruether.). They honour the Pauline 
injunction to obey the const.i.tuted authorities, regarding them as ordained 












sanctifying the status quo, a practice which is apparent both in Latin 
America (where the existing order is regarded as virtually co-terminous 
. with Christendom) and also in South Africa where the Afrikaner's civil 
religion decrees that he is called of God to implant and maintain Chris-
tian civiU.zation on the southern tip of the continent. In both regions 
Rosemary Ruether's description of the consequences is applicable when 
she says: "To oppose this Christian society is to oppose God, be an 
'atheistic secularist' or t communist' " (24) 
(c) Luther .arid the "Two Kingdoms". 
The long term effects of the Augustinian position hich have been manifest 
down to the present time, received further impetus from the doctrine of 
the"two kingdoms" enunciated by Luther. Luther's theory can be seen as 
a direct descendent from Augustine's idea of the two cities. He says 
"There are two kingdoms, one the kingdom of 
God, the other the kingdom of the world ..• God's 
kingdom is a kingdom of grace and mercy, not of 
wrath and punishment. In it th~re is only 
forgiveness, consideration for one another, love, 
service, the doing of good, peace, joy etc. But 
the kingdom of the worid is a kingdom of ·wrath 
and severity. In it there is only punishment 
repression, judgment and condemnation, for the 
suppressing of the wicked and the protection of 
the good. For this reason it has the sword, and 
a prince or lord, is called in Scripture God's 
wrath or God's rod (Isaiah XIV) ..• Now he who 
would confuse these two kingdoms - as our false 
fanatics do - would put wrath into God's kingdom 
and mercy into the world's kingdom; and that is 
the same as putting the devil in heaven and God 
in hell", (25) 
Luther emphasizes the need for the autonomy of the secular kingdom. It 
is an order of God that comes as a consequence of the Fall, Because man 
is sinful God ordains this structure of restrains in order to preserve 
·life and impose a measure of discipline in human relationships. (26) 
In addition to restraining evil the political power exercj_sed a parental 
role in providing sustenance and care. Here Luther is able to in;::lude 












family, property and the relationship between masters and servants. All 
of these participate in the positive aspects of the secular government 
ordered by God. (27) There is thus a discernible affinity between 
Luther's thought and the biblical dualism between the kingdom of God 
and the kingdom of Satan. I~ is also related to Augustine's doctrine of 
the two cities. For Luther the kingdom of the world is primarily the state 
with the "sword" as the power and duty of 2xacting punishment and there-
fore of preventing evil. Summing up Luther's position Paul Althaus can 
say, 11 If secular government is basically represented by the state and 
particularly by its punitive power, i.t is obviously easy to approach the 
whole problem on a dualistic basis ••.•• the unconditional opposition 
between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the sinful world •••• " (28) 
It is also true however that there is in Luther's thought a unity between 
the two kingdoms, since the secular government is
11
God's own work, insti-
tution and creation". (29) Nevertheless there is a difference in rank, 
for "temporal· power is but a very small matter in the sight of God, and 
too slightly regarded by him for us to resist, disobey, or become quarrel-· 
some on its account, no matter whether the state does right or wrong". (30) 
There is an independence and an interdependence. The secular kingdom can 
exist independently of the spiritual and vice verse. fu?t the latter 
needs the former since it can only carry out its spiritual'duties when 
there is peace, and for this it needs the secular arm. Likewise the 
worldly kingdom needs the spiritual dimension since it can only continue 
to maintain law and order if it has the knowledge of God and his truth 
which its spiritual counterpart provides. One of the consequences of 
this is that a Christi;:i.n may find himself acting in a dual capa.city, since 
he lives in two areas at the same time. He is both a private person and 












The doctrine is open to two major criticisms. The first is that the 
rigidity of the separation between the two kingdoms tends to limit the 
lordship of Christ to the area of the spiritual and thereby 3ssigns 
an autonomy to the area of the human political realm~ removing it from 
the scrutiny of moral demand and...:critical surveillance. This is the 
same criticism we noted with regard to the Augustinian formula.. The 
second is that Luther disregards the eschatological significance of the 
kingdom of the world, and weakens the. polemical tension between the two 
spheres. They consequently appear to stand side by side in 
static coexistence. 
Thielicke insists tlrnt it is the New Testament concept of the two aeons 
which provides the corrective to the simultaneity of the two governments 
put forward by Luther. Instead of existing side by side the two aeons 
follow one another temporally. He adds~ in a. psaage which we £eel 
Miguez Bonino would approve of, 
"Only when we abide by the New Testament's 
definition of the true relationship can we 
avoid reconciling the two governments in 
terms of a static and timeless coexistence. 
Only then is our aeon constantly called in 
question by the coming aeon, Only then 
does the challenge to ~11 its orders and to 
its fallen nature remain. Only then can 
we be dissatisfied with the view that 
because power reigns in politics and 
retribution dominates law, these are 
supposedly the will of God. Only then 
are these things seen to be provisional 
and open to que.:otion. Only then does the 
coming world constantly bre~K in upon the 
. present world, to disturb it, to keep it 
from absolutizing itself and fashioning for 
itself a 'good conscience', a conscience 
which no longer lives in expectationu. (32) 
Of greater consequence, however, is the danger that the "two kingdomsn 
concept wilt encourage a religious quietism which will abdicate respon-
sibility for the political re;al.m and withdraw into ·an irrelevant and. 












have asserted. Thielicke in fact admits as much when, contrasting Reformed 
and Lutheran views of Church and state and their respective images of 
"activism" and "passivity", he draws attention to the different responses 
to the German Christian movement under Hitler. Reformed theologians 
took the lead in the Confessing Church to oppose this movement, whilst 
their Lutheran counterparts were usually defensive i.n their strategy. (33) 
The mainly passive reaction by churches influenced by the two kingdoms 
theology does not mean that they do not protest against the state when it 
commits crimes against humanity. It may well offer admonitions and warn-
ings but it will not offer radical resistance. The result, says Thielicke, 
is that there develops a wide rift between ecclesiastical and political 
or spiritual and secular, responsibility and "the church is guilty, not 
only in respect of its ow-n nature and task, but also in respect o.f the 
state. By abandoning the state to is Ov.711 devices, the Church delivers 
it up to demonism and error". (34) It is precisely this "demonism and 
error" agai~.st which Miguez Bonino and Gutierrez and their fellow liberation 
theologians are seeking to guard. By using the Marxist analysis of their 
society they perceive the state as being little more than a tool 
in the hands of capitalist entrepreneurs and the multi-national companies. 
Their "historical. project", validated by their claim that history is one, 
seeks to assert the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man 
before him in the creation of a just society. 
(d) Providence and Predestination 
The doctrine of providence was first formulated by Augustine, who, notwith-
standing his use of the classical idealist philosophy, was able to break 
away from it in working out his concept of.time. (35) In contrast to the 
53 
naturalistic cyclical idea of time Augustine saw that the Christian inter-· 
pretation involved the idea of linear sequence, laying stress on the signifi-
cant un.iqucmess and cruciality of each moment. Augustine perceived the 











(i) They tried to account for the. world by 
phenomena that are intri~sic to it; 
(ii) in making a circle of the infinite they 
omitted to recognise the incomprehensi-
bility of the co~2ept; 
(iii) by focussing on the typical, they lost the 
sense of uniqueness of the individual 
person and event; 
(iv) and in regarding history a~ having 
already done all that its 01-m limitations 
would a 1. low it do do they could not see it 
as a process reaching forward to a new 
and continuous creation with the possibility 
of novelty through human freedom. (36) 
The events which gripped Augustine himself and about which he was sub-
sequently able to generalize were the sacrifice of Christ on the cross 
and his resurrection, together with his own experience of salvation 
based on that sacrifice and resurrection •. These he affirmed as being 
unrepeatable and in doing so drew attention to the biblical emphasis 
on "once-for-all-ness". (37) 
From this inner conviction and certainty Augustine was able, by extension 
and reflection, to see the importance of every moment. If one of two 
moments can be full of unique and unrepeatable contents charged with 
eternal significance then any other - and th~refore every other 
historical point of time can be similarly filleC.. They are equally 
unrepeatable because they too can mediate salvation, Since these moments 
all together constitute history they impart significance and therefore 
meaning to history. This also means that historical time is moving to-
wards -~ significant future from a beginning in the mystery of creation. 
Furtheri:11ore, because every moment is able to bear ultimate significance 
it means that there is the possibility of novelty and the emergence of 
the new. 
When Christian th0ught thus triumphed over the thought f orrns of the 
ancient world it pressed the claim that the world is a creation of God 












implied the belief that history had a beginning and came to be by the 
act of God. The New Testament (following the Septuagint) had used the 
t.~ord ktizein which emphasized, not the shaping of something that had 
been eternally co-existent with God, as ·in Platonic thought, but an 
entirely new foundation, something created out of nothing, ex nihilo. 
Since God himself had created this world, it was essentially good. 
He was the source of the creative activity and, in Augustinian thought, 
the principle of order and the course of motion in the creation thus 
initiated. (38) 
In this continuing creati,_;e activity lies t:he understanding of providence. 
The temporal process is not self-explanatory. Its origins and its cont.in-
uance come from outside itself, a need inherent in the concept of a trans-
cendent God over against· his creation. In creation and providence there-
fore God acts in the same way. He grants the power of existence to all 
things both as an initial act and as an ongoing process. Providence is 
not a repetition of creation, but is dibtinct from it, presupposes it~ 
guarantees and confirms it. The natural creation (as distinct from the act 
of creating) becomes the scene in which God enacts his providential ruling, 
and hence Barth can say that the goodness and perfection of the creation 
"consists in the fact that God has made it 
serviceable for the rule of His free and 
omnipotent grace, for the exercise of the 
lordship of Jesus Christ •••• That he uses it 
in the service of this kingdom; that He 
co-ordinates and integrates it with His 
work in this kingdom; that He causes it 
to co-operate in the history of this kingdom, 
this is the rule of His providence". (39) 
Basic to the idea of providence is the belief in the nature of God 
as sovereign Lord of h:i.story. Augustine saw the divine sovereignty 
at work in the rise of the Roman Empire. Because God is the sovereign 
Lord who wills the· rise and fall of nations, claimed Augustine, he had 












A problem to all accounts that have discerned the divine providential 
ordering of historical events has been the role of human action in 
relation to the providential will of God. These have usually resolved 
the dilenrrna by subsuming human intention within the larger purpose of 
Cod. Indeed, Butterfield has drawn attention·to the strange way in 
which the outcome of historical processes has frequently been completeJy 
different to the one intended by the people' making the decisions. This 
phenomenon he calls "that kind of history-making which goes on so to 
speak over our heads, now deflecting the results of our actions, now 
taking our purposes out of our hands, and now turning our endeavours to 
ends not realised". (41) Not only is God thought to be in control, 
but the idea that he knows beforehand the outcome of events he has 
designed has been present to a greater or lesser degree in most classical 
theological writings. It assumes a divine "plan" because it perceives 
the broad outline of God working his will in, with, through and despite 
the actions of men in history. It results from a sense of the absolute-
ness of God's controlling power. Stemming from the model of the choosing 
of the Israelites by God in the Old Testament covenant this idea appears 
also in the New Testament. Augustine takes up the claim asserting both 
that believers, the members of the City of Goa, are destined fo1~ the 
end of knowing God in blessedness and also that the events of history, 
both sacred and secular, happen in fulfilment of the preordained scheme 
of God. (42) 
History therefore becomes an unfolding of this predetermined plan, and 
man's role is reduced to that of a spectator and responder. The biblical 
view of God and man "polemically engaged 11 (Miguez Bonino) together in 
creating history has Biven way to a one-sided emphasis on the power of 
God. Calvin taught that the object of history was to enable God to 













this end was beyond history, outside of ti~e and space, (43) 
The sovereign will of God, for. Calvin, operated in the sphere of providence 
which he saw as the outer working of God - the forces that rlay upon a 
person from outside - and election was the rule of God over the inner 
"spiritual" life. It will be seen that Calvin's main concern was with 
the life of ;:-iety of the individual believer. Unli.ke Augustine, Calvin 
was not unduly interested in constructing a speculative philosophy of 
history but rather in Godts working providentially and re.demptively in 
the lives of indbiduals and through them transforming history. Barth 
·• 
has distinguished between providence and predestinatio  by saying 
that God's predestinating rule over a person relates to his claim over 
that person as an object of saving grace whilst God's providential rule 
relates to his ongoing governing of a person in the sense that the person 
is a product of God's creating activity. (44) 
The elaboration of the doctrine of providence into predestination with 
the accompanying implication of determinism 7 leads us again to the 
heart of the question being posed by Miguez Bonino in his treatment of 
"Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engagement", It seems to us 
that the core of what he is getting at in his indictment of Christian 
passivity arises at this p0int. For not only had Christian eschatology 
been dualistic but where it has attributed to God a providenti~l 
sovereign role in secular events it has been inclined to advocate by 
implication, an attitude of withdraw,-::i.~ and renunciation of responsibility 
on man's part. By over-emphasizing God's sovereignty, theology has 
tended to underplay man's role and significance in the creation of hist.cry. 
However, the gradual abandoning of this stance sl.nce the Enlightenment 
has led to the enhancement of man's awareness of his role and in Marxism 
to his assumption of control to the exclusion of any participation by God. 
Miguez Bonino and his fellow.theologians of liberation have latched on 











reconcile this insight with the traditional (and Biblical) understanding 
Of G d 1 s 1 ·ngl rule i·n h~story l'e i·"' concerned, no less t. ha11 Augu·s-. O r~l. y -~ • J. ~
tine, Calvin and Barth, with the need to stress the part God takes 
in history, and his use of the category of the kingdom shows this. But 
he is concerned also to expose the attitude.of resignation and other-
worldly escapism which has so often clo.:::~ed the legitimation by the 
Church of political cppression and conservatism. 
The presupposition on.which Augustine's doctrine of providence was 
based, and which has been at the root of the problem was the idealistic 
type of eschatology he expounded. In trying to combat the chiliastic 
teachings which were prevalent he adopted the view that the Book of 
Revelation was to be understood as a spiritual allegory. (45) 
The kingly rule of God, according to Augustine> is now taking place J.n 
two ways. - first as the present mission of the church a.nd secondly as the 
blessedness of heaven for the redeemed, which be saw in Platonist fashion 
as beholding God: nsimil.arly, in the future life~ wherever we turn the 
spiritual eye of our bodies we shall discern, by means of our bodies, 
the incorporeal God directing the whole universe 11 , (~.6) In working out 
his theology of history Augustine pointed out that the City of God, 
though present in this world lives l::y supernatural regeneration and is 
eternal and innnortal. As such it is ahistorical, and secular history., 
the Civitas Terrena, is incidental. In eliminating chiliasm Augustine 
replaced the expectation of the end of history with the expectation of 
personal death and individual glory. Paul Tillich has spelt out the 
consequences by saying "A nonhistorical element has penetrated into the 
Christian interpre1..ation through the elimination of chiliasm. This element 
was strong enough to devaluate historical activity a,1d the struggle for 
social justice and to separate the individual destiny from that of the 
whole". \47) For Augustine the main interest and concern was not there·-
fore in the dominion of empires, their rise and fall. I:. was rather 1n 
the suprahistorical, eschatological goal of participating ' 1 in God's 












eternity beyond death, space, historical time, the physical body and th~ 
physical earth". (48) 
When the crisis in western Christianity, precipitated by the sack of 
Rome by Aleric in 410, chall~nged the Christian claim that conditions 
would impr"ve when the Empire recognised the church, the reply Augus-
tine made was, in effect, to sideline the importance and significance 
of secular history by asserting the ultimate supremacy of the Civitas Dei 
in "the world beyond". In so counteracting the "this-worldly" hopes of 
the chiliasts and defending the faith against pagan recriminations, 
Augustine had shifted the locus of eschatological hope from earth to 
heaven. This non-historical eschatology became the predominant thought 
in western faith and has survived down to the present day. (49) It does 
not rule out the possibf lity of the Parousia, but it has the effect of focus-
sing attention away from any such future intervention by God i.n history. 
(50). It follows that for Augustine there was no possibility that the 
redeeming activity of God might apply i11 the realm of secular history. 
As with the writers of the New Testament he displays an indifference to 
the fate of the C~yitas T~I_~ since for him it is of no eschatological 
significance. Its purpose was simply to provide sustenance for the 
upbuilding of the church. 
When Calvin restated the doctrine of providence in his Institutes over 
a thousand years after Augustine he used scriptural categories rather 
than those of classical philosophy. In doing so he made certain 
departures from the Augustinian precedents. One of these was his 
belief that providence performed a much more creative work in history 
than it had with Augustine. For Calvin, God's will is both active 
and sovereign to regenerate men and women. As with the other 
reformers the concept of j'.."stification was strong and he taught that 











sanctification flows from this. This work of sanctification, however, 
did not seek to take men and women out of this world. Rather it effec-
ted a transformation of character in them within the world and therefore 
indirectly of the world itself. (50) 
This is a radically different emphasis, and it represents a new depar-
ture in the Christian attitude to history. For the first time, Calvin 
enunciated a biblically grounded notion of a histoi:y transformable by the 
providential rule of God operating through Christian believers. He injected 
into the understanding of history a more dynamic s~nse of the liberating 
power and presence of God. In this view change can be brought about 
by God, a.nd can be seen to derive from his hand iP.. events. 
Calvin envisaged three ways in which Christians were to participate in 
political life. The first of these was by involvement in the establish-
ment of the Christian community which would be faithful to the gospel. 
The. second was by personal participation in political action which would. 
improve social life by lawful and constitutional.methods. The third 
was by refusing to obey unjust laws if they were incompatible with the 
gospel. (51) Here we note the. correspondence between Calvin's view and 
the assertion by Miguez Bonino that "Faith is not a different history but 
a dynamic, a motivation, c1.d in its eschatological horizon, a transform-
ing invitation". ~2) This is a far truer reflection of the essential 
Biblical prophetic view than the. dualistic notions we have looked at, or 
the Augustinian idea of a providential ordering of history from active 
participation in which man was largely excluded. Calvin sees man as 
the agent of God in the precess of introducing h~storical change. 
Augustine's doctrine of providence had been rooted in the classical 
concepts of static orders for ·which change. >·ms anatbema. As such the 
very concept of God had become static too. Calvin opens the \,Tay for a 
rediscovery of the dynamic concept of God in the Bible and in contempor-












of shaping the world, Gilkey has encapsulated this belief in the follo~-· 
ing quotation: 
"Historical change is, therefore, for us as for previous 
cultures, a religious phenomenon, one of the most 
deeply religious factors in·ordinary experience, From 
the point of view of faith, it is the strange face of the 
hidden God constituting, upsetting, destroying, challenging, 
judging, re-creating and calling11 • (53) 
2. PROPHECY AND ESCHATOLOGY 
There is no one view of history in the Bible. The approach of Isaiah is 
clearly different to that of the book of Ecclesiastes, whilst the New 
Testament focusses mainly on the fulfilment of promises made in the Old 
. Testa1:ient. Then again the apocalyptic literature provides an interpre-
tation which is so significant that it demands a section of this study 
for itself. 
The view of the prophetic v.-rriters is based, like that of Calvin, on 
the central coneept of the sovereignty of God. So important is the 
proph~tic literature itself, and so pervasive is its influence on the 
more historical sections of the Old Testament that we can consider it 
as representing the main central nexus of ideas concerning history in the 
Old Testament. Indeed, when Miguez Bonino rejects the dualistic approach 
to history by recourse to the Old Testament it is to the prophetic out--
look he is referring. He describes his approach to history in the Old 
Testament as follows: 
"There is scarcely a question of "two histories" in 
relation to the Old Testament. There, God's action 
takes place in history and as history. It inextricably 
:i.nvolves human action and, conversely, there is no 
human action reported outside the relation with God's 
purpose an~ word. This interconnection does not mean an 
equation b~tween God's sovereignty and history, as if 
the former would justify or sacralize everything that 












the Lordship of Yahweh is an efficacious word which 
becomes history and creates history by convoking and 
rejecting men and peoples in relation to God's purpose. 
Thus, Yahweh's sovereignty does not appear in history 
as an abstract act or an interpretation but an announce-
ment and connnandment, as announcement which convokes, 
as promise and judgment demanding and inviting a response. 
History is, precisely_ this conflict between God and his 
people in the midst o..id in relation to all peoples". (54) 
This is an excellent description of the prophetic view of history. It 
can be well illustrated in the call of the; prophets. Amos was taken 
from his work as a shepherd and ordered to go and speak the word 
of the Lord to Israel and apparently never demurred. (55) 
The response of Jeremiah was by contrast!. a far more hesitant reply and 
his description indicates how Jahweh had to persuade him. (56) Again 
by contrast Isaiah was able to overhear the divine speech and volunteered 
to respond. (59) In each of these three instances the degree of human 
reaction to and involveri1ent with the prior divine initiative varied, but 
in each there was divine - human interaction. 
As we shall presently see, the prophets were thems_elves directly involved 
in the historical process, but we cite these three instances to serve as 
models of human responses to God's call and conunand. Similar patterns 
of responding can be seen in kings and military generals, priests, 
cmd government officials. God spoke and men either hec::::-d or refused to 
hear, obeyed or disobeyed, accepted or rejected his corrnnand. Whilst 
the prophets themselves furnish reactions to the. divine sovereignty in 
ways which might be.regarded as more compliant, we can see in other 
places similar varying responses; in the incident with No.a.man (58) an 
initial refusal to obey is followed by submission; in the description by 
Deutro·-Isaiah of Jahwc.':1 1 s deliverance of the exiled people, Cyrus the 
Persian is depicted a3 the. tord' s anointed one. (59) But men are free 













to the people to change their ways usually go unheeded. (60) What 
happens in the events of everyday history therefore is a curious, if 
I 
fascinating, interweaving of divine initiative and human response which, 
as warp and weft together form the fabric of events. God and men 
interact with one another in a dialectical pattern which the liberation 
theologians, amongst others, have rightly perceived to be one history~ 
Miguez Bonino goes on to make two further claims with regard to the Old 
Testament. In the first he refutes the validity of the frequently made 
dichotomy between what he calls the "brute facts" of history and and 
interpretation of them iu the prophetic witness. These belong together 
because of the prophet's message comes itself as one of the constituent 
parts of the historical process and is hence "an act and a factor in 
itself". (61) Its object is not detached.explanation but engagement, 
calling, inviting and condemning. 
His second comment on the nature of Old Testament history emphasizes 
its political character since as action and word it embraces both the 
totality of the life of the people as a people and also the intergroup 
relations of different peoples and nations in the structures of power. 
The dualism that separates political life from religious life is foreign 
to the Old Testament. Even the personal epiphanies are woven into the 
history of the people of God. In all the commerce of the day to day 
legal, political, economic and domestic relations of the nation "Yahweh 
conflictively asserts his sovereigntyby calling and rejecting, forgiving 
and punishing and thus erecting the signs and the road of his coming 
final victory, his Kingdom, (62) 
We can see from both of these assertions a correcting of the dualistic 













Bonino emphasizes the historical nature of t}1e prophetic word itself. 
The prophet is not merely a commentator on historical events but a 
participator in the process. His call to repentance, his invitation 
to the nation to redirect its course of action and his appeal for social 
change, come into line with Marx's fundamental principle of praxis and 
the role of philosophy - to change the world rather than to interpret 
it (a theme to which we will return later). This points to the prophetic 
function as historical engagement and underlines the involvement of prophecy 
with history. It is also the role Miguez Bonino assigns to theology. 
This engagement in historical action has been described by Von Rad (63). 
In a study of the role of the divine word in prophetic activity he points 
out how from early times even the word of man was conceived as having a 
creative power in itself and as an objective reality in its own right. 
The divine word was, however, immeasurably more powerful and hence the 
theology characteristic of Deutro-Isaiah developed emphasi;;:ing the activity 
of the word of God in creation. 
From its presence in creation to its force in history there was really 
only a small transition. The phrase "the word of .Jahweh came to so and 
so" occurs 123 times in the prophetic literature and "represents the 
apperception of the divine word as event, a unique happening in history 
which a man is looking for or which takes him by surprise, and which 
therefore sets the person in a new historical situation". (64) Further-
more, although there may be a simi,lc;.r~ ty between the oracles of a parti-
cular prophet each one is still un.ique - it is the word of the Lord and 
not a word and therefore each one is to some evtent a new event. 
The prophetic activity was involved in a dialectical relationship therefore 
with the events of history. The day to day happenings prompted the 
prophets to speak, but when they uttered "the word of the Lord" that word 
in turn affected the course of those events. So when Isaiah talks of 











that he can add that "it he.slit upon: Israe111 • (65') · Jerem-iah was called 
to prophesy and his ministry was to involve him in plucking up and break·· 
ing down, as well as the building and planting of nations (E,~). This was 
not only historical activity, it was hi.storical action of the most 
' 
,~ffective and radical nature, and there:is little wonder that the estab-
lished authorities were fearful of the prophets. (67) 
Whether Miguez Bonino was consciously using these insights of Von Rad 
is not clear, but the correspondence between his succint paragraph and 
the exposition by Von Rad is striking. In any event Miguez Bonino is 
correct in pointing out the iuvolvement of the prophetic message with the 
course of historical events. 
With regard to the second point - the nature of Old Testament history as 
political - we can here note the concept of the unitary nature of reality 
which underlies Miguez Bonino's attempt to guard against the dualistic 
interpretation of history. The reality of the sovereign God and the 
reality of ::~1e political events in Israel's, history are indissolubly linked 
for neither mak~s sense without the other in the prophetic way of looking 
at them in the Old Testament. 
Clearly the prophets speak the word of God in relation to the political 
events happening around them and it is both in relation to and even some-
times through these happenings themselves that God speaks to them. No-
where is this "political" and "secular" nature of the history seen more 
clearly than in the attitude of Deutero-Isaiab to the rise of Cyrus of 
Persia, to which we have previously referred. The prophet links the 
action of God with the imperial ambition and statecraft of the foreign 
king in a union that is at once both political and theological. 
There is, however, more to the prophetic interpretation of history than 
Miguez Bonino brings outs and a fuller understanding of its dynamics 












tracea the prophetic awareness of history to the Hebrew sense of time 
and contrasts this with the contemporary western concept. Western man 
thinks of time as a linear sequence beginning in a. vague distant past 
and moving into ~ecorded history with the present as the centre and 
with the future stretching onward. Israel had a somewhat Jifferent 
attitude. For her, time was not separated from specific events. It was 
in fact "event-full" and it was the occurrence taking place in the pain'.: 
of time or period that invested any particular time with significance. 
Thus there is no such thing as an abstract or philosophical idea of 
time, but rather of a "time" when something happens. "The tree yields 
its fruit in its time' (Psl:3) and God gives his creatures food 'in 
due time t (Ps. 104: 27); that is to say, every event has its definite 
place in the time-order; the event is inconceivable without its time, 
and vice-versa". <·68) There thus evolved in Isre.elite thought and prac-
tice the ordering of the year in relation to the great agricultural 
festivals. The peculiarity of the He1)r1:1w nse of these celebrations was 
that she eventually 11historicized11 the.m by linking them with events i-c 
her past - the Exodus, the sojourn in the wilderness and the dwelling in 
booths. In making this transition she demonstrated her unique awareness 
that she was not bound to the cyclical events of nature but to historical 
acts in which Jahweh had botr. saved and accompanied her, By re-enacting 
these historical events the Isra.elites felt th-?-mselves to be participating 
in them in a real and vivid way which meant that the saving acts held a 
certain contemporaneousness about them. 
Israel did not stop there. She went on to add a whole series of such hap-
penings to her calE:ndar and consequently there evolved. from the aggregate 
of these special times "a span of historical time'' ('Jon Rad), the begin-
ning of the concept.of a linear historicai span. Fundamental then to the 
sense of history for Israel was the conviction that it existed only as 












With the prophets there is a sharpening of this idea. By-relating their 
message to the historical movements of their own day, 
"they placed the new hi.storical acts of God which they 
saw around them in exactly the sane category as the 
old basic events of the canonical history - indeed, 
they gradually came to realise that this new histo~ical 
action was to surpass and therefore, to a certain 
extent, to supercede the old. They were in fact 
called forth by their conviction that Jahweh was bring-
ing about a new era for his people11 • '69') 
Their theological interpretation of current events distinguished their 
work from mere political calculation because they perceived precisely 
that interrelationship between human actions and the sovereign free-
dam of the will of Jahweh to which we have previously refer:ced. In 
this looking for the novum which God was to inaugurate they switched 
the perspective of time from a concentration on and celebration of 
the past events to an expectation of the future working of God. So 
the characteristic feature of the prophetic message is "its expecta-
tion of something soon to happen11 (70). 
This sense of the imminence of the future marks the beginning of the 
biblical eschatological awareness. The prophets he~ghten the sense of 
drama by depicting a break between the present and the future. This 
division, separating the present age and the future age is what con-
stitutes the true dualism of the biblical interpretation of history. 
It is marked by the intervention of "Jahweh 1 s great act of demolition" 
(Von Rad) in which he brings to an end the previous age and usher:o 111 
a new state which is so different from what went before it that it , 
cannot be regarded as a mere continuation of the past. This sense of 
urgency prompted· the prophets to preach their message of judgment. By 
doing so they sought to dislodge the people's faith in past events 
which had given them a false sense of security. A new thing was about 
to happen, a vitally crucial new thing for "the prophets sai·? Jahweh 











tions increasingly invalid since from then on life or death for Israel 
was determined by this future event". ( 71) 
The experience of suffering ai30 served as a component factor in the 
Israelite historical awareness. Her geographical position resulted in 
her constantly be.coming embroiled in the imperial power struggles of 
the. ancient near east. Har smallness and relative weakness led to 
frequent defeats in battle and to her regular subjection to foreign 
powers. Her story has been well described by Butterfield as being full 
of "the thuds and thunders of disaster". ({2) 
73 
In Abraham Heschel's reckoning this suffering meant that history was a 
_"nightmare". "There are more scandals", he says, "more acts of corruption, 
than are dreamed of in philosophy. It would be blasphemous to believe 
that what we witness is the end of Godvs creation". ~73) The prophets 
believed that such a state of evil cannot be accepted as final or as 
inevitable. Improvement even, was not enough. They looked for redemp-
tion. In so doing the prophetic message contained not only the threa~ 
of condemnation but also promise. Ezekiel speaks of a heart of flesh 
replacing the' heart of stone ('74 ) and Isaiah looks for a time when 
nature herself will change to match the glory of the age. ( 7.5) The 
new age will see the end of fear and of war, the disappearance of i<lola-
tory and the flowering of the knowledge of God, · (76) · 
This hope of a new age then~ stems from the Hebrew belief in justice 
which demanded that.the suffering be requited. The ve-::y same sense of 
outraged justice hs.d led Plato to formulate his doctrine of the two 
worlds. If this one allo\\'"ed injustice there had to be another one 
where things were everywhe.re perfect. (77 ) But the Hebrew Bind had 
no such ideal world elsewhere. It was earthed in the reality of this 
world, and it needed a terrestrial fulfilment of the pronu.ses. With 











was on the horizontal level of history that justice must be done. If 
a blessed future had been promised in the past and only suffering 
was known in the present then that promise could only be fuHilled 
in the future. This same passion for the replacement of wrongs by 
justice reappears in the theology of Miguez Bonino and his fellow 
liberationists. 
With the prophetic hope for a new age there is emphasized the concept of 
Jahweh as the God who comes. If he is transcendent, and wholly other, 
he is, nevertheless, the one who intervenes in the course of events, 
and because he has come in the past so he will come again in the future. 
"The coming of .Jahweh is the central idea of Old Testament eschatology". 
~78) He is the God who comes because he is the God of promise. 
Indeed, his very nature revealed in the mystery of his name points to 
the coming fulfilment of his promise and thus to the future. In the 
Sinai revelation he names himself as''I am who I am" or 11 I will be what 
I will be" (-79). Israel's understanding of Jahweh relates therefore 
to a dynamic nature, to a God who is still to reveal. -himself to her in his 
future acts and comings. "When his name is demanded of him, he simply 
interprets the intention which tore him from his local soil and put 
him on the move in the form of a cloud and a column of fire toward the 
future, the futurum Canaan, as if he were moving to his distant home". 
Cao) Always there was some promise still to come to fulfilment. From 
the covenant with Abraham promising '•t_he land that I will show you", __ 
through the Exodus promise "that I will bring ycu up out of the afflic-
tion of Egypt1', and the dreams for the "Day of the Lord" so scathingly 
denounced by Amos, to the hope of a glorious future of shalom arti:culated 
in the prophetic vision of the return to primordial paradi'se, the new 
covenant of Jeremiah, the restored Israel of Ezekiel and finally to the 












of the future beckoning them towards the fulfilment of a still-hoped-
for promise 
In all this the great prophets fulfilled the role of catalysts. It 
was thefr perceptive insight which pierced.to the cutting edge of 
time and discerned amidst the tramp of a"t'.mies, the moral demands of God, 
and the pain of a people, the interrelationship of forces and the 
decisiveness of the conditional nature of the covenant. For them the 
future was not pre-programmed. It was dependent upon what the people 
would do in the present and constituted a call to change their ways ·-
or else Jahweh would bring this or that to pass. Heschel declares: 
"What saved the prophets from despair was their messi<mic 
vision and the idea of man's capacity for repentance. 
That vision and that idea affected their understanding 
of history. 
History is not a blind alley, and guilt is not an 
abyss. There is always a way that leads out of guilt; 
repentance or turning to God. The ~rophet is a person 
who, living in dismay, has the pm.;er to transcend his 
dismay. Over all the darkness of experience hovers the 
vision of a different day 11 • (81) 
It is this vision with its accompanying power to rise above despair 
which has captivated the theologians of liberation as well as contempor-
ary political theologians. As they have sought to interpret their hope 
for the poor and dispossessed in the light of the Biblical revelation 
they have rediscovered this Old Testament model of a theology of · 
history. 
One su-.:h theologian has been' Jurgen Holtmann who has utilized Von Rad's 
outline of the prophetic categories of ~1.0v~ and futurum in expounding 
his theology of hor~. (S2) Moltmann sees in this complex of ideas 
"the first signs of a universal eschatology of mank::..1d 11 <~83) He 
also perceives that the content of the hope - a new age of blessing, 












the experience of deprivation and suffering. He detects in this rever-
sal, furthermore, the dialectical pattern which Hegel and Marx were to 
analyse in the movement.of history. "The positive content of the ideas", 
he says, "is all supplied by negation of the negative". (84) 
The essence of the biblical response to suffering is, according to Molt-
mann, not resi.gnation or despair, but hope. This hope is not an escapist 
or quietist flight to some heavenly bliss (85) but a protest against 
suffering. The resurrection of Christ points to the future of the 
earth and is consequently "the enemy of death and of a world that puts 
up with death". (86) 
Miguez Bonino, in line with other theologians of liberation, shares this 
conviction that history provides mankind with an opportunity to engage 
in historical action which will constitute a response to the divine 
invitation to set up signposts of the kingdom of God on earth. This 
belief, as we have seen, emerged in the Old Testament prophets. 
However, when we move into the.New Testament we· find a somewhat different 
attitude to history. The New Testament resounds with the confident claim 
that the manifestation of God's kingly rule promised in the Old Testament 
has come in the person of ~esus Christ. The Messianic Age has arrived; the 
promises are fulfilled; the things hoped for have materialized. Indeed, 
the relationship between the two testaments should be thought of not 
so much in terms of upward developme1:'_ nor of contrast but rather in -
terms of beginning and completion. The link that binds them to each 
other is the concept of the kingly rule of God. (87) This sense of 
continuity is to be carefully noted, Miguez Bonino makes the claim that, 
11Nobody can fail to see that w.e move into a somewhat different climate 
as we enter the :t-Jew Testament, particularly the Pauline and Johannine 












He suggests that this difference is due to the difficulty which Gentiles 
have in identifying with the events of the Biblical narratives. Wl:~ilst 
!'.hey see the continuity bet.ween their m·m national histories and their 
present situation Miguez Bonino feels tli.ey therefore have to try to 
combine the biblical history and their own. Most fail to do this and 
finish with a sense that the biblical eve11ts are distant and remote as 
history. 
However, there appears to be a much more theologically significant fact 
which Miguez Bonino seems to overlook. This is the shift in the under-
standing cf time and history which the Christ-event brought. As we. 
have seen, the predominant sense of history in the Old Testarner.t was 
very largely the result of the development from the awareness that God 
had acted in a series of.past events into the future orientation which 
the prophetic hope engendered. The focus of time had therefore come to 
be fixed largely on the future. In the New Testament the emphasis is on 
the "now" of the saving events. This results in an awareness of Christ 
and the events surrounding his incarnation, ministry, death and exalta-
tioti as constituting the centre of history. Because Christ is the ful-
filment of the promises the eschaton has arrived. But it is not the end 
of time and history. Rather it is the mid-point. (89) 
Despite the strong emphasis on the fulfilment in the present nevertheless 
the sense of the future still to come, so strongly evident in the prophetic 
witness~ by no means diminishes in the New Testament.. Although t~~e aware-
ness that the kingdom has already arrived is strong, the hope for a 
future consummation still remains. Whilst in one sense the coming of 
Jesus represents the eud to which history has moved, in another it 
signals the beginning. For now the end time - inaugurated by the incar-
nation, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus - has ushered in the 
last phase of history. This also has a goal - the return of Christ -












declares Ber'!::hoff, "looks forward and backward, ~nd knows himself to 
be involved in the unrestrainable movement towards the completion of 
God's Kingdom". (90) 
There are two aspects of this forward reference in the Ne~; Testament hope. 
The first is the sense of the inuninence of the Parousia. Whilst the 
intensity of the first expectations gave way in the face of pragmatic 
needs to a more realistic perspective, the hope of orientation to the 
future itself never diminished. A consummation of the Kingdom is every-
where predicted. The manner of this consummation may vary but the hope 
remains strong. (91) 
The second aspect of this future hope, however, is the conviction that 
the ld.ngdom, so vividly manifest in the Christ-event and to be consumrna-
ted at the close of the age, is nevertheless an ongoing reality in the 
world. The mission of the church to the Gentiles is a witness to this 
continuing awareness. In his parabless Jesus had spoken repeatedly of 
an imminent coming of the K i!lgdom as well as referring to its presence 
in his person. But he also told of a link between the present and the 
parousia in the "growth" parables - those referring to the mustard seed, 
the wheat and tares, the seed growing secretly and the leaven. These 
point to the conviction that not only has something happened, and not 
only is something going to happen but it is also taking place, albeit 
silently and unnoticed~ now. There is a continuity between the past 
and the future, and the apostolic church witnessed to that present and 
continuing activity of the Kingdom in 'its proclamation and its service.. 
There is thus a complex set of factors which leads t-,-. the change 
in climate between the Old and New Testc3.ment to which Miguez Bonino 
refers. When he accounts for the transition by claiming that Gentile 













history, as well as the events of the biblical drama (92) this is really 
beside the point. It.may to some extent explain the duality of histories 
which we have to hold together, but Miguez Bonino seems to make something 
of a red herring of this fact. The change is the shift of focus from the 
future reference of prophetic eschatology to the realization that the new 
age has begun. 
At this point, however, we must go a little more deeply into the questi::n 
Miguez Bonino asks with regard to the difference i.n climate bet.ween the 
unitary concept of history in the Old. Testament and the much less discernible 
interest of the New Testament in the political events of the day. This 1s 
the real problem with which Miguez Bonino 1.s trying to come to grips. 
Here we have to face the fact that the New Te.stament writers have by 
and large omitted to "eschatologize" the truth they sought to witness 
to. In an important passage which spells out the signifi c.ance of. this 
fact Van Ruler says: 
"The word 'eschatologize' is ;:neant -to convey the fact that 
origi~ally and finally, and hence continually, our concern 
is with God himself and the world in the naked subsistence. 
of things. 
This may be glimpsed at times in the New Testament where it 
speaks of the end of faith, of the Son's giving of the 
kingdom to the Father, of the dwelling of God among men, of 
the new earth in which righteousness dwells, of the new 
birth of the world of authority and the good as such (1 Pet. 
1:9; 1 Cor. 15: 21.~, 28; Rev. 21:2; II Pet. 3:13; 
Matt. 19:28; Rom. 13: l-;7). But generally speaking, this 
is all concealed in the particularity of revelation. The 
Messiah and the Spirit, the incarnation and the indwelling 
cover it over, keeping and preserving but also hiding it ••• 
ln the Old Testament this original and final element~ this 
faithfulness to tne earth and time, is plainly more visible". /OJ) . \J 
It is poss:i_ble to account [or this lack on the part of the New Testament 
writers. For one thing they lived for the most part with the vivid 
expectation of an i.mmin.ent parousia. This meant that since a further 
irruption of divine power was expected any day there was no awa.reness 












himself was soon to make all things.new. Since he had acted indepen-
dently of human initiative in the mighty acts of the incarnation, re-
surrection and Pentecost it must have seemed perfectly normal to think 
that any acticn needed on the stage of what Van Ruler calls "the earth 
and time11 could also be expected to come directly from the intervention 
of God. 
Secondly, the tumultuous political events that did take place, such as 
the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and the Neronic persecutions must only 
have served to stimulate the apocalyptic expectations which we find so 
strongly emphasized in the New Testament. These in their turn attri-
buted the predicted sensational happenings to divine intervention 
rather than calling for human action. 
Thirdly the position of the Christian community itself was a factor. 
In the earlier years of the period during which the New Testament was 
written the focus was on the activity of God in and through the mission 
of the Church to the Gentiles. The whole attention was directed to 
creating and maintaining the tiny communities ih an increasingly hostile 
environment. In the later years the church was itself a persecuted 
minority and the extant writings reveal a concern with urgent defensive 
reactions against the twin dangers of heretical teaching and physical 
persecution. 
Because of the widespread and intermittent persecutions any writin::;s 
that may have been circulating which could have portrayed the church as 
a politically dangerous element would have been suppressed either by the 
church itself or by the authorities. This constitutes a fourth possible 
cause for the lack of any overt;"eschatologization11 of the Christian 
testimony in the sense we have referred to above. 
The Church has followed this tendency, and the gap which Miguez Bonino 












context of their "earth and time" reality by the New Testament writers 
whatever the cause may have been. 
Van Ruler also voices this concern of Miguez Bonino. He believes, 
" •••• that in this respP.ct we have to speak most 
emphatically of the greater value of the Old 
Testa:nent as compared with the New. The Old 
Testo.ment has a more positive concern with creation 
and the kingdom, with the first things and the 
last, with the image and the law, with sanctification 
and humanity, with ethos and culture, with society 
and marriage, with history and the state. These 
are precisely the matters at issue in the Old Testa-
ment. For this reason the Old Testament neither can 
nor should be expounded christologically, but only 
eschatologically, in other words theocratically. 
There is in it a profound confidence in the goodness 
of the world, the serviceability of man, and the 
possibility of sanctifying the earth. 
This the church needs for its own life, to keep it from 
hopeless entanglement in the problems of sin and a.tone-
ment. as though only dark shadows lay on the earth and 
life. For God's sake it needs to be more human and 
secular than it has hitherto let itself be in its tradition". (94) 
The New Testament then, with the exception of the Apocalypse and the 
occasional references to historical characters such as Herod, Pilate, 
and the silversmiths at Ephesus has little to say about the secular 
events of the day. But the sense of history is not missing. It is 
perhaps better to say that the Old Test~ment concept of history is the 
fra:nework within which th8 New Testament picture of God's acts is set. 
Before we ieave the teaching of the New Testament lve must pause to take 
note of some trends in eschatological thinking which have emerged in 
modern times. Following the nineteenth century liberal unclerstandiLlg 
of the Kingdom which focussed on human experience and ethical activity 
the emphasis began to change with the appearance in 1892 of Johannes 
.. 
Weiss' work Jesus' Procl:;:imo.tion of the Kii~-~d<;?!l'_:_of 9od, (95). Weiss 
claimed that the teaching of Jesus depicted the Kingdom of God as an 
irruption into history, a crisis which was solely the work of God. 












work and teaching· of Jesus was dominated by the apocalyptic thought 
forms of our Lord's day centring on the imminence of the coming 
Kingdom. (96) Schweitzer's work had the value of pointing out that 
eschatology was central to Jesus' own thinking and not merely periphe-
ral. This school of 11 consistent11 or "future" eschatology was followed by 
the work of C.H.Dodd who claimed that the eschaton was realized in the 
person and work of Jesus. (97) Dodd made great use of the statement 
by Jesus, "The Kingdom of God is in the midst of you". (98) 
One of the most important expositions of New Testament eschatology, however, 
has been the existentialist interpretation of Rudolf Bultmann. He is 
important in our present context because he represents a point of view which 
the contemporary political theologians have sought to repudiate. In addi-
tion his ideas lead to a position where history is de-valued as a sphere 
for eschatologic:ally significant concrete human action. Bultmann set out 
to expound eschatology in terms of Heidegger's existentialist categories, 
In doing so he fastened on to the New Testament eschatological emphasis 
on the present to the exclusion of its Biblical components in the past 
and the future. His eschatology is thus all centre, with neither beginning 
nor end in the histor{cal continuum. 
Acknowledging that Heidegger's existentialism was an atheistic version, 
Bultmann claimed that since it analysed human existence, and this was one 
of the concerns of theology~ it was useful as a vehicle of interpreta-
tion for·theological understanding. The result is that Bultmann eschews 
the historical and eschatological significance of i::he objective world and 
the making of history, concentrating on the interior, subjective life of 
the individual as the focus of the word of God in its addre.ss to and 
dealings with man. 
In Bultma.nn 1 s view, man finds himself, his authentic being, in decisions 












bility only in historical encounters and the decisions he makes regar-
ding them and the responses he offers to them. His historicity does not 
consist in the sort of historical engagement Miguez Bonino is calling 
for, but rather in his own history which is when he realizes himself. (99) 
Here then, the dualism is seen in the dichotomy between the outside 
objective world of historical structures and the interior, s:.tbj ective 
world of the self where authenticity becomes reali?.ed in the actualizing 
of man's possibility. Transcendence is localized in subjectivity 
and God is removed from the v.iorld of historical activity. Bultmann says: 
"God, who stands aloof from the history of nations, 
meets man in his own little history, his every-
day life with its daily gift and demand; de-historized 
man (i.e. naked of his supposed security within his 
historical group) is guided into his concrete encounter 
with his neighbour in which he finds his true history". (100) 
Faith for Bultmann is not resp~:mding in conm1itment to God with an out·-
going love, but with a new interior disposition. Renewal is effective 
at the personal level only. Bultmann's concept of eschatological sig-
r.ificance ::..3 grounded in the present moment. Any moment in which God 
confronts me is invested with eschatological import.snce because in it 
I am called to make a decision in response,. The ~schaton is the present 
moment in which God gives me the opportunity to opt for authentic exis·-
tence. Bultmann affirms that the eschatological event of Jesus Christ 
becomes new repeatedly in the proclamation of the church and the response 
of faith. Preaching encounters and addresses man, and demands 
an. answer, a decision. He claims "It is the paradox of Christian being 
that the believer is taken out of the world and exists so to speak, as 
unworldly and that at the same time he remains wjthin the world, within 
his historicity11 • (101) 
In such an understanding, history - secular, creative and political 
has be.en divested of meaning. This can be found in the inward world of 
"authentic existence". In such a downgrading of history there is the 












relationship with and responsibility before God. The inevitable con-
sequence is the privatization of man's relations with God and the 
repudiation of responsibility for the concrete issues of political 
and social existence. 
Jurgen Moltmann has articulated the criticism which contemporary politi-
cal theology makes of existentialist theology by sa~ing, 
"A theology which settled faith in the existence of the 
individual, in the sphere of his personal, immediate 
encounters and decisions, is a theology which from the 
viewpoint of sociological science stands at the very 
place to which society has banished the cultus privatus 
in order to emancipate itself from it. This fa:Lth is 
in the literal sense socially irrelevant, because it 
.stands in the social no-man's-land of the unburdening 
of the individual - that is, in a realm which materialist 
society has already left free to human individuality in 
any case". (102) . 
Whilst the existentialist interpretatio'J. of New Testament eschatology 
suceeded in avoiding some of the problems facing New Testament scholar-
ship at the time it was formulated (103) it nevertheless finished up 
with an un,~crstanding of the historical foci of the Christian faith 
which was a denial of the very significance of history which the 
prophets had sought to emphasize. Bultmann 1 s theology, no less than 
the traditional theologiess has lent significance to a realm of reality 
removed from actual history. I.n so doing it has created a new dualism 
which is as clearly otherworldly as was the dualism stemming from the 
Augustinian tradition. It was equally as disengaged from concrete poli-
tical activity as they were. 
In an attempt to re-establish the eschatological significance of histori-
cal action, and to avoid the dualism which ·we have seen to be inherent 
in traditional theology contemporary political theology turned again 
to the biblical sources. It was attempting to discover categories of 
interpretation which would offer hope for a bc~tter future in the face 













led them to look afresh at the apocalyptic understanding of history. 
3. APOCALYPTICISM 
One of the fruits of the Marxist-Christian dialogue has beE.11 that theo-· 
logians have turned their attention to the theology of history and in 
doing so have rediscovered the insights in apocalypticism. This has led 
to a remarkable reversal of interest, since both the modern mind and 
the Church had been uncomfortable with the apocalyptic mythological frame-
work. The attention it now receives would have been impossible prior 
to the sixties of the present century~ (104) 
Although in one sense: apocalyptic ·arose because of the failure of the 
prophetic model it nevertheless has certain affinities with prophecy. 
Both seek an answer to the riddle of theodicy. They look also to the 
action of God in the political events of history in the future and there-
fore have a predictive element. Differences in style abound which it is 
not necessary to elaborate on here. Despite the.se distinctions both 
prophets and apocalyptists spoke what for them was the work of God in 
their respective styles and situations. (105) The most important fea-
ture of the apocalyptic framework for understanding history is the 
combination of a cosmic dualism (which involves a struggle between the 
personified forces of go0ri and evil) with the idea of the two c:..ges. 
This present age is the sphere cf human history, and it is under the 
power of evil. The apocalyptists see no hope for improving it, so totally 
evil has it become. The righteous tind themselves suffering and perse-
cuted because of the evil powers at work. It is because of this sense of 
helplcssnzss that apocalypticism has sometimes i>een described as pessimis-
tic. Moreover there is the prediction of increased suffering before the 
; 












But it finds its hope in the idea of the new age, the 2.ge to come. 
Soon, claim these writers, God will intervene with power.and, in a 
mighty conflict which will include the whole cosmos, he will overthrow 
the evil power and inaugurate a new age under his dominion. The faith-
ful followers will share with him in the bliss of this ne~v age which will 
be their reward for loyalty and endura11.:.e in the face of their present 
suffering and oppre:sion. In some apocalyptists this earth as well as · 
this age is to be replaced by a new one, or, as in Revelation, by 
the descent of a heavenly city. In this way, the apocalyptic view of 
history sought to explain the present prevalence of evil in the form of 
suffering, and to assert faith in a God who was ultimately in control 
of the universe at the same time. The cry for justice we have pre-· 
viously noted is inherent in this explanation also, with the new age 
predicted as the time when the w-rongs will be put ;:ight, and true 
justice established. 
The essence of the apocalyptic faith, however was its insistence on 
and confidence in, the power of God to intervene in the course of history. 
The present age was thoroughly evil and incapable of redeeming itself. 
Its redemption had to come from outside. Its hope, its only hope, lay 
in the intervention by the transcendent God. This intervention~ more-
over, would come - of this there was no doubt in the apocalyptistsi 
faith - and the new age would be brought about therefore by miraculous 
means. 
In this divine intervention we observe a distinction between the pro-
phetic view of the future and that of apocalyptic. The prophets, as we 
noted earlier, saw future history as under the conti~ol of God but con-
tingent also upon the human response to God. Men in their freedom ha<l 
the power to influence the course of events. The apocalyptists, on 
the other hand, having despaired of the possibility of cillY favourable 












mighty intervention at th~ end of the age. God would dispense with 
human freedom because to use Rowley's phrase, "He would Himself act in 
a way as solely His own as His act in creation had been". (106) 
The age to come will, in the apocalyptic view of history, see the 
establishment of the reign of God. Those who have remained faithful to 
God in the sqffering and persecution will be saved and will share in 
this glorious future. Some who have suffered death will be raised to 
share in it. (107) 
87 
The belief in hope for a resurrection had arisen in the first of the 
apocalyptic works, Daniel (108) and whilst not unique to Jewish apocalyptic 
was taken up in the New Testament. It became one of the legacies from 
apocalyptic thought to achieve a permanent place in Christian belief. 
Judgment is to take place as a part of the establishment of the theocracy. 
It is a forensic type of judgment and usually has God as the judge. (W9) 
It is dispensed on the basis of faithfulness and obedience (or apostasy) 
during the suffering and oppression. 
All initiative it seems, is removed from human hands, and in the dialectic 
between despair of the evil present and hope for the divinely-ordained 
future there is little pl?~e for the exercise of that human freedom so greatly 
prized and so sacrificially gained in the modern era. Truly, if apocalyptic 
is to provide any meaningful contribution to a theological perspective it 
will have to be reinterpreted in order to designate a real role for man's 
participation in and creative contribution to the shaping of the histori-
cal process. This may be the meaning behind Migue7. Bonino 1 s statement 
that "we must deepen our understanding of the apocalyptic literature" (110) 













The apocalyptic view of history, because it holds out a utopian hope of 
God's intervention, the end of suffering, and the rule of righteousness 
and peace, has captivated the imagination and aspiration of various 
groups down the centuries. Despite its.association with, and appropria-
tion by, fanatical groups it may not be casually dismissed. Indeed 
Russell, in assessing its significance concluded that this "proIT!ised 
kingdom is one of shalom and as such is nG~ altogether divorced from 
earth or history or from the kingdoms of men. Its sign is that of 
justice and peace not just in some far-off time or place, but in the 
. ' 
struggles of contemporary life". (lll) 
Apocalyptic teaching has given rise to two diverse reactions. The first 
is quietism (112), and the other is militant, political and even revo-
lutionary millenarianis~. (1135 One of the most influential of the 
latter forms of teaching came from Joachim of Fiore who lived in the 
latter half of the twelfth century. (11~) Using typological and alle-
gorical style of interpretation from the scriptures he worked out a 
. 
scheme of history based on the doctrine of the trinity~ involving three 
epochs of history each of which manifests a person of the trinity. The 
final period would be one· of love, joy and freedom and the knowledge of 
God would be directly perceived in the hearts of all men. Joachim deduced 
that this third phase was to begin in a short while and that the final 
.age would commence about A.D. 1260. Before this there would be a three 
and· a half year reign of the Antichrist who would be a secular rul"'r. In 
the interim period Joachim declared that there must be a new order of 
monks to prepare for the final age and their rule would endure until 
the Last Judgment. TL,re was then to be a. two-stage eschnton. The age 
of the Spirit was the first stage and the parou_si~. and final judgment 
the ultimate conclusion. In this scheme we can see the provision both 











The revolutionary tendencies latent in thiE type of Apocalyptic inter-
pretation came to prominence in the use Joachim's followers made of his 
ideas. The Franciscan Spirituals proclaimed him as a new John the 
Baptist and St. Francis as the nevus dux, eve-::i a 11new Christ 11 • They 
formed a minority order within the larger Order and later seceded from 
it. They interpreted Joachim's ideas in order to claim that they them-
selves wer·e ti1e unworldly monastic order which was tc replace the hier-
archia1 institutions of the Roman Church, Pope, cle!'gy, sacraments~ 
scripture and teaching. They used the life of St. Francis as the criterion 
by which to condemn the contemporary corruption of the Church and identi-·· 
fied the Emperor as the Antichrist who would chastise the Church. 
The teaching of Joachim ir.spi:r:ed other revolutionary movements in subse-
quent periods. His importance however lies in the three-stage type of 
historical interpretation he inaugurated. This three.:..stage model wa.s 
to be copied in the idealist philosophies of Lessing, Schellings· Fichte 
and to a lesser extent Hegel. Similarly Auguste Comte's division of 
history into phases ascending from theol0 gical~ through metaphysical, 
and culminating in a scientific era, illustrates the hold Joachim's 
schema exercised on subsequent minds, It can similarly be seen to reappear 
in Marx's theory of histor)'" as consisting of three.main epochs - primitive 
communism, class society and final corrmmnism. Coh-::i can also hear an echo 
from the Joachite past in the Nazi phrase "Third Reich" and the belief 
that it was going to last for a thousand years. (115) 
The conclusion we are dravm to is that the promise of a future golden age 
to replace present wrongs holds a great appeal for the minds of men in 
different periods. It can also exert enormous emotional and political 
influence when used by those seeking to gain power. The liberation being 












strong resemblance to Joachim's projected third epoch of love, joy and 
freedom. When in addition to the offer of such sought-after gains 
tl.1e prediction is made that the new age is about to break in then the 
mixture can prove to be a potent brew. As Holtmann has observed, 
"When freedom is near, the chains begin to gall" (116) 
This comment is well illustrated by the events which followed the teach-
of Thomas Mi.intzer. A learned man, Muntzer was a contemporary of 
Luther in the early sixteenth century. At first he supported Luther but 
soon broke away and became a bitter opponent of the great. reformer. 
The apocalyptic element that Muntzer adopted in particular was the theme 
that the last days were at hand and God was speaking directly to his 
-elect. The Turks were soon to conquer the world and the Antichrist 
would rule over it, but the elect were then to rise up and annihilate 
the ungodly. The elect were those who had received the Holy Spirit, "the 
living Christ" who was distinct from the historical Christ. 
Muntzer counselled intense ascetic self-mortification in preparation for 
direct communication with God. When the Holy Spirit comes to a person 
thus prepared he becomes a vessel of the Holy Spirit, and such a person 
is thus given complete knowledge of Godfs will, lives in perfect harmony 
with it and is consequently able to fulfil the divinely ordained eschato-
logical mission. Hi.intzer claimed that he himself was in this condition. 
His teachings appealed particularly to the poor, who were ever eager to 
hear and follow one who promised better things to come. At Allstedt 
people flocked from the surrounding countryside to hear him. These he 
formed into a revoluti0'1.ary movement which he called the "League of the 
Electll in opposition to Luther's university influence. A new Reformation 
in which Allstedt was to replace. Wittenberg, was foretold, and this 
reformation, claimed Muntzer, would be total and final. It would usher 




















The revolutionary nature of his eschatological beliefs was clearly stated 
\ 
in the sermon he preached before Duke John in July 1524. Basing it on the 
Book of Daniel he declared thc-.o.!: the last of the world empires was now 
91 
approaching its end and that theworld was the empire of the devil. Priests, 
monks and ungodly rulers all needed to die, claimed Muntzer. "The sword is 
necessary to exterminate them. And so t~.at it shall be done honestly and 
properly •••• our dear fathers the princes must do it •••• If they resist let 
them be slaughtered without merc.y ••• At the harvest time one must pluck the 
weeds out of God's vineyard". (118) However Muntzer had little to say 
about the nature of the future society and apparently did little to improve 
the material lot of the peasants amongst whom he lived, What is clear is 
that he foresaw a state in which property and goods would be held in common 
and each would receive according to his needs. 
In 1525 Muntzer was able to stir an army l)f peasants 5000 strong into 
revolt against the princes, They were massacred and Mi.;ntzer was behc::aded 
after battles at Frankenhausen an<l Hulilhausen. 
Muntzer is perhaps the classic example of premillenial revolutionary 
chiliasm. He has been accused, in his insistence on precipitating the 
millenium by coercive h-:.iman action of a "Promethean snatching of the 
stuff of divinity out of: heaven" and of holding a Gnostic Christology 
and. soteriology, (119) De.spite these heretical tendencies Muntzer 
enjoys favour amongst the modern advocates of liberation by violence. 
In assessing his importance Matheson declares: "For the Marxist his impor-· 
tance lies in his a~;areness of so~icll injustice and above all in.his 
analysis of the use and abuse of power-poli.tica1., ecunomic and cultural. 
For all its 1.mconscious romanticisn.1 there :i.s much to be said for this view". 
(120) 











usually made on the basis of the ideological bias of the commentator. 
He has been acclaimed by Marxists as "the Theologian of Revolution", 
and Bloch begins his biography of Muntzer with the statement: "M"untzer 
is, first of all~ history in a productive sense; he, his life and 
work, and all the past that merits recording, has the function of obli-
gating us, inspiring us, to support ever more broadly what we were meant 
to be". ~121) 
/ 
From an Anabaptist standpoint. Goertz has concluded that Muntzer was. 
basically a mystic who believed that when a believer received salvation 
or the Spirit this was a paradigm of what happened in the political spec-
trum. A transformation in the inner life, for M~ntzer, necessitated a 
corresponding change in power relationships. Mysticism could be fused 
with apocalypticism. (122) 
The significance of Muntz.er for this study :i.s that he repre2ents one 
possible response to the apocalyptic interpretation of history. This 
response affirms the eschatological nature of human history, declaring 
that man has a place and a role to play in the creation of history:unde;.-
God. As against the passive role of the Church castigated by Miguez 
Bonino, Muntzer was prepared to take hold of human affairs. Believing 
in the future inbreaking of God into terrestrial events, he sought to 
bring in the promised age of socialistic egalitarianism and righteousness 
looked forward to for so long by the poor and the oppressed. Muntzer was 
prepared to write history "from unde~:i.eath11 and, in doing so so to see 
himself as an agent and co-worker with God. 
The apocalyptic interpretation of history, despite its inherent weaknesses 
in being devoid of any ethical emphasis and of denying man a rule in the 
creation of the promised future, can nevertheless become a powerfully 












and im.rninent irruption of the eschatologic::il kingdom. Left in its pris-· 
tine biblical form it can lead to a renunciation of political and social 
responsibility every bit as quietist as the dualism of tradi:::ional theo-
logy. It substitutes a tempo1:al dualisrr1 for the idealistic one and this 
switch leads t0 an important change in the psychological effect it has on 
those who acr-.ept it. When, to the insistence on tr.e imminent inbreaking 
of the future there is added, by way of amendment to the biblical schema· 
the claim that men must act to prepare for or to establish that Kingdom, 
then the possibilities of upheaval in a revolutionary situation are greatly 
increased. Such a revolutionary situation~ where millions suffer exists 
in the third world today and to a greater or lesser degree these conditions 
apply in most, if not all Latin American countries.. Liberation theology 
can be seen as a theological ref iection in such a situation which makes 
use amongst other themes of the apocalyptic emphasis on universal history. 
Apocalyptic has been restored to prominence in the main stream of con-
temporary t:heology mainly as a result of the work of Wolfhart Fannenberg 
whose aim was to re-establish history as the fundamental theme of theology. 
In order to do this Pannenberg first seeks to understand the nai:ure of 
history as revelatory event and concludes that it only becomes compre-
hensible from the viewpoiPt of its end, which is apocalyptically conceived. 
He therefore draws attention to the universality of history in the 
apocalyptic scheme. This universality of history emerged from the gradu·-
ally developing concept of the univ1.~r sal sovereignty of God which became 
explicit in the post-exilic writers. The succession of world empires 
and the theclcgical reflect:i.on on this phenomenon eave rise to this 
understanding. Pannenberg discerns an underlying unity in th8 various 
apocalyptic writings which consists of the theme that the meaning of history 
will only be completely known at its end when all will be revealed. 













will be disclosed. In Pannen.berg's view, the intervening events of 
history reveal God only indirectly. (123) 
For Pannenberg, this final cor~c;unnnati.on of the Kingdom of God, when 
understood in characteristically apocalyptic style. as innninent, is what 
gives significance to the here and now. By interpreting the teaching 
of Jesus in this way Pannenberg is able ':o unite the ethical with the 
apocalyptic an exercise which Miguez Bonino follows in the second 
' 
section of his chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engage.:. 
. 
ment" and to which we will return later. By doing this Pannenberg over-
comes the ethical weakness in apocalypticism which we have previously 
noted. 
The significance of Pannenberg' s treatment 01.: apocalyptic for this study 
is that he enables the contemporary mind to treat apo!::alyptic seriously. 
His hold affirmation of the value of its vision of universal history as 
the arena of faith and action points the way for political and liberation 
theologians to relate the insights he uncovers to their particular fr"'.me 
of reference. Whilst Pannenberg himself stops short of relating his 
theology to specific political issues his combination of apocalyptic 
with an ethical content serves to focus on the possibilities available 
to others with a more contextual interest. We shall have occasion to 
refer to Pannenberg's theology again. In the meantime we must consider 
other contributory factors wb.ich· bear. upon Miguez Boninovs theological 
enterrri.se. 
The rise of contem;::')rary politics.1 and liberation theology movements can 
be seen in part as a result of the rediscovery of the Biblical under-
standing of eschatology and apocalyptic. This renewed awareness of the 
importance and significance of history to Christian theology \•~as prompted 
by the challenge presented by the Marxist interpretation of history. 












cognizance of Marx's thought and philosophy, and to that system we 
now turn our attention. 
".. THE MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 
As we have seen the "unworldliness" of the church's traditional under-
standing oi'. history can be attributed to its captivity to idealistic 
categories. The rise of Marxism, and its appeal to proletarian man derives 
from its rejection of this interpretation of Christianity. Gollwitzer 
has summed up the situation by asking: 
"Did not the urgency of material need and the object 
lessons taught by material wDrk compel the proletarian 
to a materialistic understanding of the world, in 
contrast with which the idealism cherished by the Church 
necessarily appeared as a pale, unrealistic, misleading 
and deliberate confusion of the real issues ? Did not 
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theology interpret Christia~ fa·i th· in idealist categories, 
Platonic i~stead of Hebrew, so that it was easy to take 
Christianity for a special kind of idealist world-view ?'' (126) 
It is this id(~alist world-view of Christianity as it relates to history 
and its effects in the renunciation of h.istorical responsibility which 
Miguez Bonino is seeking to correct. 
At the same time the Marxist view of history evolved out of the philosophical 
' 
speculations of idealist thought in the mid-nineteenth century. This line 
of reasoning had been developed via Descartes (125), Kant (126), Fichte 
(127), and Schelling (128). Idealism is dualistic and in dividing reality 
into two separate entities it gives rise to the .dichotomy of reality which 
appears in Descartes who postulated a self-contained mechanistic world of 
matter· completely divorced from the world of mind or spirit. The problem 
becomes acute when the separation of 'spirit' from 'nature' leads philosophers 
or theologians to clo~he Christianity with idealistic and therefore dualistic 
garments. Whether idealism leads to theism or not the effect has been the 
same. The British Harxist, John Lewis has described the result: 











grappling with the problems of the actual world, whether social or 
scient.if ic. (129) Furthermore j_t creates an attitude which discour-
ages any attempt to improve or reform the social milieu. This plays 
into the hands of those who benefit materially from the status quo and 
is exactly what we have seen to be the situation in Latin 1'.merica, 
In Marxist circles idealism is seen as the "a1.ly of clericalism and 
superstition'' (130). This, however, is a superficial assessment. When 
the German idealist movement was a new and developing school of thought 
it was calling into question the philosophy it was replacing in the same 
way as the teaching of Marx criticized and replaced idealism itself. 
But it has to be admitted, with Gollwitzer, that in so far as Christinity 
was expounded in idealist categories an inaccurate picture was drawn 
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and a weakened form of faith was communicated. The force of Miguez Bonino's 
contention that history is one, and his assertion that man rnust be 
invol,1ed in a historical project can be gauged frorr1 these criticisms of 
the traditional Christian approach to hi~tory. If we are to follow the 
Marxist rejection of idealism and idealistic versions of faith ·we need 
to see first how idealism developed in the thought of HegeL The reason 
for this is that in Hegel idealism reached its full flowering before 
turning into the historical materialism of Karl Marx. 
Fundamental to Hegelianism is the principle of the dialectic. He tried 
to show how the identity between Nature and Spirit which.Schelling had 
spoken of was achieved through the resolution of the contradiction of 
opposites in a gradually ascending scale. (131) 
Hegel evolved the notion that pure concepts give rise to each other by 
means of three stages of formulation: thesis~ antithesis and synthesis. 











within itself inadequacies which lead to tht:. assertion of its antithesis. 
These polarities then inevitably produce a tension which is resolved 
by the development of a third concept, or synthesis of the preceding 
elements, The synthesis is necessarily of a higher order than the previous 
thesis. The process then begins again, for the first synthesis now becomes 
the thesis of a new and higher triad. (132) 
The succession of polarities is the basis for Hegel's dialectic of his-
tory. Each stage of history, he believed, contained within itself the 
contradictions which brought about its own destruction or dissolution 
which in turn led to its transformation into a new and superior stage. 
History, for Regel, was the sphere where.the eternal ideas of divine reason 
appear in dialectical succession within time and finitude. 
In his Lectures on the Phi.~osophy of History he outlined four such stages 
of world history. (133) These he called the Oriental, the Greek~ the 
Roman and finall Y the Germanic which for Hegel was the age in which 
human spirit reached full maturity. Each of these perio<ls~ Hegel contended, 
had some essential principle which characterized it but which also led to 
its breakdown and ensured that it was succeeded by some better principle 
in the next phase. These principles have a successive order like the 
stages in rational reflect:'._on, proceeding dialectically from a simple 
and inadequate understanding to an increaingly complex view with a 
number of different aspects to its truth. In attributing the eYents of the 
historical process to a dialectical ,,•,quence or rhythm Hegel was of 
course, postulating a determinism. This was in line with the Enlightenmerlt 
tendency to discover the natural laws at work in the universe. It was 
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also~ however~ a restatement of the pre-Enlighteruaent theology of providence. 
For God~ Hegel substituted the term 11World Spirit", and in place.of the 












This was for Hegel~ a transcending purpose that function~d in, over 
and behind the conscious actions of historical figures, and this sense 
of a transcending purpose was to all intents and purposes an idealist 
rational version of the theological concept of providence. Carr has 
suwJUed up this aspect of He8el's position well with the statement 
"Hegel's Wo::'.'ld Spirit grasps providence firmly with one hand and reason 
with the other". (135) 
In his dialectical progression of epochs and his concept of the "Horld 
Spirit" Hegel utilized and developed Schelling's ideas of development 
in the Absolute. The idea, which came to the fore in Fichte, of subject 
and object seeking a synthesis in infinite progress has been transcribed 
on to the stage of world history by Hegel, Fichte 1 s creative subj ec·· 
tivity emerges here as well, for to present Hegel's view of history as 
a simple, thoroughgoing determinism, is a very one-sided perspective of 
a complex and dialect:i_cal formulation of the interlocking forces at work 
in history. For alongside the "cunning 0f reason" at work in the his-
torical processes Hegel also lays stress on the development of human 
creativity. 
In The Phenomenology o~ Spirit with its complicated thought patterns 
and its confusing juxtaposition of the developmental phases of mind as 
mere schemata with the cor:cesponding actual phases in the history of 
culture, Hegel develops the notion of the importance and role of human 
labour. 
His reasoning may be summarized as follows. He began from the awareness 
of experiencing a desire to appropriate objects. This was linked with the 
awareness of inhabiting a wcrld of work and artefacts. This world around 
was a world of people in society, and the relations between these people 
were expressed in work. He came to the conclusion that man :t.s an economic 












environment in. which he lives. In so doing he negates the world as it 
is, by changing it into a i-10rld of objects. In this action he transforms 
the world by means of his labour. 
For Hegel, it was through the application of human labour that man 
developed the human spirit and achieved the freedom he sought. Looked 
at from this perspective man's labour and struggle can be regarded as 
the means by which he raised himself. Here we can see the source from 
which Marx was later to derive his theory of the proletariat and the 
idea of labour as the demiurge of history. -(i~6) 
In Hegel's complex teaching we find certain other themes which were to 
be taken up by Marx and developed into his historical materialism. The 
first of these is the use of the dialectic which affirms that it is 
through contradiction, negation and struggle that man arrives at a new 
stage in the achievement of freedom. The second derives from the context 
in which HegeJ. worked out his philosophy. He did this by reflecting on 
the French Revolution which proclaimed the right of every person to t~ 1 ~e 
part in the creation and control of the society of which he was a part. 
Henceforth the common people were to assert themselves in the events of 
history and the role of the proletariat was to achieve increasing 
significance. (137) A third theme was the importance cf man's work 
as a transforming and creative activity in human existence. Through his 
labour man transforms his world and educates himself. The fourth aspect 
is his stress on the importance of man's passage from the awareness of 
freedom to its achievement. In doing so man seeks to be free from 
alienation and subs~rvience. 
·We find these themes being taken up by Karl Marx who developed his inter-
pretation of history from the Hegelian scheme. Marx~ however, rejected 
the idealism with which Hegel's thought had been impregna:=ed and instead 













"is n0t only different from the Hegelian but is its 
direc~ opposite. To Hegel the life process of the 
human brain, i.e. the process of thiriking, which 
under the name of 'the Idea 1 he even transforms 
into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the 
real worl.d, and the re~l world is only the external, 
phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the con-
trary, the ideal is nothing else than the material 
world reflected by the human mind and translated 
into forms of thought •••• The mystification i;-;rhich 
dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means pre-
vents hi.rn from being the first to present its general 
form of working in a comprehensive and conscious 
manner. With him it is standing on its head. It 
mu.st be turned right side up again if you would dis-
co·ver the rational kernel within the mystical shell". (138) 
Marx took the materialism of Feuerbach and married it to the dialectic 
of Hegel. His stages of world history were economic stages and it was 
part of the unfolding dialectical evolutionary task of history to 
expose and refute the idealistic expositions which had gone before. 
In a well-known passage he declares: 
·"The task of i1istory, therefore, once the world beyond 
· the truth has· disappeared, is tc· establish the Truth 
of· this i:7orld. The immediate· task of philosophy-· -
which i.sat"" the service of history···-oncethe-"SaIIltly 
form of human self-alienation has been unmasic.ed, is 
tot!mnask self-aiienation in its unholy forms. Thus 
the criticism of heaven turns into the -·criticism 
of the earth, the criticism of religion into the 
criticism of right-;-and the cridCisr:t of theology into 
the criticism of politics''. Cl39) 
In the place of the dualism inherent in idealistic philosophy Marx's 
historical materialism is essentially monistic. For him the fundamen-
tal determinative reality, which is sufficient to c.ccount for the 
origin of all other aspects of human existence, is the production of 
the necessities of ~.ife by means of human labour. His anthropology 
therefore is· based on th.e pre.suppositions that man is first a '.vorking 
being, and secoP.dly that his distinguishing mark is to rr,ake tools with 
which to do that work. (140} The changes that take place in ~ociety 
are consequent upon the improvements man maker. to his toois and the 












Marx affirms: 11Man himself, viewed as the impersonation of labour-
power, is a natural object, a thing, although a living conscious thing, 
and labour is the manifestation of this power residing in hint" . (141) 
He claims therefore that labour~ or as he would prefer to designate it, 
labour-power, is the ultimate reality. 
The key to h:~tory, according to Marx, is the diale~tical pattern of the 
changes in the economic base. In Marx's way of thinking all things 
are in a state of flux, change and movement. This applies alike to 
natural, social and conceptual phenomena. Nothing is a finished entity 
in itself. Moreover there are intricate inter-relationships between 
phenomena, and these, too, are part of the pattern of restlessness, 
agitation and becoming. 11There is a continual movement of growth in 
productive forces, of destruction in social relations and of formation 
in ideas; there is nothing immutable but the abstraction cf the move-
'ment -. mars immortalis" (142) 
Following Hegel's thought, Marx also saw the struggle of opposites and 
contradictions and the consequent emergence of the new and superior in 
the synthesis. Marx however "exteriorized11 the principle and combined 
it with the materialism prPviously noted. For him the true. reality 
is in the actual phenomena themselves as they are apprehended in sense·-
perception, and the ideas of them are but reflections of the physical 
world. Because reality is external to the human mind it is therefore 
scientific, and the dialectical method is a scientific approach to 
historical phenomena. 
In ~articular Marx utilized this concept of the dialectical nature of 
historical change in his analysis of the social processes as these have 
been fashioned and shaped by economic: influences. He expended much time 
and energy applying this theory to the forces at work in the capitalist 












and primitive societies an<l then into the f 1_:ture projecting in advance 
the arrival through the dialectical process of what he conceived would be 
conununist society. This would come about because the capitalist system, 
true to his dialectical theory, embodies.withir.. itself the contradiction 
which would ensure its own decay and overthrow. This contradiction was 
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the alienation of the working class. The antithesis or negation of 
capitalism would come in the consciousness of the workers, which conscious-
ness would lead them to revolutionary activity and subsequently give rise 
to socialism, 1.;rhich would then be the negation of the negation. 
In Marx's understanding it was essential for the economic conditions to 
have ripened in order for the revolution to take place. There had to 
be a convergence of material circumstances ~,,hich precipitated the end of 
capitalism and the present world-order. Man himself could not produce 
this convergence by seeking to take the initiative in speeding up change. 
Even the proletariat could not do that. The economic forces had to 
develop to A. pitch of intensity for authentic revolution to have any 
possibility of succeeding. 
Marx was ccnvinced that in this dialectic he had discovered the laws of 
historical change. History was not shaped by divine powers, nor by 
great persons, and it did not happen by sheer chance. Hen created it, 
mostly unconsciously, within the dialectical movements which were conse-
quently the laws of the historical process. 
If the forces of history are moving inexorably towards the dissolution 
of capitalist society and the establishment of con7:unism it follows that 
Marx is seeking to hold out the promise of a. glorious future to mankind. 
His thesis is that capitalism has, in true dialectical fashion, the in-
herent contradiction within itself that will bring about its own disso-











engendered. tfuilst throughout the previous stages of history the 
accumulation of wealth has always resulted in poverty for the worker-s 
and wealth, prosperity and culture for their oppressors only capitalism 
has created the ~aterial preconditions which will lead to the removal of 
this oppression by the workers themselves. Marx describes the process 
as follows~ 
"Along with the constantly diminishing number of the 
magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all 
advantages of this process of transformation, grows 
the mass misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, 
exploitation, but with this too grows the revolt of 
the working class, a class always increasing in num-· 
bers and disciplined, uniteds organised by the very 
mechanism of the process of capitalist production 
itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter 
upon mode of production, which has sprung up and 
flourished along with, and under it. Centralisa-
tion of the means of production und socialisation 
of labour at last reach a point where they become 
incompatible with their capitalist integument. 
This integument is burst asunder. The knell of 
capitalist private property sounds. The expropria-
tors are expropriated. 
The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of 
the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist 
private property. This is the first negation of 
individual private property, as founded on the labour 
of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, 
with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own 
negation. It is the negation of the negation''. (143) 
Herein, then, lies Marx 1 s view of the future of capitalism. On. the one 
hand the dialectical forces within the system would ensure its collapse. 
On the other, the class stri.1ggle would come to its climax and the 
proletariat would rise in revolution. Again it is to be noted that 
Marx nowhere laid down the a('.tual economic conditions that would presage 
the downfall of capi.~~aiism, a fact first pointed out by Rosa Luxemburg, 
(144) who tried to make good this deficiency with her theory of accumu-· 
lat ion. 
For Marx, the proletarian revolution, to which he urged the workers, 












represented ~or him th~ end of pre-history. History proper was about 
to begin. Garaudy explains, "For ~us, Communism is not the end of his-
tory, but the end of prehistory, man's prehistory which is made up of 
jungle·- like encounters common to ail class societies". (145) 
It was Marx's firm conviction therefore t:hat communism was coming. More-
over it was coming not just as an ideal to be hoped for - it was a reaI 
movement which was even then in its birth-pangs and would finally destroy 
the present order. What he envisaged was not merely a restructuring 
of the present system but the establishment of a new one. Ushered in by 
an unprecedented revolution "Socialism is Ii.ovissimus,the end of history as 
it has hitherto been known, and the beginning of the adventure of 
mankind." (146) 
The first step is for the proletariat to g&in power and this it will do 
by revolution. The dream goes on: "The proletariat will use its politi-
cal supremacy to wrest, by degrees, :ill capital from the bourgeoisie, 
to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, 
i.e. of the proletariat organized as the ruling class, and to increase 
the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible". (147) The hope 
is that the system of inequality and oppression~ greed and poverty will 
be supplanted by a redistribution of the world's wealth and goods on a 
more equitable basis. 
The so<alist cause, though initiated by the working class is for and 
on behalf of all mankind. Since the proletariat had suffered the most 
inhuman degredations and privations it wa.s tc be conscious of its missio1i. 
on behalf of all humanity. But Harx held firmly to t:he belief that: the 
capitalist was every bit as alienated as the labourer and that communism 
was therefore to embody the liberation. of all people. Communist society· 












proletariat does not merely substitute itself for the bourgeoisie but 
eliminates both itself and its opposition. Connnunist society was to be 
the "classless society". One of the features of the new society would 
be the abolition of private property. Individual property would replace 
capitalist private property. (148). 
Other consequences following on the establishment of connnunist society 
would be the elimination of the state, (149) and the demise of conflict 
between individuals (150) , Furthermore there will be the maximum 
development of the full potential in each person (151) the abolition 
of the division of labour (152) the regaining by man of his true nature 
which had been i1'.lpaired by the alienation inherent under a capitalist 
system (153) and the full humanization of man (154) • In Marx's utopian 
vision man, thus liberated from his subjugatinn to the tyrrany of the pro-
ductive forces and the enslaving relations they create, will become not 
only fully individual man, restored man, and social man, but also univer-
sal man. In the Grurtdrisse: Marx descri"'.Jes this dimension by saying: 
"The basis as the possibility of the universal 
development of individuals; the real development 
of individuals from this basis as the constant 
abolition of each limitation conceived of as a 
limitation and not as a sacred boundary. The 
universality of the individual not as thought 
or imagined, but as the universality of his real 
and ideal relationships. Man therefore becomes 
able to underst;md his own history as a process 
and to conceive of nature (involving also practical 
control over it) and his own real body". (155) 
In Marx 1.s scheme we can now delineate certain significant features. 
The first of these is the rejection of the idealist interpretation of 
history in favour of a thoroughgoing materialism. Ideas deve.lop from 
the relationships created by the economic modes of production as do 
ideologies, culture and religion. 












making being is the creator of history. Responsibility for change is 
entirely in man's hands. ·when he changes his mod~ of production man 
changes his whole social, cultural and political configuration. There-
fore he has it within his power to initiate change. Where he finds him-
self in a situation of oppreRsion and exploitation - as do the proleta-
riat in a t;c;:pitalist system - he can bring about change by means of revolu-
tion. 
A third element Marx emphasizes in the historical process is the dia-
lectical nature of historical change. This means that there is a certain 
determinism at work and that change comes about under certain patterns 
or laws. This aspect underlines the dynamic nature of history. 
The fourth feature we need to single out is Marx's eschatology. The 
promise cf a future libe~ated society is in fact a secularized eschatology. 
This fulfils a utopian role in Marx's scheme in the sense that it motivates 
men to seek change and creates the desire to achieve thei:::- liberation. 
It provides the momentum therefore, for ti.istorical innovation. This is 
the same aspect which we have found in the apocalyptic interpretation. 
Then fifthly, Marx designates the proletariat as the savJ.our of the 
human race, and i.n so doing gives to ther:i a sense of dest:iny and imper-· 
tance when they perceive their role as a messianic calling. 
A further aspect of Marxist teaching is that it provides a description 
of the forces at work in industrial society. In doing so he expos 0 ~ 
the enormous power (generated under capitalism) of economic forces to 
exercise control over cultural, religious, social and political dis-
positions. 
In Marxism then, we find a system which offers a secular alternative to 
much that Christianity had hitherto claimed to provide. Marx expounded 











millions of people toiling in industrial society with little hope of 
ever improving their material lot, a worldview moreover which offered an 
enthropology~ a soteriology, and an eschatology, combined with a 
messianism and an overriding humanism. In short Marx gave a description 
of present circumstances which was· recognizably accurate, a vision for 
the future ~-;hich lifted men 1 s minds to the possibility of improving them-
selves and a hope which could motivate them to do so. 
The widespread influence of Marxism and what Kirk calls its 11 perennia.1 
fascination" (156) are factors that do not need elaboration here. What 
we do need to note however is· the effect which Marxism has had on the 
development of theological reflection and its role in the fornn1lation of 
liberation theology in particular. The Christian-I:farxist dialogue which 
took place in Europe in the nineteen~ifties and sixties posed certain chal-
lenges to theologians. In particular it was the thought of Ernst Bloch 
which helped theologians to come to grips with the challenge of the 
Marxist interpretation of history. 
With the possible exception of Roger Garaudy, Bloch more than any other 
philosopher from the Marxist. side of the debate was able to discern a 
correspondence between Christian concepts and the Marxist approach to 
history. (157) Like Marx, Bloch explored Hegel's dial~ctical method and 
saw that its value lay not, as Hegel himself conceived, in the dialectical 
evolution of Spirit as reality but ra.ther in the creation of concrete 
historical determinism of the orthodox Marxist teaching. With te~.:..ing 
simplicity allied to c:.lmosl mystical insight he c:ombined idealist and 
materi.s.list strains, juxtaposing the idealist contemplative role with the 
materialist revolut:i.ona.ry, and perceiving the relation between biblical 
and Marxist insights into the nature of history. Bloch perceived also the 












Before Marx there was either selfish materialism or an in-
effective idealism in the guise of "a misunderstood Jesus". (158) · 
Bloch believes that the genius of Marx was that he 11at last created sepa-
rate sensitivities; to externality which so easily hardens the heart, 
and to the goodness of a man who would bring freedom by himself alone. 
Only afterw1rds does he unite the two; he is guided simultaneously, so 
to speak, by Jesus with a whip and the Jebus of brotherly love". (159) 
In contrast therefore to Marx, Bloch can see the validity of a religion 
stripped of its usual id~alistic interpretation. His futurism, to which 
we shall return later, readily re~theologizes into eschatology, without 
losing the Marxist emphasis on praxis. Bloch's aim is to ontologize human 
hope and·by so doing, he is able to pave the way for theologians to his-
toricize God, so to spea~ in the future. God thus becomes not a static 
being in the realm of eternity but the power of the future. 
Bloch stresses the idea incipit vita nov~s a new life begins. It is not 
the return to, or renewal of a previous :i.if e. It is essentially novum -
that which has never been before. This he finds symbolized cultically 
both in the mystery religions and in Christian baptism. However, the 
really new derives solely from the Biblical revelation and in particular 
from the resurrection. In contrast to the cyclical renewal of the mystery 
religions the resurrection is located in linear time, and was completely 
without analogy in previous history. Bloch says: 
"Instead it emerged in its own right, as a novum 
in time; as if before Jesus there had been nothing 
in any way really new, but only longing for, and 
suggestions and expectations of this one new thing •••• 
and ~o) for the Christian consciousness, incipit 
· vita nova had its unique. starting·-point in history, 
which was 1.:hronically identifiable as 'under Pontius 
Pilate'. So that when the divine helper (the Paraclete) 
appeared at the end of history (John 16:7) the same 
new beginning would start the process of complete 
renewal in which not one stone would be left upon 
another". (160) 












the ultimum with the novum and not exclusively a primum". (161) Bloch 
however does not leave the incipit vita nova on the purely personal, 
subjective level. His vision is utopian and in a later passage more in 
keeping with his Marxist presuppositions he declares: "The form of 
incipit vita nova which is attached to the present respects immediate 
ends enclcced within the possible range of a human life, they must at the 
same time set: their sights on the distant goal of a society without aliena-
tion". (162) It is possible to see in this line of thinking h0w Bloch 
overcomes the idealist problem of historical dualism. In so doing he also 
enables Moltmann and Pannenberg to discard the traditional concepts of a 
God conceived in the conventional metaphysical categories of being and to 
rediscover the biblical concept of a universal and unitary history. 
Bloch's thought has therefore served as a catalyst for much present-day 
theological reflection., includinP' that of Miguez Bonino. 
5. THE THEOLOGICAL ANTECEDENTS OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY 
The bridge between Marxism of Bloch and the liberation theology of 
Miguez Bonino is provided by the political theology of Moltmann and Hetz. 
Like Bloch, Holtmann stresses the future as the factor which determines the 
present and by utilizing the insights of Von Rad, is abl.e to break away 
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from Greek philosophical categories in fashioning a Christian interpretation 
of history. 
He affirms that the prophetic view of history as proclaimed in the Old 
Testament is the starting point for :a Christian understanding of the 
historical process. He goes on to develop his theology in the categories 
of promise, hope and rhe new creation. (163) 
Holtmann accepted the Marxist criticism that the church had neglected the 












seeks theref':'re to re-theologize the future hope emphasized by Bloch. What 
in Marxism had become secularized must according to Holtmann be re-introduced 
into theology in such a way that Christians can commit themselves not only 
to a future life hereafter but to a future before the hereafter. We will 
return to this theme later. 
Holtmann similarly took the Marxist point. that it is both necessary aiv~ 
possible to overcome the sufferings and contradictions of the present social 
order. This is a presupposition which as we have seen, Miguez Bonino a.nd 
the liberation theologians of Latin America have also adopted as theit· 
starting point. 
For Holtmann hope is a call to pierce beyond present viewj)oints in order to 
change the existing soeial reality, Like Bloch and other Marxists, he 
believes that hope is "a basis for constructing a ne''' image of society 
which will challenge the claim that present society has reached a harmonious 
state". (164) This change, however, cannot be brought about as a result 
of a purely factual technological study of existing conditions. Toge~~er 
with Marxism, HOltmann perceives that an ideological viewpoint is 
necessary. 
Moltmann furthermore goes along with the Narxist claim that the economic 
forces which dominate contemporary man are the root cause of his alienat:ion 
and oppression. 
Like higuez Bonino, 11oltmann's use of Marxism is a dialectical one. He 
criticizes the inadequate humanistic basis to which he believes Marxism is 
tied. This was de1:iv.ed from itssources in Feuerbach and the Enlightenment 
and has led to the divinization of man and the conc.:e.pt of the authentic 
society. 
Moltmann also criticizes Marxism on the score that its 2-::count of human 












condition. Holtmann recognizes that to substitute one set of working 
conditions for another will not get to the cause of Man's internal tensions. 
We will see, in chapter four~ that Miguez Bonino reiterates this criticism 
of Marxism. 
Moltmann's third main: criticism of Marxism is that the priority of praxis 
over theory is impossible. He believes that "we must also ask whether the 
critical analysis of man's misery, and practical attempts to alter it could 
ever be completed without such conceptual patterns, ·which extend beyond 
experience and beyond the success of the practical attempts." (165) Here 
there is some degree of divergence between Moltmann and Niguez Bonino (166), 
for liberation theology generally places a firm emphasis on praxis as the 
locus of truth. 
The significance of Moltmann1 s theology for this study, then, lies primarily 
in his willingness to accept much of the Han{ist criticism of the idealistic 
understanding of reality that has ;:iermeated much Christian thought aud 
practice, Picking up the category of hope from Bloch, Holtmann has begun 
to fashion a theology which represents a rad:?.cal departure from the 
existentialist offerings of Bultmann. By wedding Bloch and Von Rad, so to 
speak, Mal tmann has bE2en able to reconcile God, man and history in a creative 
and dialectical way. By dispensing v.rith the dualism with which Christian 
theology had become involved, Moltmann has set the stage for the "History 
is Oni=~" plea which is strongly advocated by Miguez Bonino and his fel1m1-
liberationists. 
Metz focusses on the fact of secularization, claiming that the church 
should accept it since the characteristics of plur~lism, openness to the 
future, pragmatism and post-atheism are al.l aspects which correspond to 
a Christian understanding of the world, For Hetz the Christian view of 











tiator and dynamic principle. He says: 
"We must bring together that which has been so long 
disastrously separated: Namely Transcendence (God), 
and the Future, because this orientation toward the 
future is demanded by the biblical faith and message 
itself." (167) 
Metz therefore postulates a unified view of reality in which God and the 
world are nevertheless distinct and separate. As in Moltmann, God is :-1ot 
U2 
conceived of in metaphysical and atemporal categories. Commenting on Hetz's 
position, Kirk says: 11Transcendence has been converted into event. 
History is real, for God has accepted the world in his Son". (168) 
Thus Metz arrives at a similar conclusion to that of M.oltmann, though by 
a different process of reasoning. What in Hegel had been the dialectic 
of Spirit and in Marx the dialectic of historical and economic forces has 
become the dialectic of God and history. The dualism of Augustinianism 
has been overcome by the monism of Marxism and the groundwork of what 
Miguez Bonino was to assert about the unity of history was being laid. (169) 
Another potent influence on the development of Miguez Bonino's thought on 
this issue is that 6f Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Like Miguez Bonino, Bonhoeffer 
was concerned to repudiate the dualistic theology so prevalent in the 
Augustinian tradition, and cited three instances of this trend. (170) The 
first was the scholastic s:heme of nature and grace in which the realm 
of the natural becomes subordinate to the realm of grace. The second was 
the Lutheran division of reality into two kingdoms which resulted (as we 
have seen) in the autonomy of the oril,_;rs of this world being set in 
opposition to the law of Christ. The third example was the congregation 
·of the elect .. (under Thomas Hiintzer) who struggled against a hostile world 
to establish God's Kingdom on earth. Bonhoeffer 1 s descrip'tion of the 











"In all these schemes the cause of Christ becomes a 
partial and provincial matter within the limits 
of reality. It is assumed that there are realities 
which lie outside the reality that is in Christ. It 
follows that thes~ realities are accessible by some 
way of their ovm, and otherwise than through Christ. 
However great the importance which is attache~l to 
the reality in Christ, it still always remai~~ a 
partial reality amid other realities". (171) 
Such an idea runs cou1tter to Bonhoeffer's concept of reality. He is 
thoroughly convinced that such a dualism. is against both the Biblical 
and Reformation principles. The result of such dualism is that man sban-
dons reality as a whole and sets himself in one or the other of the two 
spheres. This means that he either has Christ without the wo:cld or the 
world without Christ. If he tries to bridge the gap by standing in both 
spheres at once he becomes "the man of eternal conflict". (1~2) 
Bonh~effer grounds his notion of reality in Christology, which is regar-
ded by most commentators as the key to his whole theology. (173) For 
him the point of departure for ethics is not tb.e reality of the world 
or of the self but of "God as He reveals himself in Jesus Christ". (174) 
This is a word of revelation which God has already spoken. In this re-· 
velational reality alone lies the good, because this alone is the real, 
and it is a concrete not an abstract reality. In this way Bonhoeffer 
sees the unity of the reality of the world with the reality of God. The 
former possesses its reality only through the reality of God which is the 
ultimate reality. Christ reconciles what in idealism are the irreconcil-· 
able - !:he ideal (or standard) and things as they actually are - what ought 
to be and what is. For Bonhoeffer the inner meaning of God's revelation 
in Christ is that here the two realities are reconciled. "The reality of 
God" he says, discloses itself only by setting me en;_irely in the reality 












sustained, accepted and reconciled in the ~eality of God". (175) 
Such a notion supercedes and abolishes all idealism and cancels out the 
dualistic concepts of reality. Such dualism is a false representation 
which regards the separate spheres as "ultimate ·static antitheses" (176) 
and such a static way of approaching things leads inevitably to thinking 
in terms of :!aws. Luther's "two kingdoms" have to be seen and held to-
gether in a polemical unity which Bonhoeffer believes is how Luther on.~ 
ginally intended the idea. (177) Bonhoeff er thus conceives of the 
world, the profarLe or secular as taken up into the ultimate reality which 
is Christ since they have no separate reality outside of His reality._ 
This unity of reality is realized concretely afresh in the life of men,. 
The result is that the life of the Christian, and therefore of the 
Christian con:nnunity is not one of withdrawal from the world for the s2.ke 
of the pursuit of an otherworldly spirituality, but rather of immersion 
in the world where the reality of God and the world are reconciled. In 
this sense Christians are worldly, participating fully in the history-
making process of worldly engagement. 
The Christian does not have to be the man of eternal conflict but, "just 
as the reality in Christ is one, so he too, since he shares in this 
reality in Christ, is himself an undivided whole. His worldliness does 
not divide him from the world. Belonging wholly to Christ, he stands at 
the same time wholly in the world". ~l 78) 
In the world of political action then, which the liberation theologians 
have chosen as the focus of their theological reflection, there is 
(according to Bonhoeffer) no question of shunning responsibility on the 
part of individual Christians or the Christian community. If in the past~ 
a dualistic theology of history has encouraged political passivity, this 













incarnation which is the locus of the unity of the reality of the world 
and God. The Kingdom of God can only be the rule of God when it is his 
rule within the reality of the world which he has taken up into the 
ultimacy of his own reality. 
Whilst Bonhoeffer was writing in order to formulate an outline of 
ethics, the !)rinciple on which he grounds his syst2m applies equally 
well to the realm of history. In fact so well does his statement of 
the matter accord with :Miguez Bonino' s attempt to establish a Christian 
idea of history t.hat we have to keep reminding ourselves that it was 
indeed ethics that Bonhoeffer was reflecting on rather than history. 
6. MIGUEZ BONINO AND THE UNITY OF HISTORY 
Our consideration of various interpret tions of history has brought us to 
the stage where we need to recapitulate some of our main findings before 
we try to evaluate Miguez Bonino's own handling of the theme of the 
unity of history. Our :examination of the thought of Plato, Augustine 
and Luther revealed that there was an inherent dualism in their teachings 
which has influenced much traditional Christian theology and the attitude 
of the church to "temporaJ 11 affairs. In each of them we find a transcen-· 
deuce posited outside of history. In Bultmann on the other hand. the 
transcendence is interiorized but is no less removed from the arena of 
historical engagement. For all of these theologians, however, the sphere 
of the real, the meaningful, the eschatologically significant is not in 
history itself but in eternity, the spiritual, OL the subjective. Well 
then may Miguez Bonino assert that in Christianity as opposed to Marxism 
there has been an inclination tb passivity with regard to the shaping of 
history. This has com<:: about through the continued emphasis on the con-
ception of two worlds: ':this present, temporal, earthly one~ which had 
a preparatory, contingent, and even at points negligible value, a.nd the 












the goal for the Christian11 • (179) 
The doctrine of Providence, begun in Augustine, was an atte>npt to attri-
bute historical happenings to divine sovereignty, as was the development 
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of the idea of predestination. Calvin, however, was able to evolve a theo-
logy of providence which also stressed the significance and role of h~':nan 
responsibility in political action. From the prophetic understanding of 
history we have seen illustrations of the claim by Miguez Bonino that 
history is a conflictual interaction between God and men and that the 
prophetic witness was itself a participation in history. In addition the 
Hebrew.sense of time and of the sovereignty of God combined to create· a 
sense of the imminence of the future about to break in. The New Testament 
rings with a greater emphasis on the "now" of the saving events, together 
with a continued appeal to a future consummation. In apocalypticism we 
have seen how the emphasis on the universality of history has been combined 
with an et~ical emphasis in Pannenberg's theology to produce a convincing 
account of the unity of history and the importance of historical action. 
In Harxism our study has shown that the dualism of idealism has to. be rejec-
ted and that the dialectical interaction of economic forces propels man into 
the position of the sole creator of history. Marx eschews any notion of 
transcendence either within or outside of history whilst Bloch puts a 
biblical face on Marxism. By accepting the validity of the Marxist rejec-
tion of idealism Mol tmann and Metz : ... ·e both able to formulate a theology 
of political action which is grounded on a more biblical understanding of 
history than idealism had portrayed. Bonhoeffer's theological grounding of 
reality in Christology represents a courageous attempt, to use Meeks' words, 
"to overcome the dualism between act and being? the idealistic norms of 
natural law and the positivistic apotheosis of reality, and the. ethics of 











When Miguez Bonino refutes the dualism in much traditional theology he does 
so not only by referring to the polemical nature of history in the Old 
Testament and the problem which Gentile converts have in reconciling two 
histories in Christianity. 1n addition he draws attention to a number 
of "pointers". 
For one thing there ~.s the problem of the failures of the Church. These 
failings contradict any .alleged continuity between the Church and the 
Kingdom of God (which often arise from the Augustinian or Lutheran con-
cepts). The "history of faith11 has itself been characterized by many of 
the marks and features of the secular history which is so despised in the 
dualistic pattern of thinking. kn. empirical consideration leads to the 
conclusion that ecclesiastical and seculax history are "pretty much of 
a muchness". This known and acknowledged difficulty has given rise to 
the awkward theories about "i:he invisible· church, the· coetus elec,torum, 
and sectarian views 11 • (181) The upshot has been, however, that any 
attempt to identify the presence of the Kingdom of Go<l with the hist0~y 
of the empirical church has been._fraught with. difficulties and embarrass-
ments. 
Then secondly, Miguez Bonino speaks of "our own experience cf God's 
presence in the world and "the witness cf scripture" (182) as being 
further evidence of some continuity between the Kingdom and history as 
such. Very soon in the church's history there arose the question as to 
the eschatological fuj:ure of people who had not heard the gospel but who 
nevertheless had t:te right attitude. St. Paul made reference to this 
problem in 1 Cor. 15:29 when he replied to the Corinthians' query about 
being baptized on behalf of the dead. Clearly this primitive custom of 
vicarious baptism related to the Corinthinian Christians' fears that un-
believing relatives who died might be excluded from th·~ Kingdom. The 












Paul made to their query in expounding his doctrine of the resurrection 
clearly show that primitive Christianity was prepared to recognize the 
possibility of God's presence and power being active outside the commun-
ity of faith. 
In addition, Miguez Bonino points to the reference in 1 Peter 3:18 - 19 
on which the article of the creed relating to Christ's descent into he:l 
is largely bDsed. One of the traditional interpret~tions of the crucial 
phrase "he went and preached to the spirits in prison, who formerly did 
not obey'' is that these were people other than Christians. If this is 
accepted, then it is an indication again that the early Church believed 
that God's sovereignty extended beyond the boundaries of the Church itself. 
A further point Miguez Bonino makes is that the surprises at the last judg-
ment to which Jesus refers also indicate that any human action in love has 
esch<:tological significance, Here he is no doubt thinking of what he 
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caLLs the "eschatological inversion" in such biblical passages as the parable 
of the great assize in lfatt. 25: .'H-46, the promise by Jesus that "tax 
collectors and harlots go into the kingdom of God before you'' (Matt.21:31) 
and his declaration that in the Kingdom of God "the last will be first, and 
the first last" (Matt. 20:16) Miguez Bonino is prepared to admit that 
although these "remarks applied first and foremost to Israel, they do force-
fully suggest some continuity between general human history and .the 
kingdom". (183. 
In addition, in "Historical Praxis" hP. further points to the fact that 
the dualistic solution tends to use what he calls "a whole slew of 
biblical texts'' (184) and depands on a hermeneutical approach contrary 












"its conception of redemption is borrowed from that 
of gnostic and m~stery religions. The God of the 
prophets and of Jesus Christ can hardly be equated 
with the soter ("saviour") of such sects, for the 
latter is busy trying to populate his Olympus with 
a few select souls who have been rescued from the 
tumultuous sea of matter and human history. The 
Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles depict 
a divine mission that takes on Israel's hope (Luke 
1-2) and launches it out toward the limits of this 
earth and history through the power of the Spirit. 
The sAer of Patmos envisions all the. peoples of the 
world bringing their offerings to the heavenly Zion. 
Paul describes all creation waiting in expectation 
for the manifestation of God's children; he pro-
claims the c6llapse of all barriers, the creation 
of a new humanity, and the recapitulation of all 
things in Christ. All of these notes in the New 
Testament would seem to be incompatible with the 
straightening religious view that would make the 
histo:ry of human beings and nations irrelevant. Thus 
the 'dualistic' situation would seem to involve us 
in grave difficulties from the standpoint of biblical 
theology and its ethical and ideological functionalism". (185) 
It seems to us that whilst what Miguez Bonino says in support of these 
pointers to the continuity between God's work and human history tllay be 
true in itself the unity is net proved or disproved by these references. 
Indeed, this seems to us to be the weakest part of his l·»hole argument in 
the chapter under scrutiny, and its elaboration 111 "Historical Praxis 11 • 
The idealistic notion that reality is divided into a dualism of the ideal 
and the actual has to be rejected because the overriding ontology of 
reality in the Bible is onP. which involves a reconciliation bet.ween the 
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reality of a transcendent God and the events of man's historical pilgrimage. 
This unity was well brought out by Miguez Bonino in his account of the 
prophetic understanding of history. 
The unity of history therefore is guaranteed, not by the occasional refer-
ences to God 1 s working in events that are external to church affairs in 
the New Testmnent. It is guaranteed by the sovereignty of God and the out-
working of· that sovere.ignty in the world of men and their history. In a 











"For in the encounter with the Christ of the Gospels 
there is the assertion of a mighty living reality 
as inseparably bound up with the O.T. past as 
pointing forward into the futt.re. That which binds 
together indivisibly the two realms of the Old and 
New Testament - diffe~rent in externals though they 
may be - is the frruption of the Kingship of God into 
this world and its es'.:ablishment here. This is the 
mntive fact because it rests on the "action of one 
and the same God in each case; that God who is 
pr0mise and performance, in Gospel and Law, pur-
sues one and the self same purpose~ the building of 
his Kingdom". (197) 
This link between the Old and New Testament in their prodamation of divi.r..e 
sovereignty in history is well illustrated in the universality of history 
depicted in the apocalyptic interpretation. The apocalyptists affirmed 
the unity of history in three ways. In the first of these ways, their 
view encompassed a continuity between past~ present and future which were 
ultimately embraced within the divine purpose whate\Ter temporary setbacks 
had to be encountered. In the second place the apocalyptists affirmed 
the unity of history because it is a simple goal towar<ls which both the 
universe itself as well as the history ~f men are moving. That goal is 
the consununation of the kingly rule of God. In the third place, the 
apocalyptists follow the prophetic emphasis on monotheism and envisage 
the unity of history as "a corollary of the unity of God". (187) 
As we have seen Pannenberg makes use of the essential message of apoca-
lyptic in his theology. this Re does1woreover, by starting from a departure-
point in anthropology. Amongst other characteristics, man is open to 
that which transcends the world and this feature affects his relr.Lion to 
his own future. (18S) This gives rise to the phenomenon of hope in man. 
Following Von Rad's expounding of the prophetic hope Pannenberg draws 
attention to man as the historical animal. Israel could experience the 
continuity of the chain of events because she knew herself "to be in on 













whole understanding of the apocalyptic not.Lon of history. Notwithstanding 
the efforts of post··Enlightenment man to centre the meaning of history in 
himself this is something he can never achieve because he ia always 
trapped in his particularity. (190) The unity of history cannot be 
guaranteed by technology or the media of communication either. This, 
claims Pannc:1berg, "is still only accesible from the God of Israel 
•.•• The unity of history is established by the appearance of the end of 
all events through God's revelation in Jesus". (191) 
The end of history has a universal significance beca.u.se it is the final 
event in whic.h God is vindicated as the God of all peoples and of all 
creation., By drawing out this aspect of the apocalyptic message Pannenberg 
offers a view of the unity of history which is not only accesible. for 
contemporary man. It is also useful for liberation theology. Miguez 
Bonino, we feel 1 would establish a better basis for his theology of the 
unity of history were he to follow Pannenherg at this point. Miguez 
Bonino's usual hermeneutic.al key is the belief that God and man are 
polemically involved in the creation of history. For some reason he 
seems to depart from this method in his e.ff:ort to renounce dualism 
in the New Testament and resorts instead to the method of finding 
proof texts. The result o~ this is that he arrives at the right con-
clusion but for the wrong reasons. 
Miguez Bonino, however, is correct ir- seeking to establish a more s1gn.:i.-
ficant role for human-action than apocalyptic normally allows. He 
avows: 
"God builds his Kingdom from and within human history 
in its entirety; his action is a constant call and 
challenge to man. Man's response is realized in the 
concrete arena of history with its economic, political, 
'ideological options. Faith is not a different history 
but a dynamic, a motivation, and, in its eschatological 












Pannenberg's use of apocalyptic, however, is also rooted in the resurrec-
tion which he sees as a "prophetic revelation'' of the apocalyptic visJ_on 
of the end. He therefore focusses his concept of the unity of history 
both on the nature of God (193) and in Jesus Christ. In the final an~ 
alysis, then, his focal point is in chri~tology. 
Bonhoeffer also locates his theology of the reconciliation of the reality 
of God and the world in the christological reality. Again it seems to 
us that the references Miguez Bonino makes to the New Testament pointers 
we have mentioned would have been unnecessary if he had more faithfully 
followed Bonhoeffer. The latter's formulation is a more soundly and 
solidly based foundation on which to build the sort of ethical super-· 
structure which Miguez B:mino has in mind, Dualism has to be ove:ccome 
in incarnation. Only here can transcendenc-2 and worldly realities 
be truly combined. Well then may the Jesuit, Scannonc, say: "As Christian 
faith sees it, history has an inca.rnational structure, thanks to gracP, 
It thus is in the nature of a sign, a mystery and a sacrame11t 11 • (194) 
This is a conviction which we feel sure Miguez Bonino would be happy 
with. Indeed Miguez Bonino may have formulated his theory of history on 
the foundation laid by Bonhoeffer. J. De Santa Ana and G. Clarke Chapman 
have both drawn att.~nt:ion to the influence of Bonhoeffer on the develop-· 
ment of the theology of liberation (195). It was precisely in the 
area of overcoming dualism that Bonhoeffer was most helpful, claims De 
Santa Ana, who proceeds to show that it was through the influence of 
that the 
Protestant liberation theologians in I.at:i.n Arilerica •;v0 ~·e prompte,d to work 
out a theology whic-.h declared that "in our time God cannot be usf:d as a 
working hypothesis by which to understand reality". (197) Miguez 
:Soni.no, moreover, seems to be rnald.ng an lrnmistakci.ble allusion to the 











"At the centre of our faith there is an unavoidable 
physical and historical reality: cross, resurrection, 
the sacraments, the resurrection of the body, a new 
heaven and a new earth, Idealism ·- the attempt to 
dissolve these realities into subjective feelings, 
ideas or symbols ·- is in Christian terms a heresy, 
whether it comes in the guise of neoplatonic gnoticism~ 
spiritualistic mysticism, subjective pietism or Jiberal 
Hegelian, Kantian or existentialist philosophy ! 
011-r discussion with Harxist materialism cannot be 
e;::.gaged at this point. We must take for granted the 
reality and uppermost significanc~ of the material 
world and the material basis of human relationships 
and social processes 11 • (198) 
Miguez Bonino wrote this~ in Christians and Harxists some time after his 
earlier work, Doing Theology and it may well be a deliberate correction. 
In any event it represents a more decisively christological basis for 
his ;:ejection of idealism than the arguments he had previously adduced. 
The recognition that dualism is overcome in the reconciliation of the 
world and God in Christ a.lso leads to the affirmation of the autonomy 
of the secular as a valid sphere of activity in which God and man engage 
together in the creation of history. The clarity with which Bonhoeffer 
expounde.d this mes~;age was welcomed by Latin American Liberation theo-
logians both Catholic and Protestant, enabling them to criticize the 
dualism inherent in the 11 'split level t supernaturalist worldv~_ew" and 
the "cleric:alization that withdraws the church into a spiritual ghetto". 
(199) 
Certain important consequences follow from this view of history. The 
first of these concerns the identity of God. In an idealist scn~~e God 
is robbed of his specific identity. He becomes s,:i. object J_n our thought 
who is described in terms of his c.ttributes. In this w2y he is thought 
of apart from the act~~ns in which he comes to us, calls us, redeems us, 
judges us and liberates us. He is the idealist way of thinking about 












When the reality of God and the reality of the world are seen as a 
unity then God is t:11e "I am" who "himself defines his own identity~ 
he who is what he want::; to he for us and the world" (200). He reveals 
himself in his actions in his world. He is encountered therefore only 
where he is active, which is in history. 
The Christiar. view of history therefore locates tra:iscendence within 
history. Icle11lism portrays a transcendence beyond history 11 in eternity11 
and to which~ by contemplation and devotional practice we are to relate. 
The focus of attention is therefore outside the reality of this world. 
Similarly in the existentia}bt way of theolog:i.zing transcendence is 
located in the personal, interior subjectivity of the individual. Agaiti 
the focus of this interpretation of religion is in the authenticity of 
the person, which renders the reality of the world irrelevc:Dt, This in 
turn rend.,~r.s Goel irrelevant., ~1arxism l0c.ks any sense of t;:-anscendence, 
deliberately seeking to avoid any such notion since it might smack of 
compromise with idealism or religion. For Harx) man alone controls 
history even.though he i  subject to th2 dialectical "laws" or "processes", 
The second consequence is that in this biblical view God is working J_n 
history when he engages wii::11 man in 2.n action or anncmncement that 
involves man in an active relationship wit.h his neigh.bour and the world. 
Miguez Bonino explains: 
"There is no mani£E~staticn o-!' God in Scripture in 
.which a specific form. of act:l..Jn is not included. 
God does not §peak merely to inform or to notify: 
he speaks in order to invite, to command, to forbid 
a certain course of action. And this action is 
always related to a particular historical cont~nt -
to men, nations~ things, eve.ntsn. (201) 
In the biblical perspective therefore this is precisely what history is 
God and man in the pc•1.emica1 relation.ship we saw descr:i.bsd in the Old 












This formulation constitutes M.iguez Bcninors restatement of the doctrine 
of Providence which had largely excluded man and in so doing had denied 
him any poss:i.'uility of participating actively and creatively in any 
historical project. Eere history is seen as a dynamic process of 
action and interaction, in which God <:1.nd man conflictively and d:'._alec-
tically create the new. Upo.n this foundation it will be possible for 
Miguez Bonino to er~ct his theology of the ingdom of God as an 
eschatological reafity which is being built in, by and out of this 
interaction between God 2.nd man, 
The third consequence relates to Miguez Bonino's theological method and 
epistemoJogy. If history :Ls where God is acting in concert with man 
this action must be the source of our know1.edge of God.. In the idealist 
scheme man derived. his know1edge of Cod from revcl<?.tion ci:ad from that 
worked out deductively what· his action~ obedience, d:i.sc:i.pleship, ethics· 
had to be. From the '\->the:c worldn he obta:Lnec; an idea or i'rinciple 
which he had to work out in "this world", 1.-hguez Bonino st<J.tes; 
;;Obedience :i.s riot a 5:~equcnce,_9_f om: knowledge 
of God, just as it is not a pre-condition for it; 
ol1edience is included in our k11owl2dge of Goel. 
Or, to put it mere bluntly: obedience is our 
knowledge of God. There is not a .~ep~!3t~ noetic 
moment in our relationship to God, There is an 
imperfect fai.th, a faltering faith, but there can-
not be, in the nature of the cases a believing 
di.sobedience ..•. 11 (202) 
Therefore the unity of the reality of God. and of history locates the 
primacy of our theologic.al datum in action wLichs in the language of 
liberation theology means our praxis. Praxis is, of course, more than 
a.ction as such. It is the 0 two-way traffic that is always going on 
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between acticn and theory". (203) This :nea.ns that ~<.nowledge and therefore 
also theology is derived from the reality of God and man i.n action in 
history, Another way of saying this would be to say that our theological 











mediations of scripture and tradition on t~.at reflection. To use Brown's 
words, 
"This .•• is an ongoing task, invoi.vi1.1g our constant 
check of action at the hand of theorys theory at 
the hand of action" and it means ttnot to have a 
passive intellectual acceptance of something, hut 
an ongoing dialectical relationship with something 9 
in interchange with which both it and we are 
trapsformed". (204) 
This ties in with Miguez Bonino's description of the prophetic task 
as involving participation in the process of history itseH. It also 
relates to Marx' c avowal that the task of philosophy J.s to chan.ge the 
world rather th.:m to interpret it. 
Praxis then provides Miguez Bonino with the clue to interpret the 
biblical category around which he has chos n to build his liberation 
theology~ viz. the Kingdom of God. This hermeneutic is one of histori-
ca11y engaged praxis whic.h enables him to see the; 1<'.ingd0111 in terms of 
1'a call, a convoc.ation, a pressure that irn.pels'',, (205) This 1le;;i2.11ds 
an active engagement which is what history is and whe;:e our ki-10-v:Iedge of 
God begins. By contrast the idealist hermeneutic begins with a search 
of the Bible for truths about God and principles for ethical conduct 
which have to be deduced and then put into ope!~ation. Eul tmann' s 
existentialist hermeneutic reduces all historical action to interior 
experiences which have no c.onnection with the uni::ary reality of God and 
history. In idea1ism theology begins 11 in eternity11 , in Bul tmam; it begins 
"in me", whereas in Miguez Bonir::.o it oegins in the ecgageme!lt ' 1nen. 1112 Ke 













MAN 1 S HISTORICAL PROJECT , UNDER GOD 
The key factor in all theologi:al interpretations of history is the signi-
ficance attributed to the roles of God and man respectively. The 
idealistic schemes concentrate on subjectiv~~y and otherworldliness and 
generally consider historical action to be relatively worthless. A simi-
lar lack of emphasis on political activity is to be found in the existen-
tialist understanding. The prophetic account does give prominence to 
concrete political engagement but this is lost sight of to a certain 
degree in the New Testament, whilst Apocalyptic has to be re-interpn~tE,d 
if ethical action on the part of man is to play any meaningful role in 
its scheme. We have seen how the doctrine of providence elevates the role 
of divine initiative to the neglect of the human side. Calvin, however, 
has shown a more dynarnic role can be assigned to man within the frame-
work of a central theological emphasis o'1 the sovereignty of God. 
By contrast, in the Marxist interpretation man becomes the prime mover and 
sole creator of history, The liberation theologians have taken their cue 
from the :Marxists and are seeking to re-assert the significance of human 
actior:_ in history and at the same time to retain th.e theological stress on 
the divine initiative and sovereignty. 
Whilst he nowhere acknowledges any indebtedness to Calvin, Miguez Bonino 
follows the reformer in underlining the priority of the divine in~ti~~ive 
in _human history. He does so, however, by using the category of the 
Kingdom of God which provides an eschatological dimension within which 
significance can be clai~sd for human action ~itho11t losing the indi.spen-












chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia~ and Historical Engagement" therefore 
Miguez Bonino deals with the fundamental issue that is crucial to his 
w~~le theol6gical enterprise. This can be put in the form of a question: 
"How far can human historical action be regarded as having eschatological 
significance ? Does it belong to the. coming Kingdom of God ?" 
''0r again, how do we return to the eschatological 
Christian faith the historical dynamism which it 
seems to have lost ? 
Do historical happenings, i.e. human historical 
action in· its diverse dimensions - political, 
cultural~ economic - have any value in terms of 
the kingdom which God prepares and will gloriously 
establish in the Parousia of the Lord ? If there 
is such a relation how shall we understand it ? 
And what is its significance for our action ?" (1) 
In this chapter we begin by looking at the traditional theological 
position~ and in particular the ildist:i.nction of planes 11 model. Contempor-
ary European pol:i.tical theology has attempted a response and has called 
into question the traditional stance. However its anmver is inadequate 
since it stops short of using any languag~ that would imply a causative 
connection between historical praxis a·,1.d the Kingdom. \:e go on to see 
how Miguez Bonino tries to remedy this deficiency in his use of the cate-
gory cf the Kingdom of God and how he utilizes the apocalyptic idea of 
the two aeons. 
We then exam1.ne his use of the Pauline co1:.cept of the "body" and "Resur-
rection11 on,the one hand and "works 11 on the other as analogies for the 
continuity and discontinuity between history and tne Kingdom of Go(... We 
take note of additional material he has utilized from New Testament sources 
in expoundir.g this theme in a later ~1ork., 
We follow this with a study cf the Harzist nnde.rstanding of the role of 
human action in history with its stress on the creation by men of their 













Marx said about the role of the proletariat and productive forces, as 
well as the secularized eschatological goal of Connnunist society. 
We also examine some of the futurism of ·Ernst Bloch and see how this 
is paralleled in biblical thought. 
We then trace the correspondence and divergences between Miguez Bonino's 
thought and Marxism before referring to four contemporary theologians who 
provide comparative approaches to the question of the relationship between 
the present and the future. These studies - of Pannenberg, Moltmann, 
Rahner and Bonhoeffer - afford us an insight into the value and strength 
of Miguez Bonino's eschatological thought. 
1. SOME TR...\DITIONAL THEOLOGICAL POSITIONS 
The classical theological fornmlations of the relationship b2t1veen faith 
and .temporal reali.ties have followed idealistic lines. 
Augustinianism gave rise to the concept of Christendom. This denied any 
atithentic existence to "the ·world", and saw salvation as confined exclu-
sively to the religious dimension of man's experience. The chm_·ch became 
the sole dispenser of salv~,tion ('extra ec_i::l~iam E-:!lla salus ~) and 
secular history became largely irrelevant. The church assumed for itseJ.£ 
a position of power in relation to the world and sought to exploit what~· 
ever advantage it could gain to furt'.~..:!r its mission of evangelization. 
This political act:i.vity was pursu2d by clergy and bishops with laymen 
giving support and assistance where necessary and possible. (2) 
This attii:ude) described by Gutierrez as "the longest histcrical experience· 











areas. Indeed) it forms the backdrop to tne liberation theology move-
ment of Latin America. It was to some degree, however, superceded by 
~he "distinction of planes 11 idea. This posited a sharp dis~inction 
between the church and the world, the latter being regarded as having 
an autonomous existence of its own. The Church's role vis a vis the 
world was to respect that autonomy. Its influence upon the world was 
via the moral teaching it gave to individuals who then exercised their 
consciences in the temporal sphere. This is similar to Calvin's position. 
The Church was seen as having a dual mission lo evangelize individuals 
and through them to influence society. By converting men to faith and 
baptizing them the Church adopted the stance of an "order apart" p:-omo-
ting salvation and holiness in the world. wnen these people then influ-
enced the society and civilization of which they were members she fulfilled 
her mission to be "the soul of human society". (4) The unity between. 
the 1 two planes 1 was provided by the Kingdom of God si:1ce both Church 
and world in their separate ways contributed to j_ts eclif ication. 
Simiiar tendencies have appeared in Protestant theology. One such was 
Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms which we have outlined and evalu-
ated above. (S) Another is the doctrine of the sovereignty of spheres 
worked out by the nineteenth century Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper. 
In seeking to counteract the growth of atheism as a development. of 
Enlightenment thinking in Dutch edu.:..<J.tion, KHyper taught that there 
were two types of grace. Special grace was that which operates i'1 the 
individual believerr~ inner life to root out sin. There was a distinc-
tion between this and cowmen grace however, which was the restraint God 
placed on the effect of sin in society. It served to maintain the 
sovereignty and indepencit:nt characteristics of the God-given sph2r<2s of 













sphere was organic and natural in Kuyper's scheme. It was formulated 
in order to protect the family's and the individual's rights against the 
0buse of power by the state. As in the later Catholic "distinction of 
planes"· system the individual's role is·to go out and permeate the life 
of society with Christian principles and ideas., In this way the members 
of the ChuJ:".::::h are the invisible church in society, the visible institution 
having no right to interfere in the sphere of the state, which has its 
own God-ordained sovereignty. (6) 
One of the ironies of the history of theological thought in Southern Africa 
. h ' f '1 . d . .f h h .d is t .at Kuyper s ormu .. ation was later use to 3ust1 ·y t ,e apart ei 
policy of the post-World-War II South African government. Despite its 
origin as a theological attempt to defend the individual's rights against 
an authoritarian state, Afrikaner theologians have elaborated it to claim 
that the policy cf apartheid defends the authority of the divinely ordained 
inner law of each ethnic group. (7) This has been used to provide divine 
sanction for a system which, by severely J.in:it.ing human rights, achieves 
the exact opposite of what Kuyper intended. 
Iri each of these developments we note the more or less rigid distinction 
bet.ween church and world and the dualism implied. The inner "spiritual0 
life of the believer is seen as the prime locus of Ced's saving activity, wh:!.:::h 
only indirectly affects the historical~ or worldly life of mankind. 
This privatization of faith probably came to its fullest expression in 
the existentialist th~ology' of Bultmri.nn. 
-
One of the objects of contemporary political theology was precisely 
to combat the implied d1,alism a.nd dehistorization of the faith which 
followed from the positior.s we have now sketched. In order to counter 
this distortion contemp0rary theologi.;:ins such as Noltmann and Metz 
sought to emphasize the publ.ic and p01itic2.l ch<ir.acter of the faith by 












teristic of philosophers and theologians that when they try to reverse 
a trend in this way they sometimes go too far in the opposite direction 
a~d overstate their case. C.H. Dodd's espousal of 'realized eschatology' 
is typical of this type of pendulwn effect. The question to be posed 
in relation to the political theologians however, is not whether they 
go too far ~ut whether they go far enough. Liberation theologians are 
convinced that they do not. 
2. THE RESPONSE OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
Miguez Bonino contends that the contemporary political theology emanating 
from Europe has ir. fact failed to grasp the nettle on the issue of the 
connection between historic.al action and th  kingdom of God. In this 
·assertion he follows Segundo who stresses the caution with which German 
political theology expresses this link. Segundo contends that this 
caution can be traced back to the influe~ce of Luther on Protestant theol-
ogy. He makes the point that for Catholic orthodoxy the link between the 
planes of human activity and God's eternal kingdom was the concept of merit. 
Merit was the eternal worth of human action and great value was attached 
to right intention. 
Luther, however) claimed in his doctrine of justification by faith that 
salvation was guaranteed by Christ 1 s merits alorLe. Segundo believes that 
this severed the connection with human action and Luther thereby "s2ems 
to have undermined the possibility of any theology of history". (8) 
Our previous chapter has shown how the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms 
similarly narrowed the ~ospel in terms of its relationship to history. 
Segundo majntains that since contem.poj~ary political theology is very 
dependent on Luthervs doctrine of justification it has declined to attri-











construction of the eschatological kingdom. This is because the emphasis 
in the doctrine of justification by faith is placed on God's activity, 
and faith becomes the "confident -but essentially passive accci:)tance of 
God's fixed plan for human destiny and the construction of his eschatolo-
gical kingdom". (9) 
He then shows that there is a marked_ semantic tiri1idity on the part of 
the European political theologians to commit themselves to any ianguage 
that would imply causality in the relationship. He quotes Weth who says: 
11God himself brings about the revolutionary action that is decisive for tlH'! 
-coming of his kingdom. His action cannot be effected or replaced by an:;..:_ 
human action". (10) Weth uses the word 11 analogy! 1 to describe the rela-
tionships whilst Holtmann uses"anticipation" and Metz the term "rcugh 
dr<\ft". In doing so they are seeking to maintain the distinction betwee·a 
the relative and the absolute. The European theologians are seeking to 
safeguard the eschatologieal kingdom of God as the absolute nr.d to affirm 
any political order as relative. 
Segundo quotes from both Metz and Moltmarm to prove the point he is try·· 
ing to make. Metz says that 'Christian eschatologyr knows less about the 
future than either Western or Eastern ideologies and claims that the 
Church ''should institutionalize this eschatological reserve by setting 
itself up as a court or instance of critical liberty vis·-a-vis social 
development". (11) In this way it wo~ld be able to combat the inherent 
tc.ndeP._cy of the latter towards absolutization. 
Holtmann is quoted as saying: ':Only through the dialectics of- taking sides 
is the universalism of the crucified one realized in the world. By con-
trast the false t'.::iiversalism oi the church ••••• is a premature and ;,;_ntimely 
anticipation of the kingdom of God". (12) Segundo concludes that European 












it be from the past or the future, from East or West, including both 
the existing and projected orders. The burden of his contention is that 
p~litical theology opts for revolutionary change in theory only. He 
claims that the political theologians believe i!: is wrong to "encumber 
the absolute (here the Kingdom of God) with the weight of the relative 
(here perishable political systems)". (13) The reason for this belief 
is that relative values are completely unrelated to absolute values. 
Segundo is correct in his reading of the Europeans' position, for 
the influence of Luther is patently evident in their writingsc 
Since Miguez Bonino himself follows Segundo here, this excursus ir,to the 
latter's argument has enabled us to get a more amplified version of the 
point Miguez Bonino is making. He concludes that~ for the European 
theologians, action in history and eschatological transformation are of 
different orders. 
110ne cnn never say there is a d.irect link between th8 
two because the eschatologic.al kingdom is 'totally other'. 
The relevanc12 and relatedne.ss of historical effort is 
situated on another pla~and is 1 at best, indirect. 
All historical activity is rclativized, and eschatology 
stands as a caveat against all poU_tical commitment. 
As a result ~em to get some 'religious 1 or at least 
1 suprahistorical 1 sphere that takes primacy. The real 
eschatological kingdom of God and his message stands 
over and above the contingent, secondary, and perhaps 
partially inauthentic realm of historical lit2ration. 
While we may use such terms as 'liberation' and vsalva-
tion' fo;: the latter, our use is at best analogical 
and at worst equivocal. Salvation in the real and strict 
sense applies to a spiritual, eternal kingdom; only in 
an emasculated sense does salvation apply to the tempor:il 
realm of history". (11+) 
He ends with th~ scathing observation "The ideological functionalism of 
such a scheme is readily apparent". (15) 
3 •. THE KING::JOM O:F GOD AHD HISTORY ; CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY ---------------··--------··-· -~------·--· ----·----












connection b~· using the Pauline theology of resurrection as a model • 
. This posits a tension of continuity and discontinuity. There is a 
continuity in the sense that there is a recognizable identity between 
the body of the present life and the resurrection body. But there is 
also a transformation, a. change (or discontinuity) which illarks the 
beginning of.the resurrected life. This is the newness or difference 
which Paul emphc::sizes as a hallmark of the future. 
"Such transformation is not a disfiguration or 
denaturalization of our bodily life but its fulfilment, 
its perfecting, the elimination of corruptibility and 
weakness. As a matter of fact: bodily life reaches 
its true shape, its full meaning - communication, love, 
praise - in the resurrection. Resurrectio , far from 
being the rescue of a spiritual element in human life, 
cleansing it from the bodily experience and identity 
obtained throughout life, is the total redemption of 
man, the true and unhindered real7_zation of a bodily 
life cleansed frcm self-deceptioa and self-:-seeking 
(flesh) and made perfect in transparent (glorious) single-· 
ness of purpose and experience (spiritual) and full 
community with God". (16) 
It is necessary here'.to note al so that this image is more instructive 
even than Miguez Bonino himself draws out.. For the resurrection bod~r 
is part of the age to come of apocalyptic thought. It belongs, in 
Paul's thinking, to the coming age, the eschatological kingdom - and 
the same tension of continuity and discontinuity is manifest in the 
relationship between "this age0 and nthat which is to come". (17) 
Miguez Bo;.1ino then uses the concept of 1works' in Paul to underline the 
e.schatological significance of human action. He claims that works 
perfor~2d in this life belong to the new order in sc far as they are 
done in love,. since that new order 11becor1;es explicit in love". (18) 
The weight of this cla:i.rn is b<=;st examined by referring to the bib1ic2.l 
passages Miguez Bonino has in mind. (19) The firs~ four verses of 
Cclossians chapter three all have an eschatologicaJ. flav~mr -· e.g. 
11Your life is hid with Christ in God 11 • The fourth verse in particular 













continuity w~ich Miguez Bonino is seeking to emphasize - "When Christ 
who is our life appears, then you also will appear with him in glory". 
Then again there is the allus:i ')Il in verse 6 - "On account of these 
the wrath of God is coming" - and:further in vv. 24 25 he says, "knowing 
that from the Lord you will receive the inheritance as your reward; you 
are serving the Lord Christ. For the wrongdoer will be paid back for tli.e 
wrong he has done and there is no partiality". 
' 
In this same passage Faul 
\._, 
repeatedly emphasizes love as the hallmark of the new life or "age": 
"Put on then: as God's chosen ones, holy and beloved~ 
compassion~ kindness ••••• forbearing one another .••••• 
forgiving each other •••• And above all these put on 
love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony. 
Here there cannci,t be Greek and Jew, circumcised and 
uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, 
but Christ is all, and in all". (20) 
But Paul is no apocalyptist, for the strict dualism of the two ages in 
transformed in his thinking by an inherent continuity. According to 
Jenni, Paul 11believes that he and his readers 'stand in the isthmus of 
time between the ages' 1 or better, he believes that the age to come 
can be entered from within history 11 • (21) This is precisely the lins 
of argument Miguez Bonino is pursuing~ viz, that the works, or good con-
duct of which the hallmark is love, repr.esent the ethical outworking of 
the new age which is now appearing in the present age. He says, "Since 
Christ has risen and inaugurated a new realm of life~ man's existence in 
love bears the marks of this new age and will find lasting fulfilment when 
this nevr age will become an unresisted and total re<:i.lization". (22) 
In his later work. "Rcom to be :F'eo·.:;1e" (23) Miguez Bonino deals at , ___ _...,..,....,,.._.., _____ _ __ 
greater length ,.cith this connection between tbe present historical actions 
and the eschatological kiGgdorn in biblical writings.- and since this is 
the whole t~_irust of his c;.rgurnent in this section of the chapter we are 











After ref erring to the Colossians 3 passage he draws attention to 
the parable of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-31. The point of the 
story, as told by Jesus, was that the rich man's options WCLe open . 
only in this life. Therefore, for him, 
"the decisive moment has already passed. Eternity 
was already at: work while he had been enjoying his 
life without caring about his fellow me.:i. The 
character and destiny of his life was s~aled then 
and there •••• 
The reaL question is whether or not here, in this 
life, we participate in the 'society' which God 
has established with human beings for ti1e creation 
and transformation of the world •••• 
This life here is the decisive :factor". (24) 
The message is clear -· that historical actions here and now are dctermi-
nitive of the eschatological destiny. The future is being created now. 
The continuity is again brought out in the emphasis Miguez Bonino lays 
on the dictum by Segundo to the effect that "There is no love lost in 
this worldn. (25) This he uses as a summing up of the biblical assur-
ance that :; iove endures" from I Corinthians 13. 
"The most heroic actions, the most philanthropic or 
resounding deeds, can be nothing more than short-
lived manifestations of an action with no value or 
permanence. They can be the isolated sound of an 
instrument played thoughtlessJ.y. Only love gives 
permanence and :::eaning to these actions. Because 
only in love is there the permanence, the tenacity, 
the total commitment, the prudence, and the sensi-
tivity which can achieve a pe:rmanent: result. There is 
one life if there is love and in the extent to which 
there is love 11 • (26) 
This can be further illustrated in t··'') passages from the. gospels. In 
the first, recorded in Hark llf: 3-9 there is related the incident of 
the anointing of Jest:s at Bethany. W11en the <lisc....i..ples complained, 
Jesus def ended the woman by declaring that she had performed an act 
of love which would be rec'.)unted wherever the gospel is preached. Ti.1e 
act of love is not lost. It is permanent, "as eternal as the gospel 












eternal, and with his word an act of love ~,rill never be without a future" 
(28) 
The second is the familiar parable of the ~reat assize in Nd.tthew 25. 
The criterion for judgment was declared to be the human, historical 
actions of mercy and compassion (or the omission thereof). In his 
comment and explanation Miguez Bonino reiterates his assertion that 
love is the nature of the future kingdom: 
"We deceive ourselves if we see this as a simple 
commercial transaction, for a service offered to 
a poor person here, you receive a reward later 
there. It is concerned with the very nature of the 
future which Jesus Christ. offers. His kingdom is 
the triumph of single-minded and active love 11 • (29) 
The nature of life after death is not given much attention in the New 
Testament. The determinative principle is the permanent and undying 
character of Christ's love which gives an eternal dimension to human 
love:. When human love is identified with Chri3t·it participates in 
that death-transcending character. 
The same principle applies in the gospel account of the raising of 
the widow of Nain 1 s son in Luke 7: 11-17. This shows not only Jesus,r 
power to raise the young man back to life (he would die again) but his 
death-denying compassion. The incident pr.oves that ''love does not have 
to cry over what seems lost. Whoever lives in love here in this life 
has a future both here and in eternity". (30) 
The conclusion Miguez ~onino comes to is that love gives meaning to the 
isolated acts that make up this human life, and t~at life after death 
participates in this same reality. Its foundation and impetus is the 
very being of God which means that. love has an eschatolcgical dimension. 
If participating in the love of God manifest in Christ imparts meaning 












meaningful life must have a future in the afterworld. In love and only 
in love does our life have a future". (31) 
I~ is important. to note that in .~oom to be People Miguez Bonino is expounding 
his theme in a humiletical rather than an ac.ademic context and consequently 
avoids relating what he says to the apocalyptic framework ~1e has used in 
his other studies. But the burden of thi:> exposition is the same - the 
new age which is to be consumniated in the future is characterized by love 
and that love has to. be explicated in the here and now. Actions of this 
nature participate in that coming kingdom and so the continuity between 
present history and the eschatological kingdom is a thread runni~g ~hrough 
the biblical record. In fact the "new age'!, with love as its hallmark, 
has broken into "this present age" and this overlapping of the ages provides 
the link between historical action and the eschatological kingdom. 
Miguez Bonino also underlines the corporate'nature of this kingdom. Since 
love is of the essence of the kingdom it necessarily implies a breaking 
down of the harriers of separatenes.s and a com.TD.unity of persons. This is 
also a part of the biblical witness. Indeed, he says, the kingdom 
"refers to a humanity that has been transformed on a 
renewed earth. It is a vision of a world in which 
the creative plan of God is finally fulfilled, where 
hunger, poverty, injustice, oppression, pain, even 
disease and death have been definitely overcome; it 
is a world from which evil has been rooted out for-
ever. \~here. the love of God is "all in all", where the 
human love manifested in Jesus Christ has penetrated 
all humankind and therefore fulfills God's plan for 
creating a humanity which manifests his love in a 
harmonious world which they th~nselves work, culti-
vate, and make fruitful". (32) 
This is an outworki~g of the biblical concepts of justice and peace both 
of which are expressions of relationships between and amongst people 












Miguez Bonino also makes use of the Pauline concept of God 1 s ultimate 
purpose being the uniting together of all things in Jesus Christ which 
the apostle sets out in the Ephesian letter. The biblical concern, 
therefore, is for a future of humanity in a ·"collective and organized 
~xistence •••• a community which is created and recreated J.n love, in a 
world destined to be 'the home' of that community". (33) Thus the con-
cept of love can never be reduced to individual and isolated acts of kind-. 
ness and mercy. It is necessarily a community concept. This means that 
if the Christian message is reduced to dimensions that are only private 
and personal it is distorted. If further~ such a privatized life is 
lived only in and for itself and is thought of as prolonged eterually 
then it is "in truth, hell, condemnation, damnation because love cannot 
conform to living a private life". (34) 
The corollary of all this for Miguez Bonino is that love translated into 
such corporate terms has an eternal future in the same way as does an 
individual action. If healing a sick person is an act of love with an 
eschatological future so also is a national health programree. It 
follows also that political action,- undertaken in love for th'Jse s 1.Jffer-
ing from oppression and injustice is "part of the gospel" (35) Indeed 
he says, 
"all opposition to oppression and injustice must have 
a future. And for that reason, it is part of our human 
service to Jesus Christts opposition to capitalistic 
greed and bureaucratic dehumanization and the substitu·· 
tion of monopolies and mult:~nationals for a11 economy 
which serves all mankind. :i..t is the struggle to 
politically'organize the human community with a real, 
not false quality,, so that: people will have equal value, 
not just in theory but in actual opport~uities for them 
to develop their abilities and manage their jobs and 
their lives". (36) 
The kingdom of God is established in such acts. So too, we are to see 
the eschatological significance of th0 many acts of sacrifice which 











are only partially successful. But all participate in the kingdom. 
In a significant passage Miguez Bonino sums up his eschatology thus: 
"But God has invited us to begin to create the 
future and has promised to guarantee and certify 
for eternity what we create through personal and 
collective love. There. is one human history in 
this world before death because God is love. And 
therefore there is also one human history after 
death and after this world. This is the nature 
and· foundation of Christian hop.; 11 • (37) 
We can see therefore that in Room.to be People Miguez Bonino expounds 
passages from the New Testament which enable him to emphasize the 
elements of continuity and causality. The Kingdom life here is deter-· 
minitive·of the life of the kingdom to come and the hallmark of that 
kingdom is love. 
It is possible here to discern a development in Miguez Bonino 1 s thinking. 
I11 po:ing Theology his co1i.tention that there is a continuity between 
present action and the future kingdom was based on a relatively limited 
range of New Testament ideas, These were the nature of the Resurrection 
"body" and "works!' in Pauline thought aDd some gene::cal remarks about the 
Itingdom. In Roon1 to be PeoplE: he has used a more widely-·based biblical 
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foundation which includes both Pauline and synoptic sources. In develop-
ing his though1;:s about the importance of continuity however he has to 
some extent neglected his previous emphasis on discontinuity. This ele-· 
ment in his teaching had been derived from the apocalyptic stress on 
the future kingdom which irrupts into the present. We now move to a 
consideration of Miguez Boninots use of apocalyptic. 
THE KINGDOM AND APOCALYPTIC THOUGHT 
Miguez Bonino's idt:a of .. he Kingdom of God is ground.eel in the New Testa-
ment affirmation that in Jest•s Christ God's rule has both arrived au<l 
is yet to be consummated. Tb~.s, as we have shmm in the previous chapter · 











ment message is expressed. 
It is important here to note that the New Testament message of the 
~ingdom involves the very same polarity of continuity and discontinuity 
which Miguez Bonino has underlined in his use of the resurrection 
theme and the concept of works in Paul. It is in this connection also 
that his reference t0 deepening our understanding of the apocalyptic 
literature can best be understood. (38) The kingdom, he declares 
11 is not the natural outcome of history. Conflict 
and judgment intervene. Yet the kingdcm does sal-
vage, transform and fulfill the 'corporeality' of 
history and the dynamism of love and fellowship 
at work in it. This means that the eschatologicai 
reality, in turn, is fashioned> nurtured, and 
raised in history". (39) 
The continuity and discontinuity between history and the coming kingdom 
u1 apocalyptic thought is brought out in a helpful insight provided 
by C.B. Caird who draws attention to the distinction between the 
German words Das Ende and Die Endzeit. The Jewish people, he points 
out,expected the latteJ:" rather ratl:2r than the forme.r. However 1 it is 
easy to become confused between the one and the other. Caird says, 
"But to expect an End is not the same as to expect an End-time. The 
one is an event beyond which nothing ca!l conceivably happen. The other 
142 
is a period of indefinite duration in which much is expected to happen". (/f0) 
In discussing this observation, D.S.Russell contends that <las Ende is 
better defined as the transcendental finale and die Endzeit as a temporal 
continc~tion of history in the sense of the kingdom as the earthly 
reign envisaged by certain of the apoca1.yptists (including Daniel). In 
this way some continuity can be affirmed ·- both between history and 
the end-time and between the end-time and the end. :n fact in some apo-
calyptic w"Titing there is a fl.t:.ctuation beh;een them and even a mingling 












It has to be admitted however, that in typical apocalyptic thinking 
the element of discontinuity is paramount. The sharp antithesis is 
drawn between "this present age" and "the age to come". The awaited 
\. 
kingdom is transcendental and other-worldly, and this is the kingdom 
that really matters, and on which the future hope is set. 
Russell does point out, howevers tfrnt; though contemporarj' history is ~·wt 
clearly in focus in apocalyptic thought, it is nevertheless a signifi-
cant factor in the scenario. Frequently hidden behind obscure imagery 
and by the phenomenon of pseudonymity there is an air of unreality 
about the whole picture. "Nevertheless continuity remains and history 
as well as eternity has a firm plac2. within the revelation of God's 
purposes made knm·m. to them. The coutempora·cy scene is the stage on 
which the divine purpose is even now being worked out and 1.t is 111 
contemporary terms that -::he kingdom is to r;e. understood". (Li2) 
Furthermore, despite the prominence , . , T/!f'.1-Cl.1 apocalyptic gives to the sal-
vation of the individual there is al_so reference to the comnmnity in 
the age to come. This is an aspect to which Miguez Bonino has drawn 
attention in his teaching= The goal cf salvation is envisaged as a new 
society, which will manifest justice and peace. With sl:alom as its dis-
tinguishing ,characteristic this kingdom is rooted in this world of time 
and history. 
This is alJ. in line with the New Testament 1 s eschatological emphasis that 
the kingdom powers are at work now as well as in the future. If the 
early Christians could cry "Come, I.,ord Jesus" (43) it was because he 
had already come and his reign ha.d begun. The vision of the seer of 
Patmos could include, therefore, the praise of: the eiders in heaven who 
worshipped God and sa:i.d 
"We give thanks to thee l.ord God Almighty, whc 
art and who wast, that thou hast taken thy great power 











The stuff of history therefore - the daily action of social life, insti-
tutions, individuals, politics, science and commerce, is the very activity 
of the kingdom itself and not merely a setting against which some other 
'real' or 'spiritual' life of the kingdom iakes place. The concerns of 
secular history, therefore are meaningful in terms of the kingdom and 
can and do contribute towards the establishment of a society based on 
peace. and justice. "They are, or can become, a means whereby the kingdom 
can become visible on earth." (45) 
Nevertheless, the other side of the polarity has to be given due con-
sideration. l: ... s Miguez Bonino himself emphasizes '!The Kingdom is not ••• 
the natural denouement of history". (46) Human being; may be agents 
of its co~ing and stewards of its mysteries. But it is also· supramundane 
and transcendent. It i:>'. something I given' ~ the work and gift of Gcd 
himself. Whilst the prayer of the disciples was to be "Thy kingdom come •••• 
on eart.h11 its coming is a consummation, and that im.plies a break~ or 
discontinuity. (47) This sense of "ot'bsrness" is brought out in the 
affirmation contained in a World Council of Churches publication: 
"We believe that time is not infinite, that history 
will end, that the present heaven ancl earth will pass 
away, that the new heaven and the new earth will come, 
that the kingdom of God is not something that happens 
in linear continuity with history. In this sense 
Christians are not naive utopians or simple optimists 
who identify the just and sustainable society with the 
Kingdom of God". (48) 
The discontinuity is also emphasized in conteml)Orary theological dis-
cussion~ Wolfhar.t Parinenberg :for example, expresses his belief tt1at 
the Kingdom is not the present reality. The latter is all too recog-
nizably characterized by injustices brutality and war, and this fact 
indicates the gap between the present and the kingdom. The biblical 
literature in its realism proclaimed the kingdom as the coming reality. 
Even when things were goiDg -;,,rell, and there \·:as a sense of God 1 s rule 











kingdom. "In the light of the futurity of God's Kingdom, it is 
obvious that no present form of life and society is ultimate". (49) 
However, Pannenberg's use of the resurrection as the prolep8is of the 
apocalyptic end also leads him to see a continuity between. 11riow" and 
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"then" and sinc:e he also emphasizes history as the sphere of God's seJ:F-
revelation ti.1e foci of his theology are fixed both in the "here" and the 
"hereafter". This is brought out when in discussing the ro.dical trans-
formation of the body described by Paul in I Cor. 15 he makes a distinc-
tion between a structural continuity and a historical continuity. The 
transformation effected i:vill be so radical that nothing will be unaffected; 
the replacement of the old perishable body by the new spiritual body :!.n 
the resurrection of the dead will represent a break between the old 
existence and the new. This break is a substantial or structural break. 
But Pannenberg affirms on the other hand a historical continuity. The 
transformation of resurrection will bring change to the same earthly 
body, for "t:here is a historical continuity in the sense of continuous 
transition in the consummation of the transforrnatiori. itself" and hence 
there is a "connection between the beginning .and the end point which 
resides in the process of transformation itself, regardless of how radi-
cally this process may be conceived". (SO) From this definition Fannen·~ 
berg is able to argue for a "historical continuity"between the "la.st 
days" and the "ne\·J age11 in the apocalyptic scheme. 
For_ Jurgen Mol tmann, tJ1e emphasis is placed rather on the future as the 
fulfilment of promise. For him, promise declares the "coming of a not 
yet existing reality from the future of the truth •••• future is that 
reality which fulfils and satisfies the promise because it completely 
corresponds to it and accords with it". (51) In the 'not yet existing 
reality' we find the discontinuity, but: continuity is affirmed in the 











present and the future are linked by hope, which, for the Christian is 
directed towards the iTruption of the new creation of all things by 
the God who raised Jesus Christ from the dead. This again stresses the 
discontinuity in the eschatological views of Moltmann, as he calls the 
new creation a 11novum ul timum", (52) For Moltmann, thP Christian 
response to promise is in hope which invnlves historical action. This 
latter brings the lo:iged-for future into the present and so transforms 
the suffering of the present. Herein lies the continuity. The discon-
tinuity in the theology of hope consists in its doctrine of the future 
of God. (53) 
In his understanding of apocalyptic esch2.tology, Noltmann again brings 
out the element of discontinuity. He declares the theological signifi-· 
cance of apocalyptic to lie in the "historifying of the cosmos~" (54) 
and sees it as an eschatological and hist0ric interpretation of the 
cosmos. (55) By this he means that the apocalyptic dualism of the two 
aeons applies not merely to man and his history - but to the universe as 
well. Thus the natural sphere is llhistorified 11 in the apocalyptic 
sense that it splits into ''a world that is corning and one that is passing 
away". (56) Thus the change in man, in this -view, involves the conver-
sion of the whole cosmos, since '1the whole creation is included in the 
suffering of the last days. The suffering becomes universal and destroys 
the all-sufficiency of the cosmos, just as the eschatological joy will 
then resound in a r nei:·7 heaven and a new earth 1 " (57) i'foltmann is at 
pains also to point out that when apoc.::.lyptic i;; viewed from this cosr.~o­
logical perspective the "existing bounds of reality" could themselves be 
transformed, (58) The end therefore would not be ~ return to the begin-
ning, not a repristinati0n of creation nor a reversion to a pre-fall 
condition of purity, but' a bringing to be of something >Iide?: than the 












of the eschaton. 
If we allow the validity of this insight - and the imagery of the book of 
?,evelation, speaking as it does of a "new heaven and a new earth", would 
seem to require us to do so - then we can see that when Jesus spoke in his 
ministry of men seeing "the Son of man seated at the right hand of power, 
and coming On the clouds of heaven" (59) he was declaring the arrival 
of the future as a present reality. Apocalyptic sees the end in the 
beginning, an.·d especially the beginning of the end time can be seen in 
the life and ministry of Jesus which demonstrated the breaking in of 
the kingdom. The first advent is~ foreshadowing of the.second and his 
death and resurrection can be seen as a demonstration. of his coming glory. 
The witness of the New Testament according to Russell is that "the Kingdom 
will be ushered :i.n at 'the end' but through Christ its life and citizen-
ship are a present possession". (60) 
Miguez Bonino uses two brief phrases to delineate the relationship 
between history and the consummation. On the one hand, he says, 11 the 
kingdom redeems, transforms, and perfects the ;corporeality' of history 
and the dynamics of love that has (sic) operated in it". (61) Neverthe-
less it is also true that '1history arrives at the Kingdom through suffer-
ing, conflict and judgment". (62) Here he is aff irmi~~, in the first 
place the continuity aspect. However, "suffering~ conflict and judgment11 
speak of the discontinuity so forcefully brought out in apocalyptic 
thought. In order to yield a balanced understanding of the twin c~phases 
in both the prophetic and apocalyptic interpretations these two poles 
have to be held in tension, and th:i_s .Higuez Bonino was careful to do in 
· poirtg Theolo_;;;y. Both c~-:e necessary for a. full picture of the relationship 
between history and the kingdo:n. As Russell .has succinct1.yexpressed iL: 
"The kingdom ii:; 'on ea1:th'; the kingdom is 'from heaven 1 ; and these two 












Part of the appeal and fascination of the apocalyptic view of the kingdom 
is its belief that this present age is to be replaced by a new one, 
that out of the destruction and death of things as they are there is to 
arise a new reality. The intervention of what Miguez Bonino calls 
"suffering, conflict and judgment" is to be the prelude tn new and 
better things. A similar vision inspire:::> Marxism. There is to be no 
easy optimistic grad~al development, as in the nineteenth century liber~l 
view of 11prog~ess 11 • In fact Marxism ui1derstands, says Niebuhr, "as t.he 
purely progressive view of history does not, that civilizations ~md cul~ 
tures do not merely grow but that they must die and be reborn if they 
are to have a new life". (64) 
5. THE SECULARIZED ESCHATOLOGY OF MARXISM 
For Y~rl Marx the corning age will see the arrival of communist society • 
. ,/ 
And he was quite definite as to who was to be responsible for inat:gu-
rating this future bliss. This was the' task of the proletariat. He was 
firmly convinced that the dialectical processes at work :i.11 the historical_ 
events of his day were bringing about the dissolution of the capitalist 
system. The constant phases of prosperity followed by crises, with 
intermittent periods of dullness were some of the fluctuating influences 
which all adversely affected the working man. He therefore encouraged 
them to strike and to participate in any action which would rouse them 
from the torpid state of disinterest into which they were cast by the 
dehuma1~:.z:i.ng forces that were exploiting and oppressing them. He con-
sidered that the object of such activity Has not just to gain S'.)me slight 
and temporary economic advantage., but to a11aken their political awareness 
for the role they were destined to play in history. (65) Marx believed 
that the Marking class should organize itself as a movement to initiate 













and the forces of capitalism itself were, by their ever growing concen-
tration into larger and larger (but ever fewer) units, turning the 
. proletariat into "a class alw::ys increasing in numbers and disciplined~ 
united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist 
production itself". (66) 
Marx had perceived that the only way in which his projected communist 
society could be brought into being was by the proletariat b~coming aware 
of its revolutionary potential. Thus the task for him was to arouse in 
the working class their incipient revoiutionary consciousness. He has 
discovered also that "it ·is not the consciousness of human beings which 
determines their existence, but social existence which determines 
their consciousness". (67) To participate in the economic struggle 
would, therefore, prepare and train them for the political conflict that 
was looming. 
There is here. a tension in Marx's thinking. For whilst on the one hm.Hl 
he believed that it was the proletariat's historical mission to initiate 
the revolution, he also knew that the very conditions in \1hich they worked 
·had the effect of simultaneously numbing them into resignation to their 
lot 
"The advance of capitalist production develops a 
working-class, which by education, tradition, 
habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of 
production as self-evident laws of Nature. The 
organisation of the capitalist .process of produc-
tion, once fully developed, breaks down all 
resistance ••••• The dull compulsion of economi.c 
relations completes the subjection of the labourer 
to the capitalist". (68) 
In Marx's opinion it is the task of Marxism itself to act as the catalyst 
in such a situation. He declared: "We must force thr~se petrified 
relationships to dance by playing their own tune to them". (69) The 
revolutionary consciousness was there latent in the proletariat. It has 











the fuse which would ignite the revolution;:;.ry explosion. In the "Critique 
of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" written when he was only twenty-six, the 
seed of this idea is already germinating in Marx's thought. 
"As philosophy finds its materiai weapon in the 
proletariat, so the proletariat·£inds its spiri-
tual weapon in philosophy. And once the lightning 
ofthought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil 
of the people, the emancipation of the Germans into 
tr1el1 wili be accomplished •••• The head o[this emanci-
pation is philosoph:.:_. Its heart--rs-the proletariat". (70) 
Thus for Marx the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat was the 
indispensable requisite for social change. In and through this reformed 
consciousness the implicit and unconscious historical tendency became 
explitic and recognizable. Later Marx ref erred to this as scientific 
socialism, a tenn he used in order to distinguish it from utopian social-
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ism "which confined itself to propounding an arbitrarily constructed ideal". 
(71) One of Marxism's celebrated statements is the affinnation that "The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of ~lass struggles:'. 
(72) Once the unity of primitive communist existence had been destroyed 
by the acq~'.'..sitive avarice which led to the system of private property, 
class division began and relations between classes emerged. These took 
the form of friction, struggle and antagonism. Marx applied his insight 
of the dialectic to this phenomenon and hence evolved his theory of the 
class struggle. This he believed was the outcome of the developing rela-
tions of production (master-slave, lord-serf, and capitalist-worker) 
through the historic stages. The class struggle was therefore built into 
the successive economic structures t~~.t were erected in these different 
phases. 
When Marx subsequently postulates the revolution as the culmination of 
"pre-history" it is not then a new innovation in his scheme. It represents 
the deve.lopment and fulfilment of a historical trend that has been gather~ 











In Marx's un<lerstanding of things, the contradictions in the capitalist 
system merely served to polarize the existing antagonism still further 
until the inevitable revolutic-n would signify that the breaking point . 
had been reached. 
By terminating pre-history in this way, ~he proletariat would: in Marx's 
view, eliminate class differences by restoring the humanity of all men 
as social be.ings. History was under man's control and Marx eschewed any 
idea that there was any power outside of the historical process itself 
that could affect it. Nan "is not doomed to run behind history trying 
to catch it up". (74) Ile can himself take charge. 
"The materialist doctrine that men are products of 
circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, 
changed men are products of other circumstances and 
changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that change 
circumstances, and that the educator himself needs 
educating". (75) '"· 
·~.) 
This highlights the crucial rble of the proletarian revolution in Marx's 
·) 
scheme. Man's freedom to create histoYy happens when that revolutior. is 
ready to break in upon the course of events and interrupt the normal flow 
of historical events. This point is reached when the proletarian consci-
ousness ripens and the working class becomes aware of its historical 
destiny and opportunity. Even whilst capitalism casts its alienating 
spell on mankind it is bringing about its own self-destruction by means 
of its internal contradictions. One of these contradictions is the 
alienation of the proletariat to the point of historical self-conscious-
ness and its consequent assumption of the role of saviour of mankind. 
Van Leeuwen has thr_:;:efore described the similarity between the Marxist 
plan of salvation and that of the biblical revelation aptly by saying: 
11Th. . 1 . d . . ' 1 . 1 h 1 . ' . -. ' 1 . is J.s a secu arJ.se . oio ica esc! ato ogy in wrncn tne pro etariat 
has assu:ned the broad features of the Servant of the Lord, whose vicarious 













There are two aspects of Marxism that need to be noted at this point. 
The first is that in Marx's soteriology, salvation is something achieved 
ps a result of self-effort by one section of mankind - the proletariat. (77) 
Marx, seeking to deny the Christian belief in creation, could declare: 
"A being only considers himself independent when he 
stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his 
o~;n feet when he owes his· existence to himself. 
A man who lives by the grace of another regards him-
self as a dependent being. But I live completely by 
the grace of another if I owe him not only the main-
tenance of·my life, but if he has, moreover, created 
my life - if he is the source of my life". (78) 
Marx believed, mutatis mtitandis, that man had to save himself. Instead 
of his state of bondage and alienation the final revolution will usher 
in man's total regeneration. It will not merely bring about material 
plenty and a fairer distribution of goods but a spiritual awakening and 
liberation. Thus man, by his own efforts will re-create himself as a 
totally new being. In the Geiman Ideology Narx and Engels spoke of this 
regenerative activity when they said: 11 The coincidence of the changing 
of circumstances and of human activity o.: self-changing can be conceived 
and rationally understood only as tevolut_ionarz . .l'ractice". (79) 
Then secondly this leads us to lfarx 1 s Prometheanism~ In the foreword to his 
doctoral dissertation Marx had declared, "Prometheus is the most eminent 
saint and martyr in the philosophical calendar" (80) and he is said to 
have read the works of Aeschylus in Greek every year. (81) No doubt 
deriving his inspiration from this annual devotion Marx weaves the 
Promethean thread into the tapestry of his thought throughout. M<trx' s 
Prometheus is a collective one, in fact the proletariat that steals fire 
from Zeus (for Marx, capitalism). 
J.M. Lechman has described Marxfs interest in Prometheus in three ways. (82) 
Firstly he welcomed the rebellious nature of the Greek mythological figure. 
He does this on behalf of and for the benefit of mankind. When he brings 













settlements. Then secondly he admires Prometheus' martyrdom. Prometheus 
is condemned (by vengeance of the gods) to suffer in chains and this 
,symbolizes for Marx the lot of the proletariat. Thirdly, he appreciates 
the stubborn refusal by Prometheus to be cowed and submissive. Marxists 
generally see him as "a human genius moving beyond all the set boundaries, 
questioning all the traditional prerogatives of the gods, and installing 
man as the responsible agent and final hope of the universe". (83) 
Miguez Bonino sees Prometheanism as the key to Marxism. He says 'Prometheus, 
human affirmation - rebelliOn and solidarity - at the centre of history: 
this seems to me the pulsing heart of Marxism as a historical movement" • 
. (84) It is here that we find one of Miguez Bonino's important learnings 
from Marx, and, utilizing this insight from Marx he emphasizes the true 
biblical understanding af the role of man. For him the God of the Bible 
is not a Zeus, and does not impose limits nn man's creativity. Rather he 
creates man in his oi;.m image, mak<:os him a steward in his creation and a 
partner in his ongoing task. As such, 1:2 invites him to share in the 
eschatologically significant historical project of establishing his 
kingdom. The biblical God "is not a cosmological policeman jealously 
watching the frontiers of his untouchable realm" (85) as was the Greek 
god. Instead of keeping the fire of creation for himself he shares it 
with man. He also shares himself .. "In Jesus Christ he goes the way of 
·man so that man might go his way: to have life and to have it in abun-
dance, to participate in the life everlasting, the world without 21:d". (86) 
As the partner of God: man is called to use the 'fire' in his ordering 
of the_ creation and his life in history. "Man is a free, creative, 
trans~ending being, an 'eschatological existence', challenging the 
'status quo', changing the world, seeking the 'greater justice' of 
the coming Kingdom". 
echo and endorse. 












That Christian theology has not always thus seen man is undeniable. 
All too often, as we have previously p9inted out, this dynamic, active 
and positive aspect of man's nature has been obscured in a religion 
that has encouraged otherworldliness and inwardness. 
In his insistence that the workers could not "sit back and await final 
success as a gift from History" (88) MPl'.'X was throwing down a challenge 
to the church which the political theologians of Europe and the' theologians 
of liberation have ·finally taken up. In this sense, then, the Marxian 
theory stresses the continuity between the now and the then, the "pres-
, ent age" (of capitalistic exploitation, oppression and misery) and the 
"coming age" (of freedom and uninhibited growth in the communist society) 
by the esch~tologically significant action of the proletariat in assuming 
responsibility for the future of mankind. Marx's abandonment of trans..:. 
cendence and theism has forced him to spotlight man as the principal 
actor on the stage of world history. This Promethean "human affirmation" 
(to use his own terminology) is what Miguez Bonino is seeking to re--
establish by including it in the biblical picture of the kingdom. If the 
"Kingdom is not merely adumbrated, reflected, foreshadowed, 
or analogically hinted at in the individual and collective 
realizations of love in history, but actually present, 
operative, authentically - however inperfectly and partially 
realized," (89) 
it is because man's present actions in history are of abiding significance. 
This human responsibility is further brought out by Miguez Bonino in a 
quotation which he uses approvingly from the Dutch theologian Lanbert 
Schuurman, who says: 
•••• "we cannot delegate this responsibility (planning 
for the world) to someone else since we take seriously man 
as partner and co-operator with God. I am convinced of the 
need for ~an to work, to make history and not to lose time 
in creating partial or total s~cralizations of reality .... 
On this point there can be no controversy with Marxists. 
The world and its future are our business and we cannot 












It is interesting in this connection to fi-..1d Machovec also drawing 
out a similar interpretation from his study of the gospels. Not unex-
pectedly he drives home the continuity aspect of the kingdo~. Because 
Jesus and his disciples were not propagating idealism or otherworldli-
ness, his reflections about the Kingdom of God relate to this-worldly 
realities such as history, politics, social situations and the cancer~~ 
of men for their terrestrial future. (91) It is significant that Macho-
vec has here minimized the "otherness" or discontinuity of the kingdom. 
This is a temptation into which Miguez Bonino has not fallen, having 
maintained with strict discipline the essential polarity' and tension be-
tween both of these two aspects of the biblical understanding of the 
Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, Miguez Bonino has delved more deeply than this in his 
interpretation of the kingdom by means of the Marxist analogy. In the 
latter scheme there is also a marked discontinuity between the present 
age of pro~':tarian suffering and the coming age of communist society 
with its projected future bliss. In fact, the aim and purpose of the 
proposed classless society is to destroy the evils and vexations imposed 
by the capitalist system. The very notion of revolution implies this 
discontinuity. It calls for the destruction of the old and its replace-
ment by the new. The importance of revolution in Marx's thought is 
brought out in his claim that it was the "driving force of history". (92) 
In addition his descriptions of the ,:; L:ne Revolution of 1848 in Paris and 
the Paris Commune of 1870-1 and its suppression (93) indicate the s1.gni-
ficance he placed on the cruciality of revolutiouary activity. 
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It is important to understand just what Marx meant by the revolution. In 
this regard, the revolution he believed to be necessary was more than merely 












happened in the French Revolution, and Marx regarded it as a failure 
because it did not produce the new type of society, with freedom as its 
cornerstone and hallmark which the revolutionaries had hoped for, and 
which Marx himself believed to be the raison d 1 etre of all revolutions. 
The reason for its failure, M2rx contended, was that the economic founda-
tions of sc~ial life were not understood by those mounting the revolu-
tion. (94) Marx's classic statement ex~laining his concept of total 
revolution is contained in his Preface to the Critique of Political Economy: 
"At a. certain stage of their development the 
material forces of production in society come 
into conflict with the existing relations of 
production,.,or what is but a legal expression 
for the same thing - with the property relations 
within which they have been at work before., 
From forms of development of the forces of 
production these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then comes the period of social 
revolution. With the change of the economic 
foundation the entire immense superstructure 
is more or less rapidly transformed. In consider-
ing such transformation the distinction should 
always be made between the material transformation 
of the economic conditions of production, which 
can be determined with the precibion of natural 
science, and the legal, politica1, religious~ 
aesthetic and philosophic - in short ideological 
- forms in which men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out". (95) 
By his use of his holistic idea of revolution Marx emphasized the discon-
tinuity between the present and what he envisaged for thP future. Speak-
ing of the apocalyptic understanding of history and the Kingdom Miguez 
Bonino refers to "the intervening fact of judgment which divides, excludes 
and cleanses ('burns 1 ) that which doe.s not belong in the new age". (96) 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that he has seen the continuity-
discontinuity tension in both Marx and the biblical understanding of the 
Kingdom and that he has oerceived the necessity to preserve it in his own 
theological exposition. In doing so he has been more faithful and percep-











There is, however, a further level to which this study must proceed as 
we examine the parallels between Miguez Bonino and Marx. In the pre-
\ .vious chapter we referred to Marx's concept and use of the dialectic 
as an interpretation and explanation of historical change. (97) In 
fact Marxist dialectic is to be understood in three ways: 
(1) in the sense that the forces at work bringing about 
social change in the events of histo-;:-y operate in 
a dialectical way or rhyth.111 it is the objective 
fact of those processes; 
(2) as a description of those laws; 
(3) as a revolutionary force itself since it is the 
theoretical consciousness - or revolutionary 
awareness - of the proletariat, by whom the 
transformation of social history is to be 
brought about. (98) 
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In accordance with this dialectical movement of history the disintegration 
of capitalism was assured by means of the contradictions inherent in that 
system itself. Here again in the dialectical movement of history itself, 
we have, in Mar~'s thought, another instance of the strong sense of con-
tinuity he Jetected in the historical process. Capitalism would cause 
alienation. Alienation would engender a revolutionary consciousness. 
The revolution would sweep away the capitalistic system and inaugurate 
communist society. In Marx's view these would all follow as night 
follows day - it was in effect a law of history. 
The question of historical necessity arose later when Rosa Luxemburg 
emphasized this aspect of Marx's doctrine to the exclusion of any 
possibility that human. will would in any way deflect the course of 
events. This clashed sha~ply with the views of tl:~ revisionists, led 
by Bernstein. (99) In the Afterword to the second edition of_Capital 
Marx quoted with approval the account of his theory by a Russian 
reviewer who had said "Marx treats the ~ocial movement as a process 
of natural history governed by laws independent of human will, con·-











in the sequence of historical events. 
Alongside this, there appears also an element in Marx's thought which 
:Orings out the discontinuity and thus sets up the tension again. This 
is the belief that the comino connnunist society was not a far-off 
event to be expected eventually, but an imminent, indeed a present 
reality. In The German Ideology he and E~3els declared their belief: 
"Corrnnunism is not for us a state of affairs which 
is to be established, an ideal to which reality 
will have to adjust itself. We call connnunism the 
real movement which abolishes the present state 
of things. The conditions of this movement result 
from the premises now in existence". (101) 
The new society was even then in the process of gestation. In The Civil 
War in France Marx declared that the working class "have no idea.ls to 
realize but to set free the elements of the new society with which old 
collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant". (102) 
Later Marxists have drawn out with greater emphasis and clarity this 
effect of the future on and in the present. Lukacs, in ~astigating 
revisionists who separate the movement from the final goal says that 
the latter is not a condition at which the proletariat arrive as the 
culmination of a process. It cannot be forgotten during the course of 
the struggle. "The final goal", says Lukacs "is precis..:ly the relation· 
to the totality (to the totality of society considered as a historic 
process) through which, and only through which, each moment of struggle 
acquires its revolutionary co11tent. It takes the daily struggle £-om a 
level of facticity, of simpleness, to that of reality". (103) Here 
Lukacs is saying that the final goal is present, giving meaning to the 
everyday struggle to ac~~ieve it. In relation to the present context 
he seems to be ccnfirming that the discontinuity of the future has arrived 












Here again then we detect an element of the continuity-discontinuity 
tension in the secularized eschatology of Marxism, which Miguez Bonino 
points to in the Christian sphere. On the one hand there is evolution-
ary progression by dialectical contradiction and conflict to the future, 
and on the other hand the fuL~re eschatological goal gives meaning to 
the present endeavour. In the latter the evil and suffering of the 
present is partly overcome in the transf orwing newness imparted into 
it by the presence of the future. In the former there is the growth 
through conflict and suffering to the new society and humanity. And 
this, as we have seen, is the essence of Miguez Bonino's exposit.ion 
of the relation between history and the final kingdom. In Christians 
and Marxists he says: 
"In other words, history - and ethical action 
is participation in history - must be seen 
by the Christian both in its discontinuity 
with God's Kingdom (and therefore as the 
sphere where evil can only be partially 
checked) and in its continuity (and there-
fore as the sphere in which the Q;ood of the 
Kingdom can be partially antic ipA.ted)". (104) 
6. . ERNST BLOCH. AND THE FUTURE 
Bloch is the Marxist philosopher who perhaps more than any other has 
ventured into the field of transposing Christian categories and Marxist 
ideas. In doing so he has concentrated mainly on the eschatological 
aspect of Marxism and has thereby helped Christian theologians to under-
stand some of the implications of Christian eschatology. (105) Bloch's 
basic philosophical premise is contained in his celebrated statement, 
"S is not yet P". "Hence the universal formula that applies at the 
beginning of philosophy. S is not yet P, no subject already has its 
adequate predicate". (106) For Bloch, the incipit vita nm.~a, the new 













bring forth their true nature and uncover their full potential. The 
realization of this potential will come about through hope. 
' 
Bloch's underlying presupposition is that man has unlimited potential 
for self-creativity and in the looking towards and striving for some as 
yet unrealized goal man awaits his own fulfilment. Man's essence. lieP 
therefore not in a return to a golden age of the past, but in an ascent 
to the future. This future, which has still to come into existence has 
an ontological status of its own since it is a possibility, a potential 
waiting for fulfilment, both in things and human attitudes. Philosophy's 
role is to awaken this dormant utopian possibility in humanity. 
Bloch believes that in the historical record of man's mental and emotional 
images and dream-world fantasies lies the key to understanding this 
utopian urge. Men have expressed, albeit sometimes crudely, their ideas 
and hopes of a better world, a brighter future, and a release from 
suffering and pain in the poems, fairy-tales, popular legends and reli-
gious yearnings for paradise. Some of these longings are found in the 
revolutionary utopias constructed by historical figures - such as Thomas 
Muntzer - where a paradisal state is expected, which will eradicate evil, 
poverty and suffering. He claims that, "Where the negative emotions of 
expectation and their utopian images are oriented towards hell as their 
ultimate end •••• , the positive emotions of expectation (i.e. hope) - are 
oriented no less absolutely towards ~~radise 11 • (107) 
In common with other Marxist thinkers Bloch exhit5_ts an appreciation of 
chiliastic movements. The key to their motivation, he believes~ lies in 
their use of the eschatological element inherent in the biblical notion 
of the kingdom which "has posited, acknowledged and required the paths of 
utopianism as preparing for the final leap; in the Gospels the idea 











Bloch however believes that Marxism has pro•:ided the only picture of the 
future that is both concrete and consistent. It offers both a theory 
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about it and a praxis which ushers it in, In opposition to the inadequacy of 
the previous fantasies Marxism offers "an actively conscious participation 
:n the immanent historical process of the revolutionary transformation of 
society ••••• The point of a concrete Utopia is to understand precisely 
the dream conLerning it, a dream rooted in the historical process itself". 
(109) 
Bloch, however, is opposed to the Marxian concept of historical necessity, 
in the sense of laws of 'necessity of events'. In Man on His own he 
declares: "People, not things and not the mighty course of events outside 
ourselves (which Marx falsely places above us) write history". (llO) 
For Bloch, therefore, the determinative elem nt in history is man's own 
creativity. Part of that creativity is his capacity for hope and his 
reaching towards that for which he hopes. This hope is actualized there-
fore in hum2_::-. activity. Just as in the classical Marxist scheme theory 
an d praxis coincide in the coa.lescence of the proletarian consciousness 
and the socialist revolution so in Bloch hope for the Utopia and action 
to initiate it coincide. This hope is not something man receives from 
nature. He himself activates the latent hope within himself, and like 
Marx's man, cannot sit back and await the envisaged future as a gift to 
be received. "It is precisely hope (to the extent that it is joined to 
a world that does not surrender) that neither falls into despair nor 
sinks into quietist confidence". (111) 
The similarity between this interpretation and Miguez Bonino's exposition. 
is apparent, Whilst Marx rejects Utopianism, Bloch seeks to concretize 











with contemporary political theologians (112) has utilized this part of 
Bloch's teaching. 
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Bloch, unlike Moltmann, Metz and Weth, does not see the connection between 
present action 2nd the future eschatological reality (for him Utopia, 
for the theologians the Kingdom) in terms of "analogy", 11dnticipation", 
etc. He places the emphasis in true Marxist fashion on human causality, 
since he sees human hope as the dynamic force behind history. But whilst 
Bloch is able to do. this from Marxist premises, Miguez Bonino has to 
reconcile his emphasis on human responsibility with his theistic and bib-
lical sources, and this is a much more difficult task. Nevertheless it 
is Bloch who perceived the significance and parallel between his own ideas 
and the importance of the category of the kingdom for biblical faith: 
"The Kingdom remains the central religious concept". (113) However, 
Bloch is careful to delete all traces of theism from his eschatology. 
He believes that, "the Kingdom remains a messianic frontal space without: 
any theism; indeed, as increasingly demonstrated by every anthropologi-
zation of heaven from Prometheus down to the belief in a Messiah, it is 
only without theism that the kingdom remains at all". (114) 
But Miguez Bonino has "re-theologized" Bloch's categories without dimini-
shing in any way the positive and full insistence Bloch makes on human 
creativity. If the kingdom is both "from above" and "on earth" and they 
are one then there is no threat to the importance a.nd significance of human 
ethical action. Indeed, as Miguez Bonino says, even its weaknesses and 
imperfections are gat~ered up and perfected in the kingdom of God that 
is yet to come. ''The kingdom is not the denial of history, but the eli-
mination of its corruptibility, its frustrations, weakness, ambiguity -
more deeply, its sin - in order to bring to full realization the true 
meaning of the communal life of man". (115) Indeed, so effectively has 












the relationship between the kingdom in it3 present and future aspects 
that he finishes with a picture that is far richer than any "messianic 
frontal space". 
To take the matter a stage further, we note that Bloch also emphasized 
the openness of history. Because man is at the helm of history and bPcause 
he dares to ::ope for the new and to strive to actualize it, it' follows 
that history must be open. Furthermore, the activity of man in this open, 
future~oriented, hope-actualizing history, includes in its scope matter 
itself. Man is to shape the world, as well as to write his own history 
in it. 
The concept of an open history poses a challenge to any theology of 
history. If God, as our understanding of providence suggests, is in con-
trol, how can the future be open ? If God is guiding history to its con-
sununation in the Parousia what place is there for human creativity ? Again 
Miguez Bonino has responded to the chal{enge. He suggests that God charts 
the course~ whilst men pilot the ship. This is what we understand him to 
mean when he says: 
"Once we see divine initiative as that action of God 
within history and in historical terms which opens 
history toward the promise, we seem not only entitled 
but required to use the strong language of growth, 
realization, creation which, furthermore, is that 
of the prophets and ftpostles". (116) 
Bloch has even allowed a notion of transcendence which he interprets as 
the pressure of the future on the prc .. :ent. This is possible where there 
is someone who can ori'.ent himself to the future which means someone who 
can hope. Here again we have a secularized ccun·~erpart. to the New 
Testament concept of the New Age which has broken into the present and 
which we saw earlier was approximated in the thought of Marx and Lukacs. 
Whilst these latter would not aclmit to any suggestion of transcendence 











in the concept, suitably stripped of its th.eistic and christological 
connotations. After accusing Christian mysticism of "hiding the 
Christian God under a bushel" he affirms a humanistic eschatology. 
"It lies in a downward reversal.of the motion, 
not of love but of transcendence itself; down-
ward to mankind, so that in the utmost novum of 
this New Testament its heavenly Jerusalem will 
'come down out of heaven'~ and will do so 
'prepared as a bride', not as a sacrificial 
.::.1 tar, nor a throne of mercy". (117) 
Thus Bloch holds a belief that something - a Utopia - comes from the 
future into the present. In this sense Miguez Bonino perceives the 
'utopian function' of Christian eschatology. It serves to fire the 
imagination for concrete historical action. It is important, however 
to guard against thinking of the kingdom as a utopia which has (literally) 
"no place". The concept of the kingdom enables Miguez Bonino to do pre-
cisely what Bloch endeavours to do i.e. to concretize utopia. The 
kingdom has a place "both in history and in God's eschatological time" 
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(118). For Miguez Bonino it is not a dream of what the future might be but 
a mobilizing vision which defines "projectively ..••• the possibility for 
which we work in the present". (119) It embraces an interpretation 
of a past historical event, a present reality i.e. mobilizing vision 
etc. and a commitment to work towards the longed-for communal life in 
a future which will embody the great symbols of love, peace and justice. 
Thus Miguez Bonino' s concept of the kingdom is more all·-embracing than 
the Marxist hope. 
Another point of corre·spondence between Miguez Bonino and Marxism is in 
the resolution of the problem of historical necessity and freedom. The 
outline we have previously given has served to indicate the duality J.n 
Marx's ideas of the motive forces at work in the historical process. On 











dialectical nature of history in the successive economic formations which 
Marx sees as the epochs of mankind's march. These periods have each been 
&een to embody the tendencies which have developed into the ~ntitheses 
or negations of their own positive characteristics and dynamics. In their 
turn these movements have dialectically superseded their antecedant theses 
and become syntheses on a more advanced level. Thei:;e successive eras Ldve 
been seen to be processes dependent upon and deriving from the economic 
base in the modes of'production, On the other hand we have observed 
Marx's designation of human initiative and creative drive as the artisan 
of history, culminating in the proletarian revolutionary consciousness 
which performs the act of human self-affirmation in the stablishment of 
scientific socialism. We thus find ourselves faced with an apparent ten-
sion, if not contradiction, within the interpretation of history which 
Marx enunciated. 
Marx resolved this problem by positing a correspondence between them 
rather than a dichotomy. "Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past". (120) Furthermore, Marx did not 
hover between determinism and voluntarism. For him, the dialectical 
process of the breakdown of capitalism involved the rising conscious-
ness of the proletariat which was to break out in the revolution. He 
does not perceive a dilemma between r-._;_ statical necessity and conscious 
action. .Proletarian class-consciousness is both a condition of the 
revolution and the historical process in which tht:. revolution takes place. 
(121) Whilst it is giving birth to its own revolutionary conscious-
ness the proletariat therefore "passes decisively from the realm of 












Miguez Bonino's solution to the problem of how to emphasize human his-
torical responsibility in an exposition of the doctrine of the kingdom 
.of God follows similar lines. The "quite unbiblical concepL of God as 
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a kind of machine programmed to produce certain facts (the incarnation, 
the Parousia) irrespective of the movement of history" (123) though 
intended to protect the primacy of the· divine initiative, has to be 
rejected. That initiative should be seen rather as "the action of God 
within history and. in historical terms which opens history towards the 
promise". (124) If this action is 11within history and in historical 
terms" then it is also human action, and the divine initiative coincides 
with the initiative of men in terms of the continuity-discontinuity 
paradox Miguez Bonino has outlined. 
The most obvious difference between the Christian idea of the New Age and 
Marxism on this point is the appreciation of the present activity and its 
significanc~ for the future. In Marxism the present is to be swept 
away. So evil and corrupt is the exploitative capitalist system that 
the only good purpose it can serve is to conscientize the proletariat 
for revolutionary activity. In true Old Testament apocalyptic style 
it regards the present age as wholly evil. The new age wiH be the 
realm of righteousness. But for Miguez Bonino the new age has begun 
already. The works of the new age belong to the new order of the resur-
rection. Because of this they have a future - the new age will preserve, 
fulfil and complete them. 
It :Ls, furthermore, the kingdom that gives meaning to the whole content 
of the present and that gathers up the isolated fragments of human 
effort in a bringing together of past, present, and future in a 












"In this respect, we should also ask ourselves 
if the thousands of human battles waged to secure 
small amounts of freedom, justice, or dignity which 
are often bathed in human blood, often only 
partially triumphant, and where often the victory 
itself is deceiving, really constitute history or 
merely reflect incidents with no permanent signifi-
cance. And the answer is always the same. Chris-
tians should not be cynical in regard to human history 
for the same reason that they should not be cynical 
in regard to their personal life. They have learned 
to see the power of love manifested in Jesus Christ 
to ransom, to perfect, and to give eternal future to 
every instant of their personal life and to every 
movement in the communal life of human beings. They 
have come to see the love of God preserve and give 
mean:rng to all life". (125) 
.. 
In contrast with this, the Marxist future goal of classless society is 
so all-dominant that it relativizes both past and present. Actions in 
the "now11 or the "before" are divested of their value unless they are 
related to the revolutionary cataclysm to be brought about when the 
dialectical movement has ripened the processes of history. Marxism 
sacrifices the partial in the present for the sake of the whole in 
the future. It discounts the past in order to deify the future. In a 
guardedly cautious but very revealing admission at the empirical level, 
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Milan Machovec admits that Marxists today have discovered how undue con-
centration on the paradise to come "can lead to a fanaticism which 
abuses and ill-treats the ~resent-day members of society". (126) In 
Miguez Bonino's understanding of the kingdom such a callous travesty is 
avoided. The present is not only caught up in the kingdom, which has 
already arrived and is still to be consummated in the future. It contri-
butes to it and is a part of it. In a sentence which is absent from 
Doing Theology but which he has inserted in the to:;;xt of "Historical 
Praxis" he states "This means that the eschatological reality, in turn: 
is fashioned, nurtured aad raised in history". (127) Unlike Marxism 
where every new synthesis becomes negated in its antithesis we have 












present partial manifestations when they a~e salvaged, transformed and 
fulfilled. (128) 
We have now seen that in Marxism the future·relativizes the past and 
the present. We have also examined Miguez Bonino's thought and seen 
how in his hands Christian theology can assign significance to present 
action which is gathered up in the expected kingdo~. We have now arrived 
at the point where ~e need to compare Miguez Bonino's interpretation of 
eschatology with the work of other contemporary theologians. 
7. "DOES THE PRESENT DETERMINE THE FUTURE, OR DOES THE FUTURE DETERMINE 
THE PRESENT ? II (129) 
The developments in eschatological. theology which began with the work of 
Weiss and Schweitzer in the early years of the present century served to 
set in motion a continuing debate. The responses by Dodd and Bultmann 
have similarly had their contemporary counterparts. (130) In the field 
of systematic theology, however, the discussion in recent years has focus-
sed on whether the methodological starting-point should be "the future 
of the present Christ" or "the presence of the coming Christ" (131). The 
question posed by Moltmann which we have used as the title for this section 
/ 
of our study encapsulates !:his problem. It has heen restated by Molt-
mann, in the sentence, "Is the future theologically the 'revelation' of 
the present (apocalypse) or is the present the realized anticipation of 
the future (fulfilment) ? 11 • (132) 
Wolfhart Pannenberg grappled with this question L, Theol<?l?X.. and th~Kj:ng_-
dom of God. Pannenberg believes that the notion of the future as enshrined 
in the teaching of Jesus on the kingdom of God is the key to understand :7.ng 
the very nature of God, Jesus taught that God's claim on the world was 











say that, in a restricted but important sense~ God does not yet exist. 
Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's being is still in 
•the process 9f coming to be". (133) This statement is reminiscent 
of Bloch's futurism, and also implies a development in God similar to 
that envisaged in the process theology of Hartshorne and the philosophy 
of Whitehead. Pannenberg guards against this danger by claiming that 
"what turns out to be true in the future will then be evident as having 
been true all alongi1 • (13/•) 
For Pannenberg, therefore, God is "the power of the future", (135) and 
because God's Kingdom is not to be thought of simply as a far-away event 
but as innninent, it means that "Godrs rule is present and we can even 
now glimpse his future glory. In this way we see the present as an 
effect of the future, in contrast to the conventional assumption that 
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past and present are the cause of the future". · (136) He sees this future 
as an unpredictable and ambiguous, thotie"1 nevertheless personal, category. 
God is ultimate future beyond whom there is no future. God's ultimate 
act of sovereignty, the final coming of his kingdom, will be revealed in 
the eschaton. That end has been revealed already prolepticaliy in the 
resurrection of Jesus. The resurrection, however, is a unique event 
and therefore history is open because man is free. Pannenberg says: 
11 ln relation to the God of the power of the future, man is free: free 
for a truly personal life, free to accept the provisionality of every-
. thing, free with regard to nature and society, free for that creative 
love that changes 'the world without destroying it". (137) 
We can now see that PanLienberg's response to the question posed in 
our heading is clearly one which affirms the second of the two options -
the future determines the present. Like Miguez Bonino, Pannenberg has 












develop a theoiogy of the relationship between the present and the 
future. His interpretation brings out strongly the relativity of the 
.~resent vis a vis the future. This means that the present is constantly 
under the judgment of the future and this fact, to use Villa-Vicencio's 
phrase,. "prevents all moral and socio-political complacency and other-
worldlines::". (138) 
Pannenberg' s emphas_is on the priority of the future, however, has led 
him, in contrast to Miguez Bonino, to lay insufficient stress on the sig-
nif icance of present human action. Whilst Villa-Vicencio can claim that 
-~ .. 
' Pannenberg' s thought is "sigi.1ificantly political" (139) we would repJ.y 
that it is insufficiently so because of this very failure. It may be 
that Miguez Bonino's dialogue with Marxism has led him to lay a greater 
emphasis on the ethical 'imperative inherent in the biblical teaching on 
the kingdom. If so, we see in this emphasis a healt!ycorrective to the 
"abstract ethical systems" (140) with which Pannenberg is left. 
Jurgen Moltmann has found a fruitful way to harmonize the two emphases. 
He does so by a semantic study of various·words for "future". In the 
German word Zukunft there is perhaps some confusion until the equivalents 
in Latin and Greek are considered. The Latin equivalent is adventus which 
carries the connotation of expectation of something that is to come. 
"It means" he says "the arrival or 'coming' of something other, something 
new and transforming, which had not yet been present in that forrr .md 
is still not pres~nt as yet". (141) The Greek word which corresponds 
here is parousi3:_ which, in addition to the sense of arrival, was used in 
Greek philosophy to denote "the present". In the New Testament this is 
used to signify the coming of God and of Christ. As in the Old Testaffient 
it speaks of the unique and then final connng of God and of a. world 












does not arise as a consequence of the present, but rather "the present 
springs from a future which one must be expectant of: in transience". (142) 
•However, the Latin word futurum carries the sense of that wti.ich is yet 
to be and is roughly equivalent of the Greek word_yhysis which indicates 
something that will bring forth or produce. Again the German word Zukunft does 
duty for this meaning in common parlance. The Eng:ish equivalents, as 
Moltmann's translator points out, would be "Coming" (as in "the coming 
year") and future in the sense of what is "ahead". (143) The German word 
Futur should be used to indicate potentiality or "the temporal prolonga--
tion of being". (144) Moltmann goes on to draw out the theological 
significance of this distinction. The passion and resurrection of Jesus 
are the prolepsis or sending ahead of God's future, the Zukunft. Because 
this is so, then the present is determined by him and becomes the seed 
of that which is to come. It therefore produces a Futur corre8ponding 
to the Zukunft. The latter, however has a soteriological role of 
justification and reconciliation ''in an unrighteous and unreconciled 
existence". (144) The ultimate overcoming of this enmity becomes the 
Futur of this present. However, Moltmann finishes with a priority assig-
ned to the eschatological. He says: 
"The soteriolo3ical "descent' from the presence of 
salvation to the cons'mmnating future, however, is 
comprehended and enclosed by the converse theological 
'descent' from the eschatological sole lordship of 
God to the provisional lordship of Christ. It is 
only out of historical descent from the.future to 
the present that the converse soteriological descent 
from the present to the fDture acquires its quicken-
ing power'~. (145) 
Moltmann therefore recognizes the necessity for l1~1man activity directed 
to the future, but the formula he finishes with means that God's kingdom 
is entirely his own. rWhilst he allows that history must move, through 












of the kingdom in the parousia. For 11oltmann, this human creating of 
the future is participation in the mission which looks for the possi- ' 
•bilities of changing history. (146) But in Moltmann' s scheme the 
work which men do finishes with a lesser eschatological significance 
than that which Miguez Bonino assigns to it in "Room to be People". 
Whilst Moltmann ther~fore, represents an advance on Pannenberg in this 
respect, the balance in his thinking still lies more with the future 
which determines the present than vice versa. Moltmann is in dialogue 
with Marxism to a far greater degree than Pannenberg and his awareness 
of the sufferings and Godforsakenness of the oppressed in the third 
world comes out clearly in The Crucified God. Here Holtmann confesses 
the need for "political hermeneutics of faith" and "political disciple-· 
ship" (llf7) and says "the identifications of the presence of God with 
the matter involved in liberation from vicl:ous circles are real symbols, 
real ciphers and material anticipations _of the physical presence of God". 
l 
(148) 
Miguez Bonino takes issue with Moltmann at this point and we shall explore 
this disagreement in our. next chapter. At this stage it is sufficient 
to note that in Moltmann the political involvement called for is seen in 
these sacramental terms. It is a sacraraent of the future but only in 
the secondary and derivative way described above is it causative of the 
future. 
A third theologian. to deal with this issue in eschatology is Karl Rahner 
whose solution is i.o draw a clear distinction between an intramundane 
future and the absolute future. The latter phrase H> a term which Rahner 
coins as a circumlocution for the word God. The absolute future is 












described in terms of an absolute becoming whilst the absolute future 1s 
at work it "and supports it as an inner constitutive element of 
this becoming". (149) Rahner thus combines both poles of Moltmann's 
dilemma - the absolute future determines the present and the present 
determines the relative or intramundane future. 
Rahner's fvcmulation is worked out specifically in response to Marxism 
whose future goal he sees as solely an intramundane future. An intra-
mundane future is orie which is planned by man. Christianity regards such 
objectives as "the greatest possible liberation of man from the domination 
of nature", and "the progressive socialization of man for the attainment 
of the greate!:'t possible scope for freedom" (150) as genuinely human 
and God-given tasks. This task is understood by Rabner as implicit in 
the ethical imperative of love for God and neighbour which comprise the 
one commandment and accomplislLTnent of authentic Christianity. Rahner 
believes that Marxism is an ideological utopian view of the future which 
confuses the intramundane and categorisa'!:..le future with the absolute 
future. 
By contrast Christianity, by making a clear distinction between the 
worthwhile goals of an intramundane future and the mystery of the absol-
ute future protects man from the temptation to absolutize his relative 
goals. Such a temptation occurs when he invests in these relative goals 
"such energy that every generation is always sacrificed in favour of the 
next, so that the future becomes a Moloch before whom the man exis c).ng 
at present is butc~ered for the sake of some man who is never real and 
always still to come". (151) Rahner believes that "ultimate. rHdical 
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significance" is assigne(l by the ethical imperative of Christianity to 
) 











Rahner's scheme has considerable merit. A clear distinction is kept 
between the secular, intramundaue future which always stands under the 
, judgment of the absolute future. Furthermore the relative nature of 
this future is ably maintained, and the tension between the two is fully 
emphasized. It is doubtful, though, whether the philosophical categor-
ies he use: and the ethical imperative he refers to can ever engender 
sufficient motivation for worthwhile action. As the study of radical 
apocalyptic movements showed it is the imminence of the future inbreaking 
of God which provides the "utopian" motivation for significant action. 
Man needs powerful and stimulating symbols to evoke the effort needed to 
overcome the oppressive forces of conservatism and reaction. Whilst 
Rahner's answer therefore is philosophically tidy it is lacking in the 
essential ingredient which Miguez Bonino 1 s c·ategory of the kingdom of 
God includes - namely human hope. (152) As a contribution to the 
Christian-Marxist dialogue· in Europe Rahner' s thought represents a valu-
able clarifying of concepts. In the co~~ext of the humanly stultifying 
conditions of the third world it is short of dynamism. 
The need for a powerful dynamic combined with clear-cut ethical concepts 
is provided in the thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer who begins with the 
paradigm of justification by faith. Justification is t:.e last word. 
It is final in a qualitative sense: as God 1 s mm free word it is 
sovereign and independent. As such it is the irreversible and final 
word and ultimate reality" (153) and cannot be achieved by a way Jf 
one's own. Consequently it is a ju<lgmen~ on the things before the 
last. It is also final in a temporal sense, being preceded by something 
that is penultimate bu~ which occupies a span of time. This penultimate 













Bonhoeffer goes on to speak of the two extreme solutions which are 
sometimes put forward in response to the problem of the relation 
~~tween the penultimate and the ultimate. The one is the radical answer 
which emphasizes what in considering Miguez Bonino's ideas we have come 
to distinguish as discontinuity. There is a complete break between 
the ultimate and penultimate and that break is the judgment of Christ. 
The second response is compromise which distances the ultimate to such 
an extent that it has no effect on the penultimate which therefore 
"retains its right on its own account and is not tpreatened or imperilled 
by the ultimate". (154) In eschatological terms the radical response 
is equivalent to thoroughgoing apocalypticism, and compromise to 
extreme conservatism. Both are opposed to Christ in whose incarnation, 
cross and resurrection is to be found the solution to the problem of 
the relationship between ultimate and penultimate. 
In the incarnation the human reality is affirmed as that which is 
before the last. It is nei her independent (as in compromise) nor 
destroyed (as in radicalism). "He allows it to remain as that which is 
before the last, as a penultimate which requires to be taken seriously, 
a penultimate which has become the outer covering of the ultimate". (155) 
In the Crucifixion the ultimate judges the penultimate but also shows 
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it mercy as the penultimate "bows before the judgment of the ultimate". 
(156) In the resurrection new life is imparted to man but he still remains 
man, in the realm pf the penultimate. The penultimate is not annulled. 
by the resurrection "but the eternal life, the new life, breaks in 
with ever greater power into the earthly life and wins its space for 
itself within it". (157) Thus Bonhoeffer establishes a relationship 
between the ultimate and the penultimate which is christological all the 











of the world and the reality of Christ which we looked at in the 
previous chapter here Bonhoeffer sets the penultimate and the ultimate 
in a horizontal polarity. His biographer, Bethge explains that "the 
ultimate and the penultimate are correlatives, each conditioning, quali-
fying, and validating the other". (158) 
Bonheef fer sees ethics as the preparation of the way from the ultimate ~o 
the penultimate. And yet the penultimate precedes the ultimate. 
"It is everything that precedes the ultimate •••• It 
is at the same time everything which follows the 
ultimate and yet again precedes it. There is, therefore, 
no penultimate in itself; as though a thing could 
justify itself in itself as being a thing befora the 
last thing; a thing becomes penultimate only through the 
ultimate, that is to say at, the moment when it has 
already lost its own validity. The penultimate, then, 
does not determine the ultimate; it is the ultimate 
which determines the penultimate". (159) 
The ultimate then is Christ's coming in grace. And man's task is to 
. .) 
prepare for his coming since there is in the historical situation ~ depth 
.~) 
of human suffering impeding the coming of Christ. To feed the hungry is 
to prepare the W'ay for the coming of grace because it is a thing before 
the last and when done for the sake of and in the knowledge of Christ 
"this penultimate does bear a relation to the ultimate.· It is a pen.ulti. -
mate. The coming of grace is the ultimate". (160) 
However, more is needed than the amelioration of social conditions. The 
activity of preparing the way must be a spiritual reality. Only rep en-. 
tance is an adequate preparation, and repentance requires action • These 
actions must be di~ected to two objectives - to be men and to be good. 
In the final analysis, however, only the Lord HimseL: can prepare the 
way for his coming. "The end of all preparation of the way for Christ 
must lie precisely in perceiving that we ourselves can never prepare the 












not our way to Him but His way to us that 11as to be prepared and it can 
be prepared through my knowledge that He Himself must prepare it •••••• 
'Preparation of the way is a way from the ultimate to the pe11ultimate". 
(162) 
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Bonhoeffer's dialectic of the ultimate and the penultimate has the adu~n­
tage that it maintains the ultimacy of the ultimate whilst giving due sig-
nificance to the importance of the penultimate. Indeed, it is this formu-
lation by Bonhoeffer which enabled liberation theologians with Protestant 
views to participate critically in dialogue with Marxism. It clarified 
for them the distinction and relationship between hat is ultimate and 
what is penultimate. By relying on God's pardoning grace (in the ultimate) 
they we:re able to see that the goals of human justice were penultimate, 
and therefore concretizations of repentance. They were attempts to 
"prepare the way'! (163) As such the alliance with radical groups was 
a valid Christian ethical response to an inhuman situation. 
Bonhoeffer's formulation holds a healthy balance between the present 
and the future. The ultimate, in Bonhoeffer's scheme, both judges and 
pardons the inadequacies and failings of the penultimate and hence 
guards against the danger ~f absolutizing the penultimate. At the same 
time the concept of "preparing the way" allows greater significance to 
present historical action than does the sacramental model used by Holt-
mann. Bonhoeffer embraces the prior; ':.y of the future brought out so well 
by Pannenberg, maintains the clear distinction between the penultimacy 
of the intramundane future and the absolute future we have seen in 
Rabner, and still assigns a greater degree of causative significance 
to present human action than does Moltmar .. n. 












teaching on the kingdom of God with Bonhoeffer 1 s treatment of the 
ultimate and the penultimate. Miguez Bonino, it seems to us, takes 
'the essential elements of Bonhoeffer's thought at this point and uses 
them as the basic structure for his exposition of the kingdom of God. 
By so doing he is able to clothe the more spatially structured account 
of Bonhoeff e~ with syrrillols that are at once both ~ure biblical and 
more dynamic. In this respect Miguez Bonino has overcome the lack of 
an adequate eschatology in Bonhoeffer's scheme. (164) 
By utilizing the category of the kingdom of God Miguez Bonino has been 
able to develop an eschatology which maintains a healthy balance between 
the present and the future. He emphasizes both the judgment and the 
redemptive grace of the promised future kingdom whilst at the same time 
underlining the way in which these liberate us to participate in the 
historical enterprise of the present. Consequently he can claim 
"eschatological permanence" (165) for the "concrete historical options 11 
(166) which the gospel impels us to make here and now. Because these 
undertakings are penultimate God "will rescue what is significant and 
destroy what is negative" (167) The relation between the present and 
the future therefore is positive, dynamic, and dialectical and herein 
lies the strength of Miguc,: Bonino's theological work. 
Miguez Bonino then sees the future, the ultimate, (the "absolute future 11 
of Rahner) as a call to and therefor'"' determinative of the present. At 
the same time it is a judgment on the present. The result is of crucial 
importance. He says: 
"There is, therefores also a critical and polemical 
dimension in the Christian witness which consists 
in bringing to judgment the human situation and 
assuming its conflicts and contradictions in tenus 











The question then arises as to how the Christian is to determine where 
his engagement in the historical situation will begin. He must of 
'I'.ecessity choose between available political alternatives. This involves 
him in relating his understanding of God's redemptive purposes to his 
assessment of the contemporary socio-political situation. It also 
raises the issue of political and ideological mediations and we now turn 












.. CHAPTER . FOUR 
IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL MEDIATIONS 
Inherent in the liberation theolOgy enterprise is the unquenchable 
conviction that Christians must act in order to bring about a more human 
condition o~ life for all men and women. There is the further recogni-
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tion that if this action is to be in any way effective it must be actualized 
in the arena of political endeavour. Anything which stops short of commit-
ment to a political programme is destined to peter out in the quicksands 
of comfortable neutrality, ideological self-deception or well-meaning 
but ineffective intentionality. 
The need for engagement in the process of history-making is taken a step 
further as the theologia~s of liberation recognize also that in order to 
concretize this commitment Christians must use whatever resources are 
available to them. Hence they have turned to the social sciences iI1 order 
to utilize the research knowledge and in~ights about human society gar-
nered in those disciplinep. 
Alongside this ultilization of the social sciences has come the awareness 
that these sciences are not value-free. Despite the rigorously scientific 
methodological code which the human sciences strive to m~intain they are 
influenced consciously or unconsciously by ideological factors. Libera-
tion theology therefore acknowledges the nee0 for a critical discernment 
of ideological influences and goes on to assert the necessity for i~eolo­
gical self-awareness on the part of both the social scientist and the 
theologian. 
In addition to discernmt:nt and self-awareness, however, the liberation 











ideological and political options that are open to him. Whilst he may 
be aware of factors in any ideological option which are not in harmony 
with his basic Christian convictions, he may - indeed must - throw his 
weight in with some ideology and its corresponding politicai concretiza-
tion. To remain neutral, or to distance oneself from the ideological 
conflict is, the liberation theologians believe, to avoid engagement Pnd 
involvement. Also it is not possible. 
The myth of ideologtcal neutrality is particularly abhorrent to these 
theologians. They contend that an individual who purports to remain 
uncommitted ideologically is merely deceiving himself and his failure 
to engage in political action renders void any claim to profess Christian 
love. The effect of neutrality a.nd non-commitment is that the person 
ends up unwittingly supporting the ideology of the status quo and the 
politics of conservatism. 
The problem then a.rises for the Christian as to how he is going to decide 
between thP majority of Christian theologians in claiming that 
our understanding of the Bible and the ~ospel message and the 11 theologico-
hermeneu tic reasoning or instrument" (1) used in this interpretation 
enable us to ascertain criteria for judging between choices. 
Social sciences, ideology qnd biblical and theological interpretation 
then, constitute the human mediations which it is necessary to identify 
and use in the process of transposing Christian love into meaningful 
historical action, In the present chapter we shall first examine Miguez 
Bonino's own reasoning about the need for and use of these mediations 
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and follow this with a comparative study of £our other models by theologians 
who have sought to set out a social ethical system. In this section we look 
at the social ethics of John Howard Yoder's radical reformed model, KC<rl 
Earth's nee-orthodox formulation, Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism! 












In our third section we examine the debate between Miguez Bonino 
and Ju~gen Moltmann which spotlights some of the basic differences 
b~tween European political theology and liberation theology. This leads 
into a consideration of the relationship between ideology and Christianity 
and here we refer briefly to the position of Peter Berger. 
In the final section we will see how Mi£~ez Bonino delineates points 
of agreement and disagreement between Christian theology a.nd Marxism over 
this question. 
1. MIGUEZ BONINO'S TREATMENT 
Miguez Bonino deals with the question of historical mediations by again 
utilizing his key category of t~e Kingdom of God. If God's initiative is 
understood as his action in opening history towards the promise then the 
crucial issue for Christians becomes not "T1foere is the Kingdom to be 
discovered ?" (which would be little more than an intellectual exercise) 
but "How am I to participate in the Kingdom ?" From this standpoint 
the Kingdom is seen not as an object to be ooserved, discovered and inter-
preted with rational tools, but an impirical movement. 
"a call, a convocation, a pressure that impels. 
History, in relation to the Kingdom, is not a 
riddle to be solved but a ~ission to be fulfilled. 
That mission, one must hasten to add, is not a 
mere accumulation of .unrelated actions, but a 
new reality, a new life which is communicated in 
Christ, in the power of the Spirit." (2) 
This com..rnitment to action, or historical engagement, involves working out. 
the sort of individual and communal quality of life which possesses 
eschatological si~nificance. This pose~, for Miguez Bonino, the question 
of historical mediations. In examining this ~spect of his thought we 
find it necessary to refer to his writings both in ("Historical Praxis'' 












previous two sections. We do so because in Doing Theology he introduces 
his argument with Holtmann at this stage. We prefer to consider this 
•a.:>pect of his thought later fo our study and to trace here the develop-
ment of the theme of mediations in his later works. The argument with 
Moltmann is left out of "Historical Praxis'' altogether in favour of an 
approach to the issue of historical mediations in the contemporary 
Latin American context, whilst in Christians and Marxists he explores 
the concept of mediations still further. 
Miguez Bonino is unequivocally in favour of articulating Christian obedience 
through the use of mediations. In the final chapter of Doing Theology 
he sets out briefly his ideas on ecclesiology and claims that the church 
has to opt for a concrete historical praxis on either the right or the 
left. This involves it in making a decision of faith in which a church 
becomes a connnunity of faith and which "places it for or against Christ". 
(3) In clarifying this statement he gives a definition of what he. means 
by mediations. He affirms the need to reject all fanaticism by 
"recognising that a Christian option cannot take 
place except through mediations; a theological 
and ethical reflection which incorporates a 
certain analytical and ideological understanding 
of history into a careful and intelligent listening 
to the wom of Scripture and the tradition of the , 
church." (4) 
In this sentence Miguez Bonino makes three important declarations which 
constitute the core of his thinking on this subject. The first is his 
conviction that mediations are absolutely necessary both for histor,._cal 
engagement and in ~rder to avoid fanaticism. Secondly, he believes one 
of the necessary mediations to be a scientific and ideological analysis 
of contemporary society- In the third place, the interpretation of the 
biblical witness concerning the general nature of the kind of life appro-












indispensable. In 11His'torica1 Praxis'' he -clarifies the latter two 
t' "' . < rj r '~; ..•. , J 
P?ints by asserting that the mediating factors are: theological inter-
.pretation, scientific analysis and ideological synthesis. (5) 
< 
The use of theological interpretation as on~ mediation and scientific 
analysis as another corresponds with Miguez Bon.ino's constant allusio11 
to "the double historical reference" of the faith. (6) By these he 
means the 11Christ-ref erence" on the one hand which is needed to maintain 
the identity of the present reality of the kingdom in general history, 
and on the other hand the "present" historical reference which alone is 
the soil in which our faith is rooted if it is to be relevant. (7) 
The similarity between Miguez Bonino's formulation of this tension and the 
christological theology of Bonhoeffer is plain to see. 
Miguez Bonino believes that the theological mediation can be further 
elucidated as 
"the reading of the direction of the biblical tex.t, 
particularly of the witness of the basic, germinal 
events of the faith. They seem, in fact, to point, 
in their integrity and coherence, to certain directions 
which such concepts as liberation, righteousness~ 
shalom, the poor, love, help us to define". (8) 
He contends that it is not possible to derive from the Bible a set of 
laws for contemporary sociPty. But it constitutes the crucial referent 
for a contemporary faith and 
"It is indeed possible and necessary to underline a 
· ·continuum, a direction and a purpose in Go& 's historical 
action as portrayed and Jr.terpreted in the Scriptures, 
which is conveyed through such expressions and symbols 
as 'justice', 'peace', 'redemption~ in their concrete 
·biblical illustrations". (9) 
Miguez Bonino is careful, however, to stres1> the equal importance of the 
mediation of scientific analysis. This has come about as a result of the 
growth of sociological thought in Latin America and it has provided a new 
direction for theological reflection. The particular insights provided 













problem of dependence and liberation as a basic structure of analysis 
and (b) its substitution of the revolutionary nature of liberation 
in place of the liberal concept of liberty. This perspective has led 
~ociology itself, according to Miguez Bonino, to rearrange its own cate-
gories and tools. (10) These new categories were fundamental in providing 
theology with a scientific structure to enable it to understand, analyze, 
and develop the revolutionary praxis of .::.-..1 increasing number of Christians. 
Previously the theologians had no tools with which to approach this phenomenon 
which i$ the starting-point for the theology of liberation. (11) 
It is to be noted here that when Miguez Bonino speaks of scientific analysis 
he is referring to radical sociological theory. This is to be distinguished 
from the traditional academic sociology which sought to be rigorously objec-
tive in its studies of society. It is held by radical sociologists that 
academic sociology functions and makes its analyses from the presuppositions 
and viewpoints of capitalism and therefore ~.ccepts a bourgrois ideological 
starting point. It presupposes respect for the given order and stresses the 
/'' 
objective external character of social realities. 
Radical sociology on the other hand holds that capitalist society is in 
the grip of social problems which have an economic basis and can never 
be solved until they are recognized as symptoms of the malaise which a 
capitalistic economic system spawns. The ideological nature of conservative 
sociology is indicated by Shaw when he says: 
"Sociology arises and assumes the economic problems are 
· solved, when economic problems have become transparently 
social problems which cannot be solved within the framework 
·of bourgeois economics. That is to say, when the social 
character of capitalist production~ veiled by bourgeois 
economics~ has become apparent in the revolt of the chief 
force of production, the working class, sociology arises 
as a theor7 of how to respond to this revolt without 
abolishing the capitalist mode of production. Sociology 
recognizes the social character of producti~~ - but by 
denying that it is to do with production which is a 
matter for economics' 11 (12) 
The determinative criterion for sociologists is their stance on 












of sociologists to Marx". (13) This means that radical sociologists 
have a_n avowedly ideological starting point but their claim is that conserva-
tive sociology, though less aware of it, is no less ideological. 
J\adieal sociologists, then, operate from Marxist premises and therefore 
begin with a theory that is critical of capitalist society. It simultaneously 
offers an alternative. These people see the social problems as originating 
from the class conflict they believe to be inherent in the capitalist 
system and they believe that only a Marxist-type revolution can resolve the 
underlying tensions.· They still seek to pursue research with honesty and 
integrity but they 11 add Marxism to the tradition they share with the 
conservatives". (14) 
Hence the relationship between ideology and the social sciences is itself an 
ideological issue and when Miguez Bonino calls for a mediation which is 
scientific it is this self-confessed, radical, Marxist-orientated analysis 
that he has in mind. 
In "Histoi:ical Praxis" Miguez Bonino describes the analysis of the his-
torical context as "Ideological". He says: "Both our personal and our 
collective actions - be they political, economic, or simple.face-to-face 
interpersonal relations - e~press some understanding of humanity, reality 
and the future. In short, they constitute an ideology." (15) In this 
article he goes further than he did in Doing Theology be relating the 
mediations he speaks of to the actual present situation in Latin America. 
He finds the praxis of Christians there falling into two camps. One of 
these opts for a conservative stance w:th regard to political and 
economic structures - a preservation of the status quo. The other is 
more radical and is calling for a switch to a socialist system with the 
~oncomitant socio-political changes that would be necessary. He then affirms 











use of the concept of liberation which is derived from the direction of 
the prophetic message, the ministry of Jesus, and the "new life in Christ" 
.~s described by St. Paul. These together point to liberation, which mode 
of life can be spelt out in terms such as "justice, solidarity, the 
real possibility of accepting responsibility for oneself and others, 
access to t~e creation that God has given us, freedom to. establish one's 
own community through one's own effort and love, and space for worshipping 
God". (16) 
Such a quality of life he believes is not manifest in Latin America. 
The capitalist system with its internatinnal monopolistic tentacles 
"is not a viable structure for historicizing the kind and quality of 
human life that has a future in God's kingdom". (17) On the contrary 
they are potent contradi(:tions. Instead of liberation the Latin American 
scene por~rays rather oppression and slavery. Thus those Christians who 
have become engaged in the struggle for a socialist order are seeking to 
alter the status quo. Hence Miguez Bnni~o can say: 
" •••.• for us Latin Americans today socialism, as a 
socio-economic structure and a historical project, 
is viewed as our active correlation with the presence 
of the kingdom insofar as the structureof society is 
concerned. On that level it represents our obedience 
in faith and it is the matrix of theological reflection". (18) 
He goes on to stress that there is no intention to absolutize a socialist 
order. The project to create such an order is a human, historic.al effort, 
nnd as such, is to be transcended both historically and eschatolog{cally. 
Here again we sec.the·influence of Bonhoeffer's category of the ultimate 
and the penultimate. Miguez Bonino brings out clearly the relative nature 
of the proposed order - it is "more in accord with the kingdom than the 
(19) 
existing system",/but it is not coterminous with the Kingdom. Neverthe-
less Christians will be motivated to evaluate and criticize it in order 












The mediatio;.-.s involved are, Miguez Bonino admits, human and fallible, 
and therefore they cannot be absolutized. But an option has to be 
,taken since one cannot evade the issue merely because of the relative 
nature of the human enterprise. To pursue the erroneous option would 
be disobedience. Returning to Bonhoeffer's discernment oi justification 
as the ultimate Miguez Bonino concludes~ 11Here again the last word is 
'salvatinn by grace' through faith. Working in and from a concrete 
historical connnitment, we cannot hope for the kingdom and our activity 
to coincide in any way except through the gratuitous mercy of God11 • · (20) 
In Christians and Marxists (21) he delves somewhat more deeply into the 
question of mediations. Mediation is, he Affirms, of the very nature 
of any historical movement, and he cites the role of the party of the 
proletariat in Marxism-Leninism as an instance of th,~ human, concrete 
:) 
level. But he also stresses the uniqueness of Christ's mediation in the 
·Christian scheme. Because the Christia.;.; perspective sees alienation as 
a radical and fundamental estrangement it calls for a mediation that is 
practical. It differs from the Marxist scheme in that it claims the 
alienation is so fundamental that man cannot save himself. This dilemma 
is solved christologically. Here Miguez Bonino draws from the insight 
of Dorothee Solle who distinguishes between a substitute and a represen-
tative. The former takes the place of the person for whom he substitutes, 
replacing and displacing him. The representative acts on behalf of those 
he rep~':.:sents who are usually "a minor, an incapacitated, a powerless 
person or group". (22) As an interim expedient he does for them some-
thing which they are unable to do themselves. The purpose is to empower 
them so that they can e.rentually do it for themselve2, Miguez Bonino 
believes that this sort of representation describes the mediation of 
Christ which aims to recreate man as "God's free and active .agent in 












He goes on to consider Christian ethics which he describes as "the search 
for ways of realising concretely in the world the power and efficacy of 
sc.lidary love". (24) This search involves restoring the Christian under-
standing of love from its bourgeois captivity in idealistic, sentimental 
and subjective forms to its Biblical setting. The Biblical understanding 
of love should be seen in terms of the establishment of God's Kingdom -
"the sovereignty of his covenantal, humanizing love". (25) 
The breaking in of the Kingdom is seen in Christ's ministry as it fulfils 
the prophetic promise of Isa. 61:1-2 which was used by Jesus in the 
programmatic definition of his work in Luke 4:18 ff. When the Apostles 
carry on the ministry of Jesus they are taking over where the mediating 
representative (as previously defined) handed it to them. 
"A Christian ~thics has as its ultimate horizon the shalom 
of the Kingdom and as its immediate criterion and power 
the redemptive mediation of Jesus Christ. 
The indissoluble unity of this horizon and the mediation 
are at the heart of Christian witness 11 • (26) 
Here we note the similarity again with the formulation by Bonhoeffer, 
The eschatological ultimate is, in Miguez Bonino, the shalom of the 
Kingdom and the penultimate is here the redemptive mediation of Christ. 
Their unity is a christological unity, the touchstone for Bonhoeffer's 
formulation. 
For Miguez Bonino, the crux of the problem is the task of getting from 
the biblical cluster of concepts - love, peace, justicej liberatior, -
to the concrete hi'storical situation. He states his position well when 
he says: 
"Christian to:::hics, nevertheless, faces still a crucial 
problem. HoYl do we do justice effectively in the world ? 
The hungry, thirsty, naked, foreigners and prisoners 
of the world are always historical beings, caught in the 
web of lm:nan economic, political, social relationships. 
Our obligation to them cannot escape the complexity of 












has to do with the problem of li.istorical mediation. 
We cannot at this point simply reproduce biblical 
models because we live in a different world". (27) 
,Hence there is the indispensable need for a contemporary sociology, 
politics and economic theory. 
Miguez Bonino then mentions some of the classic instances where the lack 
of a consciously formulated mediation has led to the unwitting smuggling 
' 
in of interests of those constructing or using the system. One such 
instance was Calvin's attempt at Geneva to apply Old Testament legal 
injunctions literally. Another was the Anabaptist use of the New Testa-
ment guidelines. Similar tendencies have been apparent in the scholastic 
concept of "natural law" and the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms. 
All of these schemes have suffered from the weakness that their creators 
were unconsciously manipulating them for their own political or economic 
purposes. 
In the casP of Calvin and the Anabaptists the result was fanaticism, 
whilst the "natural law" system led to confusion. The "two kingdoms" 
formulation by Luther led to the ideological servitude of the German 
Christian movement under the Nazi regime as well as the "thinking 
in two spheres" (to use Bonhoeffer 1 s phrase) apparent in the capitalist 
interpretation. 
The danger of fanaticism crops up again in Miguez Bonino 1 s exposition in 
11Historical Praxis". Here he points ,1ut that some theologians have 
started their ethical.systems by asking "What is God doing in history 
today?" They then attempt to identify God's acti .. ms with human programmes. 
He admits that there may be some value in such an endeavour but it is 
prone to the fanaticism of the crusader. "Once people think they have 
discovered 'what God is doing' they quite logically tend to absolutize 
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Miguez Bonino believes that Christianity has lacked an adequate mediation 
for analyzing the dynamics of society and its own role in it. This, 
'he claims is provided in Marxism which he describes as "a scientific, 
verifiable and efficacious way to articulate love historically". (29) 
He derives this belief from his premise that the ethos of the Marxist 
enterprise can be su11nned up in the affirmation "solidarity (love ?) 
is better than egoism" (30) Following Rubel he sees the focus of Marx's 
theoretical formula.tion as stemming from the humanist tradition. (31) 
The rejection of c~pitalist self-~eeking and individualism is at the core 
of Marx's ethics and the positive expression of this is solidarity. In 
support of this claim he quotes approvingly from Lenin: 
"The old society was based on the following 
principle: either you loot your neighbour or 
he loots you; either you work for somebody 
else or somebody works for you: you are 
either a slave or a slave-owner. And it is 
understandable that ~en, educated in such a 
society, will assimilate, together with their 
Mother's milk> as it were, the psychology, the 
habits, the idea that there is nothing but 
master and slave, or small owner or small 
employee, officer or intellectual, in one word, 
men who are exclusively engaged in caring for 
themselves and._wbat is theirs, without. thinkfng 
of-others. (Re,~olution) is a victory over -
our ovm routine and weakness, over petit bour-
geois egoism, over all those h-abits which an 
accursed ca~italism has left as a heritage to 
the worker and peasant''. (32) 
In elucidating this claim Miguez Bonino uses as a starting point, the 
assertion by Che Guevara that "a revolutionary is a person possessed by 
deep fe~lings of love". (33) 
Marx however, by retaining the philosophy of identity and of self-
containment, failed to provide a sufficient dynamic for openness to "the 











understanding of God enters in, for in the biblical notion love is 
ontologically ultimate and is grounded in a trinitarian base. (34) 
This love is also historically concrete'and engaged, being derived 
from the covenant-God. (35) It is in addition a love which "encompasses 
and gives unity to the total~ty of man's relationship with God and with 
his neighbour". (36) This is the foundation for his development of a 
love-ethic which, in order to be efficacicJs needs the mediation of the 
Marxist ideology, aµd requires Marxism and Christianity to meet in engage-
ment. If Marxism can in fact provide a historically scientific way of 
making love efficacious then, he claims: 
"the use of the Marxist analysis is not something 
foreign for the Christian. Our real discrepancy 
has to do with the ultimate nature and foundation 
of that love. And this is not without practical 
consequences. But the intention to make this 
love historically operative for the total human 
society is E:°ssential for both Christian and Marxist". (37) 
Miguez Bonino claims that at this point Marxism and Christianity need 
each other. Christianity has the motivating power, source and dynamic of 
solidary love but lacks an adequate theoretical and scientific structure. 
Marxism has the latter, but lacks the former. Thus historically, Chris-
tianity has been allied with a capitalism whose basic ethos is anti-
Christian. In fact, "in terms of their basic ethos, Christianity must 
criticise capitalism radically in its fundamental intent.:..on, wkile it must 
criticise socialism functionally, in its failure to fulfil its purpose". 
(38) It must be underlined that Miguez Bo~ino sees !'1arxism as a tool to 
be used for the attainment of Christian ends in a thoroughly secul:.r way. 
Because of this he can be adamant that, 
"there is therefore no sacrali;rntion of an ideology, no 
desire to '~heologize' sociological, economic> or 
political c ..... tegories. We move totally and solely in the 
area of human rationality - in the realm where God has 
invited man to be on his own. The only legitimate 
guestion is therefor-e whether this analysis and this 
projection do in fact correspond to the facts of human 












become the unavoidable historical mediation of 
Chris ti an obedience11 • (39) 
Starting from the premise that the Kingdom demands historical engagement, 
·then, Miguez Bonino has argued his way to the position where he feels 
he can make a commitment to a specific secular political movement without 
thereby secralizing that ideology. In this respect the theologians of 
liberation go further than previous theology has dared to venture.· The 
route from the command of God to its concretization in the socio-political 
context has been a particularly difficult one, but it is instructive to 
see how the map has been charted by others. 
2. A CRITIQUE OF OTHER THEOLOGICAL MODELS 
In order to gain a better perspective on Miguez Bonino's ethical 
approach we now propose to review four other theological models. From 
this we hope to establish a. comparative basis by which to understand 
and evaluate Miguez Bonino's own position. The first of these models 
comes from the radical reformed tradition and is worked out in the 
theology of John Howard Yoder. The neo-orthodox theology of Karl· 
Bar.th provides us with a second model. The differences between these two 
are not great, but there is a wide gulf between Barth and "Christian 
Realism11 which is our third example and comes from the mind of Reinhold 
Niebuhr. We conclude this section with a look at Dietr:.ch Bonhoeffer' s 
ethical system·which derives from his "Christological Realism". 
These models represent a fair cross-section ~f theological reflection 
on the question o.f Christian social involvement in the twentieth century. 
(a)· The 'Radical Reformed' Model 
In this approach the church is seen as discontinuous with society and 
therefore is called to fulfil ethical principles which are not intended 













radical alternative to that society and will only weaken its own ethical 
position be oecorning involved in the sort of historical engagement advocated 
by Miguez Bonino. As the principal exponent of this view Yoder eschews 
, the mediation of any human wic-lom except the interpretation given by the 
gathered assembly of Christian believers. Yoder bases his social ethic 
on the premise that the humanity of Jesus is normative and constitutes what 
he calls "the. primary substantial criter:'._on". Thus the obedience Jesus him-
self offered to God the Father is definitive for Christian disciples. In 
addition the moral teaching Jesus himself gave provides a basis for 
guidance and decision-making. However, he adds: "This excludes any 
single-issue system whereby one holds out the promise that once one key 
theme is struck (law and gospel, or nature and grace, or love and justice, 
or providence or vocation) the rest of ethics will enfold (sic) simply:• almost 
deductively". (40) 
Arising from this stance Yoder singles our- .. 'Jesus' role as servant as the 
key category for Christian obedience. -~ased on this model the disciples 
will follow a pattern of "revolutionary subordination" in imitation oi 
Jesus. This life-style w ll be focussed around such characteristics as 
forgiving, loving indiscriminately~ dying with Christ and sharing his 
risen life, serving others, mutual subordination, suffering (both in 
innocence and under persecution), sacrifice and see1.ng death as both 
liberation from sin and as victory. (41) The example of the teachi_ng and 
life of Jesus is, claims Yoder, quite adequate to provide a basis for a 
Christian social ethic. 
Unlike Miguez Bortino's understanding of the Kingdom, in which human action 
in historical engag~ment utilizes political, sociological and ideological 
mediations in order to shape history the radical re£0rmed model sees a 
discontinuity between church and society. This comes out in Yoder's rejection 
of Niebuhr's concept of the need for a balancing of powers in the political 












of power by cinful men. Yoder sees the new birth as marking a quali-
tatively distinct way of living for the Christian believer which requires 
,a completely different ethical starting point from that for unredeemed 
society. He says: "the doctrine of redemption means that ethics for 
Christians a.nd ethics for unregenerate society are two distinct disciplines". 
(42) In such a stark contrast the ri~id dichotomy between church and 
society is accentuated. 
Central to Yoder's reasoning is the conviction that the early church saw 
itself as a unitary community over against society at large. This changed when 
the rise of Constantinianism led to tbe idea that the believing community· we:..< 
co-terminous with the empire. Civil government was now seen as the bearer 
of histori'Cal movement and ethics became the standard of conduct of which 
the ruler was capable. " 'Social ethics' means not ,,rhat everyone should 
_,.~.~ 
think and do about social questionss but what pepple in power should be 
told to do with their power". 
Yoder holds that the New Testament demands of Christians an ethical pattern 
which is valid for the Christian whether it enables him to "manage society" 
or not. Much effort is expended, he claims, in trying to find what he 
calls the "right handle by which one can 'get a hold on' the course of 
history and move it in the right direction'' (44). For Yoder, the criterion 
for ethical conduct should not be the question as to whether a particular 
course of action will achieve the desired effect in society or history 
but ratner whether it conforms to the pattern of Jesus who was prepared 
to accept the powerlessness of the cross. The method of arriving at 
ethical decisions is the one used by the New Testament church. In a key 
passage Yoder states: 
"The.knowledge of the meaning for today of partici-
pation in the work of Christ is mediated ecclesias-
tically •••. The promise of the presence of Christ to 












circumstance •••• was given not to professional 
exegetes but to the connnunity which was gathered 
in his name, ••• 11 (45) 
"reC'.ognises the inadequacies of the text of 
Scripture standing alone uninterpre~ed and appro-
priates the promise of the guidance of the Spirit 
throughout the ages, but locates the fulfillment 
of that promise in the assembly of those who 
gather around Scripture in the face of a given 
real moral challenge" (46) 
It is therefore the hermeneutic community that forms the bridge between 
the New Testament text and the present day. The tools of the technical 
exegete are regarded as holding less significance than the gathering of 
196 
disciples. Likewise there is no recourse to a few broad general principles 
condensed by a skilled ethicist. This apparently 'ad hoc' type of media-
tion is justified on the grounds that "the Christ around whom we gather 
is the same yesterday and today and forever" (46) and because "the ground-
floor of the canonical witness is a body of relatively clear texts". (4-7) 
This approach discounts the value of uti~izing any other repository of 
human wisdom, and, since it does not believe in working through political 
action groups these are likewise regarded as unnecessary mediations for 
any Christian action because (as we have seen) the political order operates 
in accordance with patterns that are incompatible with Christian disciple-
ship. 
In this model the church does agree with government per s.::_ even 
though it does not necessarily agree with a particular policy at 6uy 
given time. 
. 
Even uhen the effects of government policy are manifestly 
evil "The call is to a nonresistant attitude toward a tyranical govern-
ment". (49) This does not absolve the Christian community fyom all 
political action, however, for Christians have a duty to speak to the 












One response to Yoder has been made by Richard J. Mouw (50). Amongst 
other criticisms of Yoder's position Mouw points to the biblical precedent 
in that although the Old Testament approach operates in a basically theo-
. 
ciatic context there is plenty of evidence t~at some prophets did seek to 
address pagan political situe.;,.ions. In addition prayers are commanded in 
the New Testament "for all men~ for kings, and all who hold high positions". 
(51) Mouw adds that should the opportunity arise some Christians might 
see themselves as promoting justice by serving in pagan courts (52). 
Then in answer to Yoder's claim that it is not the Christian's responsibility 
to manage society Mouw points out that this seems to be precisely the 
role that is assigned to man in the Genesis account of creation. Indeed 
Miguez Bonino' s claim that the Kingdom is a call inviting man to respond J.n 
concrete action is in direct continuity with this role of co-creator. 
Thirdly> the virtual abdication of responsibility for exercising power 
in the political realm could well lead to the increase of injustice. 
From Miguez Bonino's point of view it cou:d be observed that in a 
situation such as pertains in Latin America it is little use pleading the 
mistakes of Constantinianism (and numerous neo-Constantinianisms) as Yoder 
' does. (53) Ninety percent of the population there is nominally Catholic 
and the boundaries between church and society are blurred. Whether indeed 
it is possible to put the clock back anywhere is questionable for that 
matter. In such a situation the ethic for a radical minority is hardly 
meaningful, especially considering that the majority of Christian ~.inkers 
" have abandoned that idea of mission which seeks to rescue people out of 
society in order to put them into the church. 
Tbe christological approach which we have found in Bonhoef fer seems to us more 












then the whole of the reality is God's sphere. His presence and activity 
is not limited to a small enclave within the totality of that reality. 
His Kingdom is not coterminous with the church, The radical reformed 
model seems to suffer from failing to hold in tension the two referents 
of faith which we have seen to be so essential. Yoder en:::: on the side of 
maintaining the identity of a Christian r.-thical position at the expense of 
relevance. In this respect he stands in sharp contrast to the concretization 
advocated by Miguez Bonino. Yoder admits that "Christian ethics must 
respect fully the concrete situation in which man hears the call to obedi-
ehce; valid ethical discourse is inseparable from accurate knowledge of 
historical realities and of the available. alternatives". (SI+) Despite 
this claim, he seems to give little or no place to the reality of the 
this-worldly locus of Christian obedience. 
Furthermore it is doubtful if many will accept the omi_ssion of mediation 
.) 
in the form of scholarly interpretation which even Barth admits. We 
could point out also that the Holy Spirit is able to lead and inspire 
a dedicated scholar every bit as much as tl1e gathered community, Indeed 
the latter, especially if it had no expert resources available could easily 
become a pooling of mutual ignorance. 
A further weakness of this model is that it seems to be unaware 
of the problem of the ideological captivity which the liberation theology 
of Miguez Bonino exposes. So acute is this criticism, and so manifest 
is the captivity to which it points that any social ethical system which 
ignores the chaLlenge· it poses runs the risk of being charged with naive 
oversimplification. 
(b) The Neo-Orthodox Model 
The neo-ortnodox model of Karl Barth seeks to avoid at all costs any 
possibility of sacxalizing a political or ideological system. It makE'.s 












is the command of God, or the claim made by God in demanding that man 
approve the gracious action of God. This action is God's free decision, 
a decision which is eternal and sovereign, and even as it claims man it 
' is also God 1 s judgment on him. Barth describes it as "the judgment of 
His grace by which man is at once condemned and acquitted and thus becomes 
free for eternal life". (55) 
In special ethics the attention focusses on the man who is thus addressed 
by God. Barth calls the encounter in which God meets and commands man the 
ethical event and believes that there are spheres and relationships in 
which this meeting takes place. The determination and demarcation of these 
spheres from each other results from the historical articulation of the 
figures involved, viz. the God who corrunands ancl. the man who acts. 
Although God's will for man is one will it has different forms and 
elements and man similarly exists and relates to God in historically 
differentiated aspects and elements. 
::) 
For his concept of the spheres of speci~l ethics Barth begins from the 
structure of real man which he had outlined in his treatment of the 
humanity of Jesus Christ. He had designated this in terms of the man for God, 
the man for others, the whole man, and the Lord of time. Since s'pecial 
ethics is the discernment of the ways in which the command of God comes to 
man it becomes "a matter of learning to what extent this command of God in 
this particular sphere has in view the sanctification of man, or in other 
words aims in this particular sphere at his freedom". (56) Th:ls leads 
Barth ~0 delineate the spheres in terms of man's fourfold freedom. First 
there is his freedom before God or his relationship with God. Then 
there is his freedom in fellowship which is his relationship with his fellow 
man. Thirdly Barth describes rnan 1 s freedom for life which is "the 
freedom which man is to realise •....•.•.•...• in the act of his life as 
soul of his body". (57) Finally there is manrs freedom in his 
existence as a finite being with regard to "the limit of time) 












scope for including a wide variety of human problems and issues. 
The spheres which Barth designates therefore are not divine forces in 
history. They are rather the place where God confronts man to claim man's 
obedience to his commands. They are to use· Meeks' words, "particular 
spheres on earth which are claimed, taken possession· of, a~d molded by the 
divine command". (59) 
The idea of spheres no doubt prompted Barth's description of the relation-. 
ship between the "civil community" and the "Christian community" in terms 
of two concentric circles. (60) The outer one is the state and the inner one 
is the church. They exist side by side but are never coterminous. For 
this reason the church is to maintain a critical stance vis ~ vis the state, 
because there is a radical discontinuity between the Kingdom of God and 
all human political structures. (61) 
Barth therefore rejects the value and nee4:for political mediations. His 
position has to be seen against the backdrop of the context in which he 
,·-,, 
th~ught and wrote. His bitter opposition to the Nazi regime and the 
German Christian movement had sho~~1 him the dangers of sacralizing a 
political ideology and this fear no doubt prompted his call for a radical 
break from any identification of salvation with political liberation. 
Barth was not without his political commitment and in his earlier days 
had championed the socialist cause (62), but he saw no possibility of 
partial realization of the Kingdom, no continuity between the penultimate 
and the ultimate in the political realm. 
Although in this•model Barth avoids any overt attempt to steer the 
course of historical events as envisaged by Higuez Bonino he does 
nevertheless admit that Christians will enter the political arena anony-
mously and will thereby witness to the Christian gospel. In this way 
they will be constantly "giving the State an impulse in the Christian 












Furthermore Barth believes that the Church as such will encourage the · 
state along the lines of social justice. He says "And in choosing between 
•the various socialistic possit-ilities •••• it 'will always choose the move-
ment from which it can expect the greatest measure of social justice •• " 
(64) This prophetic rol-e however will be a critical stance taken from a 
distance and because the church will re:::.ain outside of historical engage-
ment she will abstain from fighting with political weapons. Because theo-
logy for Barth chooses its own interpretation of reality it does not get 
involved with secular interpretations. Hence whilst the church opposes 
tyranny it does not see itself as free to engage in the best human politics 
available in the secular world in the way that Miguez Bonino advocates. 
If we accept the need for what Holtmann and Miguez Bonino call the 
two.;..fold reference of Christ on the one hand and present reality of the 
) ~ 
world on the other, it is clear that Barth has sacrificed relevance for 
the sake of identity. 
.-, 
If Christology is the starting point for ethics 
then for Barth i.t is a Christology which is dominated supremely by the 
historical reference of the Biblical revelation. Since our knowledge of 
the present reality of the world is so partial and incomplete it has, for 
Barth, a relatively minor significance. This one-sided concentration on 
the ultimate causes him to gloss over the importance of the penultimate 
and leads to a failure on his part to give sufficient recognition to the 
penultimate. This in turn means that he ignores the need for the range 
of hi~ :.:orical mediations which Miguez Bonino clairn.s is e.ssential. There 
is no doubt, however, that Barth does recognize ~he importance of the 
mediation of theological interpretation and in this sense also his posi-
tion is an advance on that of Yoder. Barth's own i;:.rsonal pilgrimage away 
from active political involvement and polemics is no doubt :reflected in 
his theological reluctance to acknowledge the necessity for the ideological 












reality, since his o·wn life-work became more and more wrapped up in 
his later years with the task of theological writing and teaching. 
' 
Despite his inclination towards a socialist viewpoint his weakness 
lies in his failure to perceive the need to self-consciously choose a 
political mediation, and his consequent omission to be rignrously self·-
critical in the field of ideological preference. 
(c) The Christian Realism Model 
As we indicated in the introduction to this section this model marks a 
distinct departure from the previous two positions and takes political 
realities seriously. Like Miguez Bonino Niebuhr believes in historical 
engagement. However, he starts from a different ideological position 
and consequently finishes some distance away from the liberation theologian's 
standpoint. 
Emphasizing that "We are men and not God" f65) he set cut to show that 
American Protestantism was "meeting complex ethical problems of a . .) 
technical civilization with an almost completely irrelevant in<lividua::.istic 
pietism and moralism" (66). Just as Miguez Bonino's starting-point is the 
suffering of the masses in Latin America so Niebuhr developed his ethical 
views in response to the exploitation of industrial workers in the Detroit 
motor industry. 
His anthropology has been labelled "pessimistic" as a result of his firm 
belief that ''the Christian doctrine of original sin is the best attested 
of the ~hristian doctrines". (67) 
In contrast to Miguez Bonino, this model fears that an undue emphasis on 
eschatology might lead to an 11otherworldly11 indifference to political 
issues. Here we note a fundamental difference betwc.:.n Niebuhr and Earth. 
Niebuhr criticized Barth's silence on Hungary, attributing it to 
complacency. This was caused, Niebuhr maintained, by Barth's "too 











coming of Christ the changes on the political front were to be accepted 
with equanimity. (68) Niebuhr's scathing reply was, 
"The'certain smaller changes' which are to be 
accepted with calm are, for instance, the 
change from comparative political freedom to 
despotism. Not ~eing a theologiari, I can only 
observe that if one reaches a very high 
altitude, in either an eschatological or a 
real airplane, all the distinctions which 
see.m momentous on the 'earthly' level are 
dwarfed into insignificance". (69) 
Niebuhr was keenly conscious of the responsibility of the church to 
fulfil its prophetic function in society. Like Miguez Bonino he 
believed that the church could not remain aloof from the struggles and 
anguish of the human situation. He had a clear sense of the providence 
of God manifesting itself particularly in judgment. Whilst the purpose 
of judgment was to turl). men to repentance it was not within the. church's 
competence to change their all too frequent despair into repentance. 
Only divine grace could work such a miracle. "But it does belong to the 
' 
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'care' of the church for the world that it so interpret the judgments 
under which nations stand, and so disclose their divine origin, that 
there is a possibility of repentance". (70) 
Niebuhr held a deep conviction that the Church had to be involved in the 
penultimate concerns of the world and that the church's social ethic had 
been inadequate historically to enable it to relate meaningfully in 
political engagement. It had either sanctioned government a.s an ordinance 
of God to prevent anarchy (71) and to support the ruling power, or had . . 
encouraged fatalism through teaching that an evil ruler is a punish~ent 
from God. It had further used a perfectionist ethic to reinforce counsels 
of submission to injustice. (i'2) 
He believed that the church should help in def i.ning and applying principles 











This could not be left to "pagans" (73) 
The biblical basis of his position is the ethic of love propounded 
by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. This involves a deep insight into 
the true situation of others and a willingness to <;lff irm their life at 
the same time as, or even at the cost of, one's own. But in the sociai 
dimension th~s involves the weighing of the political realities and the 
achievement of justi_ce through the balancing of the competing powers at 
work in the structure of society. So great is the .passion for pursuing 
selfish ends that only a counterbalancing of harmonizing powers can keep 
in check the worst effects of its destructive.drives. (74) 
Niebuhr's approach therefore, was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. He held 
.an eschatological perspective only as a distant horizon. Such an end he 
described as "the final pinnacle of the Christian faith and hope" (75) 
and stated· quite categorically his preference for an ethic of "the foothills 
where human life must be lived" (76). "Realism", "Pragmatic Democracy", 
"Approximations of .Justice", 11 Ethical Relativism", "Balance of Power", -
these then were the watchwords and principles which Niebuhr enunciated as 
he wrestled with the task of preparing the way of the Lord in the penal-
tirnate. 
In this model there is a del:i.berate and self-conscious choice in favo~~r 
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of utilizing political mediations. Niebuhr's ethical formulation is therefore 
firmly grounded in the secular realm, in the reality of this world. 
Furthermore, he has not lost sight of the ultimate, for his awareness of 
the prevalance of hurr..an sin does not lead to despair, but to hope. This 
he acknowledges is guaranteed by the fact of divine judgment. Niebuhr has 
therefore managed to maintain in tension and balance the dual reference 












The major weakness ut Niebuhr's- model is the failure to acknowledge his own 
ideological bias. This arises because he is not sufficiently self-
'CLitical with regard to unconscious ideological presuppositions. Whilst 
his pragmatism led him to reject ideologically conceived political 
systems his choice of human means to achieve limited ends is itself an 
example of ids own ideological commitment. In fact, the mediations 
Niebuhr uses - "Christian Realism", "Pragmatic Democracy", "Approximations 
of Justice", "Ethic'al Relativism", and "Balances of Power" are all part 
and parcel of the ideology of Western liberal democracy, 
It is instructive in this regard to note Niebuhr's response ~o the early 
formulation of liberation theology in the work of Shaull. (77) This 
he characterized as soft utopianism. Earlier_ Niebuhr had spoken critically 
of utopianism (78). "Soft" Utopianism, he claimed, could be distinguished 
from "hard" utopianism. The former were the western liberals and the latter 
included such "hard-liners" as Marxists and Fascists. "The soft utopians 
do not set themselves in array against an evil world, or claim that their 
cause is the perfect embodiment of the divine will" (79), The hard utopians 
by contrast had been prepared to create a fighting community because 
they were motivated by "the fanatic fury which makes the pretension of per-
fection so dangerous''. (80) The soft utopians sought to meet the radic~l 
evil with non-resistance, "hoping that kindness would convert the hearts 
of tyrants". (81) 
The Christian Re~lism .school have severely criticized liberation theology 
(82) but, in line with the assessment we have just offered, Rubem Alves 
has seen through the ideological captivity of the Christian Realism critique. 
It begins from the assumption, he says, that the present system is worth 
preserving by means of balances and checks whilst liberation theologians 
-
regard this as a fatalistic attitude and contend that it is not 











ideological self-justification of Christian Realism is manifest, contends 
Alves. He says: "When a system despises certain ideas as being utopian 
or incapable of realization, it says very little about the real possibility 
or impossibility of these ideas, but it definitely makes a confession of 
its own limitations". (83) 
(d) Christological Real~~ 
This model is important in understanding Miguez Bonino's theology because 
ethics is another area where he has been deeply influenced by Bonhoeffer. 
From his world-affirming base Bonhoeff er was able to go on and proclaim 
a God who is to be found, not at the periphery of the world but at its 
centre. (84) It follows that for Bonhoeffer ethics is faith realized 
in the midst of the reality of the world. To be a Christian is to be a 
man and this means being one with Christ in his suffering which is in the 
middle of the world of reality. It means to .. immerse oneself in the 
secular concerns without necessarily trying to "Christianize" them. 
Bonhoeffer says: 
"To be a Christian does not mean to be religious in 
a particular way, to cultivate some particular 
form of asceticism (as a sinner, a penitent, or 
a saint) but to be a man. It is not some reli-
gious act which makes a Christian what he is, 
but participation in the suffering of God in the 
life of the world". (85) 
This involves being a man because Christ is incarnate. But it also means 
being a man sentenced by God because it involves being conformed to the 
Crucified one. By the same token to be a Christian means being conformed 
to Chris1.. as the Risen one and .this points to a new man. "In the midst 
of death he is in life. I1i. the1ni.Qst __ of_ sin_!ie is righte_ous. In the 
midst of the old he is new". (86) 
This whole conception is set with the fram•2work of Bonhoeffer' s polarity 












what they are, but ultimate answers must not be given· to penultimate 
questions. To do so is irresponsibility and the ultimate answers are 
•in fact no longer ultimate. This highlights his awareness o[ the need 
for mediations. These are necessary because •••• "One cannot and must 
not speak the ultimate word before one has spoken the penultimate. We 
live in the penultimate and believe in the ultimate". (87) 
In an earlier treatment of the meaning of discipleship Bonhoeffer had 
shown his understanding of the need for mediation. The Word is the media-
tion between God and man and between one Christian and another. (88) 
Immediacy so easily leads to capriciousness and loss of perspective. 
Only the Word gives us access to reality. Bonhoeffer therefore insists 
that only he who believes is truly obedient, "for one can obey, with 
sanity and sanctity, only when one is at a distance. There must be 
mediation". (89) Without mediation there is fanaticism and, like 
desire; when fulfilled it is no longer strong and compelling. 
Bonhoeffer's ethic, following his christology, is a contextualist ethic. 
It seeks the answer to the question "Who is Christ for us today? !I The 
t'wo poles of its reference are emphasized even in this brief statement. 
On the one hand there is thR Christ who is taking form in this world and 
207 
on the other there is the "today" and the reality of the inunediate here-nnd·· 
now world where life is being lived, and where Christ is taking form. This 
latter is a dynamic~ ever-changing reality. So that who Christ is for us 
today may not be.identical with who he was for us yesterday.. 11What can 
and must be said is not what is good once and for c;ll, but the ways in 
which Christ takes form among us here and now". (90) 
These tw~ references in Bonhoeffer's ethic correspond with the mediations 
referred to by Miguez Bonino when he writes about "Hermeneutics, Truth 












a foolproof key to Christian obedience~ but a significant framework for 
it". (92) The dependence of Miguez Bonino on Bonhoeffer is apparent. 
This ethic, grounded as it is in the formation of Christ in the world, 
is a "filled" rather than an atomistic ethfo. Its base in the christo-
logical reality safeguards it from the danger of ato.mism. Since Chriin: 
is the ongoing reality - the Sar.le yesterday, today and tomorrow - continuity 
is assured through its being his form that is in the world. Every indivi-· 
dual act is therefore vague, but the ''structured ontological unity of the 
form of the world and the form of Christ" (93) ensures a universality mis-
sing in purely atomistic ethics. 
The methodology of Bonhoeffer's ethical system arises from the ontological 
coherence of the reality .of the world and .of God in Christ. Thus he 
derives two descriptions of moral action from this christological founda-
tion which amount to the same thing. The one is "conformation to Christ" 
and the othtor is "correspondence with reality". In being conformed to 
Christ man takes on the form of Christ, and since Christ became man 
he therefore takes on his ow-n true form: "The form of Jesus Christ takes 
form in man. Man does not take on an independent form of his om1, but 
what gives him form and wh?t maintains him in the new form is always 
solely the form of Jesus Christ himself". (94) If the reality of Christ 
and the reality of the world cohere it follows that "action which is in. 
accordance with Christ is action which is in accordance with reality". (95) 
Bonhoeff er goes Gn to say: 
''Action which is accordance with Christ is in 
accordance with reality becallse it ;:;.llows the world 
to be the world; it reckons with the world as the 
world; and yet it never forgets that in Jesus 
Christ the world is loved, condemned and reconciled 
by God". (96) 
Here we find a possible basis for Miguez Bonino 1 s affirmation of the need 











with the world "as the world" the Christian can engage J_n historical 
action and can participate in political ac.tivity with those who are not 
Christians. This presupposition underlies Miguez Bonino's si..ance and 
attitude on this question. 
A further theme developed by Bonhoeffer is that of responsibility and c2pu-
tyship. "Responsibility is the total and realistic response of man to the 
claim of God and of our neighbour" (97). It is a basic response to life 
itself, an all-embracing orientation that includes attitudes~ actions, 
responses and choices. In line with Bonhoeffer's other ethical ideas it 
is worked out from a christological basis. Jesus Christ is responsible 
for men. To be conformed to Christ is to be open to and responsible for 
others. 
Deputyship is the hallmark of responsibility. Vicarious living, even to 
the length of being prepared to die for another is the meaning of deputy-
ship. The example of Christ's sacrifice provides the criterion for being 
fully a man. This type of vicarious living for others is the hallmark of 
cormnunity as well as individual fulfilment (98). Bonhoeffer developed 
his concept of the range of deputyship throughout his wnrking life. In 
his doctoral dissertation t~!e general idea of deputy ship was suggested as 
being in force in Christ and his church only. He later broadened its 
range with a universality of scope commensurate with his expanded chris-
tology which exalted Christ as the pa1i.tocrator in the Ethics. Here 
deputyship is follnd in· the behaviour of~ll. responsible men, whether 
Christian or not, for it may be found or exercised in the whole of life. 
In his Ethics, Bonhoeffer also outlines another mediation in his ethical 
system, the mandates, a concept closely akin to Barth's special ethics. 
These are the areas where God orders life through concrete commandment. 












"By the term 'mandate' we understand the concrete 
·divine commission which has its foundation in the 
revelation of Christ and which is evidenced by 
Scripture; it is the legitimation and warrant for 
the execution of a definite divine commandment, 
the conferment of divine authority on an 
earthly agent. The term 'manda.te' must also 
be taken to impli the claiming, the seizure and the 
formation of a definite earthly domain by the 
divine commandment, The bearer of the mandate 
acts as a deputy in the place of Him who assigns 
him his conm1ission". (99) 
Bonhoeffer's mandates are the Church, marriage and the family, culture 
and government. Each can be thought of as a constant in the middle of 
life which conveys the command of God by showing the creature what the 
creator requires of it. Instead of a multiplicity of separate and dis-
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connected ethical events man is born into a world where the mandates guide 
and direct him in his corporate life with its obligations and demands, 
relationships and respon~ibilities. In and through them man is able to 
realize his being-for-others, or deputyship, which is derivative from 
Christ's deputyship. 
Supremely it is in Bonhoeffer's concept ~~ Christian faith as productive 
of human maturity that his thought is suggestive for Miguez Bonino 1 s libera-
tion theology. Bonhoeffer was able to move from the belief in power as 
dominance to power as capacity and could decry human weakness. "Is not the 
weakness of men often more dangerous than deliberate malice ?" he says, 
and answers his own question with the affirmation, "Christ does not only 
make men good: he makes them strong too". (100) 
Bonhoeffer developed his concept of Christian maturity in the sect~~n 
of the Ethics headed "The structure of the Responsible Life". (101) He:re 
we find deputyship, correspondence with reality, acceptance of guilt and 
free action forming th~ four qualities of adulthood. This state of adulthood 
is the opposite of the state of depencience which Miguez Bonino is 












a social analysis J_n the way Miguez Bonino had, Bonhoeffer had 
provided him with a description of ''a particular mind-set, that of the 
mature Christian". (102) When people like Niguez Bonino take up Bonhoef-
fer's basic thoughts and develop them in conjunction with the systematic 
description of society provi~ed by the analytical tools of Marxism, the 
distinctive teaching of liberation theology emerges. 
In the structures of Bonhoeffer's thought then, we can see the outline 
being formed from which Miguez Bonino was later to develop his concept of 
mediations. There is the crucial and all-determining criterion of the 
dual reality of Christ and the world. Any system must do full justice to 
both cf these referents. Then there is the eschatological reference point 
of the ultimate which determines the penultimate. In Miguez Bonino this 
is the Kingdom of God: the present structure of human social and politic~l 
life must be brought into conformity with this. In Bonhoeffer there is 
the use of mediations to avoid fanaticism and over-simplisti~ action and -
to provide concretion for ethical actior Miguez Bonino develops this into 
socio-political analysis and ideological commitment. In fact, in Bonhoef-
fer's own involvement in the Hitler assassination plot there is the blueprint 
for Miguez Bonino's call for the articulation of Christian obedience in 
secular political activity. 
Although Bonhoeffer had not come to the point of dealing with the realities 
which contemporary theologians of the Third World grapple with in the 
form of economic exploita~ion~ social deprivation, and political injustice, 
he was however tleeply· concerned about the lot of the poor of his day. 
The task of "preparing the way of the Lord" entailed making a caring response 
to their needs. He derlared: 
"The hungry man needs bread and the homeless man 
needs a roof; the dispossessed need justice and 
the lonely need fellowship; the undisciplined 











for the love of Christ •••••• that I share my bread •••••• 
and that I share my dwelling with the homeless". (103) 
Nevertheless these were not conceived in structural terms because the 
' importance of Marxist analysis (with its emphasis on the significance 
of ideological factors and political engagement) had not yet become an 
issue for theological ref lecticn. 
The key to understanding Miguez Bonino's ethical model with its 
emphasis on the need fGr socio-political mediations is in his sentence 
"We move totally a.nd solely in the area of human rationality - in the 
realm where God had invited man to be on his own" · (lQfi.). In this state-
ment he clearly indicates his affirmation and acceptance of the need 
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for secular political involvement. It also underlines, however, his aware-
ness of the dangers which the radical reformed and neo-orthodox models 
sought to avoid, viz, the sacralization of au ideology. 
By his use of the category of the Kingdom of God with its all-embracing 
stresses on the sovereignty of the divine connnand, the unitary nature 
of history (implying the affirmation of the secular) and the possibility 
of judgment, he has been able to assert the necessity for Christian engage-
ment in historical activity without losing Christian identity or 
sacralizing any ideology. 
Miguez Bonino has therefore, we believe, improved on the radical reform€d 
model which finishes with a radical minority group of Christians 
effectively disengaged from secular political activity. This group 
remains faithful to the pristine New Testament community's pattern but 
. . 
has little possibility of ever influencing human affairs to the extent that 
it might bring relief to the sufferings of the m<:ss of humanity. 
Much the same can be said for the neo-orthodox model of Barth. The raci5.cal 
discontinuity this requires between th~ Kingdom of God and the secular 












great an autonomy to the secular realm. Miguez Bonino counters this weakness 
with his concept of the Kingdom which impels Christians to effective action 
in all spheres where love is needed to overcome evil. 
Whilst Miguez Bonino's model allows for a greater degree of agreement with 
~iebuhr on the score of historical engagement he differs at two 
important points. The first of these is the question of ideological self-
awareness and che second is the radical degree to which he is prepared 
to utilize the Marxist social analysis as a mediation. It is interesting 
to note that Niebuhr had a clear concept of the judgment of God operating 
on the historical level, but apparently failed to see this extending to 
the mediation he himself was using, a feature which enables Miguez Bonino to 
commit to God the weaknesses of his mediations. 
Miguez Bonino's stance is self-consciously Il'.odelled on that of Bonhoeffer 
but again the ideological option he chooses signifies something of the 
, 
distance he travels from Bonhoeffer before arriving at his destination. 
This study c;: the different models all points to a conclusion which is 
crucial for the understanding of the iiberation theologians' position. This 
. is the conviction that ideology, and the way a particular ideology influences 
and even determines the method of theological reflection is at the heart 
of the liberation theology enterprise. Nowhere is this insight more 
clearly demonstrated that in the public debate Miguez Bonino has had with 
Jurgen Moltmann. 
3 •. THE DEBATE W;I:TH Moin1ANN_ 
Miguez Bonino 1 s differences with Mal tmann arise Hi part from his consider a-
tion of the need to maintain the tension of the two-fold reference of the 
Christian faith. Any action which purports to have eschatological s1g-
nificance, or a permanent future has to "name" this future and "correspond 











love in action on the other. Neither may '!:.e subsumed under the other. 
Both are eschatologically significant but their unity is "not in our 
hands. The tension cannot therefore be overcome this side cf the full 
realization of God's Kingdom" (105). This tension has to be lived with 
and in the ethical underst;mding of this "double historical reference" 
there comes the problem of relativizing the one or the other. Miguez 
Bonino believes that the North American and European theologians fall into 
this trap because for them "the specific 'Christ-reference' relativizes the 
'present' historical reference of our fa~th and action". 
Moltmann as an example to prove his point. 
(106) He uses 
After briefly summarizing the main thrust of Moltmann's Theology of_Hope, 
and noting certain criticisms that had been made of it Miguez Bonino 
offers the opinion that Moltman.n has corrected and deepened his earlier 
thought in his later work The Crucified God. He has done this by con-
centrating on the cross, which he sees as the meeting point of the tension 
between identity and relevance (which Miguez Bonino has described as the 
"Christ-reference" and "present historical reference"). Moltmann singles 
out five vicious circles of death (107) by which he describes the concrete 
identification of God with suffering, Goel-forsaken man. These 2.re poverty, 
violence, racial and cultuLal deprivation, pollution and meaninglessness 
and they are met by the concrete contents of historical hope which n.e lists 
as justice, democracy, cultural identity, peace with nature and meaningful-
ness. These are political issues ant: call for a 11p9litical theology of 
the cross", which 11must liberate the state from the political service of 
idols and must liberate men from political alienation and loss of rights". 
(108) The political task of the church is there.fore seen by Holtmann as 
the critical function of de-sacralization and de-ideologization. 
At this point Miguez Bonino makes his first criticism of Holtmann. He 












general and jmpressionistic description of the social forces at work. 
Something much deeper is needed. "Can we remain satisfied", he asks, 
'"with a general description of the 'demonic circles of death', without 
trying to understand them in their unity~ their roots, their dynamics, 
i.e. without giving a coherent socio-analytical account of this manifold 
oppression ?" (109) 
Miguez Bonino believ~s that Moltmann has failed to employ a sufficiently 
penetrating analysis and in so doing has failed to take seriously enough 
the hard facts of history, especially as these relate to the ideological 
captivity o[ the Church. Referring to the political role of Christianity 
in the post-Constantinian era he asks: 
11Are we not forced to indicate how was 
the Christian faith co-opted into a 
political project, what were the relations 
to the dominant ideologies, wha~ is the 
historical dynamics of the process, how 
is the critical awareness concerning 
the inadequacy of this synthesis related 
to historical - socio-economic, political, 
ideological-changes ?11 (110) 
Miguez Bonino has here put his finger on a soft spot in Eu~opean theology. 
He has shown how liberation theology, by using the more rigorously scien-
tific categories of sociology and Marxism exposes the hidden ideological 
agenda of much trad_itional theology. In addition, he is correct when he 
asserts that Moltmann has sacrificed the "present historical reference" 
to the overarching "Christ-reference11 , and therefore, despite his efforts 
to avoid it, ha~ made relevance subservient to identity, and has reverted 
to an idealistic methodology. 
Miguez Bonino' s second criticism of Holtmann is on ti1e score of identif ica-
tion. with the oppressed. He acknowledges that Moltmann recognizes that 
God is "not an unpolitical God, he is the God 0 f the poor, of the oppressed, 












of liberation theology. But he draws attention to the failure to go 
the whole way in Moltmann's statement that "The crucified God is in fact a 
' stateless and classless God". (112) Miguez Bonino, in reply to this, 
argues "are we really for the poor and oppressed if we fail to see them 
as a class, as members of oppressed societies ?" (113) He takes up 
Moltmann's claim that a theology of liberation needs to affirm historical 
"materializations of God's presence" and points out that a theology which 
remains ideologically neutral "above right and left •••• independent of a 
structural analysis of reality" (114) cannot provide them. Holtmann 
fears that ideological commitment wtll result in the sacralization of 
that ideology. Miguez Bonino recognizes this danger but adds that a 
recognition of the secular nature of such a political option will ensure 
that the danger is avoided. This leads him to place. his emphasis on medi-
ations. So, he says 
"it is important to stress that such a secularization 
of politics is t6 be attained not through a new idealism 
of Christian theology, but t~rough a clear and coherent 
recognition of historical, a11alytical and ideological 
mediations. There is no divine politics or economics. 
But this means that we must"'r"esolutely use the best human 
politics and economics at our disposal". (ll5) ---· 
His third criticism, which again brings out the relativism of Moltmann 1 s 
position with regard to historical relevances constitutes a call to 
European theologians to de-sacral_ize their concept of "critical freedom". 
This would enable a true secularization of politics to take place. It 
is necessary, he claims, to recognize the human, ideological contents 
in the idea. 
"V.1hen they conceive critical freedom as the form 
in which God's eschatclogical kingdom impinges 
-- on the political realm, they are simply opting for 
one partic; 1 l.ar ideology, that of liberalism". (116) 
European theologians may be justified in their choice of the liberal 












ideologically in terms of its human political nature and not disguise 
it as "the critical freedom of the gospel". (117) 
Moltmann' s reply came in his Open Letter to Jose Miguez Boni.no (llS) 
His first response is to claim that Latin American liberation theologians 
have not pruduced a distinctively new theology. In fact they have made 
iess of a genuinely indigenous contribution to theology than have those 
who have generated African, Japanese and North American Black theologies. 
Furthermore some of the Latin American theologians criticize the 
European theologians fiercely, and then finish up saying the very things 
they have criticized the Europeans for saying. This is true, says 
Moltmann, of Alves, Segundo, Gutierrez, and of Miguez Bonino himself. 
Moltmann goes on to poinl out that the St.tll'mary points at the end of 
Miguez Bonino's chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engage-
ment" are all found, to greater or lesser degree, in one European theo-
logian or another. 
Moltmann's second rejoinder is on the score of the use by the Latin 
Americans of Marxism. Here again, Moltmann believes that the liberation 
theologians have failed to generate ''a peculiarly Latin _-\m.erican way to 
socialism". (119) Whilst they do utilize 1"f..arxist ideas -· advocating 
Marx's class analysis - they do not apply this to the history of their 
own people. Holtmann claims that they merely rehash a few basic doctrines 
without producing a truly indigenous theology or sociology. The upshot 
of the Latin Americans' claims seems to be that "one is called upon to 
opt, in a moral altern:.~ive for the oppressed against the oppressors and 
to accept Marxism as the right prophecy of the situation" (120) 
Holtmann further castigates Miguez Bonino and his fellow liberation 












not achieved, he pointsout, by adopting Marxism which only brings a 
theologian "into the company of Marxists and sociologists" (121) 
iie also claims that European theologians are not politically neutral as 
Miguez Bonino had asserted, and quotes both from Metz and his own 
Theology of Hope to substantiate this claim. 
In his third criticism, Holtmann accuses the Latin American theologians 
of failing to make an accurate analysis and assessment of the historical 
situation. These differ, he claims, as between Latin America and Europe. 
In tqe former there is the necessity for revolution but not the possibi-
lity since those who are to carry out the revolution (the poor and 
exploited) are not yet ready. The consequence is that the intellectuals 
and students (and presumably Moltmann means to imply the liberation 
theologians) are theoraticiansof revolution rather than practitioners. 
On the other hand the European theologians perceive that they themselves 
are·~ living in a revolutionary situation - despite the noises of the 
1960's - and so they cannot be expected co produce a revolutionary 
theology. Moltmann believes that his theology stays with the people 
whilst that of the liberationists is more a theory about a utopian future. 
Moltmann rounds off his articles with a statement of his belief in 
"Democratic Socialism11 as the most realistic concept for Europe. He 
acknowledges that others in different situations might pref er to "overcome 
class rule and dictatorship of the tight by a temporary leftist dictator-
ship, a protective and transitional dictatorship for the building t:p of 
• 
socialism and democracy". (122) 
In seeking to evaluate the dialogue the following points arise: 
(1) Miguez Bonino has correctly pointed out the inadequacy cf 
Moltmann's "five vicious circles of death" to provide a sufficiently 












the social forces at work in the situation of oppression. Holtmann 
has not sought to defend his position against Miguez Bonino's criticism 
~nich is thus a very penetrating observation. In failing to deepen his 
perception of his need, Molt:uann has indeed succumbed to the temptation 
to relativi7.e the present historical reference of the faith so cogently 
stressed by Miguez Bonino. 
(2) In Moltmann's statement of his belief in favour of democratic 
socialism we perceive a response to Miguez Bonino's requirement of ideolo-
gical conunitment. It would, however, have been preferable if Moltmann had 
elaborated on the mediating role of such a concept - i  the same way that 
Miguez Bonino has related his more radical socialist understanding with 
the biblical concepts of justice, peace, and solidary love. In this res-
pect Miguez Bonino's criticism of Moltmann's failure to identify fully 
with the poor is valid. 
(3) In his reply Moltmann seems more intent on criticizing weak-
nesses in the Latin Americans' theological formulations than in developir.g 
an answer to Miguez Bonino's criticism of his own position. In one place 
he asserts 
"The true radical change that is necessary is 
still ahead of both the 'political theologiaas' 
in the European context and the 'liberation 
theologians' in the Latin American context. 
In my opinion they can enter in a thoroughly 
mutual way into this change, namely a radical 
turn toward the people". (123) 
Here it is nec~ssary to point out that the Latin A..~erican theolog:Jns 
evolved their liberation theology by a turn to the people, and th2 
result is evidenced by such events as the death of Camilo Torres and 
others, as well as the witness of Helder Camara. The fact that Miguez 
Bonino may not publish in Spanish in his Argentinian homeland> and that 
Assmann' s writings have beeT\ restricted in Bolivia is testimony to the 












the liberation theologians to have achieved.(124) 
. (4) It has to be said, however, that there is some value in Nolt= 
mann's reminder that the Latin Americans have borrowed extensively from 
European political theology, ~nd that there is therefore nothing specifi-
cally indigenous in their liberation theology enterprise. Insofar as 
they have used Marxist tools this has cons~ituted a copying of their 
European counterpart.s. The distinctiveness of their contribution lies 
in the radical degree to which they have utilized these tools, the rigour 
with which they have applied the class analysis of Marxism and the 
critical distance they have set between themselves and the European think-
ers. 
(5) Brown. summarizes the responses of Latin American' theologians 
to Moltmann's attack. (125) Gutierrez has shown that there are two 
different theologies involved - one in "the modern spirit" and the 
other from within a situation of oppressi~n, with a. gulf between them. 
Others see Holtmann as entrenched in the western liberal tradition and 
fear that he is seeking to· impose this as a world theology. This presup-
poses a movement of "reformism from within11 and endeavours to move only 
gradually to a more just social order. The!.·e is a feeling amongst these 
theologians that Moltmann is still intellectualizing. 
(6) Finally, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the Latin Ameri~ 
can theologians are guilty of projecting their own context into other 
situations. By so doing they are calling for a liberation theology in e\rery 
situation or at least setting theirs up as the standard and norm for 
theology. Miguez :Bonir~'' s book is aptly entitled Doing Theolo_~Y in a 
Revolutic:?ary Situation._ Holtmann is qu;ite right to retort that he is 
not in a revolutionary situation and so is justified in st::irting from 












Subsequent to this verbal debate Holtmann visited Latin America and, in 
reporting on his impressions, revised some of his harsher opinions of 
the liberation theologians. He expressed the view that the process of 
self-awareness in liberation theology was to .be regarded as brave and 
honest, and in some ways served as a corrective to the unrealistic radi-
calism of their European critics. He was convinced that the oppression 
of the poor was so chronic that liberation theology was the only theolo-
gical response available to Higuez Bonino and his fellow theologians. 
\ 
However, he claims that liberation theology still needs to move from the 
realm of ideas to the realm of people, and to move from the exodus to the 
cross. (126) 
4. IDEOLOGY AND CHRISTIANITY 
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In a study of Miguez Bonino's use of Marxist critical tools de Gruchy asserts 
"The problem of ideology remains central to the discussion". (127) Our study 
in thii chapter so far has underlined the validity of this contention. In 
our first se:tion we set out Miguez Bonino's o-wn position which emphasized how 
integral to his thought is the conviction that an ideology is an indispensable 
.mediation in giving effect to Christian love in political terms. By contrast 
we saw how the models evolved by Yoder and Barth led to a concept of the 
Kingdom of God where effective historical engagement was virtually ruled out, 
The Christian realism model faced up to political realities without going far 
enough to ensure total political and ideological involvement, whilst Bonhoeffer 1 s 
concepts of responsibility and maturity were only tentative pointers in the 
direction to whi.,ch Migu,ez Bonino has now committed himself so fully. 
It is important now to examine the c.oncept of ideo::..ogy and to attempt an 
understanding of the relationship between faith and ideology. 
Whilst there were rudimentary concepts of ideology prior to Marx (128) it is 
in his work that the idea first becomes a crucial issue. The contradictions 












sciousness and hence they are given distorted solutions in the mind. 
Sunnnarizing Marx's position, Larrain states :'Ideology is, therefore, a 
solution in the mind to contradictions which cannot be solved in practice; 
it is the necessary projection in consciousn~ss of man's practical inabili-
i...ies". (129) For this reason, in Marx's understanding, the contradictions 
cannot be solved by mental criticism, but only by revolutionary practice which 
goes to the problem of ideology at its roots by removing the contradictions 
which lead to it. (130) 
Furthermore, there was a class interest in ideology for Marx, since it was 
used by the dominant class in order to maintain the system. It was therefore 
an instrument of oppression. As such the concept of ideology had a definitely 
negative connotation. 
Later Marxist thinkers modified the concept somewhat, and a full outline of 
these developments has been given by Larrain. (131) The most important is 
undoubtedly the way in which Lenin changes the idea. By emphasizing the 
base-superstructure polarity Lenin expands the concept to include the notion 
that since economic factors determine all other modes of thought ideology 
becomes a set of cognitions and theories which express the interests of a 
class and hence it is not confined to the use by the dominant class only. It 
has now therefore acquired a positive connotation. (132) In effect it comes to 
designate a class ~eltanschauung. With minor modifications, Lenin's 
adaptation was followed by Lukacs and Gramsci. 
It is worth noting at this point that Miguez Bonino uses the notion in both 
of these senses1 In his argument with Moltmann he accuses the latter of 
being captive to the western liberal democratic .id2ology (133) which is a 
use of the ideology in the false consciousness sense of Marx's mm under-
standing. When he advocates the use of Marxism as a mediation because it 
offers a coherent ideological world view then it is clearly the second 












Larrain has detected sociological and psychological interpretations of the 
origin of ideology in Durkheim (135) and Freud (136) respectively, but the 
next major contribution to the theory of ideology came from Mannheim. 
Mannheim drew a distinction between ideology and utopia. The former 
denoted ''the insight that in certain situations the collec~ive unconscious 
of certain groups obscures the real cond~tion of society both to itself and 
to others and th~reby stabilizes it''. (137) Ideology therefore has a 
reactionary connotation for Mannheim. By contrast, utopian thinking is the 
insights into a situation by oppressed people whose interest in changing the 
society is so strongly motivated that the.y perceive only the elements in that 
situation which tend to negate it. However Mannheim proceeds to develop what 
he calls a total conception of ideology which entails a radical analysis and 
criticism of all points of view including thf; analyst's own. (138) Thus the 
concept of ideology merges into Mannheim's theory of the sociology of 
knowledge. Here we note that Mannheim is ~oving towards the position which 
Miguez Bonino and his fellow liberation:_·theologians call for in respect of 
theology, viz. that all theological reflection is affected by the idenlogical 
sympathies of the theologian and these need to be unmasked and ackncwledged 
in any valid theological discourse. 
Subsequent developments in the concept of ideology evolved via the theory of 
genetic structuralism of Goldmann (139), the structural analysis in 
linguistics of Barthes and Greimas (140) and the structural analysis of myth 
by Levi-Strauss (141) as well as the adaption of this theme in a Marxist 
way by ~odelier (142). 
The structuralist i_.:iterpretation of ideology.in Marxism is most commonly 
associated with Louis Althusser who believes that iil.::ology "has a material 
existence which determines the subject" (143). Therefore according to 
Althusser the source of ideology is in material reality itself, and not the 
subject. Men cannot live without some representation of their world and of 











''In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation 
between them and their conditions of existence, but 
the way they live the relation between them and their 
conditions of existence. This presupposes both a real 
relation and an 'imaginary', 'lived' relation" (144) 
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Althusse believes that in order for the working class to arrive at a true 
knowledge of the social structure they need the theoretical practice of 
science, a view which closely resembles Lenin's. 
The debate a.-::ongst contemporary social theorists or. the relationship between 
science and ideology need not be elaborated at this point. Sufficient has 
-been said to demonstrate the complex nature of the subject and to indicate 
that the debate on the concept of ideology itself is very far from con-
eluded (145). The word ideology as currently used i  theological discourse 
can thus serve to designate a cormnunal or group world-view or, in a more 
specific sense, a political doctrine which usually sets out to implement the 
goals of the group whose interests are purportedly served by that political 
party. In addition ideology can be used with a negative connotation or in a 
positive sense as we have ·outlined above in contrasting the meanings assigned 
to it by Marx on the one hand and on the other by Lenin and most subsequent 
writers. Theologians frequently indicate in which sense they intend their 
use of it to be understood (146) 
The problem for Miguez Bonino lies in determining the extent to which he can 
legitimately go in using an ideology as a mediation without surrendering the 
essential Christian identity of his theology. He also has to remain within 
the parameters of his overall objective which is to work out a theology of 
historical en&agement within the category of the Kingdom of God, In addition 
he has to retain the status of his theology qua theology for "when theology 
is used to support, justify, or becomes a functinn of the system, then it has 
surrendered its prophetic and critical function and that is fundamental to 












Villa-Vicencio asserts that gospel and ideology are inherently related 
--; ' to each other and depend on each other. He sayd: "The one cannot 
authentically exist without the other. Yet.if one dominates the other 
the milk turns sour. Gospel devoid of ideology is abstract theory and 
esoterical ~onsense, while ideology without gospel is political 
tyranny" (148). After defining Gospel as "the wide-ranging call or 
lure of God in history to ultimate freedom in Christ both in one's 
person and at a communal level" (149) he goes on to describe ideology 
as "a systematic articulation of ideas to enable people to live together 
in a given situation in a peaceful and orderly manner". (150) This 
latter definition is altogether too loose to do duty for all the variations 
in meaning which the word ideology has (as we have seen) to carry. 
Villa-Vicencio is not unaware of the other meanings, as his earlier 
> survey shows (151). 
However, the value of his insight is in the light he throws on the 
nature of the gospel as an incarnational. gospel which is always contextually 
relevant. A positive ideology enables thE gospel to be relevant to the 
context in which it is being proclaimed. The gospel of the Kingdom was 
relevant to the needs of first century Palestine when JLJUS preached and 
declared it. He spoke "with a Jewish social and political 'accent'" and 
his gospel was applicable to the socio-political and spiritual needs of 
the day". (152) But what Jesus offered was more than a programme of . 
political absolutes or totalitarian dogmas. "It was an eschatological 












it called men to absolute freedom in the name of God it was sharply dis-
tinguished from the Jewish nationalist ideologies of the day. 
Thus the Christian tradition has alwaysmaihtained a stance, which, 
despite temporary ideological captivities, has had within itself both a 
contextually relevant component but also an element which has enabled it 
to break free from and transcend any tendency to c0mplete identification 
with any specific party-political ideology. Because of its eschatological 
roots in the coming Kingdom the gospel has a position from which it can 
exercise criticism of itself and therefore of any ideological system with 
which it may become involved. This means that the gospel serves as 
critique vis-a-vis ideology and is thus engaged in a relationship with 
ideology which is dialectical. Villa-Vicencio is here using ideology in 
the sense of open or positive ideology. It is, he says "an open~ dynamic, 
relational, contextual doctrine of ideas", "it is politically realistic 
and potentially redemptive". (154) The gospel is therefore both incar-· 
. 
national and. independent, being in dialogue with various options but 
never "identical without remainder" (155) to any particular one. 
Going on to pose the question "Does not the milk always. turn sour ?11 (156) 
Villa-Vicencio points out the danger of the gospel becoming ideologically 
captive within a closed, demonic ideology. Various historical instances 
are cited of this actually happening and he comes to the conclusion that 
the gospel is an invigorating and dynamic power whilst people are en 
.. 
route to liberation. When success is achieved it tends to capitulate to 
doctrinaire ideology. This, he postulates, is because the lust for 
power becomes uncontrollable. 
Villa-Vicencio ends with a lucid exposition of the possible alternative 
relationships between gospel and ideology. The first of these is the 












falls involved in the possible captivity of the gospel or theology to 
a political ideology a choice is made for political non-involvement. 
lt is seen in the sort of other-worldly pietism common. in extreme evangelical 
circles and which comes in ~or particular scorn from the political 
theologian!". 
Secondly there is what Villa~vicencio designates the "no-escape option". 
He explains "No-escape simply suggests that it is a fallacy to equate 
inactivity or political non-participation with an absence of influence". 
(157) In fact this usually involves an unwitting support for the status 
quo. He concludes that it is impossible to be completely uninvolved in 
the ideological struggles of the day. Whilst this is not clearly spelt 
out by Villa-Vicencio the person choosing this option recognizes that he 
is involved willy-nilly in the ideological conflict and dee.ides (usually 
on the basis of pragmatic considerations) which of the competing ideologi·-
cal formulations on off er will serve h~s- own cause the best. The like-
lihood of self-delusion is high. Villa-Vicencio asserts "Gospel, try as 
it may, never quite succeeds in isolating itself from ideology". (158) 
The third option is described. as the lev_el of princiyle optioD;,• The 
advocates of this option claim that since the bible pres~nts no carefully 
worked-out political programme, the responsibility of the Church is to 
enumerate certain general principles, such as love, justice, and peace. 
From these the politicians should work out specific political poli"ies 
> 
and programmes. (159) Villa-Vicencio rules out this option as an evasion 
of Christian responsibility and an avoidance of cormnitment. Because the 
gospel is an incarnatic...::.al reality it speaks to a specific need with a 
specific word. The church therefore should participate in the process of 
spelling out the ideological proposals in concrete terms. This will 












Because of her political fallibility therefore the church will speak as 
a human participant and not as if she is declaring the word of the 
·Lord. As a contributor she will "agonise as part of mankin(l_ in the 
creation of a viable political progranune for a just and peaceful 
society". (160) '~ \ 
The fourth option is the role of the gospel as criciq~e. The Church 
needs to adopt a political perspective that is in conformity with the 
gospel, critical of any ideologies and supremely self-critical. To 
do this there has to be politicai co!IlII'.itment, though it is commitment 
from an independent position. Herbert Richardson suggests that "the 
beginning of political thinking is criticism. It is criticism that shows 
If 
the limitation of all totalistic accounts of human life, ••• (lGU. The 
act of criticism locates man in the finitude of his world and regards 
his political activity not as the creation of .the Kingdom of God but as. 
an attempt to establish "a tenuous finite good: a house to live in~ a 
state that is .at peace". (162) Theology is the handmaiden of this tenu-
ous, finite project. 
Villa-Vicencio is aware of the difficulty of this task for an institution-
alized church. It is possible, however, he claims, for small groups and 
individuals. 
This delineation of the relationship between gospel and ideology is closely 
akin to that pf Miguez Bonino. In a discussion of the role played by 
ideological presuppositions in biblical interpretation he reveals his 
understanding of ideology as 11a (more or less coherent, or partially 
modified) unified conception of the world" (163) This indicates that he 
uses ideology in ·the neutral sense of world-viewo However> he 
goes on to make clear his awareness of the negattve sense (that of class 











11Hermeneutics in this new context means also an 
identification of the ideological framework of 
interpretation implicit in a given religious 
praxis. It is important to point out, in this 
respect, that such discernment of an ideology 
implicit in a theological or religious praxis 
does not necessarily imply the intention of the 
person or group in question to uphold or promote 
such ideology. One could even venture to say 
that, in most cases, people are themselves 
1rnaware of it. Their words and actions may 
intend something else. But in the context of 
a given situation they may in fa~t be support-
ing and ·buttressing a certain pof[tical and/or 
economic line, and, therefore, functioning, in 
the wider context of the total society, as 
ideological justification of such lines 11 • (16!•) 
Here Miguez Bonino clearly reveals agreement with the views o:f V:i.lla-
Vicencio on the closeness of the relationship between theology and 
ideology. It is an admission of the ideological captivity of theology. 
It should however be remembered that, as Fierro has. pointed out, ( 165) 
this is an advantage which contemporary political theologians have over 
previous theologians - they are aware that they are influenced by the 
ideological framework from which they operate. This enables Miguez Bonino 
- and for that matter those theologians who share this view - to be self-
critical. It is this awareness that allows Miguez Bonino the theological 
freedom and independence to examine critically and opt for the ideology of 
socialism. He declares: 
"Any course of action which keeps a certain coherence 
implies a unified perspective on reality, an explicit 
or implicit project. Ideologys in this sense, has 
also a positive meaning; it is the instrument 
through which our Christi<>n obedience gains coherence 
ana unity.· It is so, though, provided that it be al-
ways brought to consciousness and critically- examined 
both in terms of the gospel and of the scientific 
analysis of reality". (166) 
Here we see Miguez Bonino clearly emphasizing the dialectical relation-
ship.between theology and ideology and underlining what Villa-Vicencio 













A useful comparative study to Miguez Bonino's ethical position is 
provided by Peter Berger who sets out from a sociological perspective 
to explore the relationship between political ethics and social change 
in the third world. (167) Berger maintains -that one needs to utilize the 
best insights of different ideologies. He arrives at this conclusion 
through an e:.:hical evaluation of both- capitalist and socialist models. 
Using Brazil and China as examples of capitalist and socialist development 
respectively he subjects them both to the ethical criteria of what he 
calls the "calculus of pain". These countries have both been prepared 
to sacrifice a generation of people in order to achieve their goals. 
Berger shows that c2.pitalist development in Brazil has led to a wide 
disproportion in the economic levels between the very few who are rich 
and the vast majority of poor. Large areas of the country remain unaf-
fected by industrial growth and millions of people are severely under-
nourished and in fact starving to death. Life expectancy is low (in the 
thirties) and disease is connnon. His conc1-usion is "Millions of people 
have died because Brazilian society is what it is". (168) 
In China the situation is somewhat different. Millions have died there 
also, but this has occurred as a result of the campaign of terror pursued 
by the Maoist regime. Up to 1955 the figure had been put at between five 
and ten million victims, with a decline in the ruthlessness since that 
date. Overall, however, there had been a small but significant rise in 
the economic level of the Chinese population. 
~ 
Both China and Brazii therefore have witnessed widespread suffering in the 
implementation of development prog~ammes derived from their different 
ideologies. In Brazil, the number of victims from political brutality 












In China the reverse is the picture. In both countries the respective 
regimes excuse the present suffering on the grounds that it is the neces-
sary price to pay for the future happiness •. In Brazil this promised 
future is depicted as the wealth and prosperity of a full.)" developed 
society, in China as coIIlL~unist society. The calculus of pain which 
Berger uses as the ethical criterion for the. evaluation of these two models 
of development involves certain value presuppositions. He says 
"They are very simple: It is presupposed that 
· policy should seek to a~oid the infliction 
of pain. It 18 further presupposed that, 
in those cases where policy does involve· 
either the active infliction or the passive 
acceptance of pain; this fact requir.es a 
fustification in terms of pain rather than 
technical necessity:!. ~169). 
When the promised results of capitalist and socialist development in the 
two selected instances are measured agains.2 this criterion they are then 
seen to be nothing more than articles of faith. The empirical evidence 
·) 
which is available, Berger claims, does not lead to the conclusion that 
these postulated results will necessarily follow. 
Furthermore since they are articles of faith there is the possibility 
of doubting them. There is also the possibility that they may be wrong. 
Berger is at pains to prove that most political decisions have to be taken 
before there is adequate knowledge available by which all possible options 
can be studied - a phenomenon he calls 11 the postulate of ignorance" (170) 
Since this is so the legitimations for both the colossal htL~an sacrifices , 
involved in both the Brazilian and Chinese models falls down. Then the 
result is seen to be an enormous amount of' human misery and pain which has 
been deliberately caused and which has no justificc..':'ion. 
Berger's second ethical criterion is the calculus of meaning and again 
he states his underlying belief, which :ls: "Hu1~~1.?:J?~~%._!ia1i~.!:.]2~_righ1:_ 












tive for policy" (171) One of the characteristics of mankind is the 
propensity to attach meaning to the various experiences and phenomena 
of life. Man utilizes both cognitive and nqrmative meanings - "what is" 
and "what ought to be 11 • The .Cirst could be described as the 11definition 
of reality"_ When groups or individuals are deprived of such frameworks 
of meaning they are said to be in a state of what Durkheim called Anomie. 
The onset of modernization in the form of functional rationality and 
pluralism has not only threatened the frameworks of meaning in traditional 
society but has also offered the benefits of technological advancement. 
Berger's point of entry into the debate concerns the limits that may be 
set to modernization in a third-world situation. It centres on the 
question "What components of modernity may be tinkered with, and which 
must be taken (or left) as a package deal ?" (172) 
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In reacting against the threatened loss of meaning posed by adopting modern 
practices the counter-modern values held by many third-world peoples are 
termed "Resistances to development" (173_). Berger questions the pre-
supposition behind this term. He holds that, since men have the right 
to live. withirL a framework of meaning the cost of implementing policies 
which seek to modernize the way of life of people in a traditional culture 
is frequently in the realm of meaning. In fact the so-"called "resistances 
to development" need to be taken seriously. There is a high probability 
of failure for policies which ignore the indigenous definitions o: a 
' 
situation. The phenomenon of resistance to development arises because 
there exist counter-definitions of any given situation. Where these oper·-
ate on the nonnative level it means that the traditional values are being 
threatened by the onse.t of modernization. Where the counter-definitions 
are on the cognir.ive level the traditional world view is being challenged 












Berger makes the plea that political planning and policy-making be 
conducted in a humanistic way which gives due regard for the sifnificance 
of values and meanings in human affairs. 
In this exercise Berger is making an evaLuation of ideologies and policies 
from an ethical standpoint. He has chosen his criteria~ and recognized 
the value-judgments· implicit in them. He has thus followed a similar 
procedure to the one pursued by Miguez Bonino. By contrast, the latter 
has chosen as his criteria the theologically-mediated and biblically 
derived concepts of "liberation, righteousness~ shalom~ the poor, love". 
(174). Both however, have used their criteria in the sense of critique as 
outlined in our discussion of Villa-Vicencio's ideas. Miguez Bonino, 
using theological and biblical criteria, o_? mediations, is able, through 
a dialectical grappling with Marxism tq,opt for a socialist ideology in 
·~ 
order to articulate Christian bedience in a situation of oppression. 
Berger is outside that situation and his ethical criteria lead him to 
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make more rigorously critical ana)yses of both capitalism and socialism 
from empiriQal examinations of their achievementsG 
It is perhaps not surprising that they come to adopt different stances 
with regard to socialism. Berger, from a North American background is 
far more critical of socialism than·is Miguez Bonino, and his analysis, 
/ 
it mus:- be admitted, is far more rigorously scientific. By applying the . 
criterion of the "calculus of pain" he is able to outline the extensive 
cost in human suffering to be paid in a situation like China, This 
price is largely ignored by Miguez Bonine. Both ag r 0 .e, however, that 












There is further agreement on the need for commitment. Whilst acknow-
ledging the value and place of detachment for scientific observation, 
Derger admits that the moral urgency in historical situations frequently 
jerks him out of "an attitude of permanent disengagement". (175) 
Berger agrees with the analysis which claims that Third World states have 
little hope of emerging from poverty unless they can disentangle themselves 
from dependency on the more affluent countries (176) .. He goes on to con-
cede that "there are situations in the Third World in which, with however 
much reluctance, one must conclude that the revolutionary option is the 
only plausible one". (177) 
Berger, however, is by no means an idealogue. He believes that pragmatism 
rather than ideology is a better guideline for economic policy and that 
Third World governments would be well advised to adopt such a pragmatic 
stance in order to build up their countries. An approach like this would 
cut across the capitalist-socialist dicl.0tomy. He points out (with a 
realism lacking in the liberation theologians) that the situations in 
Third World countries are so varied, that no hard and fast doctrinaire 
decisions can be made as to which ideological pattern would ensure the best 
development in any given place. In one country capitalist development 
would be better whilst socialism might suit another. It is important to 
Berger that all development should allow for the enhancement of "the 
meanings by which human beings live". (178) 
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Berger's recipe for a method of political ethics requires a mixture of 
utopian imagination and motivation on the o!!e hand and "hard-nosed analysis" 
on the other. He concludes that the intellectual self-discipline involved 
in scientific analysis as well as the visionary imagination of the utopian· 
are both indispensable. Furthermore they are needed in the same individual 











Berger provides an inte:::-esting comparison with Miguez Bonino. Like the 
latter he introduces self-confessed value judgments and uses these to 
provide a rigorous critique of ideological ~tandpoints. Berger manages 
however to be more detached from his own admitted position in the 
Western liberal tradition and consequently is able to be more critical of 
the ideology of capitalism (and the "development" this offers) than is 
Miguez Bonino of the socialism which he espouses. Whilst the latter 
chooses the Marxist analysis as a critical tool ancl evaluates an existing 
socio-economic situation from that perspective he fails to be as objec-
tively critical of his own chosen stance as Berger. In effect Berger 
finishes up by evaluating his own critique and offering as a solution 
a mixture of the pragmatic realism of capitalism together with the power-
ful dynamic of the utopianism of socialism. Thus the diffe1~ence between 
them is that Miguez Bonino opts for an "either-or" choice, whilst Be.rger 
prefers a "both~·and" answer. 
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Berger does provide e.n example, though, of the sort of mediation which Mig·· 
uez Bonino speaks of. His ethical criteria. for the evaluation of ideolo-
gically-based political action represent. an attempt to construct a 
framework of reference from which analysis and criticism can begin. This 
is similar to the way in wnich Miguez Bonino considers that the Marxist 
analysis relates to the Latin American situation. Whilst Berger is able 
to approach the problems of the third world from a more detached 
scientific perspectiv.e Miguez Bonino is seeking to engage Christian 
commitment with the need for historical action in order to precipitate 
radical social change. He P'~rceives a sense of what Berger calls 11moral 
urgency" in his own situation and it is because of this that he is 
prepared to utilize those components in Harxism which he considers can 











5 •. MARXISM AND HISTORICAL . MEDIATION 
Jn his willingness to adopt elements of Marxism in order to express 
Christian obedience, Miguez Bonino indicates areas of agreement between 
Christianity and Marxism: 
11Christians can agree with Marxists on the need 
for a historical mediation of :mr humanist 
intention, i.e. for a set of analytic tools, 
a concrete political and social programme 
and a coherent ideological view which permits 
men to embrace and carry forward the struggle 
for human liberationn. (179) 
.( 
The first component of this historical mediation is "the set of analytic 
tools". By thi.s we take Miguez Bonino to mean the Marxist: belief 
in historical materialism as an analysis of the economic forces at work 
in history and as a rejection of idealist interpretations of reality. 
In a succint summary of Marx's later thought, based on the latter's claim 
that social changes are brought about by the changes in the forces and 
modes of production 5 Miguez Bonino gives a six-point digest of historical 
materialism. These are: 
"(l) man is not seen any more as an essence 
to be realised, nor strictly as a moral 
individual; rather, we are faced with 
total entities called 'social formations' 
(feudal, capitalist, socialist, cormnunist); 
(2) such social formations are not the embodiment 
of ideas or the result of man's planning but 
are determined by the 'mode of production' 
dominant at a given time; 
(3) this 'mode of production' is the basis on 
which the 'edifice' of a socio-economic 
f°ormation·rests and, in its turn, it determines 
(at lease in principle) the character of this 
formation; 
(4) the emergence of a new mode of production J.s 
main. ly dependent or.. the appearance of new 
technologies which a.re in turn related to new 
forms of mmership; 
(5) the basic force behind the whole process 
is 'need', the way in which man solves the prob-













(6) the social relations that result from this 
situation determine in turn all superstructural 
elements: ideology, family, religion, culture11 • (180) 
Xiguez Bonino, whilst not accepting all tha~ is stated or implied in 
this outline sees it as the ~:.9.y in which Marx gives "a scientific faun-
dation and content" (181) to his revolutionary project. 
Nevertheless Miguez Bonino believes that :t-'ictrxism is not to be embraced 
in a set of tenets devised once and for all by Marx and Engels and handed 
dmm for faithful interpretation and implementation by their followers. 
Rather he sees the onward flow of interpretation and reformulation through 
successive generations and in response to new situations as inherent in 
the ethos of Marxism. In an outline of the development of Marxism through 
Leninism and Stalinism, the Frankfu:rt School and Althusser, he finally 
declares his belief that' 
"one should set Marxism in the context of the 
long heritage of man.' s aspirations and struggles 
for a more human and just organisation of 
individual and social life. These struggles, 
always partly successful and partly frustrated, 
combine moral aspirations, the possibilities 
and conditionings afforded by scientific and 
teehnological progress and man's intellectual 
effort to penetrate and take control of the 
dynamics of human history and social 
relationships. The movement teaehes a new 
qualitative level with the extraordinary and 
rapid technological and scientific developments 
of the modern age". (182) 
Marxism is itself dialectical, and from within the struggle of its own 
thesis and antithesis comes its ever·-evolving development. Marx h:'.mself 
. 
turned Hegelianism "upside dovm". He engaged in the struggles of the 
proletariat and rescued it from its own weakness - that of a "voluntaristic 
world of imperatives" ~:83) . He further embraced the economic principles 
of the theorists but reversed them by inserting into them the latent 
revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. Miguez Bonino concludes: 
"Thus he possesses the berit3.ge in the only possible way: by transforming 












also offers a future to it". (_184) Marx did this by-providing it with 
a set of analytic tools and a revolutionary theory. Hence Miguez Bonino 
· believes that Marx's contribution"must be judged by his matur~ scientific 
thought". (185) 
Miguez Bonino further declares his conviction that the Marxist movement 
has at the moment lost its impetus and cannot provide sufficient motivation 
for a global socialist revolutionary struggle. The remedy he believes lies 
in the Christian motivation for solidary love. But any Christian involve-
ment in revolutionary activity needs to utilize the elements of :Marxism 
which h~ "the permanent core of any struggle for liberation" (186) 
These are: 
1. Historical materialism in the sense that 
"history is not primarily the unfolding of man's 
consciousness or of his ide2s but the dynamics 
of his concrete activitys the main form of which 
is the work through which he transforms nature 
in order to respond to the totality of his needs" (187) 
2. The connnunal nature of man as a "concrete 
social formation with its structures, relation-
ships and self-understanding (ideology)" (188) 
3. The fact of class struggle and the revolu-
tionary part to be played by the proletariat. 
Since they are the ones in a position to become 
"an ind spensable and certain force fer change". (189) 
4. The notion of praxis as the source of knowledge. 
"Truth is not found in the contemplation of a 
Platonic world of ideas or in the exploration of 
subjective consciousness but in the scientific 
analysis of the activity of human beings within 
the conditions of their social situation". (190) · 
Whilst affirmation of Marxist materia"i.i.sm might at first arouse suspicion 
it has to be remembered that this is being put forward in opposition to 
the idealist interpretation of reality which He examined earlier. As we 
have seen God calls merL into a moral and spiritual relationsl1ip with him-
self and their neighbours. But this has to be mediated through historical 












The second part of the historical mediatiou Miguez Bonino calls for is a 
concrete political and social programme. In Marxism this is seen as 
embodied in the communist party as the institutional organisation of 
Marxism. Marx himself had little to say about t:he party or its forma-
tion. Instead he held firmly to the belief that man was able to save 
himself, and, as we have seen, he assigned to the proletariat the role 
of heilbtinger. His failure to spell out the exact economic circumstances 
that would trigger off the great proletarian revolution led to embarrass-
ment and argument amongst his followers, and it was left to LeniLl to 
become the architect of the first great Marxist revolution. 
Lenin's unique contribution to the development of Marxism was not in the 
theoretical field. His peculiar genius was to see the need for a 
historical mediation in the form of an organized political party. It 
was to be an elite of professionals. The reason why the general mass of 
the proletariat could not articulate their revolutionary consciousness 
was simple: "they have had to slave in factories and have had neither 
the time nor the opportunity to become Socialists". (19l) 
Therefore, for the revolution to come about it had to have a well disci-
plined leade.rship. Lenin saw that homogeneity and continuity of leader-
ship were necessary to success. In 1902 he affirmed the need for a small 
group of tried and talented leaders with professional training, They had 
to be trained by long experience and l:>y good team work. Withoat such a 
leadership eschelon n'o class could conduct the necessary struggle. 
Thirteen years later he still mair..tained this vic-,1 when he said: 11 If 
a small group (at present our Central Committee is a small group) 
(192) 
could act in every given crisis, directing the masses towards a revolution, 












Shortly after coming to power he admitted the elitist.nature of the 
small cadre of leaders, since, as he .said "the stratum of workers who are 
governing is an inordinately, incredibly thi12_ one", (194')· But the 
daunting task which devolves upon this small elite is one which the group 
is equal to. Lenin's visionary hope emerges when he describes the party's 
challenge: "This grain of sand has undertaken the tc>.sk of transforming 
everything, and it will perform it". (195) 
Thus whilst Marx eschewed the need for a concrete historical mediation this 
was corrected by the pragmatism of Lenin. Marx, of course, was in this 
respect at least, the captive to his own love for philosophy. (196)' 
Philosopher he may well have been, but organiser he was not. (197) 
Miguez Bonino feels that there need not be any essential discrepancy between 
Christian and Marxist claims on the question of historical mediation. Both 
assert the need for some concrete mediation to be the embodiment of their 
respective nistorical movements. The historical project which constitutes 
the historical mediation M guez Bonino envisages is to include the rejec-
tion of developmentalism because of its involvement with internatinnal capi-
talism, a social revolution, a strong centralized state~ popular partici-
pation involving conscienti":ation, a concentratinn of a "prolonged 
political struggle" (Miguez Bonino), the creation of an indigenous Latin 
American socialism which rejects Marxist dogmatism and the development 
of a "new man" in place of the "non-man" (Gutierrez). (198) 
The third aspect of the historical mediation envisaged by Miguez Bonino 
is what he calls "a coherent ideological view" which allows people to be 
involved with and to promote the struggle for human liberation by which 
he means th~ adoption of a Marxist type of socialism as a world view. 












rejected as conflicting with the direction ~f the gospel. By the same 
token socialism ~1st be preferred. Indeed, 
"the basic ethos of capitalism is definitely 
anti-Christian: it is the maximising of 
economic gain, the raising of man's 
grasping impulse~ the idolising of the strong, 
the subordination of man to the economic 
production. Humanisation is for capitalism an 
u~intended by-product, while it is for socialism 
an explicit goal. Solidarity is for capitalism 
accidental; for socialism it is essential". (199) 
The features of Marxism which are important for a coherent ideolog~cal view 
are precisely this commitment to solidary love, the analysis of reality 
which involves the rejection of idealism and the adoption of praxis 
as the fundamental locus of knowledge, and the availability for the 
cause of the oppressed. In addition the revolutionary thrust of Marxism 
as the means for liberating the oppressed is part of the necessary world-
VJ_ew. Marxists see their theory as more than an analytic tool, It 
1s a revolutionary theory and movement for transforming the world, invol·· 
ving the working class as the revolutionary instrument. 
Miguez Bonino is careful to state that there are however, limits to 
the extent to which a Christian can go in adopting the Marxist ideology. 
One of these is in the understanding of historical materialism. Insofar 
as this means the correction of the distorted understanding of reality 
which arises from idealism this is acceptable. But of course the Marxist 
understanding of historical materialism as we have outlined in chapter two 
means more. ,Miguez Bonino points ou;,: that this is where one of the funda-
mental differences between Christian faith and Marxist ideology occurs. 
This is because 
"most Marxists - at least the most conspicuous -
have claimed for materialism a totality and 
exclusiveness which neg~tes in principle all 
reality which is not reduced to immanent terms. 
Such a claim Christians must reject~ not 
because they speculatively pose the existence 












have been grasped by the reality of the 
living God who is beyond history and the 
universe, the living God who in faith they 
know to be true, may to be the true and 
ultimate reality in which everything has 
meaning and existence. At this point, no 
compromise is possible. Actually, such 
a compromise would voice the engagement 
of the Christian.as such of all authenticity 
and meaning 11 • (200) 
The other ideological limitation of deficiency is in the understanding 
of the nature of love. Quoting Fromm, Miguez Bonino shows how the 
Marxist concept of love envisages it as originating in and emanating from 
man himself. 
·"Man constitutes himself by dete:rmining, without 
any external authority, although certainly in · 
the context of society, the goals and meaning of his 
existence. Hence, he rejects all 1 love of God' 
which would not be, in the last resort, man's 
return to himself as a human being -· 'all gods who will 
not recognise man's self-consciousn ss as the highest 
divinity' as Marx has said. This is, according to 
Fronun, the only possible humanistic ethic. Anything 
else is alienation, because 1man owes to himself his 
existence, not only materially but also emotionally 
and intellectually 1 ~• (201) 
~his, as Mi~uez Bonino points out, is an inadequate understanding for the 
Christian who claims that he is a product cf love rather love being a 
product of man. The origin and motivation for a Christian's love is 
the love of God himself. 
Miguez Bonino then, believes that in order to concretize the eschatologi-· 
cally significant actions which man's participation in the Kingdom of 
God requires there is an indispensable need for mediations. Without these 
there is either the ab~olutizing of an ideology, ideological captivity, 
fanaticism, or no effective historical engagement. He contends that 
three mediations are essential. These are, first, a radical scientific 
analysis of society which alone can furnish a sufficient understanding 
242 
of the social reality in relation to which Christian love has to be articu-











so that the ethical requirements of the Kingdom of Go_d may be spelt out 
in relation to the social analysis and political reality of the 
contemporary situation. The third mediation is an ideological world view 
and political programme which is able to provide a vehicle by which 
Christians can give effect in a secular w:s..y to their commitment to 
articulate their love. 
This position, as we have seen, represents an advance on other ethical 
models which either fail to put their Christian commitment into effective 
political engagement or do so without sufficiently rigorous scientific 
analysis. The comparison with Berger's similar study has sho-w-n that 
there are other ethical approaches to the question of ideological 
options in a third world situation and we propose to return to this 
consideration in our final chapter. 
Miguez Bonino is fully aware, however, of the need for Christian theology 
to distance itself from any ideology it chooses so that it can mai!ltain 
its prophetic and critical role and therefore its identity. His choice 
of Marxism is fraught with problems, even though he uses it in a dialectical 
way. He is convinced, nevertheless, that this is the only one possible 
for a Christian in the Latin American situatio!l if the cycle of oppression, 
misery, suffering and exploitation is to be broken. He believes that 
the situation is so chronic that only a radical approach can have any 
chance of effecting change in a meaningful way. 
Furthermore, be claims that by allyinh itself with Marxism in the revolu-
tionary situation in Latin America Christianity can make a significant 
contribution to Marxist theory and praxis. In this way he hopes to 
liberate theology from its ~erely critical and reflective role to one 
in which it ~articipates in the changing of the social order. 











in applying the ethical criteria he has chosen to th~ ideology 
to which he has committed himself. Is Marxism any more likely than 
capitalism to usher in conditions more appropriate to the coming 
Kingdom of God ? Furthermore, is Miguez Boriino's interpretation of 
the Kingdom in terms of historical engagement a valid one ? To a 













CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE SEA'..{CH FOR A 
THEOLOGY OF HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT. 
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The search for a theology of historical engagement which Miguez Bonino has 
undertaken is well surmned up in a question he asks about the nature of 
the relationship between God and man. He says, 
"Is God a substitute subject for men in historical 
action, or is he the wherefrom and the where-to, 
the pro-vocation, the power, and the guarantee 
of an action that remains fully human and responsible ? 
If he is a substitute subject - however much we may 
try to explain it away - history is a meaningless 
game and man's humanity a curious detour" (1) 
It is Miguez Bonino's claim that much traditional theology has indeed 
regarded God as a substitute subject for man in historical action with 
the consequences outlined. He has set himself the task of re-instating 
man as the subject of his own history whilst maintaining the biblical 
emphasis on the sovereignty of God. In his re-examination of the theme 
of the King:::om of God he has sought to emphasize that God does. not take 
over from man the handling and ordering of the world's business. Rather 
God's role is to prompt and provoke man into historical engagement. 
Miguez Bonino has chosen the Kingdom of God as the biblical motif around 
which to work out his theology. In this final chapter we look at the 
suitability of this category for this undertaking and we underline this 
suitability in terms of the centrality of the Kingdom in the bible, and 
its ability to enable Miguez Bonino to maintain a Christian identity and 
a contemporary relevaI}ce in his liberation theology. 
We go on to examine the criticism that liberation theology, like Marxism, 
only treats man in his corporate dimension and consequently fails to offer 
salvation to the individual. We see how l'·figuez Bonino avoids this pitfall 












Kingdom. The first is in terms of meaning and significance in this life 
and the second relates to a personal life after death. Both of these, 
however are conceived of in ways that emphasize political engagement. 
We then turn to a brief survey of leadiri:r. expositions of the Kingdom of 
God in the twentieth century and see how they each emphasize the Kingdom 
as gift and man's role as merely· reflexive or passive. By contrast 
Miguez Bonino draws out the active, dynamic role of human action within 
the Kingdom. The liberation theology of Sobrino, however, offers a posi-
tive and biblical corrective to Miguez Bonino's vagueness on the crucial 
category of repentance. 
In looking at Miguez Bonino' s use of Marxism as a mediation we note the a.l ter-
nativa approach suggested by Berger and:, point out the need for a more 
rigorously critical appraisal by Miguez Bonino according to the criteria 
~l 
he himself .has offered. In further evaluation we refer to the stress 
which Niebuhr puts on the depth and magnitude of human sinfulness and 
point out that history has a record of turning the tables on those who 
would steer it along a particular pre-determined course. This unpr~dic-
tability is referred to by Niebuhr as irony. 
Finally we set out seven theses which we consider this study of Miguez 
Bonino's theology has suggested as steps in the direction of a theology 
of hist~rical engagement. 
1 •.. THE KINGDOM OF · r!fJD . AS THE ·KEY CATEGORY 
The key to Miguez Bonino's exposition of liberation theology is in his 
understanding and interpretation of the Kingdom of God. The significance 
and importance of this choice is not that it is a useful, 












that i't is a category which is at the very core and centre of the 
biblical message. Indeed, in trying to evaluate other Latin American 
liberation theologians, Kirk has selected this theme as his criterion 
because of its centrality in the Bible. He can talk of ''Scripture's 
testimony to the kingdom of God as the central herrneneutical key ••• c. 
for its own understanding". (2) 
In selecting any biblical theme as a hermeneutical key there is always a 
danger. Barr has drawn attention to the problem in his discussion of the 
habit which theologians have manifested of attributing greater prominence 
to some themes within the Bible than others. In this way"election" in 
traditional Calvinism, ''justification by faith" in Lutheranism, and the 
synoptic gospels in liberalism have all constituted "thematic priorities" 
at different tirnes.(3) Barr prefers to use the term "material centre" 
to describe such a choice and admits that, within limits, it has its 
value. The difficulty arises, however when theologians elevate a material 
centre to a higher status than others and succumb to the temptation to 
absolutize this theme and to regard it as beyond criticism. Some of the 
criticisms currently being levelled at liberation theology are along these 
lines. For example Kirk regards the categor·y of the Exodus as a "privil-
eged text" in the hands of some Latin Americans who have seemingly absolu-
tized it. (L•) 
There are two main reasons why, in :Miguez Bonino's use of the Kingdom of 
God, the dangers in choosing a key theme and regarding it as the supreme 
touchstone of theological evaluation are reduced. The first of these is 
because of its centrality. The witness of the Bible is that God rules 
over history and achieves his redemptive purpose within it: in a new and 
determinative way. In the life and ministry of Jesus it was the major 












of his resurrection is that God's rule is vindicated over the powers of 
evil and death and that his ultihlate victory is assured despite the inter-
vening possibility of suffering and strugg~e. 
Nevertheless, even such a choice is not without its problems, and 
a major difficulty in selecting --it~ is the ~pparent absence of the 
Kingdom theme in the teaching of St. P2ul. (5) However this should be 
seen as an apparent· problem rather than a real one. There is in the 
teaching of Jesus a close connection between the proclamation of the 
Kingdom and his own person and work 0 The concern of the 
early Christian preachers and apostles was not to repeat the message 
of Jesus but rather to declare the significance of Jesu~ himself as the 
crucified and risen Messiah. (6) Paul emphasizes the fact that the 
rule of God had broken in by his constant references to the events of 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. He further stresses the immi-
nence of the Parousia which corresponds with the !:.y.noptic teaching on the 
consunnnation of the Kingdom and also refers to- the cosmj_c scope of salva-
tion in passages such as Romans 8:21. / 
Then secondly the danger of absolutizing this theme is minimized because 
the Kingdom of God is so w~de-ranging in the area of its biblical concerns. 
The concept of sovereignty is basic in any doctrine of creation; the 
cosmic lordship of Christ over the powers is an obvious instance of the 
inbreaking of the Kingdom; the new :-·:eation and the new man are both 
related to the Kingdom of God; so too are providence, resurrection~ and 
exaltation; and redemption (in the sense of release from alienation for 
love and service) is likewise part and parcel of the Kingdom story. (7) 
The centrality and wide-ranging nature of its concerns also enables the -
category of the Kingdom of Cod to serve as an anchor by which Miguez Bonino 












theology. By its alliance with Marxism liberation theology runs the risk 
of sacrificing this identity and some critics are convinced that this 
has in fact happened. 
Hebblethwaite believes that there is no satisfactory syntnesis between 
Christian theology and Harxist theory. nespite the many efforts to 
achieve the right mix he questions whether it is possible at all. He 
contends that it is,"an attempt to square the circle". (8) The verbal 
gymnastics used by the synthesizers involve attempts to redefine Christianity 
in order to prove its revolutionary essence and at the same time to show 
the peacable intentions of Marxism. Hebblethwaite concludes that the 
end result is a sell-out for 'Christianity 1vhilst Marxism "gets the benefit 
of the doubt". (9) 
f"'~t 
A similar conclusion is arrived at by Vree', except that in his opinion 
both Marxism and Christianity lose out. J (10) Admittedly most of Vree' s 
thinking relates to the European and North American dialogue, but the 
liberation theology enterprise is an even more radical attempt to find 
what he calls a synthesis. Vree claims tha.t in dialogue with Ma.rxism 
Christianity veers towards gnostic.ism whilst in tlie same. enterprine Marxism 
sinks into revisionism, (11) 
It is our contention that Miguez Bonino is fully aware of the dangers in-
herent in the attempt by liberation theology to utilize aspects of Marxism 
and that he successfully avoids the pitfalls involved. 
Moltrnann has ernphas:i~ed the r.irnportauce of maintaining Christian identity 
in any political theology and attempts to do so 1; anchoring his 
theology in the crucifixion. He claims that "Christian theology finds its 
identity as such in the cross o= Cbrist". (12) Miguez Bonino by contrast 
has successfully maintained ti1e specific.ally Christian chc=>.racter of his 












God. Using this central biblical affirmation as his criterion he 
has reen able to define the unity of history as the locus of the sovereignty 
of GodJ to embrace the tensicT'. between the present and future .action of 
both God and man in history, and to relativize the necessqry mediations 
in the process of articulating Christian obedience in political struggle. 
At the same time he has been able to take seriously the Marxist emphac:is 
on human initiative in historical engagement as well as its analysis of 
socio-economic dynamics. 
The Kingdom of God is also an apposite material centre for theological 
reflection because it adequately fulfills the requirement of contemporary 
relevance. Miguez Bonino, following Moltmann, accepts that faith and 
theology always have to live in a tension between. what he calls the "Two-
fold historical reference" which consists of the distinction between 
. \ ._,, 
human history and the sovereignty of God 9 between action and proclamation, 
and between the 11present" and "Christ" references. Relevance concerns 
the degree to which theology takes account of and meets the realities of 
the contemporary life of mankind. Summarizing Holtmann's exposition, 
Miguez Bonino says: 
"The relation of the two appears in contemporary 
Christianity as almost inversely proportional: 
the greater the involvement in present historical 
action for the sake of the neighbour, the 
greater the risk of losing the specific identity; 
the stronger the consciousness of attachment to 
the specifically Christian heritage the stronger 
the risk of isolation from the present struggles 
of mankind and therefore of irrelevance." (13) 
There can be little question that Miguez Bonino's liberation theology 
maintains the demand for relevance~ and it is our sti"1mission that it is 
his choice of the Kingdom theme that enables him to do this. The 
biblical concept of the Kingdom includes within its scope the concern for 
radical social change which is so all-important in the Latin American 












stewardship of power, and the interrelated~ess of the different levels 
of liberation as well as a hermeneutic which takes account of the 
conflictual nature of society. (14) 
Whilst Miguez Bonino undoubtedly derives his concern for these issues 
from the Marxist analysis of the Latin ill-aerican situation his choice of the 
Kingdom motif enables him to i~tegrate this historical reference with 
the "Christ reference". The reason why such a thoroughly biblical concept 
is able to withstand the test of relevance lies in its thoroughly this-
worldly character. In our study of the prophetic interpretation of 
history we saw how idealism was excluded by the biblical focus on the 
rule of God in the present events of human experience and the expectation 
of the future. The predominant emphasis even in the Genesis accounts of 
creation sets the world in the dimension of time and history. As Van 
Leeuwen has put it: "Right from the start the primary reference· of the 
Hebrew expression· 'olam is to time and.'"Aistory ~ within which the Lord 
moves with his people toward his Kingdom"< (15) Consequently, when 
Miguez Bonino wishes to reflect theologically on a praxis which includes 
a scientific analysis of the dynamics in contemporary society the Kingdom 
motif is particularly suitable. 
Furthermore it is christologically defined and is therefore fully in iine 
with Bonhoeffer's formulation of the unity of the reality of God and the 
reality of the world.in Christ, who is the ultimate reality. The New 
Testament proclamation that in Christ the rule of God broke into the world 
in a new way means -::hat the theme of the Kingdom of God has a christological 
basis and definition. It is precisely this christological franework of the 
Kingdom which determined that its use in the liberation theology of Miguez 
Bonino will be grounded both.in contemporary history and in the biblical 












between Hig11ez Bonino and the thought of Sobrino. "I think that 
liberation theology as 'theology' is profoundly christological'', says 
Sobrino, "and insofar as it i~; concerned with 'liberation', its most 
all-embracing theological concept is rthe Kingdom of God' " (16) 
Miguez :Bonino has also been able to acc:.mrnodate within this concept 
the eschatological dimension of the biblical orientation of the future. 
By drawing out the ·tension between the present and the future in his 
continuity-discontinuity formula he has combined together the positive 
elements in prophetic eschatology, apocalyptic theology and the New Testa-
ment dual emphasis on so-called 11realizedt1 and 11future 11 eschatology. Along-
side this harmonizing of biblical themes he has simultaneously blended in 
the melody of the ultimate significance of present human historical action 
undertaken J.n love. In this skilful way.Miguez Bonino has been able to 
·) 
take the insight enshrined within the Marxist belief in the inexorability 
() 
of the coming revolution and reinterpret the Christian message of thP 
finality of Christ and the coming consununation of his Kingdom from that 
vantage point. In the process of achieving this goal he has also managed 
to synthesize into a unified whole the hope contained in the prophetic 
understanding of time, the apocalyptic stress on the inversion of the 
order pertaining in the present status quo, and the ethical requirement of 
a love which is the criterion of human historical action. 
This c.:'mbination of diverse elements has also enabled Miguez Bonino to 
overcome the major weakness in apocalyptic expectation. By 
emphasizing the es~hatological significance of love he has avoided the failure 
tn much apocalyptic theology to work out any mec:-.11ingful ethic. At the 
same time, by underlining the ultimate significance of actions done in 
the present he has ru_led out the probability of pessimism and despair 
which result from the apocalyptic coiwiction that the pr<:'.sent age is so 












One of the mos~ serious criticisms to have been levelled at liberation 
theology concerns an integral dimension of biblical eschatology. 
This may at first seem somewhat surprising since the liberaion theologians 
lay considerable stress on eschatology. The criticism, however, is 
directed at their apparent lack of interest in the life to come. Fierro 
alleges that liberation theology follows l'.Jltmann in not stating what its 
position is in this regard. There is left the suspicion that "it does not 
believe much in that ·life, if at all". (17) Fierro believes that one of 
the reasons for this ambiguity is that liberation theology has not really 
come to grips with the traditional theology of salvation nor has it 
set out its own attitude to it. In singular terms the problem could be 
posed in the question: "Is it possible to believe both in heaven and 
in the theological meaning of decolonization?'' (18). A similar stance 
is adopted by Newbegin. He deals with the Pfoblem of salvation under-
·· stood as human meaningfulness. (19) Accepting the critique by libe~a-
") 
tion theology of the traditional idealistically conceived theology of 
salvation Newbegin sees the questicn of meaning c:.s a dilennna. On the one 
hand meaning can be found in the future cf the community. Traditionally 
Christianity offered the former option, whilst Marxism has proclaimed 
the second. They have usually been understood as mutually exclusive 
and Newbegin asks whether the dilemma is inevitable. Does meaning for 
the individual have to exclude a meaning for history or does one have to 
choose meaning for history at the cost of pe~sonal hope ? 
Cutting right across the search for meaning is the intervenirig fact of 
death which, from a human point of view is the negation of all meaning. 













The gospel of the resurrection meets the need for a meaningful future and 
embraces both the private and public life of the human person. The 
Cl1t:istian hope 1S one: it offers a personal possibility of life after 
death but it also proclaims the destruction of whatever opposes God's 
kingly rule and the final subjection of the universe to God. Newbigin 
contends that: Romans 8 enshrines the essence of the Christian gospel of 
liberation. "By giving his Son to die the death of sinful man", he 
asserts, "God delivered us from the grip of sin and death and pla.ced us 
under a new jurisdiction - that· of the Spirit ••• This is an accomplished 
liberation. Like all liberations it is a change of regime". (21) But it 
involves those who are thus liberated in becoming agents of liberation 
through both suffering and service. Newbigin goes on to point out that God 
the Father and creator is likewise ordering all things in the ~osmos towards 
the fulfilment of the end to which he has called them. 
In this way Paul's teaching presents a picture which portrays history itself 
as a struggle for liberation and the church as a participant in that struggle~ 
'But the significance of the individual is not sacrificed. '.rhe indi-
vidual Christian has a role as both a fighter £oL liberation and as one 
who has himself been liberated. The church cannot bring in "the city which 
is the perfection of all that God purposes both for our ro.rsonal and for our 
public life" (22) because there is no evolutior..ary road from here to there. 
The ascent is not simple. As in the New Testament Apocalypse the New 
Jerusalem is to "come down" rather than being !!built up", and the ch.irch's 
role is that of witnessing to the grace and justice which both judges and 
redeems those structures in which are embodied our hopes for justice. 
Newbigin's exposition represents a useful and helpful response to Miguez 
Bonino. Together with the comments by Fierro it draws attention to the 












the exceeding sinfulness of sin in the individual. It seems to the present 
writer that in the quest for structu:::·al l'i bera. ti on some theologians - notably 
Assmann and Boff- have omitted to deal with total human liberation~ Gutierrez 
has descri'bed this as threefold. (23) It would appear that by concentrating 
on political liberation they have finished with an imbalance which neglects 
the spiritual liberation of persons. The impression is almost given thar 
the liberation theologians have gone along with the Marxist contention that 
only the future socie.ty to be inaugurated by the revolution can provide 
the necessary c.onditions for personal fulfilment and what the older theology 
has usually called salvation. On this score Newbigin's criticism is to be 
welcomed. In any endeavour to interpret the message of the New Testament 
the individual must necessarily be given. due significance • 
. On the other hand Miguez Bonino, unlike the ~ajority of liberation theolgians, 
. } 
has attempted the task of incorporating a 11beyond-death11 dimension into his 
exposition. This emphasis on the after-l~{fe comes out in two places. 
The first of these is in R66m t6 b~ P~6ple where he deals at length with the 
theme "Love will never cease to be" s (24 Y and me.ets the problem of meaning 
on a personal level which Newbigin has highlighted. His answer is that it 
is the eternal future after death which gives meaning to the otherwise dis-
connected and incoherent experiences of learning, working, struggling and 
·loving of this life. Whilst he is careful to emphasize that in the New 
Testament there is very little inforrilation or speculation about the nature 
of the hereafter he is·adamant that the nature of the Kingdom life is love. 
"What is constantly repeated is that the love of 
Jesus Christ is permanent and that death cannot end 
it. Therefore, Jesus Christ gives an :-ternal dimen-
sion to the love in cur lives. Whoevc has identi-
fied himself with it has already conquered death". (25) 
Miguez Bonino even goes on to deal with "Images of the Future Life" and 












joy and harmony. "The future life is present in this image" he says, "like the 
kind of lj.fe in which effort, work, an<l service become joy and repose, 
while happiness is creation, service and duty". (26) The consequence 
is that here and now we shoula be trying to transform work which means 
involvement •vith the economic and political fields. The future is not just 
an end to be arrived at, though. The images of the future life carry hidden 
within them a call for the transformation of the present. 
A further image of the future life which he refers to is that of reward .. 
Considered as the accumulation of credit this is absurd but it makes sense 
when seen as 11 a kind of parable which teaches that actions that; belong to 
this new life are never incomplete or unfinished, but rather are projected 
into the future, then the idea seems coherent and positive". (27) 
We would maintain therefore that Miguez Bonino has foreseen the criticism 
by Newbigin and Fierro and has met it in this exposition. It may well be 
that Room to be People was not available ~o Newbigin when he wrote his 
evaluation of liberation theology since it was only published in English 
in 1979 and Newbigin wrote a year earlier. It is clear that Miguez.Bonino 
is fully aware of the danger of ignoring the issue of personal salvation. 
On the evidence in Doirtg Theblog~ Miguez Bonino could be charged, along with 
liberation theologians in general, of this imbalance. His later book, how-
ever, without sacrificing any of the insights of Doing Theblogy, has effec-
tively restored the balance and has provided an insight which is a v:1luable 
contribution to the liberation theology exercise. 
A second reference to the significance of death comes in the last chapter 
of Christians and Marxists where Miguez Bonino reckons with the heroism of 
conmmnists who have died for their cause. This poses a call to a spiritu-
ality of commitment for Christians whose gospel demands complete dedication. 











connnunist martyr goes to his death without any hope of resurrection. 
"His Good Friday, is not S'1.reetened - much less 
absorbed - by any Easter Sunday, a Sunday in 
which he wil1 p.:rsonally return to life. The 
Heaven to which the martyrs raised their arme 
amidst flames and smoke, does not exist for the 
red materialist. And nevertheless he dies con-
fessing a cause, and his superiority can only 
be compared with that of ·::.he very early Christians 
or of .John the Baptist". (28) 
Whilst Miguez Bonino is at pains to stress that he is not trying to set 
up Christian spirituality in any competitive sense over against Marxist 
connnitment he nevertheless delineates what for him is the more excellent 
way of Christian devotion. Grounded in the spirituality of faith, hope 
and love as set out by St. Paul in I Corinthians 13, Miguez Bonino expounds 
the relevance of Christian · · · i·t 'd t th 1 t" sp1r1~ua i y am1 s · e revo u ionary 
struggle along three directions. 
~:) 
In the first of these there is the requirement of utter availability for 
service as conceived in the words of Wesley's covenant prayer: "I am no 
longer my own but Thine. Put me to what Thou wilt, rank me with whom 
Thou wilt; •••••• I freely and heartily yield all things to Thy pleasure and 
disposal". (29) Miguez Bonino interprets the evangelical emphasis on 
salvation by grace through faith as indicating that an individual finds 
his true identity and reality not in himself but in Christ, The simple 
trust of faith involves the total surrender of the person and his subjec-
tivity to his Lord. 
In this passage Niguez Bonino locates himself firmly in the evangelical 
tradition and shows t~at a theology of liberation does not have to abandon 
or discard the theology of personal salvation. Whils1- Miguez Bonino does 
not spell out the relevance of this teaching for a theology of the Kingdom 
of God it is transparently clear nevertheless that the theme of personal 












subject of the one who is the King. 
,_ 
The second direction of Christian spirituality'is a coIIUnitment unto death. 
Here the hope of resurrection enables a Christian to risk his life because 
he is "conscious of the freedo1(1 for self-giving available to those who 
know that 'de;;ith •••• cannot separate us from the love of Christ' 11 (30) 
Miguez Bonino sets death in the context of ~he struggle for liberation and 
at the same time reco:gnizes the costliness and suffering involved in any 
social transformation. "It seems to us that only a faith that transcends 
death can responsibly undertake the awful decision of indispensable but 
costly transformations", he says. (31) Suffering and even death therefore 
are envisaged as "participation in the lot of solidary love, the only thing 
that can really create a possibility of new life for man". (32) The 
end result is that the Christians shares in the triumphal procession with 
. the Lord which is the consumma.t ion of thE: Kingdom. 
In this way Miguez Bonino has built into his eschatology the element of 
personal significance and has shoim how a liberation theology of the 
Kingdom of God allows for and includes the hope of the hereafter, For him 
it is this very hope which gives ultimate significance to the ethical 
struggle in the present. Always, however, the hope of the future sonsurmna-
tion is to be related, not to pious escapism$ but to historical engagement. 
"To be a disciple" says Miguez Bonino, "is, in Christian terms, to enlist 
in a conflict which is still raging, however much its outcome may be ,~vident 
to faith" (33). 
In the third place, faith, hope and love issue in joy and gladness. We 
can rest, in the true meauing of the Sabbath, becauses "We do not cll.rry 
the burden of the whole world on our back, we carry only the burden of the 
day". (34) Here is an aspect of Christian discipleship which, in 












Marxism at this point fails to take account of the depth of human "joy, 
personal fulfilment, hope and love" (35) despite the fact that these 
are illustrated in the lives of some of the militants. 
As with other aspects of Christian spirituality, joy too h2~ to be 
related to historical cornmitmen~Miguez Bonino says: 
"It is necessary, particularly, where we have 
been dealing with the most 'spiritual' dimensions 
of Christian life to remind ourselves that we are 
still.speaking about political and social engage-
ment - we are still in the world of social .struggle, 
economic considerations, political progrannne, revolu·-
tionary theory, perhaps jail and torture, in any case 
conflict. It is here that the Christian liv,es his 
witness". (36) 
We have now dealt at some length with Miguez Bonino's teaching on personal 
salvation, death and resurrection in order to show that within his attempt 
to develop a liberation theology using the category of the Kingdom of God 
-, 
•. I there is ample room for a theology of meaning in personal terms. The 
criticism by both Fierro and Newbigin (whilst directed at liberation 
theology in general) is, in our opinion, amply met by Miguez Bonino's 
exposition in the way we have outlined above. 
Newbigin has stressed the nature of personal sin, salvation, and the after-
life. He has shown how, in the Christian understanding personal meaning 
finds its full flowering in the life of the Christian community. It seems 
to us, however, that :i.n making his evaluation of liberation theology he 
has failed to take sufficient account of the depth~ complexity and massive·-
ness of titructural and social evil. In line with a number of the critiques 
summarized by Brown in .Theolo&_y ·in a Ne\.J _Key it seems to us that Newbigin 
has missed the main point in liberation theology's attempt to co-opt the 
Marxist analysis. Whilst he claims to accept the Marxist critique of 
capitalism (37) he seems unable to see its usefulness in the Christian 
enterprise of liberation. In other words he fails to gras:' Miguez Bonino's 













Christian alternative to Marxism. This is r.'J answer to the endemic political 
and economic nexus of q:ipression and exploitation that pertains in Latin 
America and one might have expected that New~igin (with his p£rsonal 
P-Xperience of the third world) would have had a more comprehensive insight 
into the nature and intractability of the problems there, as well as the 
inadequacy of simplistic solutions. 
2. THE KINGDOM OF GOD Al~D HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT 
The contemporary study-of New Testament eschatology has been characterized. 
by a pronounced emphasis on the divine prerogative in the establishing of 
the Kingdom of God. Beginning with Johannes Weiss' rediscovery of the sig-
nificance of the apocalyptic element in our Lord's teaching, the tendency 
has been to emphasize the radical transcendence of the Kingdom. Weiss 
believed that Jesus was referring to a future rather than a present Kingddm, 
and it was to arrive apocalyptically rather than develop gradually. The 
recent translators and editors of Weiss' epoch-making work sum up his teach-
ing with the following statement: 
"For every man, and that includes Jesus, 
the only via~le attitude to take vis-a-vis 
. the advent of the Kingdom was one of passi-
vity. Men could pray that the Kingdom might 
come, but they could do nothing to bring it 
into existence. That remained forever solely 
the prerogative of God_ The Kingdom was a 
gift, not an assignment.". (38) 
C.H.Dodd in, reacting against the apocalyptic emphasi.s of Weiss and Schweitzer 
interpreted the Kingdom in categories reminiscent of Platonism. There is 
a tension between on the one hand the eternal order, which is the kingdom 
lying beyond history and which is represented by the prayer "Thy Kingdom come" 












of God has come upon you". (39) History becomes a series of events deri-
viug from a timeless reality beyond it. "It is instrumental, or more 
properly sacramental, to the eternal order". (40) This eternal order 
impinges upon present human experience and confronts individuals with 
the Kingdom of God "that is, with the ultimate good and the final power 
in the univcrse:i. (41) 
The role of men, in this interpretation of the Kingdom is to accept it, 
respond to it and enter into it. 
"Out of the ii~ response, one way or the other, 
further events proceed. Thus history is moulded 
by the spirit. The whole series of events 
remains plastic to the will of God, and serves 
to bring men again and again face to face with 
the eternal issues". (42) 
To accept, to respond and to enter are all considerably less passive 
roles for man than the one Weiss gives him. Nevertheless they fall 
far short of.the active, positive part which Miguez Bonino envisages. The 
reason is not hard to find since Dodd's .,cheme is set within a framework 
of idealism. Having argued away any meaningful future consummatinn for 
history or the Kingdom, Dodd is left with a dualistic situation in which 
historical events are merely the interaction of timeless spirit with the 
temporal order". (43)" Dodd's work is a brave attempt to reconcile two 
philosophies of history which are poles apart - the Greek idealistic 
system which J.s essentially cyclical and the Hebrew eschatological and 
apocalyptic view in which time is fundamentally linear. The result is that 
man is robbed of any possibility of becoming the subject of his own 
history and finishes with the prospect of a Kingdom of God which in the 
final analysis offers "hlessedness" in eternity. Political action and 
economic forces do not even come wit:h:i.11. the orbit of concern in this inter-
p_retation. 












emerged as the extremes in twentieth century studies of the Kingdom of God 
it was inevitable that other scholars wouJ.cl seek to synthesize "consistent" 
(or future) and "realizedrr esc!.~atology. 
One such attempt was made by W.G. Kummel who accepted that the Kingdom of 
God is the future eschatological age. He stressed, however, that in 
Jesus the Kingdom came into being. His eschatological teaching assured 
men that they are now living in the last days and tha.t the consummation was 
imminent. (Li4) Jesus' own ministry was the guarantee and demonstration of 
the eschatological character of" the present time. The importance of the 
teaching which Jesus offered~ claims Kummel, does not consist of the :unnn-
nence of° the apocalyptic end of the world. It lies in the arrival of the 
consummation which will allow the Kingdom of the God who has already shmm 
·- and actualized his redemptive purpose and power in Jes~s to become an 
unfettered reality. It is because Jes·.is has already fulfilled the promise 
of God that ,it will be fulfilled. 'r) 
For Kurrnnel man 1 s role in the Kingdom consists of '1adherence to tbe man Jesus 11 
(45) and of acceptance of his ·preaching. Again we note that in Kummel's 
exposition the action is all on God's side whilst man is assigned to a 
reflexive and responding part only. Although Kiimmel comes nearer to 
Miguez Bonino's concept of the relationship of the present Kingdom to 
the future one than either Weiss or Dodd, man is still not the subject 
of his o~m history. Indeed~ history itself, as secular political activity, 
hardly comes into the picture. The Kingdom is a religious activity 
centred on the preac~1ing of Jesus and the loving help he desires to give, 
as well as his death and the certainty of his resurrection. As such it 
points to the eschatological fulfilment still to come. The concept of 
any penultimate ethical requirement of socia.1 or political action to 












A further study of the Kingdom of God by a contemporary scholar is supplied 
by G. Eldon Ladd in his book The Presence of the Future. (46) Ladd dis-
tinguishes between four different uses of the term Kingdom cf God. in 
the gospels. In the first it is used to denote the reign or rule of God; 
in the second it means the future apocalyptic order at the end of the 
age; in the third use it signifies the presence of God among men now, 
and in the fourth meaning it indicates a present realm into which men 
' 
are entering. (47) 
Like Kummel, Ladd sees the key to the meaning of the Kingdom in the fact 
that it has become dynamically active in the person and mission of Jesus 
himself·. The Kingdom is basically to be thought of as God 1 s supernatural 
breaking into history in the person of Jesus Christ. It is supremely an 
act of God, a gift with which he blesses his people. In a sentence which is 
in some ways typical of his thought Ladd says: "The Kingdom is not only 
an eschatological gift belonging to the age to come; it is also a gift to 
be receiveci in the old aeon". (48) 
In an otherwise extensive examination of the meaning of the Kingdom, Ladd 
allocates a mere two pages to "The Kingdom and Social Ethics". (49) 
Here he acknowledges the ahsoluteness of the Kingdom to come, the need 
for the church to "make an impact on the world" (50) and the concern 
of Jesus for men's physical and social wel.1-being in addition to their 
spiritual welfare. The individual ethics are absolute ethics and only 
attainable in the age .to come. As in the previous critics, again we find 
little or no conception of any dynamic and active, part for man to play. 
The action is almost entirely one-way ·- from God to man. Human initiative 
is limited to the receiving of blessings~ or salvation as a gift. The 
Kingdom relates almost exclusively to the inner life of individuals. 
Secular history is abandoned to the politicians, and man passively awaits 











If these four interpretations of the Kingdom of God are typical of New 
Testament scholarship in the twentieth century it is not difficult to 
see how Miguez Bonino and the other theologians of liberation have 
found themselves impelled to seek a new hermeneutic of the Kingdom. 
With Marxism calling men to create their own history and carve their 
destiny for chemselves, the plea to accept, receive, and respond to the 
Kingdom as a gift or as something imposed from without appears as 
a tame alternative. In this regard it is interesting to note the ob-
servation by Martin that Marxism along -v;ith Islam appeals to the mascu-
linity of mankind. It does so because it sees "no ambiguity in power 
itself, and proletarian power acquires unqualified legitimacy". (51) 
By contrast the responding, reflexive role assigned to men in the Kingdom 
of God by these interpreters of the New Testament appears as femir.j_ne 
rather than masculine. Clearly some new hermeneutic key had to be 
employed if the levers of power were not to be abandoned to the sole con-
26/f 
trol of those who eschew any allegiance to the God and Father of Jesus Christ. 
It is our belief that Miguez Bonino has shaped a new form for the inter-
pretation of the Kingdom of God in categories which, whilst remaining 
faithful to the biblical foundation are yet able to bear a superstruc-
ture in conformity with the power-conscious demands of cc:i.temporary man as 
articulated in Marxist revolutionary consciousness. When we analyze 
Miguez Bonino's references to the Kingdom in the chapter we have selected 
for the focus of our present study we find he uses the phrase in five dif-
ferent senses. 
In the first place by the Kingdom of God he refers to the active sovereignty 
or Lordship of God in hi~tory. Out of some fifty-three references to the 
Kingdom in the chapter~ twenty seven or approximately half, fall into this 
group. Clearly uppermost in Miguez Bonino's interpretation is the Old 












God's present action in the totality of the affairs of men and his 
guidance and influence in those affairs. There are, for example, frequent 
rtferences to "history and the Kingdom", but the key sentence for clari-
fying our understanding of this concept is the one where he says, "Once 
we see divine initiative as that action of God within history and in 
historical terms which opens history toward the promise, we seem .••• required 
to use the strong language of growth, realization (and) creation~ (52) This 
accords with scriptrire and the doctrine of providence~ It is similar to the 
first use of the term noted by Ladd. 
In the second of Miguez Bonino's uses he means the Kingdom as the future 
eschat~logical goal of history to be realized at the Parousia of our Lord 
and this meaning appears in about a quarter of the references. Clearly 
again he is in full harmcmy with one of the central biblical aspects of 
the kingdom, and one which has been uppermost in the contemporary 
studies of the Kingdom. With the exception of Dodd, who later acknowledged 
the need to modify his view, most modern scholars have recognized the 
fundamental soundness of the point being made by Weiss and Schweitzer -
that the future aspect of the fulfilment and consummation of the Kingdom 
was intrinsic to the biblical picture. Any arguing away of this dimension 
can only represent a serious omission on the part of the interpreter, and 
leads to a thoroughly non-eschatological or ahistorical view of the Kingdom. 
Like Marx, Miguez Bonino prefers not to use the term "utopian" to des-
cribe this future Kingdo~. Such language he believes, removes the King-
dom out of the context of history and puts it into the category of 
wishful thinking. "The Kingdom" he sa.ys 11 is not utopian: it has a 
place both in history and in God's eschatological time". 
•' 
(53) Thus, in 
· line with both Kiimmel and Ladd anci the majority of later commentators 
Miguez Bonino accepts that the twin emphases of the Kingdom,present and 











Here it is possible to see the significance of Bloch's insights for con-
temporary theology, and the use made of his futurism by Miguez Bonino. 
The future eschatological goal of the Kingdom is the motivation for 
ethical and political endeavour as well as the guarantee of its fulfilment 
and significance. The attempt to come to terms with Bloch's emphasis on 
human creativity in its future-directedness has compelled Miguez Bonino 
to examine the significance and role of human action in a theology of 
the Kingdom. This attempt has led Miguez Bonino to re-establish the 
positive, active role of man in becoming the subject of his own history 
and in the liberating of man from the oppression which besets him. 
Thirdly, by the Kingdom, Miguez Bonino wishes to indicate the redeeming 
activity or presence of Jesus Christ in history. This usage only occurs 
·in three places in the ch<ipter under review but they serve to underline 
the essentially evangelical emphasis which Miguez Bonino wishes to retain. 
The category of the Kingdom thus enables him to bring out the truth inh2r-
ent in Marx's application of Hegel's dialectic to the economic forces 
at work in history. In Marx the dialectically related forces lead to a 
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new age - communism. In Miguez Bonino the new age is the salvation which 
the redeeming presence of Christ effects. It may be useful to look a little 
more closely at this idea. On the first occasion Miguez :LJonino says that 
it is necessary to "name the Kingdom" in terms that relate to secular 
history. In this way phrases like "love", "liberation", and "the new man" 
can be used "as signs which allow us to identify the active soverei5.ity of 
God in history, the redeeming presencP. of Jesus Christ, and, consequently 
the call and obedience of faithn. (54) Here the redeeming presence 
of Jesus Christ is used bJUonymously alongside the sovereignty of God 
and the call of faith. All are included in the understanding of the 
Kingdom of God. In the other two places Miguez Bonino refers to the fact 












The significance of this emphasis must not be lost. If, as other critics 
have pointed out, the Kingdom brings blessing and salvation to individual 
believers it is also true that it brings a redeeming presenc~ into the 
historical process. According to Miguez Bonino it is precisely this 
redemptive activity which we are called upon to identify and align out-
selves with in the political activity to which the Kingdom points us. 
This leads us to the fourth sense in which, Miguez Bonino employs the 
term Kingdom of God. Here it is the missinn to be fulfilled and it is 
at this point that he has incorporated the active, positive, or "masculinei! 
element so predominant in Marxism, into his teaching. He emphasizes that 
God comes not merely as gift but as demand and the following sentences 
convey this meaning: 
(a) In the Old Testamer;,t Yahweh 1 s sovereignty appears 
"as an announcem'ent which convokes, as promise and 
judgment demanding and inviting a response". (S6) 
(b) "God builds his Kingdom from and within human history 
in its entirety; his action is a constant call and 
challenge to man". (57) 
(c) uThe Kingdom is not an object to be known through 
adumbrations and signs that must be discovered and 
interpreted but a call, a convocation, a pressure 
that impels 1'. (58) 
(d) "History, in relation to the Kingdom is not a riddle 
to be solved but a mission to be fulfilled". (59) 
In these statements Miguez Bonino has skilfully maintained the biblical 
stress on the priority of God and at the same time has brought out the need 
for human initiative, decision, and ~·,ction. The Kingdom is no longer , 
merely a gift to be received passively. It is a mission of human engage-
ment in the positive, active, and dynamic - even conflictual - work of 
creating history. It is not merely an inner disposition to be engendered 
nor a religious blessing to be receiveds accepted and responded to. It 
is an enterprise to be embarked on and a business to be administered. 












is to be established in human history which is plastic in men's hands. 
This emphasis stands in contrast to the views of the critics we have 
examined and constitutes a contribution to the theology of history 
in general as well as to liberation theology in particular. It repre-
sents a shift away from the passivity required in consistent eschatology 
and also from the religious blessing offered by the Kingdom in realized 
eschatology and the subsequent syntheses. It also marks a distinct 
advance over the old 11 soc:i.al gospel" of Walter Rauschenbusch where the 
Kingdom of God was conceived as the ideal human society. (60) 
The fifth meaning which Miguez Bonino attaches to the Kingdom follows 
from the last and consists of ·references to human participation in the 
Kingdom. In this way he can speak of "historical mediations for our 
' 
participation in the building of the Kingdom11 (61) and "action which 
corresponds to the Kingdom". (6~) With0ut labouring the point it is 
necessary merely to note that here Miguez Bonino underlines the human 
enterprise involved in the Kingdom as human history and the secular nature 
of that history as opposed to traditional interpretations which have 
stressed the religious character of the Kingdom. 
By contrast with Miguez Bonino, Gutierrez gives little place to the concept 
of the Kingdom in his liberation theology. His main biblical theme 
centres around the Exodus, as we have previously mentioned. Where he does 
mention the Kingdom he tries to show how it is to be thought of and worked 
for in political ways. Previously Catholic theology had thought of "the 
growth of the Kingdom" in terms of temporal progress by which it referred 
to man's dominion over nature. 
The Kingdom is both gift· and the struggle for liberation, claims Gutie:aez. 











in liberation, insofar as liberation means a greater fulfilment of man" 
(63). W'nat Gutierrez seems to be saying is that historical liberation leads 
to the growth of the Kingdom. Miguez Bonino says that because the Kingdom 
has come we must use the human mediations available to actualize the King-
dom in history and erect signs of the coming Kingdom. 
However, the recurring feature we have seen in the New Testament critics, 
appears again in Gutierrez, where the fact of the givenness of the Kingdom 
1s emphasized again. Gutierrez makes no attempt to reconcile the Kingdom 
as gift and the Kingdom as human initiative. (64) and his concept of 
the Kingdom falls far short of the one portrayed by Miguez Bonino. 
Sobrino has offered a much more thorough study of the Kingdom of God. 
He draws attention to the fa.ct that not only is the Kingdom due to God's 
initiative, but it is also redemptive of evil situations. ·Indeed, in 
the teaching of Jesus God's action and presence is only conceived of as 
the overcomi.ng of a negative situation. (95) Here is the basic libera-
tion in the teaching and action of Jesus. Two aspects of Christ's ministry 
are distinctive signs of the Kingdom - his miracles of healing and his 
pardoning of sins - and these are part and parcel of the liberation he 
offers in the Kingdom. Sobrino stresses the point that the relationship of 
Jesus to the Kingdom means that we can only know him in the service of 
God's Kingdom. The Kingdom puts Jesus at one remove, so to speak, from 
direct personal contact. His activity and life function in the service 
of the Kingdom and this is the point at which we ar~ called to relate to 
him. 
Sobrino sees sin as the abuse of power, which leads to oppression of 
various kinds. Jesus condemned in particular the collective sins where 














The proclamation of the Kingdom by Jesus included the call to repentance. 
In an important passage which is crucial to his interpretation, Sobrino 
says: "Jesus himself shares the apocalyptic conviction that the breaking-
in of the Kingdom is God's work alone •••• Corresponding to ~~is work of 
God, however, is a human attitude that is usually designated with the 
Greek word Metartoia". (66) 
This human attitude is, on the part of the poor and lowly, to be one of 
faith and confidence in God. On the part of those called to discipleship, 
however, there must not only be faith: there must also be active co-opera-
tion in the proclamation of the Kingdom and the action of turning it into 
a full reality. Their discipleship callee them to place themselves at 
the disposal of the Kingdom. This means that "Following the praxis of 
Jesus gives expression to the concrete obligation to fight for love and 
justice among human beings". .(67) 
In Sobrino's exposition then, we finci a parallel to Miguez Bonino's ma111 
interpretative points about the Kingdom. It is God's active reign; it has 
broken into history in a new and dynamic way in the p2rson and ministry 
of Jesus; it is still to be consummated; it manifests itself in redemp-
tive activity in history; and it involves a command or call on disciples 
to engage in active participation. 
We find the particular value of Sobrino's account to be that he spells 
out far more clearly a~d exegetically the concept of metanoia, which is 
not mentioned as such by Miguez Bonino. As we have seen, (68) this was 
the very point which Bonhoeffer had drawn out so clearly in his exposition 
of the relationship between the ultimate and the penultimate. 
It is important for us also to note that this response to the grace aspect 












utilizing a political hermeneutic. K.L.S-chmidt, without any of the pre-
suppositions of liberation or contemporary political theology, under-
lines this human side to the coming of the Kingdom. Beginning with the 
need to accept the Kingdom as gift, he goes .on to outline the gospel call 
to service in the Kingdom, and by using Paul's phrase about "fellow-workers 
in the Kingdom of God" (69) J.s able to a.!" Sert, "Since, however, faith is 
obedience to the command of God, our concern and effort are demanded. 
Through faith we sh~uld fight for the kingdom of God like the elect under 
the old covenant". (70) Furthermore, because the decision to be for the 
Kingdom is so crucial it follows that the "invitation to the Kingdom 
of God must be accepted in metanoia". (71) It seems to us that 
this is a weak point in Miguez Bonino's treatment, for whilst he emphasizes 
the "pressure" that the Kingdom puts on men to participate in po1itical 
action he fails to spell out just how this call or commission is worked 
out in the New Testament. Sobrino has perceived very clearly the call 
to repentance and, following Bonhoeffer,,has interpreted this as the basis 
in the gospels for the requirement of active and creative struggle in the 
service of the Kingdom. 
Sobrino also provides a further useful corrective to Miguez Bonino's con-
cept of the Kingdom in his careful exposition of the liberative effect 
which the Kingdom exerts on human affairs. Miguez Bonino has been content 
to refer rather vaguely to ''a direction and a purpose in God's historical 
action •... which is conveyed in such expressions and symbols as I• • I JUStic.e , 
'peace·:, 'redemption' in their concrete biblical r illustrations' 11 (72). 
Sobrino, by contrast, has spelt out lww sin as the abuse of power opposes 
the Kingdom and creates oppression. The latter is the direct result in 
history of collective sin. In this way Sobrino is a~le to depict how the 
Kingdom redeems in terms of liberating men from oppression, and by so 
doing makes the leap from New Testament times to today that much easier. 











explicitly than has Miguez Bonino, and in the process has exposed the need 
for a closer and clearer link between the presence of the Kingdom and 
political liberation in Miguez Bonino's liberation theology. 
3. MEDIATIOi'!S AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 
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A theology of historical engagement must, it seems to us, utilize some 
idealogical and political mediations. HeEe Miguez Bonino is quite right and 
his decision to opt for an alliance with Marxism is at least to be admired 
for the courageit reveals. 
As we have seen, Miguez Bonino feels the urgency of the contemporary 
situation in Latin America is so strong, and the economic and political 
condition so extreme that he perceives only two possibilities. Either 
one chooses to support the present capitalistic system or one sides with 
:t'"iarxism in discerning capitalism as the ruot of the evil and throws in one's 
lot with the revolutionary movements. The ethical criteria Miguez Bonino 
perceives as inherent in the Kingdom lead him to evaluate the present 
politico-economic system as basically sinful, and concomitantly he finds 
Marxism to be motivated by love. 
Built into the biblical concept of the Kingdom is the dialectical tension 
between the relativity of the penultimate and the absoluteness oi the 
ultimate. This allows.Miguez Bonino to provide for the moral ambiguity 
involved in a Christian commitment to work with Marxists for a better 
society, even though wha.t is established is only likely to be a temporary 
and partial improvement on the status quo. 
It is clear that the Kingdom formula thus enables Miguez Bonino to avoid 












Yet it is here that we feel further thought needs to be given 
to the choice of mediations. It seems to us that the availability 
of grace and the comforting assurance that the imperfections 
of the human mediations will be purified in judgement and 
forgiveness have probably led Miguez Bonino into a too-easy 
acceptance of the Marxist analysis of the social situation. 
We have referred in Chapter Four to the way in which Berger 
carefullY, and analytically evaluates the two major ideological 
· systems available to third world countries. We saw there how he 
establis_hed ethical criteria by which to measure the results of 
' . 
these ideological systems and how he sought to synthesize the 
benefits of "hard-nosed analysis" and utopian motivation. 
; 
I • 
By f o~traat it seems to us that Miguez Bonino has not evaluated 
empirical_ Marxism with a' sufficiently rigorous analysis. Hav:ing 
critically and negatively evaluat.ed the results of capitalism in 
the form of human misery and suffering he does not proceed to 
supject ~xisting Marxist systems to any such_examination. Our 
problem therefore would be that before opting for the Marxist analysis 
of society and offering it as an a_lternative to capitalism we 
would expect the same priteria of the Kingdom to be applied as were 
used 1in the case of capitalis~. 
Our study of Berger 1 s use of ethical criteria involved an 
examination of what he termed the "calculus of pain" and the 
"c~lculus of meaning". We would have preferred Miguez Bonino 
.to have developed similar .criteria in the form of a 11 calculus 
of love''• This could then be applied to situations where Marxism 




















and dispassionate evaluation of Marxist praxis would result 
I 
from the formulation by Migue'z Bonino of a "calculus of 
justice" and a "calculus o~ peace" (or "shalom")· as tools 
for·the futther evaluation of empirical Marxism. 
Admittedly the asse.ssment which would ensue would still be 
framed from a perspective which would have subjective and 
indiv1dual,istic elem,ent s. Any significant de~ree of scientific 
or obj active detachment would be difficult t.o achieve. It seems 
' ' 
therefore that the selection of the Marxist analysis because of 
its "scientific" character is a somewhat arbitrary judgement. 
For t
1
hiei reason the justice implied in the Kingdom requires 
that 
1
a certain amount of caution and reserve need to be exercised 
I ! 
in the choosing of an analytical tool which is to be regarded 
as suitable for discerning'and calculating any pattern of social 
and economic formation which is to be more appropriate to the 
Kingdom than any present system. 
It is for these reasons that we find the "both-and" approach 
of Berger to be more a~ceptable as a m~ture and scientifi~ 
apprqach to the question of ideological mediations. He acknowledges 
the worth and significance of the powerful motivating factor 
I i 
in the utopianism of Marxism, and is able to hold to this without 
jettisoning the value of tough-nosed analysis inherent in the 
business acumen and skills whiah are generated in capitalism. 
It is our belief'therefore that Miguez Bonino needs to be more 
















the Marxist analysi~ highlights a critically important factor 
in the dynamics of the .Latin American situation, but, 
I 
if it is to be used in conjunction with ethi~al criteria 
I 
of the Kingdoq1 it needs to be accepted 'vvith reservations, 
or at least with greater reservation than Migu~z Bonino 
uses • 
Empirical observation leads the present writer to wonder 
whether a "mixed" economy might not prove to be an option' 
I 
which would lead to social conditions more in keeping with 
the ethical criteria appropriate to the Kingdom. Marx 
expie~~ed his conviction that the more advanced industrialized 
countries ·of the west were ripe for a proletarian revolution. 
I . . . I 
Such a conflagration did not take p~ace. What did happen, 
however, was that the more severe conditions of cruelty 
and exploitation were ameliorated as a result of the rise 
of the trade union movements and by _the exercise and extension 
of the democratic process. · Nevertheless, oyer against this·· 
I -· 
consideiatiori~ it has to be ~emembered that the liberation 
~heologians in Latin America have 6ategor~c~lly rejected 
. I . 
any s~ch third way. They do not see this as a possible 
I 
alternative in-their cultural and economic context since 
it l_acks a sufficiently strong theoretical and ideological 













We have alread~ ~ad occasion to refer ~o the inevitability 
of personal preference and even bias as well as the intrusion 
of subjective factors iri any assessment of ideological 
I 
options~ .. From a theological viewpoint this is to be expected 
and the reason is not hard to find. Reinhold Niebuhr 1 s 
"pessimism" is a sober guide here. Holding tenaciously to 
hi~ biblically - grounded affirmation· that all men 
' 
are equally sinful he points out that the strong, 
I 
the rich and the powerful hqve
1 
greater opportunity to sin 
against nod out of pride than do thoie who lack 
1 posi ti on or prestige. But this is not the total 
r~ure, Niebuhr points out that there is a dimension 
in the biblical which becomes of truth assessment 
I 
! 
obscured in . the Marxist analysis. He describes it 
as follows: 
"A too simple social radicalism does not 
~ecognize how quickly the poor, the weak, 
the despised of yesterday, may, on gaining 
a social victory over their detractors, 
exhibit the same arrogance and the same will-
to- power which they abhorred in thetr 
opponents and which they were inclined to 
regard as ~ congenital sin of their 
enemies. Every victim of injustice makes 
the mistake of supposing that the sin 
from which he suffers is a peculiar 
vice of his opp~essor". (73) 
Furthermore Niebuhr. penetrates the depths of some· of the 
I 














mediation. He points out that whilst the justified resent~ents 
' -
of the poor do provide a powerful motivating dynamic in 
history this bitterness can be a two-edged sword. 
I 
Together with their ,utopian hopes of redress the anger 
experienced by the poor can frequent}y become as distorting 
an influence on theiir judgment and hence a source of confusion . 
as is the _social arrogance and greed of the powerful. In 
I I 
addition to many other errors about the virtues of the 
\ 
poor Marxism, in Niebuhr's opinion, gives no thought "to 1 
! 
the fact _that if they become historically successful they 
will cease to be poor". (74) 
- Thtsl wa;ning by Niebuhr serves to caution us against any 
I -
over-easy acceptance of Marxism. Whilst we,contend that Miguez 
I - -
Bonin_o is right to posit the need for a Christian theology of 
historical engagement to adopt secular political and ideological 
mediations, we believe Niebubf s point needs to be considered 
in assess~ng the suitability of the Marxist analysis. 
The work of Reinhold Niebuhr serves to highlight a further aspect 
which,needs 
! 
This is the 
I 
to be takep into account in any theology of liberation. 
r occurence of 
/\ 
what Niebuhr calls the ~rony of history. 
I ~ 
By irony he means those "apparently fortuitous incongruities 
in life which are discovered upon closer examination to be 
not ~erely fortuitous".(75) This happens when a hidden relation 
is discovered in the incongruity, as for example when "strength 
becomes weakness because of the vanity to whfch strength may 













In the context of a theology which seeks to reflect upon man's effort to 
become the subject of his own history it seems right to point out that 
human design frequently fa~ls to achieve its. objectives in the field 
of historical action. Successive regimes, particularly on i:he continent 
of Europe for example have set out in the past two centuries to dominate 
the world. They have finished in failure, and have become subject to 
other powers. Examples could be multiplied •. The ancient prophets of 
Israel perceived this element in history and warned the powerful nations 
against the dangers of pretension. They affirmed that "every human achieve-· 
ment avails itself of, but also obscures 9 forces of destiny beyond human 
contrivance". (77) 
There are two intervening factors. One is the capriciousness of the bu.man 
nature which seeks unaided to control hist~·~y, frequently in defiance of 
God's sovereign rule. The other is the fact of divine judgment. 
,.,1 
Together 
these operate to bring about such undxpected results that the enterprise 
of deliberately E:et ting out to create history may seem to be a somewhat 
fatuous exercise. · Speaking of this unpredictability of history, Butterfield 
has referred to 11what a live thing history is, and how wilfully it may b:ceak 
away from the railway lines which the prophets and pedants may have set 
for it". (78) It seems to us that this soundsa much-needed note of 
warning which should be an integral part of any theology of historical 
engagen'.~nt. 
Miguez Bonino, we believe, is aware of the danger of overweening preten-
tiousness because his references to judgment seem to indicate an awareness 
that any state of affairs which might arise from the iiberation enterprise 
will only be provisional. Nevertheless his willingness (which is particu-
larly marked in Christiari.s and Marxists) to co-operate with Marxism at the 












The allowance which he makes for moral ambiguity in history needs to 
be matched by a reserve with regard to the actual achievement of ends. 
Finally the Kingdom is God's .s.:-Ld only our efforts to create a more just 
society are, as Bonhoeffer has reminded us, merely the pre?aration of 
the way. But that way is the way of the Lord and it is not our way to 
him but his way to us. 
I+. · TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT 
We have now come to the stage where we are able to summarize the signifi-
cant points which our study of Miguez Bonino's theology has produced. 
·. 
1. The essential biblical foundation for a theology of historical 
engagement is the theme of the Kingdom of God. As a central 
biblical affirmation this ensures the specifically Christian 
identity of such a theology. At the same time the rule of God 
wtich the message of the Kingdom proclaims is a reality only 
when it is understood as united with the reality of the world. 
This unity constitutes a christologically-based understanding 
of the locus of God's action and assures the relevance -0f theolo-
gic..:l reflection to the contemporary issues in the life of mankind. 
Conventional inter'pretations of the meaning of the Kingdom of 
God need to be :-e-exi'imined and reformulated in order to assign 
due significance to the importance of human activity in history. 
2. Because God's rule is exercised in the life and affairs of men 











process of history is extremely complex it is nevertheless a 
unity in which the Kingdom of God can be both discerned and 
acted upon by men. The separation of history into sacred and 
profane sections constitutes a false dichotomy and excludes God's 
action from a large part of human affairs. Consequently the 
Kingdom r.~s to be recognized and responded to in the totality 
of man's political, social, economic, cultural, religious and 
intellectual activity. 
3. The response which the Kingdom requires on the part of man is 
repentance in the sense of active involvement and obedient 
participation in the process of·change. The proper perspective 
for theological reflection is only attained by engagement in 
the issues and struggles of the historical process. The Kingdom 
therefore constitutes a mission for men to fulfil rather than 
a substitute for their concrete action. 
4. The Kingdom not only requires present historical engagement, it 
affords the assurance that, however temporary or provisional 
the work of man might prove to be it is nevertheless guaranteed 
permanent significance in the fulfilment and consunm1ation of 
the Kingdom which is yet to come. This eschatological hope 
is not merely a concession to compensate for present suffering. 
It is an affirmation of and witnes~ to the presence in man's 
human struggles of 'God's Kingdom which has already begun in 
Christ and is at work in his followers and his world. It 
points to the ultimate victory of God's rule in the affairs 












5. The Kingdom of God is able to serve as a theologfoal reference-
point which includes within its range of concerns the need for 
personal fulfilment as well as corporate salvation. The infinite 
worth of the individual in the New Testament witness is largely 
negated in Marxist praxis and neglected in much of the liberation 
theology so far published. Whilst a theology of historical 
engagement will seek to avoid the excessive individualism a1id 
subjectivism so· characteristic of evangelical pietism it will 
nevertheless atrive to give due significance to the hopes, aspi-
rations and worth of the individual. 
6. Whilst historical action is to be assigned a greater role than 
hitherto, a full understanding of the Kingdom will also keep 
in view the relativity of all human endeavour. Overemphasis on 
divine initiative in some past interpretations may have led to 
political passivity but a true perspective will maintain the 
distinction between the absoluteness of the ultimate and the 
relativity of the penultimate. Here again the Christian emphasis 
will be seen as a ready corrective to Marxist distortions. 
7. For Christian commitme~t to be articulated amidst political 
realities a choice must be made between the available options 
·and mediations. If the fanaticism of Thomas Muntzer and his 
followers is to be avoided the au+:onomy of secular political 
movements has to b'e recognized and allowed faro Q.ne of these 
mediations will be the determination of the ethical criteria 
which an interpretation of the Kingdom of God in the biblical 
record will provide. A further mediation will involve the 













will be the rigorous application of the ethical criteria to 
all the available ideological options. The alignment of a 
Christian commitment to historical action with the possible 
political alternatives is a risky and hazardous task but there 
can be -;:-.. 0 escape from the responsibility to engage in the 
affairs of the world of men if the Kingdom of God is to be the 












P 0 S T S C R I P T 
LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND SOUTHErn~ AFRI Cf. 
The relevanc.e of Latin AG!t~rican liberation theology to the situation in 
!>outhern Africa is easy to understand, given the striking simila.rities 
between the two are'1s. Botb have economies that are directly related 
to and are dependent on the two North Atlantic foci of industrial activity 
and wealth, viz. the United States and Western Europe. (1) 
Southern Africa furthermore has, like Lat:i_n America, a capitalistic ecorw-
mic system, usually referred to as nfree enterprisen by its advocates. 
There is a concomitant dispar:i.ty i.n income with the average for whiteu 
being several times that for blacks, a.nd the economic differences are 
almost universally coterminous with ethnic and colour distinctions. 
For blacks poverty is accompanied by inferior education, unemployment, 
lack of job opportunitie:.>, i~rndequate professional and technical 
training, poor housing, migrant labour~ health deficiencies caused by 
malnutrition, and the disruptioa of family life. 
The attendant inequality in the distrib 1•tion of powar evidenced in Latin 
America is repeated here. The conclusion to which the Economics Commis-· 
sion of the Study Project on Chris::iani.ty ~ln Apartheid Society came 
reads like an extract from an introduction to Latin American liberation 
theology: 
11 During its deliberations, the Connnission saw 
increasingly clearly that distribution of wealth 
within a society becomes synonymous with dis·-
tribution of power. It is the powerlessness of 
the poor that perpetuates their poverty and alie-
nates them fro;n ths hopes and drives of that 
society. 'On the other hand, the economic.ally 
secure are suspicious cf the aspirations of the 
insecure, and so become repressive and resistant 
to change. This link between power and wealth 
is at the ~cry heart of the matter. It also makes 
it imperc>.tive that: Christian thinking ~>ho;..1.ld concern 
itself with economics. For although Christian 
thinking cannct be sciicl to have any specific economic 
insights; it must and does concern itself with how 












within the economic sphere, there will also be 
inequality in the power of the poor t0 put things 
right. There are many svch inequalities within 
the l{epublic 1 reflecting the great gulf which 
exists between the rich and ~~werful and the poor 
and impotent, between white and 'black. 11 (2) 
Thus the black man in Southern Africa has experienced the oppression 
which the poor worker in Latin America has known. Added to it, however, 
has been the cultural and ethnic factor of having been despised because 
of the pign,;:;ntation of his skin. The consequent state of oppression 
\ 
and exploitation is presupposed in the thinking of all black theologians. 
Speaking of the on.gins of black thc~ology one has s2.id "it was not until 
the turn of the century and after the complete conquest of the blacks by 
the whites that black consciousness began to loom as a recovery from the 
frustrat:i.cns of the said conquest which had deprived him of personality, 
possessions and status. '' (3) So the writing of the exponents of 
black consciousness and black theology are interlaced with the words 
which denote the same type. o:E experience as their Latin Ainerican counter-
284 
parts - oppression, conquest, slavery, humiliation, hurt and "forced self-
deniH". (4) 
The presence of these conditions J.n Southern Af:cica gives rise to 
the classic Marxist situdtiun in a capitalist society with a small, 
privileged, affluent minority who have political and economic power, 
wealth and privilege and a large, relatively powerless, underpriv-
ileged and poor majority with all the features of the traditional class 
struggle depicted by Marx in the Manifesto. (5) However.~ added to this 
is the nationalistic and ethnic component which, except in a few r~~e 
instances, exacerbates' and reinforces the socio-·economic and political 
cleavages, and which is used as a further excrn;e for the oppress1.on, 
exploitation and dehuman~.zation wh:i.ch we have described. 












characterized by otherworldliness, pietisf!l> and escapism. In this 
situation says ·Boesak, "pecple went to church and thoroughly enjoyed 
being beaten to pulp for their sins; or they went there waiting to be 
swooned right into heaven away from the horrendous re.ality of our way 
of life which we cannot face:·. (6) 
Religion in this society fu1.fils.the worst features of the Marxist 
~jibe that it is an 'opiate' of the people. It is clear that the call 
by liberation. theology for historical action is likely to find ready 
ears arnongst a people who become ever more aware of their oppression 
with each passing day, and who are beginning to question the intentions 
of those who have proffered them a faith which was i~clined to inure 
th2m to their unhappy lot.' Indeed some are now claiming that the Chris-
tian church is one of thi; ma.in instruments of oppressior •• (?) Such 
an attitude is born of a religious faith which lias fr.iled to relate its 
central thrust to the hist.o:ric.al situation. l:. people who have thus im-
bibed part of the Chri.c;tian faith are becoming aware of the inadequacy 
of the springs from which the:/ have chunk. This a.w:i.reness is giving wc.y 
to a rising black consciousness which promis·2s to awaken its devotees to 
the. possibilities oi: histor:\.ca.l ci.nd in some in0tances even, revolutionary 
consciousness. The indications of this come from the black con;:;c1ousness 
movements which have grown rapidly during.the nincot.ce.n-seventies; the 
student uprisings in 1976 and the subsequent npasmoa1.c school, un.iversity 
and college boycotts; h . . . 1 t e mounting incirence of what the authoriti0s 
refer to as "urban ter'rorism1'; ths escalating bo.cder conflict; tbe growth 
of black theology and other academic "supp'.lrt-·syst•211;s 11 for the bl<ick 
consciousness movements; the willirLgness on the part: of many to partici-
pate in Marxist-related poli1.:ical and milito.ry a(~tivity (witness the 












liberation :rn the countries adjacent to the Republic of South Africa); 
as well as the accession to power in some territories of pro-Marxist 
governments. In addition the continuing incidence of labour unrest in 
the form of strike action points to a developing consciousness on .the 
part of the South African 1',.,i::-oletariatn of its need to assume responsi·· 
hility for its historical destiny. There. is thus developing a revolution-
ary praxis for which black theology is st::eking to provide a theological 
reflecting process in its emphasis both on ethnicity and liberation. 
The theme of liberation was espoused in Latin America for two reasons: 
11 it formed a direct contrast to the concept of dependence, and it had a 
long historical usage in biblical and Church tradition as a synonym for 
1 t • II (Q·', sa va .1.on • ,_ 1 Whilst the economic phase designated as "development 11 
in Latin America has not applied to Southern African ble.cks~ the need 
for self·-assertion imd s 1~lf-affirmation has been paramount, and this con-
not!ition is inherent in the concept of lib.:!ration. The ov2n:id it;.g A.ware-
ness has been, and is, not so much the econoraic factor, as in Latin 
A..'TI.erica, but tl::e el:hnic distinctions. These have been particulariy empha·-
sizecl in the post World Har II era since the policies of 11 apartne,id11 .:md 
"separate development" have been adopted by the ruling White governments~ 
parti.:: 1.ilarly in the Republic of South Africa,but also in Zirnb2_bwe and 
Namibia, What has applied in terms of oppression and subjug2.tion to the 
Latin AJneric.an working classes has applied to the black masses cf Southern 
Africa, with the additional highly emotional factor of race to increase 
2_11d rein.force those distinctions and control me.chanisms. Not oniy hc:s 
the white man been econornicaJ_!.y better off., he has considered himself 
superior because of his skin colour .::nd has accordingly treated his black 











black theologian of Southern Africa should have opted for a black 
theology re.lated solely to socio-economic realities such as his Latin 
American counterpart has chosen. For the black theologian, it is his 
situa.tion,. of suffering that is determinative of !1is experience, and 
which is therefore the fonna::..5.ve influence in his thi::!ological refle:ction. 
This is because, as Gqubule has said, 11 ••• 'black' in South Africa means 
far more than mere appearance. It speaks of. the whole history of domina-
tion,' oppression, privation, disenfranchisement ancl discrimination by 
the Whites. 11 (9) 
Religious sentiment amongst the whites has been largely influenced by 
the traditions from which thr~ two main language gr.oups originated. 
The English-speaking churches brought with them a :teligion that was 
11 individualistic and characterized by either the lukewarm apathy or 
enthusiastic piety so well described or caricatured in the novels of 
George Elliot. 11 (10) This has developed all the dualistic features 
of the idealism so strongly cou.denmed by Higue.z Bonino. 
The Afrikaans~speaking tradition was, ·on i.:he other hand, very strongly 
influenced by the Reformed teachings of Calvinism. In dialogue with the 
historical events in South Africa it led to the growth of an Afrikaner 
"civil religion" with a stn,ng sense of historical COIT.mission and 
destiny which has continued and grov.'n down to the present day. This has 
taken place also under the impact of the tea.chings of Abraham Kuyper 
with its emphasis on the sovereignty of spheres which we referred to in 
chapter three. The effect of this concept was to give theological 
validation to the socisl snd political segregation of the races that 
was developir.;;:: as a result of the histo;:-ical events in the Southern 
African sub-continent. 
Clearly Mig1~e:z Bonino' s theology of historJ.ca l erigagement has pertinent 
things to say within the Scu·\:;hern Af}~ic::tn context, His eu::.ph<-isis on the 
unity of history is a n~cessary corrective to the dualism which is 












of Christians are to become the subje.i::ts of their own history 
I 
then a theology which stresses the inclissol·~ble unity of political 
and spiritual issues ~s vital. 
Miguez Bonino's concept of the Kingdom of God is helpful in this 
regard. lt Le11s us that histcry, which in this part of the globe 
means the history of LH:rikaner, English, Asiatic, black and brown 
alike, is one complex process in which there is interaction between 
the sovereign Lord of that history and all the people of this 
sub-continent. It under.li~es fm~thermore that in this history God 
meets us, calls us, judges, redeems and liberates us, whether that 
liberation be from oppression for blac~ or from fear, prejudice, 
and self-interested domination in the white. 
Miguez Bonino, furthermore, reminds us that any theology that is 
to be relevant mu.st teach tbat our participation. in historical 
even.ts is to be und2,rstcod as shot through with eschai.:ological hope. 
The future reference of the K.in-gdom in Southern Africa 5-rnrJi,~s 
a commitment to meaningful change so that political structur:e.s, 
economic forces ~nd social relations will approximate more closely 
to the biblical shalom. In this regard de Gruchy's claim is pertinent 
when he says, nA 'sacred history of: liberation' with paradigmatic 
characters and events is developing and it is enabling Blacks to 
respond to present events and live in anticipa~ion of a better 
future." (11) It is our contention, however, that all Christians 
need to be engaged in the process of repentance and re-~reation 
so that the correlation between the ultirr:ate and the penultim::.:-e 
is actualized and' concretized in this context. 
Miguez Bonino also Eets out some useful guidlines in his reflections 
on ideology and mea~:_ations. Clearly the idealogical conflict 1.n 
Southern Africa is more complex than it is in Latin America. Eut 












i.ssues . .It has also showr1 the relevance of econonn.c factors and the 
need to utilise informed and in-·deµth social analysis if theological 
reflection is to become an effective component in historical 
engagement. This means for one thing that the pre-occupation with 
the ideology of natio:i.s.:.ism and ethnicity will need to be harmonized 
with and related to an analysis of the economic realities and dynamics 
present in the region. It seems to us rherefore that more reflection 
in the vein of Linden 1 s study on Zimbahwe to which we referred h1 our 
introduction is necessary and will valuable contributions to 
the theological debate. (12) 
Miguez Bonino's work, and the relevance to it of Bergerts suggestions 
also point to the need for the application of ethical criteria to 
ideologies. If the capitalist and Marxist options available :Ln 
Latin America need to be ·carefully scrutinized in the 1;ray we have 
indicated th~n so do the ethnic and nationalist ideologies of Southern 
Africa. A cr.itique of these, uti liz:i rig Berger 1 s "cs lc.ulus of pain" 
and "calculus of meaningn, for example~ would yield useful and 
suggestive insights for theological reflection. 
Above all, Miguez Bonino's insistence that Christian love, to be 
effective, has to utilize some ideological and political programme, 
is salutary and apposite. The tensions experienced in those South 
African churches which have largE! nwmberships in both black and 
white com.rnunities have highlighted the problems involved 
com-nitment. They have also revealed the impossibility of ideological 
neutrality, and Niguez Bonino's concept cf mediations provides a 
rationale for the P~ticulation of the Kingdom love so essential in 
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ever remain open for something more because liberation 
embraces more:: than the political and economic dimensio11s. 
Liberation goes further. It is all-inclusive aud univei:sal. 
Its ma:Lri. compon2nts ·are liberation. from everything that 
··;vitiates ln;man eff0rt (i. e, sin) and -the conquest of death11 • 
("Christ's Li.bera.tion Via Oppression:r, :fr.onti~?f 
.?1:~1ot~~~ :i . .'.2.J-·at:i.n~E~!:...:~:=_~t pl28.) 
(32) An interesting e:.-:2mple of biblica1 interpretation utilizing 
these insi:::;hts is tha.t of:. J.P. Niran<la in (a) .J.1ar){_ 
•tad th(~ B·ible (London; S.C.M.P·~·ess~ 1977), and 
(b)~~1ri~:;;:;~Uhe l·fossi<;th: !he _ _].·fe"?_§.~~.f.~-~L St. J,~\m 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis. )_977). For :a. study of 
Cf'1J_'" 1' s1_-(J' .l., (.' ',:' •• '· ~ - t"111' .• ..,, ~ .,.,, •.. 0 e -L '· 'o -.- '•0 Te Sl' s Ci:-i· ~ ~ ·c· I ~. ',., ., r ''· ... ~--.. - - -·' .LU • .::-> V r.L<.• b..:.. , D .~--~~-;_';. __ .:_::2:.::--:.._.:.:~·:.,t;:·...::...'::.'."..:::.:::.:.:. 
(Harykno1. ls ifoH York: Or;:iis s 1978)1 and J. Sobrino,, ~-st_c:_-
16gy · 2.t ttie CI.onsroBc".s: A Latin AmecLca.n Approach 
7L~c)') ..:1 ".::-:-c--:::.·-:-,;·~ -P'r_e_-;~·~---1c,-7°o;---·-----·--··-----------·-
, · 1 •. ~l .. dl.• ._~4\_,.,1:10 .... ~.:iv; ... 0,1 Sl 











cf. E.Dussel, History and the Theology of Libera-
tion (~faryknoli, New Yorlc._Orbis-;-·-r916) See-wfive 
Theses" pl99 wnere Miguez. Bonino gives a brief descrip-
tion of the way this theological project is taking 
shape. He refers to the biblical work of Miranda and 
also Vidales who "is working in the synoptic gospels, 
trying to overcome an idealistic interpretation of the 
message cf Jepus by relatin~ this message to the econo-
mic and social conditions of his time" (Ibid.), and to 
Assmann, Gutierrez) Segundo, Alves and De Santa Ana 
in the area of systematic interpretatior'... 
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(34) 11Historical Praxis 11 , p266. 
(36) (35) Ibid., pl35. 
(38) Ibid., pl36. 




and anthemas at each other. a nthaw" took place around 
the mid-fift:i.es which led first to discussion and thc11 
to dialogue, The outcome was a recognition by both 
sides of the validity of some positions held by their 
respecti~e opponents and the acceptance o~ certain 
criticisms. Works appea!'ed under the names of some 
Marxist thinkers indicating an appreciation of poGitive 
elements in Christianity. These ind.uded Ernst Bloch, 
Roger Garaudy and Milan Hachove.c whc all made significant 
contributions from the· M:::rxist side. (See espe.cially 
E. Bloch; Man on His Own (New York: He:i:der and Herder, 
1970), R.--caraudy 1 .From Anathema to Dialogue; 
· The. Alternative Fu.ture-;M.l-1achovec, J\·I,Tar:Xist Lcol::s 
· .~1:-....!-5:_s.2:!s ···(Phiiadelphia: Fortress Press-,-1976). 
The responses from the Christian perspective come from 
Mol trna~nn, Metz, Rahner, Lochmann and the l'iberaticrr 
theology movement. The most cignificant f~atures of the 
C hristian response for the useftilness of this present 
study are: the significance of human initiative, the 
correlation between praxis o.nd theory (beth of which we have 
already noted), the importance of economic factors in 
the context of the total dynamics of society, the 
·passion for social justice, and the underlining of the 
complexity of structural evil. ' . 
L. Bright, 11Cln:istian and Marxist" , What Kind of Revolution 
cd. J. Klugmann and F. Ostre.icher (Lond"On~ P·ant1{er-
Books, 1968), pl25 Y. Quoted in J. Miguez Bonino, 
· ·c1~11:ist~_a11s and 1'1arx.ists: 'fb.?. 1'Eutu~a.l Ch.e,llen1£e to 
-----·-----r:-:----------·--·----~--·--··---·-·--'-'--r-"· 











(45) J. De s~rnta Ana. "Christian Presence in a Revolutionary Society", 
World Nission ;md World Communism, Ed. G. Hoffmann 
and W. ·0iffe--(Edf.nburgh: ·;fbe Sai°nt Andrew Press 
1970) p63. Quoted in Ch1:._~~tians and Marxists, pl6. 
(46) pl9~ 
(47) Ib.:.d., 
(/+9) J. Miguez Bonino? 111'farxist Cri tic:=il. Tools: Are They Helpful?" 
Unpublished paper, pl. (This paper was not revised 
f:or publieation and the present: writer has therefore 
made occasio:;:ial gra.rmnatical and linguistic amendments 
. . . f h . . 1) in citing ·rom t e orig~na_ • 
(50) Ibid., p2. (51) Ibid. 
(52) Ibid., 
(53) Ibid., p3. Miguez Bonino goes on to give another example u1 
(54) Ibid.) 
(56) Ibid., 
(58) Ibid. ~ 
(GO) Ibid. 
Ibid. 
which J. Jeremias, in commenting or, the -µarable of 
the rich man and Lazarus concludes "Jesi:.s does not 
intend to take a position in the question. of rich 
and poo:r;". (Idem) 
p4 (55) Ibid. 
p5. (57) Ibid. 
p6 (59) :Lbid. 
(61) Ibid,, p 7. 
(63) Ibid., p8. ?1arx set ol:t his tE1derstanding of knowledge as praxis 
in his Theses on Feuerbach. The second of these 
s erves as a useful sununary of his ide.:ii:;, 11 2. The 
question whethe~: human thiEking c.::m res.ch objective 
truth - is not a question of theory but a practical 
actuality or non-actuality of thinking - thinki1ig __ _ 
isoL:itt:,d from p:actice .... in purt.:ly scholastic question." 
Writings of the Young Mar:~. pp400-4-62. -cf:_a.iso the 
following a.ppraisaf-byGutie.crez: 11Knowledge of n~aJ. ity 
that 4oes not lead to a modification of it is re<;ll:y 
an unverified interpretation, ac interpretation that 
is not transformed into truth ••. Marx starts from that 
perspective to lay the epistenrnlogical basas of bis 
ow11 contribution to a scientific un:lerstanding of his-
tory. · Historical reality, thus ceases to be the field 
for the application cf abstract truths and idealistic 
interpretations: instEad it ~ecoBes the privileged 
locale from whic11 it ever;:::ually returns, 11 "J.,iberation 













(64) Ibid. 1 p9. (65) Ibid., plO. 




Ibid. See ~lso the chapter on "Herrneneutics~ Truth and Praxisi:, 
Doing_,.Thcy_lo~y; p86 ff. 
K. Marx, Economic anci Philosophic Manuscripts of 18L14 (Moscow 
Progress' rt7S1isher s' 1977)' p96-·7. (Narx Is emphasis) 
L~ r:-_olakowski~ I pl 73. Karl Popper's description of Harx would 
----~-nodou'Ft-···fir..d an echo in contempa;rary Latin Ame1~ican 
thinking. After describing the inhuman working condi-
tions in 19th Century Britain outlined by Marx in 
Capital he concludes that "his btE'ning p1·otest against 
thesecrimes~ which w2re then tolerated, and sometimes 
even defended, not 0:1ly by professiunal economists 
but also by churchmen, will secure him forever a place 
among the liberators of mankind 11 • The Open Society and 
·its Ene:nies. Vol~ 1 (Londo!i.: Routledge-ancr····--------··--
Kega"n PauT~.-·1.96-6), ·p122. 
(70) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p70. Cf. also Miguez Bonino 1 s 
summary of-Lt;"Cfo Gera_'_s.exposition of the project of 
liberation in Latin America. nThe Latin Ame1·ican 
people ':becomes today inti1'.lately aFare of tbdr 
domination and intimately decides their LIBERATION'. 
Dependence and liberatio~ a,=.-e-not abstract ernrnc.:iat:i.ons) 
they mean cultural li.bcration (breaking &way from the 
liberal·-Enlighten.rnent.,·m.Hgi.sterial culture :Ln o;~der to 
cultivate a culture of the people,) political libera-
tion (from the power of 'the empiret which is at: pres .. 
ent represented by the U, S .A. and its local ologa:rch:i..c 
clientele)j and structural liberation (the end of th2 
bourgeois state and the creation of a different shape 
of society, a socialist om~) 11 Ibid., p67-8. 
(71) Cf. G.Gutierrez , A Th~ology of Liberation, pl59.J.L.Segundo 
has crit:LcT:sed Gut-ierrez 1--;:-;"S-e of -the Exodus in the 
sense that he conside1~s it naive to make a direct 
parallel het·ween the situai:ion of tb.e Israelites in 
Esypt and that of the oppressed people in present-day 
Latin America. He claims tha.t a mediating id-::::01.ogy 
is necessary which"we might.regard as the one which wou1rl 
be constructed by a gospel message contemporary with u3n. 
(Th~ Liberation of Theology, pll7). See the a~al)~is of 
tT12se pos'":l:tions by -S:-i1&ckie in '!Praxis as the Con..:ext 
for Interpretation11 , in Jo1.irrial of Theo l_c)gy for Scuthc.rn 
J;fric.a (No. 24 September-l~/78) ~ p38=9):-Cf:-a1so.....,3'.":!\.F.~·E:s' 
~1s-e of° the Exodus as an historical expr2ssion of thf; 
langua.ge of "Messianic lwmanism". (A The? logy of Hurns.!1 
Hope~ p39) 
(72) J .II. Yoder, "Gosheni The Reel Sea anJ Sinai: Does Liberation Com.::-! 
First ·: i: (UDpublisher:l paper), p4. Yoder also aUudes 
to the critic5_~3n1 lTlade by J.v1igu(~~~ Bor.ii;.:io viho "bas ask.ed 
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heritage it should bt:. domirnmtly or even excli.rnively the 
picture· of. I::xodus whi.:.b becomes illuminating and motiva-
ting without equal reference to exile, captivity, cross, the 
giving of the law, the taking of the land, the scattering 
of-the faithful or other major themes of the Biblical 
. witness. I! (Ibid. pl). 
(73) J. Miguez Bonino, DfJing Theology, p141. Cf. also the description· 
of liberad:--;,n in a. Christian context given by Monika 
Hellwig, the reference point for the Christian re flee-· 
tion on liberation is the person of Jesus, she cld.ms. 
11 Grucial criteria drawn frcm this reference point are~ 
first, that true liberation (salvation) is possible for 
all, not only a few; secondly, that true liberation 
encompasses the totality of the person; thirdly, thtit 
true liberation has an external and an internal dimension 
(sometimes called the pol:i.tical and mystical dimension 
a!!'.ong the. liberation theologians); and finally,' that 
true liberation is such as to transcend death and all 
other possible disaste.n:." "Liberation Theology·: an 
Emerging School", pl49. 
(74) J, Miguez Bonino, D6irt~ Th~616gy, p71 
Cl 5) Ibid., pl09. (16) Ibid. , pl12 
(77) Ibid.' pll9 (73) Ibid., pl20, 
(79) Ibid", pll6 (80) Ibid.' p122. 
(81) 11. Hellwig, 11Liberation Theology:. an Emerging School 11 , p138. 
(8.?.) J. Migtwz Bonino? Doing_~Theolofi~' pp38-9. 
(83) Ibid. , 
(85) G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p207. Here Gutierrez 
refersto-~Christ ·ag-•ithe Tord·-~f history, the liberator 
of the oppressed". On p68 h•~ says, '!The Latin .A.Ineric.an 
by participating in his ovm liberation, gradually is 
taking hold of the reins of his historical initiative 
and perceiving himself as rnastc!r of his own destiny". 
The inconsisten~y has been pointed cut by .A. Fierro, 
'Pie Mq:Ltant· Gosn~1 ('T r)ndo'C • <.! .n 'l Pr 0 -·s 19'71 p1~'6 _;__:_.,_.1.._ .. -·------~.=. .;_j .1.,. .,,, >. ~ u 1:> V e rl. - '-b · t I / ' ...... L. • 
(86) J. Miguez Boli.ino, Doii;~_The:E.!2~~Y.· pl38. 
(8B) J. Andrew Ki:rk~ 11i'1a.rxism and t:be Church ~\.n Lett in America", 
Missibn~lia (Vol. 6. No. 2, August 1978), p33 -------- . 
(89) J. Moltmann, The Crucified God (London: S.C.M.Press, 1974), 
p 7 ft:·· .. ·--·-------.. --------
(90) pl63 














Ibid., pl69. Her~ we see Miguez Bonino 1 s use of Bonhoeffer's 
distinction between the ultimate and the penultimate, 
to which we shall refer later. 
J. Miguez Bonino, Christians an4 .. !!.~ists_9 pl25. 
This theme is developed in R. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in 
Kari Ha:rx (T,c;ndon: Cambridge ui.1iversity Press, T§72)' ------· pHssim. 
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Ibid. (97) Ibid,, p12t~. 
Ibid.~ (99) Ibid. 9 pl30. 
I.bid. (101) Ibid., pl31. 
Ibid. , pl32. ,. O") .\.L J Ibid.: pl19. 
J.W. de Gruchy, "The Protesta.nt Usage of Marx in Latin American 
Theology: With special Reference !:o Jose l'figusz Bonino"~ 
· Ned. GereL Teologiese Tydskrif (Deel XX No. l~ Jan. 
19 7w,r;3 '15-. . 
R. Garaudy, The·Alternative Future: A Vi.sion of Christian 
MarxiSlli(i~ammondsworth: Pengu:G1.}30oks ~-19T6-) p84-;-cf. 
also the same ·writer 1 s claim in Ftom ,t._ne.thema tc 
· Diai.ogue (London: Coi.lins, 1967T; p6C: Sim:Cf.arly 
L:'-koiakowski in expoundir;.g Fi.·omr11 1 s interpretation 
of Harx says nMarx did uot hold that man must be 
eternally the plaything of irrational forces beyond 
his control; on the contrary, he maintained that 
man could /Je the master of his £ate". L. Kolakowski, 
Main Cnr:rents of Ihrz::lJ.n:1~ 3 Vols (Oxfo.rdgClarendon 
Pre'G's,--1§'7'13) ·· IIr'-£38"4:·--{Gul:lsecp,HH!.tly referred to in 
these notes as L. Kolakowski I,II, and III respectively)~ 











C H A P T E R 'i. W 0. 
--.~---·----·- .... 
(1) J. Miguez Bonino, 11Historical Praxis, p271. (Miguez Bonino's ow-n 
emphasis) 
(2) G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation,_ pl53. 
(3) One of the best-kno-vm expositions of this theme is contemporary 
times has beE:n that of O. Cullmann, Christ and Time (London: 
S.C.M.Pre.Es~ 1951, J.962), and Salvation in History (London~ 
S.C.M.Press, 1967), Cf. the stat.:8ment-by Cullmann in Salvation 
· · irt History, p309 "The Bible shows us how even in pre-·Christian 
·times lines lead frcm secular history to salvation history. 
Christian faith sees Christ's lordship over the world as already 
having begun~ and from this faith much closer relationships beti;;.:.en 
general history and salvation history may b2 drawn". 
(4) M. Hellwig, "Liberation The9logy: An Emerging School 11 , p 141 .. 
(5) G. Gutierrez, A Theology 6f Liberation, pl75. CL also the clai:n 
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by J.P .. Niranda that "the decisive step in human liberation was 
taken by the biblical authors when they intuited that evil consisted 
in an organic and cohesive totality, that sin had a unity, that it 
was structured into civilization and therefore had gained control 
of the very essence of the law". Marx and the Bible (Lendon: S.C,N. 
Press, 1977), p250. See the description by R.1'.CBrow.0.1, .~')2eo~2..k£.._ 
in a New Key, p69, of 11 systemic evil". 
(6) G. Gutierrez, ibi.<l., ppl77-8. 
(7) Ibic., ppl65·-6. Note should be taken, however, of A. Fierro' s 
crit:;.cism that Gutierrez "shadowboxes" with a 11phantcm11 by t2,king 
to task the dualistic theology of the 1920's, and virtually ignores 
the more contemporary theologies of Bultmann and Robinson (Tl1e 
!lilitant G~_spel,(London; S.C.H.Pres::i, 1977, p343). ··--
(8) R.C.Cross and A.D.Woogley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Co,nr.1e.n~ 
tary (London: MacHillai~, 1964), ppl78-9, where the autl10~rs~---·--··-·--
point Ol!.t that the misleading translation "idea" is a 
direct transliteration fro::i the Greek eidos or idea (which 
Plato uses interchangably). They prefer. to use the. word 
"forms", since Plato conceives of them, not in a subjectivB 
way (as "ideas in the head") but as objective realities, 
the perfect ideal ty?e, visible shape er nature of what is 
being symbolized in any particular word or term. Nevertheless; 
in coITu-aon with general usage, v:e retain the use of the word 
"idea" in our text. 
(9) A further example of Plato's dualism can 1:>": seen in the following 
passage where he say~ "a man whose thougl,'..s are fixed on tn1e :i.·,.:'ality 
has no leisure to look downwards on the affairs of ruen 1 to tak2 part 
in their quarrels, and to catch the infection of their jealousies 
and hates. He contemplat2s a world of unchanging and hannonious 
order, where reason governs and nothing can do or suffer wrong~ 
and, like one who imitai.:8s an admired comp2nion, he cannot L~il to 
fashioE himself in its likeness. So the philosopher, in C:Jns!:a.nt 
companionship with tl-ie divine order of the worlds will reprocit'.ce 















though here, as everywhere, there will be. scope for detracti0n11 • 
Republic VI, Trans. F.C.Cornford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941),p204. 
K. Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1949), p7 refers to Herodotus' approach to history: 11 The temporal 
scheme of Herodotus' narrative .... like all Greek conc"'.ption of time, 
is periodic, moving within a cycle. In the view of E~rodotus, history 
shows a repetitive pattern, regulated by a cosmic law of compensation 
mainly through nemesis, which time and again restores the equilibrium 
of the historical-natural forces". 
R. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting 
(Londuu: Collins (Fontana Library), 1960) ~ p'is6. 
Born and brought up in North Africa, Augustine was in contact with 
the Donatist movement which flourished there in the early decades 
of the fourth century. Donatism rejected the concept. of Christendom 
which had arisen following the decrees of Constantine in 312. 
Donatists further rejected the claims of the Catholic Church and 
declared that they themselves were the true church and heirs of 
the martyrs. Augustine wrote twelve volumes to refute the Donatist 
heresy. 
(13) J.N.D.Jelly; Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam and Charles 
Black, 1968), p9. 
(14) E. Portalie; A Guide to the Thought Of ·sc :\tigustine (London: 
Burns and Oates, 1960), p95. 
(15) Ibid., p96. Cf. C.N.Cochrane; Christia.nity ·.s.11d Classical Culture 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957), where Augustine's tfi:Jught 
is seen as a correction of Plato: "For Augustine the failure of 
Platonism was the failure of what he generously acknowledged to be by i:ar. 
the most vital and tenacious of the philosophic heresies. In his 
eyes, therefore, that failure was catastrophic, as making the utter 
bankruptcy of c lassical reason". 
(16) Augustine, Contra Academicos III 17, quoted in V.J.Bourke, 
Augustine's View of Reality (Villanova: Villanova Press, 1961+), p5. 
(17) Augustine, De Civitate Dei. Ed, D. Knowles, trans. H. Bettenson. 
(Harmondsworth: 1972, Penguin). Subsequently referred to in these 
notes as "Augustine: D.C.D." 
(18) P. Brown, Augustine of Hippo: a Bio~raphy (London: Faber and Faber, 
1967), p319. 
(19) Augustine, D.C.D., p626-8. 
(20) Ibid., p593. (21) Ibid. , p596. 
(22) R.R.Reuther, 11Augustine and Christian Political Theology'1 
.!?terpretation (VoL XXIX: 1975), p261. 











(25) Luther, An Open Letter Concerning the Hard Book Against the 
Peasants~-Quoted in A Cornpend M 11.ither's Theology, E""d.-li:T. Ken: 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Presi, 1943), p213. 
<26) 11Temporal authority was not instituted by God to break the peace 
and to initiate war, but to keep the peace and repress the 
fighters. As Paul says in Romans 13, the office of the sword 
is to protect and to ~unish, to protect the good in peace and 
to punish the wicked with war". Luther, Works of Martin Luther. 
PhiJadelphia Edition. Quoted in H. Thielicke, The;logic~l Ethics 
·val I (London: A and C. Black, 1968), p361. Cf. .-p~· Althaus-,--
. Th~ Ethics bf ~jrtirt Luther (Phila~0lphia: Fortress Press, 1972) 
p48 where the point is made that J,ucher "says that secular govern-
ment was already present in paradise and that :i.t was instituted 
from the beginning of creation". Althaus is able to conclude in 
a footnote, "Luther thus recognizes that at lea.st some elements 
of secular government v.Tere present befo:ce the falln. (n.31) 
(27) Cf. P. Althaus, Ibid., p49 for an analysis of Luther's usage of 
the phrases "the world" and 11 the secular" and where the point is 
made that Luther developed a clever distinction between the terms 
"government" and 11Kingdom" in the course of time. 
(28) Ibid.~ p51-2. 
(29) Luther's Works?.. 45: 91, 99. (Althalls, ibid., p54 n.53) 
(30) Ibid., "44: 93. 
(31) P. Althaus (ibid., p67) lists a number of further ways n1. which 
Luther describes this duality of roles. 
(32) H. Thielicke~ ibid., pp373-3. Miguez Bonino's treatment of the 
Pauline themes of 11 resurrection" and "works 11 (Doing Theology, 
pl41) as we will see in our next chapter, is an attempt to __ _ 
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explain both the cnntinuity and discontinuity, between the 11 pres.:.::nt 
age" and the "new age". He concludes that "history arrives at the 
Kingdom through suffering, conf:tict, and judgment. But the Kingdom 
redeems, transforms, and perfects the 'corporality' of history •••• " 
(ibid q pl42). 
(33) H. Thielicke, ibid., Vol. II, p565. 
(34) Ibid., p568. It is worth noting at.this point that Karl Barth 
attributes the "fatal ethical dualism" to Luther's definition of 
the relationship bet.ween law and gospelt and sees a direct n.onnec-
tion between Luther's dualism and the rise of National Soc:~lism 
and "German paganism11 Eine Schweizer Stimme, 1938·-1945 (Zollikon-
Zurich, 1945), pll3. Quoted in H. Thielicke, Ibid., Vol. 1 p368. 
(35) It is instructive to t-.::ace .the origins of the word providence in 
its Latin antec _·lent providentia, for here ready to hand was 
a concept with ,~.i hor:ourable f:Cnc~age. "Providencia begins by 
being the power of the Gods which takes thought for the state 
and it acts either directly or through agents; Cicero, for 
example, saved the state at the time of the Catilinarian con-
spiracy through his Providentia (2mong other things), but that 











to the inspiration of the gods. In the same way Providence was 
responsible for the emergence of Augustus, bringing back 
peace and government. From this time onwards Providentia appears 
in 'private' and imperial inscriptions, on coinsand in all the 
literature relating to the Empire. But it gathers to itself cer-
tain main connotations. It includes, most obviously, the care of 
the ruler, as for example, Trojan, for his subjects, as expressed 
in works-raods, build.lags, corn-supply, ·security of frontiers, 
provision for orphanea children, the prosperity of agriculture 
and qo.on; but it includes also the capacity for warding off 
con:piracy and insurrection and for planning the 1 succession'. 
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This last foresight at first meant planning the dynastic success-
sion; but when the elective principle, by which one Emperor chose 
or nominated his successor~ repl~ced the dynastic principle, Provi-
dentia, signified the wise choice of successor. Into this wis-e-. ---
·choice there entered also P:tovide1itia of the gods who inspired 
the selection; and SO the ruler O\ved his rule to the divine plan-
ning and was therefore the agent of the gods". R.H.Barrow, 
Introduction to St, Augustine, the City of God (London: Faber and 
Fabe.r Ltd., 1950), p23/.f, The object-ofthis Providentia was to 
secure the welfare and therefore the perpetulty of the Roman 
state. It carried with it the notion that Lhere was a providence 
governing the affairs of the Romans and that the Emperor derived 
his authority and mission from a divine source. It required little 
imagination for Augustine to marry these ideas to the needs of a 
Christian philosoJ>hy of history an<l to see the similarities between 
the classical concept and the Biblical theme. 
(36) R.H.Barrow, Ibid., pl64. 
(37) "If on the other hand, they suppose that the soul has always 
alternated between felicity and misery throughout the infinity 
of past ages, but from n.ow onwards, after its liberation, it 
will not return to a state of misery, they still lose the argu-
ment. They are saying that the soul was never truly happy in 
the past, but the11 begins to enjoy a kind of novel and genuine 
felicity, which ·is to admit that the soul has a new experience> 
something which had never before happened to it in all its 
eternity; and this new experience is something of remarkable 
importance". (Augustine, D;c.D. p453.) In refen·ing to the 
cruciality of the saving events he asserts: "For Christ died 
once for all for our sins; and in rising from the dead he is 
never to die again; he is no longer under the sway of death. 
And after the resurrection we shall be with the Lord for ever". 
(Ibid., pp488-9). 
(38) R.H.Barrow, Ibid., pl62. 
(39) K. Barth; Church Dogmatics, VoL III; pL 3 (Edinburgh: T. and T. 
Clark, l 960), pp"42--:L------------
(40) "Let us go on t.., examine for what moral qualities and for what 
reason the true ..:.~od deigned to help the Romans in the extension 
of their empire; for in his control are all the kingdou1s of the. 
earth", (Augustine, D. C.D. pl96) "The kingdoms of the East 
had enjoyed renown for---a-Tong time, when God decided that a 
Western empire should arise) later in time, but more renowned 











(41) H. Butterfield, Christianity and History (London: Collins, 
Fontana Series, 1957f:~pl24-:-:f:n his- treatment of this 
theme Karl Barth has disclaimed the possibility of any 
absolute account or description being given to the 
relationship between divine sovereignty and creaturely 
activity. He uses four metaphors to indicate it - those 
of the servant, the instrument, the theatre and the mirror. 
(K! Barth, ibid., p4o-51). Of these it is perhaps signifi-
cant that only the first involves a human, conscious agent. 
Th~ others fail to give due weight to the freedom and 
hu-:::d.nity of the creature, whom Barth is trying to designate. 
(42) Augustine, D.C.D. Book XVIII. 47. "It was foretold to the saints 
of old that He would come in the flesh in just such manner as 
it was told to us that he had come in order that through one 
and the same faith granted to us through Christ all who are des-
tined for the city of God, for God's house and God's temple, may 
be led to~..iards God". (Quoted in R.H. Barrow, Introduction, p42). 
Cf. K. Lowith, Meaning in History, pl 70. "If seen with the eyes 
of faith, however, the whole historical process of sacred and 
secular history appears as a preordained 9rdinatio Dej:.". 
(43) Calvin, Institutes of the Christici.n Religion, (London: Jaoo s 
Clarke, 1962), Vol II p202 passim. 
(44) "Predestination is more than a special example of the general 
divine government of the world. (It) is rather the presupposi-
tion, and its fulfilment in history the constitutive centre, of 
God's overruling, and the basis and goal of its realisation, In 
predestination we certainly have to do with the creature under 
God's lordship, but with the cre"ture i.e. man, as the object of 
the original, central, and persc-:::al intention of God, with 
(45) 
man as the partner in the covenant of grace made by God in and 
with creation. In providence, on the contrary we have to do with 
the creature as such and in general; with God's active relatior 
to the reality created by and therefore distinct from Himself". 
(K. Barth, ibid., p4). 
11Now some people have assumed •• ,.that the first resurrection 
~vill be a bodily resurrection. They have been particularly 
excited, among other reasons, by the actual number of a thousand 
years •••• I also entertained this notion at one time. But 
in fact those people assert that those who have risen again will 
spend their rest in the most unrestrained material feasts, in 
which there will be so much to eat and drink that not only will 
those supplies keep within no bounds of moderation but wili also 
exceed the limits of incredibility. But this can only be uelieved 
by materialist"s; and those with spiritual interest give the 
name 'Chiliasts' to the believers in this picture, a term which 
we can translate by a word derived from the equivalent Latin, 
'millenarians' ". (Augustine, D.C.D., pp906.:..7). For Augustine 
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the millenium ::_::, to be understood as the church fulfilling its 
miss~on here on earth and it has thus begun already. (Ibid., p9lt'.1···5), 
(46) Ibid., ppl086-7. 













(48) L. Gilkey; ·Reaping ·the "Whfrb.:rirtd: · A ·christian ·1r1terpretaticin of 
_!iistor~ (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), pl62 
(49) For Calvin, the eschatological emphasis also lay in the bliss 
of heavenly joys: "v!hen it comes to a comparison wi;.:h the life 
to come, the present life cannot only be safely neglected but, 
compared to the former, must be utterly cespised and loathed. 
For if heaven is our homeland, what else is the earth but 
our place of exile ? If departure from the world is entry into 
life what else is the world but a sepulchar ? And what else 
is it for us to remain in life but to be irll'nersed into perfect 
freedom what else is the body but a prison ? If to enjoy the 
presence of God is the summit of happiness~ is not to be with-
out this, misery ? But until we leave the world 'we are away 
from the Lord' 11 • (Institutes, Book III, IX:4). The idea that 
the body was a prison, from wi-lich the soul was released at death 
was, of course, a feature of Platonic thought. Calvin held that, 
by looking to heaven, believers could endure the sight of 
"wicked men flourishing in weal th and honours" even ·when these 
exploit them for their own selfish ends, 11For before their eyes 
will be· that day wh~n the Lord will receive his faithful people 
into the peace of his Kingdom, 1wil11 wipe a-v:ay every tear from their 
eyes' (Rev. 7:17) (Isa. 25:8), will clothe them with a robe of 
glory •••. and rejoicing (Eccles. 6:31 EV) will feed them with the 
unspeakable sweetness of his delights, will elevate them to his. 
sublime fellowship - in fine will deign to make them sharers in 
his happiness". (Institutes, Bk. III, IX-6). 
(50) L. Gilkey, Reap.i_r:!-g the m1irlwind, p184, 
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pp25-6. 
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L. Gilkey, ibid.' pp33-4. 
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Jer. 1: 4 ff. 
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e.g. Jer. r:;. 27-28. _,, 
Ibid. 
(62) Ibid., pl35. Cf. A.A. Van Ruler, 'The Christian Church and the OlJ 
· Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdman.s ~-~l~f71}, p91. nihe quintessence 
is to'""b"efound in politics in the broade.st sense of the term: the 
state, social and economic life, culture - in a word, the sanctifi-
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2 Vols. (New York: Harper ancl Row, Harper Colophon Books,-
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(69) Ibid., pll3. (70) Ibid., pllS. 
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(74) Ez. 11:19. 
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as the Hebrew". (N. Berdyaev, The .'leaning of History (London: 
Geoffrey Bl es, 1936), pl02. - ---
(78) E. Jenni, "Eschatology of the Old Testament", The Interpreter's 
· Dittiortary of the Eibl~, 4 Vols. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1962), pl26. 
(79) Ex. 3:14 (Including R.S.V. footnote). 
(80) M.D.Meeks; Origins 6f the Theology 6£ Hope (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1974), p84. 
(81) A.J.Heschel, Ibid,, pl81, Cf. .A.A.Van RuJ.er~ ibid,, p38, 
"This movement· towards fulfilment is not controlled by an un-
alterable plan •. God allows free course to the history. Even 
before his words are fulfilled, and irres:::>~ctive of whether they 
can later be fulfilled, they create a sphere of freedom in 
-which there is room for repentance and conversion for faith and 
obedience". 
(82.) M.D~Meeks, ibid., p73; J, Moltmarai.: Theology of Hope 
(London: S.C.M.Press, 1967), pl24 ff. 
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(90) H. Berkhof, Christ the Meaning of History (London: S.C.M.Press; 
1966), p22. 
(91) In Ephesians for example, it is seen as the "uniting of all things 
in Christ" (Eph. 1:10), and as late as the pastorals the 
Parousia is still expected (Titus 2:13). 
(92) J, Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, pl36. 
(93) A.A.Van Ruler, ibid., p88. 
(94) Ibid. 
(95) J, Weiss, Jesus! Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, Eds. R.H. 
Hiers and D.L.Hollai~(Londo~:S.c.H.Press, 19.71). 
(96) A. Schweitzer, The Quest of-the Historical Jesus: - A Critical 
Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Yfr·-ede (London: A. and C. 
Blades 1954). 
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(97) C.H.Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (Glasgow: Collins Fount, 1961) 
(98) Luke 17:21. For a complete outlin~ of studies of New Testament 
eschatology since J, Weiss, cf. N. Perrin, The Kingdom of God 
in the Tea~hing of Jesu~ (London: S.C.M.Press, 1963), ppl3-157. 
(99) W. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology 6f Rudolf Bultmann 
(:Minneapol s: Augsburg Publishing House, 1968), p30l. -
(100) R. Bultmann, Kerygrr1a and Mvth (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p25. 
(101) R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh: The University 
Press, 1957), pl52. Bultmann goes on to quote approvingly Erich 
Frank when he says: •••. "to the Christians the advent of Christ 
was not an event in that temporal process we mean by history today. 
It was an event in the histor:· of salvation, in which the realm of 
eternity, an eschatological m.::.nent in which rather this profane 
history of the· world came to its end. And in an analogous '·!ay, 
history comes to its end in the religious experience of any 
Christia.Tl 'who is in Christ', In his faith he is already above time 
and history11 • (The Role of History in Christian Thought, pp74--75. 
Quoted in R. Bultmann, ibid., pl.20.) 
(102) J. Holtmann, _!heology of Hope_, p316. 
(103) The:~ major problem Bultmann sought to contend with was the diffi-
culty arising fxom the application of the historical method to 
the biblical Kerygma. Cf. H.D.Heeks; O:dgiris Of the Theo]:Eii,;__of 











(104) "It :las occasionally been known, in the history of the church, for 
the ?auline corpus, the Johannine writings or the prophets to 
provide guide-lines for the whole theological system. But for 
a collection of writings on the border-line between canon and 
apocrypha to acquire t-his status is unique, at least in academic 
theology". K. Koch, :'he Rediscovery of Apocalyptic (London: 
S.C.M.Press, Studies in Biblical Theology Second Series~ 1972), 
pl5. Kasemann even went as far as as saying that "Apocalyptic was 
the mother of all Christian theology''. E. Kasemaun, "The Begin-
nings of Christian Theologi', New Testament Questions of Today 
(London: S.C.M.Press, 1969), p1n?.. -
(105) Rowley thought that the major difference between prophecy and 
apocalyptic was that the prophets still hoped for a future that 
would arise from the present whilst the apocalyptists de~paired 
of such a development. "That the prophets were not merely 
preachers of righteousness, but foretellers of the future, is 
plain to every leader .••• Similarly the apocalyptists sought to 
sketch the future, and were confident of their power to do so. 
The pattern of the prophecies of the. prophets and of the apoca-
lyptists differed, however. Speaking generally the prophets 
foretold the future that should arise out of the present, while 
the apocalyptists foretold the future that should break into the 
present. The prophets saw the eventi> and policies of their day 
with penetrating eye, and perceived their inevitable outcome 
•••• They looked ••.• through the darkness to a brighter dawn in the 
more distant future and had glimpses of the glory the righteous 
remnant should inherit, when evil ~1ad run its course and con-
sumed itself. 
The Apocalyptists had little f ___ th in the present to beget the 
future. They saw ••• innocent men suffering direst agonies fo: 
their faith, the righteous Remnant in the crucible of afflicL:on, 
and they looked for a great divine intervention in history in 
the immediate future". H,H.Rowley, The Relevance of Apocalyptic 
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), pp35·-6. ------------
(106) H.H.Rowley, ibid., pl54. 
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N. C:ohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (St. Albans: Granada, 
Paladin Books, illo) ,p1:-s:------·-
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(116) J, Moltmann, The Future of Creation (London: S.C.M.Press, 1979) 
p97. See also the description by Luthi. Speaking of the 
book of Daniel in Nazi Germany he says 11We are not dP3.ling 
here with a burnt-out crater. Daniel is an active volcano". 
W. Luthi, The Church to Come (Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton 
and Musson, 1939), Px. Quoted in D.S.Russel, Apocalyptic 
Ancient and Modern, p23. ~ · 
(117) N. Cclin, ibid., p238. 
(118) Ibid., p239. 
(119) D. Vree, On Synthesizing Marxism and C!'iristianity, (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp63-5, 
(120) P. Matheson, "Thomas Muntzer and the Sword of Gideon",_!~ 
(Vol. LXXXIV, No. 698, March 1981) pll3. 
(121) E. Bloch, Thc~as }~irttter a.ls The6l6ge der R~v6ltition (Stuttgart: 
1962), p9. Q;_ioted-in H.J. Goertz, nThe -Nystic with ·tbe 
Hammer: Thomas i'luntzer 1 s Theological Basis for Revolutior:', 
· Mertn6nite Quarte.rly_ Review (Vol. L, No. Two, April 1976), p85. 
(122) H.J.Goertz, ibid., pllO. 
(123) W. Pannenberg, "Do51natic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation", 
· Revelati6ri ·as History (New York: Mac1'1i1lan, 1968), pJ.28. 
Cf. A.D.Galloway~ Wolfhatt Partrtenberg (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1973), p58. -
(124) H. Gollwitzer, The Christian Faith and the Marxist Criticism 
· of Religion (Edinburgh: St. Andrews Press, 1970), p91-.---
(125) The idealism of Descartes was thoroughly dua.listic. The world 
of thought, of mind, was, for him, completely distinct from the 
world of physical matter. This enabled him to posit a self-
contained mechanist~_c world of matter subject to naturalistic 
laws which functior..')d qcite independently of the ideas and 
principles that had always been supposed to affect and govern 
it. This divorce led to two diverse developments. Science was 
able to pursue its mm course autonomously whilst those who 
accepted Descartes' proofs of the _existence of pure spirit 
stressed the primacy of thought alone. 
(126) Kant emphasized the sovereignty of human reason, pointing out the 
activity of the mind itself in the acquisition of knowledge. The 
human mind has a priori conceptions of ree1.!_ity and these fashion 
what the mind r·ec-ei·_,es-from the obj ectivc world. For Kant it 
is the a priori concept that is superior to the object and it is 
our task to ensure that the latter conforms to the former rather 
than vice-versa. This means that we have t6 suJTu'1lon a great 
effort on the part of the mind to 3chieve cognitive knowledge. 
But it is wrong to suppose that any such absolute knowledge is 
attainable. Kant's is a subjective idealism. It splits the 
mind of man. into two components, one active~ the other passive, 












is thought. Kant believes the gre.at purpose of human existence 
is tc master the world by the reason and the will and so achieve 
a God-like state. In this way essential humanity will be 
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realized, "Kant opens a new chapter in the history of philosophy's 
attempt to overcome the contingency of human existence, setting 
up freedom as man's rP~lization and establishing the independence 
of the autonomous reason and will as the ultimate goal of man's 
unending pilgrimage towards hirnsc:!lf, a self that P~ 11 then be 
divine". (L. Kolakowski, I, p50). Here we se.: emerging the 
emphasis on human creativity and the need for man's assertion of him-, 
self to achieve freedom which Marx.was going to develop with su~h 
fervour, albeit in a style undreamt of by Kant. The same connni •·ment 
to praxis reappears in the commitn:ent to historical social chai::;e 
on the part of the liberation theologians. But in Kant it is still 
idealism - the effort is mental and reality is subjective. We also 
find a departure from the Augustinian emphasis on divine providence 
which re.moved historical initiative from man. 
(127) In Fichte 1 s philosophy we find a type of pure idealism. He. 
believed that "Philosophy teaches us to discover everything in 
the ego; only through the ego can order and harmony be instilled 
into the inert, formless mass; man by virtue of his existence, is 
utterly independent of everything oucside him and exists absolutely 
in and through himself, he is eternal, existing by himself and by 
his own strength". (J.G.Fichte; ·on.·the Dignity• cif ·Nan, 1964s 
Quoted in L. Kolakowski, I. p50). - Hati""achieves th-is autonomy by con-
tinuous moral effort at self-transcendence. Thus the self becomes 
absolute and self-consciousness becones the primary state of 
Being. For Fichte consciousness itself is action and the world of 
objects has no independent exi"'"'.ence. Thus subjectivity is the 
point of departure and subject dnd object become the result of a 
duality which seeks to find :. synthesis in infinite progress. 
11 Since Fichte regarded humanity as unconditional existence, he 
could •••. regard it as practical existence, defined basically by 
an active attitude towards its own world, which possessed a 
cond~tional existence in relation to creative subjectivity. In 
this way he laid the foundation of the interpretation of human 
history as the self-creation of a species, the meaningful, unidirec-
tional ascent of freedom to self-knowledge''. (L. Kolakowski, I.p55). 
In Fichte's thought we can discern the elements of Marxist pro-
metheanism beginning to emerge - there is the stress on human 
effort, self-transcendence, and practlcal creativity. The 
sense of dependence on God which we find in the Augustinia!l 
doctrine of providence is rejected in favour of what to Augustine 
would have amounted to Pelagianism. ·with Fichte's transcendental 
ego reigning sovereign with relation to htm1an life man is at the 
helm of history, 
(128) Schelling occupies a lesser place in the idealist movement but is 
important bec.ause he introduces the idea that in God there is 
development. God transverse3 a pathway from the less to the more, 
from what is partially defective to what is ,~01r.plete and perfect. 
Schelling submerges both the ego and things ;-..1 an Absolute which 
is neither and yet both at once. 
The main significance of Schelling 1 s thought is that it provides 
a stepping stone from Fichte to Hegel. from F~_chte' s emphasis on 
human moral exertio~ and Schelling's identity of Spirit and Nature 











in the evolution to the higher, or the dialectical mode of thinking. 
(129) J, Lewis: Marxism and the Open Hind (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1957), p4. 
~130) Ibid., pl4. 
(131) Hegel based his form1..:.~ at ion of the dialectical nature of the 
rational process on t.:1e ideas of the classical philosophers 
and saw his own understanding to be .:. development from theirs. 
"In short there are three elements which, according to Hegel, 
may be said to be essential to dic:::.ectic. First, thinking is 
thinking of something in itself ta~en by itself. Second, as 
such it necessarily thinks contradictory determinations simul-
taneously. Third, the unity of contradictory determinations has, 
in that these are subliI:l.ated in that unity, the proper nature 
of the self. Hegel is of the opinion that all three of these 
elements are to be found in the dialectic of the Ancients". 
H.G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic (New Raven: Yale University 
Press, 1976), p20. The first two of these elements stem from 
Eleatic philosophy and the third is found in Plato's specu-
lative dialectic. This postulated the con~radiction and anti-
thesis of being and non-being, and, in Hegel's vie~> carried the 
implication that they belong together and entail a higher unity. 
(132)· Hegel elaborates this concept of dialectic in various applica-
tions. He sees i't, for example, in the dialectical structure 
of self-consciousness which he posits in terms of a master-
slave relationship. The thesis is self-consciousness and the 
antithesis is another's self-consciousness. "Self-conscious-
ness is to begin with, simple being-for-itself, self-equal 
through the exclusion from itseH of everything else .•• What is 
'other' for it is an unessential, negatively characterized 
object. But the 'other 1 is also a self-consciousness, one 
individual is confronted by another individual 11 • G.W.F. Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spiri1:_, Ed, Miller and Findley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), pll3. These two individuals, to prove 
themselves, engage in a life-and-death struggle. The self-con-
sciousness that emerges dominant is the master and the subser-
vant one is the slave. But to be satisfied, the master seeks 
to be recognised by another man and the slave, 1...:cause he 
is a slave he is not truly man. Therefore the master self--
consciousness has contradiction inherent within itself. 
Only the slave consciousness can achieve satisfaction by 
ceasing to be a slave -· but it must have been a slave first 
11and since there are slaves only where there is a Master, ""astery, 
while itself an impasse, is justified as·a necessary stag~ of 
historical ex'istencethat leads to the absolute science of Hr;:gel. 
The Master appears only for the sake of engendering the Slave 
who 'overcomes' (aufhebt) him as Maste·.c, while thereby 1 over-
coming 1 himself as slave. And this sJ.ave w·ho has b?-en ! overcome 1 
is the one who ·.:·ill be satisfied by what he is and will under--
stand that he i~ satisfied in and by Hegel 1 s philosophy, in 
and by the Phenomenology. The Master is only the 'catalyst' 
of History that will be realized, completed and 'revealed' by 
the slave or the ex-·sLive wbo has become a Citizen". (A. Koj eve, 
· Intr6dtiction to the Reading of llegel (New York: Basic Books, 
1969) i p47. '.Lhesyntt1esis arrived._at is thus the citizenship 













(133) G.W.F.Hegel; Le~totes 6rt the Phil~s6phy 6f ~istory (London: 
Henry G. · Boh~~ 1861), p.290ff. 
(134) Ibid., p34. 
(135) E.H.Carr, What is History ? (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964) 
pl35. See also S.J.Case, The Christian Philosophy of History 
(Chicago: Universjty of Chicago Press, 1943), p61, where she sums 
up Hegel's view of history, "Reason in its most concrete form is 
God. God governs the world; the actual worKing of his government 
- th~ carrying out of his plan - is the history of the world". 
(136) It was this element in Hegel's dialectic that appealed to Marx. 
If man experiences alienation through his objectification of 
the products of his labour in capitalism, he will, Marx 
claimed, transcend that alienation in bringing communist 
society i~to being. Indeed Garaudy has asserted that Marx 
regarded this as Hegel's outstanding achievement in "that 
he conceives objective man (true, because real man) as the 
results of his own labour". (R. Garaudy; From Anathema to 
DialoJ;ue~ p6n. 
(137) Cf. A. Prior. Rev6lutiort ·arid Phil6S6phy (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1972) p31, where the author traces--the significance of revolution 
and alienation in Hegel's thought. In Hegel's earlier thought he 
welcomes the revolution as the event which would totally replace 
alienation. He modified this attitude later~ but "even in this 
later position, historical events~ be they revolutions, or not, a.re 
in constant interplay with the negative and alienating aspects of 
the age, whence arise development and change~ Nowhere in this 
poaition is there any clear indication that Hegel opposes revolution 
anu accepts alienation. Rather, from a belief in the power 
(138) 
of revolution to remove alienation emerges his ambivalent 
attitude towards revolution and alienatiun as necessary historical 
phenomena because history is the .~. ~ena where absolute Spirit is 
dialectically realised as reason and freedom0 • 
K. Marx) Capital. From Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics 
and Philosophy, Ed L. s. Feuer (Garden ·city: N. Y .Doubleday, 1959), 
ppl45-6. 
(139) K. Marx. Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 
· Basic Writings, p263. See Kolakowski II ppl+47-458 for an ou.tline 
of Lenin; s "debate with the Empiriocritics. Host of Lenin's 
criticism was derived from Akselrod (Philosophical Essays, 1906) 
See also the assessment by J .1 .• Kirk "It would- seem that what Hcirx, 
perhaps unconsciously for later he dissociated himself from Hegel's 
dialectical method (cf. Capital Vol. I) took over principally from 
Hegel was the· idea tha.t History would ope: its meaning if only 
we could find the right key. In point at fact Marx comes very 
close to Hegel's method, substituting the reality of material 
forces for the irreality of the Idea and the reality of the class 
struggle for the irreality of the conflict of ideas". "The 
inherent Failures of l'1arxism", ~-: ssic~];ia (Pretoria, Vol. 6 No. 3 
November 1978), p72. 
(140) K. Marx. Capital V61. I. Trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (London: 
George Allen and Um.;'in) ;· pl59. 











(143) Ibid., p788-9. 
(144) L. Kolakowski, I, p371. 
(145) R. Garaudy, From~~E:~~~ema to Dialogue, ·p79. 
(146) L. Kolakowski, I, p309. 
(147) K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto, Basic Writings, p28. 
(148) The first five measures proposed in the Manifesto all relate 
direc.1..iy or indirectly to this aspect: "L .Abolition of property 
in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 
2. Heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3. Abolition 
of all right of inheritance. 4. Confiscation of the property of 
all emigrants and rebels. 5. Centralization of credit in the 
hands of the state by means of a national bank with state capital 
and an exclusive monopoly". Basic Writings. p28. 
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(149) Marx considered that since under capitalism the apparatus of state 
government was the legalized means whereby the bourgeoisie held the 
proletariat in subjection this would be no longer necessary. Since 
class conflict would cease one class could not oppress another 
and would not need the machinery to do so. Indeed one of the 
first steps in the revolution:would be for the proletariat to 
destroy the state machine. 
(150) With the abolition of private property, Marx held that the source 
of conflict between individuals would be obliterated. He assumed 
that there could be an identity between what society wille.d 2nd 
what an individual wanted. He further reckoned that the ··private 
person could therefore submerge his·own interests in those of 
the collective whole. Marx contencled that the new life in com-
munist society would create a new social dimension. Competitive-
ness would cease and peace would flourish. In terms reminiscent 
of the Old Testament picture of shaiom (Micah Chapter 2) he says: 
"In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving sub-
ordination of the individual to the division of labour and 
therewith also the antithesis betweer< mental and physical labour 
with the all-round cievelopment of the indivfdual, and all the 
springs of co-operai.:ive wealth flow more abundantly· only then 
can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety 
and society inscribe on its banners 'Fror,1 each according to his 
ability~ to each according to his needs' 11 • K. Marx, Critique of 
the Gotha PrograromQ. Basi~i.!_ings, pl19. ----·--
(151) Far from the individuality of d person being lost in the mass 
and shrinking to a colourless uniformity indistinguishable from 
his social environment, Marx believed that men would now rise 
to the level where they can maximize the :1c-;e of the latent powers 
within them and achieve true personhood. The great ideal is 
the utmost actualization of each person~ with the expansion 
and growth both of intellectual and social capacities and thus 
the larger enrichment of personality. In t}1is way the object 
of the corrununal own<~rship of the p.coductive forces will be 
a general minimizing of the unrn~cessarily long working hou;:-s. 
"The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition 











of the new has ceased to be the condition for the development 
of the general powers of the human brain. With that, produc-· 
tion based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct 
material production process is stripped of the form of penury 
and antithesis. (it is) the free development of individualities, 
and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to 
posit surplus labour, but rather. the general reduction of the 
necessary labour of ::..>ciety to a minimum, which then corresponds 
to the artistic, scitatific etc. development of the individuals 
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in the time set free, and with the means created~ for all of 
them". Grundrisse III, 2 Notebook VII. Quoted in L. Kolakowski I 
p349. 
(152) Marx found the division of labour, with each man assigned to work 
exclusively on his o-vm speciality a particularly irksome aspect 
of capitalism. Under communism he would be liberated from this 
type of bondage, because "in conununist society, where nobody has 
one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished 
in anibranch he wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for one to do one thing today a!ld 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, 
rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have 
a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic 11 • 
K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, Basic Writings, p254. 
, (153) For Marx the goal of history was for man to regain the essential, 
true humanity he had lost Ly virtue of his alienation - which 
alienation had become intolerably severe under the inhuman 
oppre~sion of capitalism. The object was therefore for man to 
achieve "the reconciliation of his species - essence with his 
empirical existence11 (Kolakowski). Marx himself articulated this 
when he said, "Communism as positive overcoming of pr.ivate property 
as human· self-'·alT~on--:- and thusas the actual appropriation of 
the-11illi1an essence through 2nd for wan; therefore as the corr.plete 
and conscious restoration of man to himself within the total wealth 
of previous development, the restoration of man as a social, thhc 
is~ human being. This communism as completed naturalism is humanisn:, 
as completed humanism it is naturalism. It is the genuine resolution 
of the a tagonism between man and nature and between man and man; 
it is the true resolution of the conflict betwe~. existence and essence~ 
objectification and self-affirmation, freedom an~ necessity, indivi-
dual and species. It is the riddle of history solved and knows 
itself as this solution". · Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 18lf4 
· Writili.gs of the Young Marx, p304. In this state liberated man, 
will still labour~- the hunting and fishing notwithstanding - but 
this labour will no longer be alienated labour, nor will it dehuman·· 
ize the individual. Rather it will affirm him since it is ~n object 
of his oi;-m self-creation. In effect, Harx 1 s conmmnism will make 
the labourer a "shareholder in his own firm11 and he will thus see 
something of himself projected in the product made. This process 
will therefore be a self-enriching experience. Conducted on a 
connnunal basis:• i:he product of the uork entailed will become an 
expression of t•,,.;;ir joint skills and combined efforts. 
(154) The underlying of the future society in Ha.rx' s scheme is the hu;:;,ani-
zation of huma.n:Lty. For this to happen man must rega.i:1 control 
of his creative po"7ers and express his self·-creativity in and 
through his personal labour energy. When this happens, man will no 












letarian he sees himself as part of the decision-making and history-
creating process he will no longer be distanced from the world 
around him. He uill be part of the co-operative of free workers 
who together poss~ss and utilize the earth's resources, and thus 
he will no longer be alienated from his fellow men but become a 
truly social being. Prior expresses the ideal succinctly when he 
says "Marx envis~ges men ceasing to utilize each other as 
objects. Men wili relate to each other i;:mnediately and not 
via the objects they produce, the worker will see his product as 
an extension of hlmself and his freedom will be reinstated". 
I 
A. Prior, ibid., plll. 
(155) K. Marx, Grundris~e, quoted in D. McLellan, The Thought of Kari 
Marx: An INtroduction, p76. It is to be noted further that 
(156) 
Marx envisaged a two-stage action by ''hich the communist society 
was to be establi~hed. The first step was the wresting of poli-
tical power by th~ proletariat in its revolutionary stage. 
But then there was the intermediate stage, a period of social 
transformation. i'his stage is known as the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" a phrase which Marx first employed in 1850 when he 
said, "This socialism is the declaration of the permanence of 
the revoiution, the class dictatorship of th2 proletariat as the 
necessary transit!point to the abolition of class differences 
generally, to the abolition of all the production relations on 
which they rest, to the abolition 0£ all social relations that 
correspond to the~e production relations, to the revolutionizing 
of all. the ideas that result from these social relations •••• " 
K. Marx. The Class Struggles in France. Basic: Writings. p317. 
Marx envi'saged mah achievl.ng his fu11-se1.I=realization only in the 
final and ultimatk stage of communism, cf. R.C.Tucker, Philosophy 
.. arid :'.-lyth; Karl Marx (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), -
plS':, where he C"I1irifies Marx 1 s teaching on this point. non the 
basis o:E this reasoning~ Marx defines the communist world revolu-
tion as the 'negation of the negation'. Unlike Hegel, however, 
he holds that thel negation of the i.".!gation does not immediately 
speil affirmation'. For Hegel the cognitive act by which Spi.rit 
negates itself as a finite being yields it the affirmative con-
sciousness of its~lf as infinite being. For Marx on the other 
hand, the communi~t action of world appropriation does not in 
itself bring man ~he affirmative consciousness of himself as man. 
He credits Feuerbach with showing that the destructive process 
of negation of th~ l1egation is not ·per se, an affirmation. And 
he says that the affirmative stage of hu~an self-negation lies 
beyond the inm1ediate revolutionary action against private property. 
Far from being fu~ly human already on the morrow of the great 
world revolution, man, accordu\g to Marx will exist in a temT,Jorary 
state of terriJ:?le degradation. The human negation of the negation 
produces only 1 unithinki.ng 1 or 'raw communism' (der robe Kommunismus) 
in which man remainss for the moment, mon: than ever a negation of 
himself. This is the immediate post-revoiutionary transitional 
stage that Marx later designated as the stage of the dictatorshi' 
I 
of the proletaria't". 
J .A.Kirk, 11The Peirennial FascinatLm of Marxism", Missionalia 













A. Fierro considel that "It is Bloch who has perhaps shown most 
earnestness and sympathy in trying to work out a historical -
materialist theor:i of Christianity that would salvage its 
legitimate herita~e. Bloch pictures Marxism, and Marxist hope 
in particular, as ! 1 religion in its heritage' " The Hi~itant 
Gospel, pll9. 
E. Bloch, Man on His Own (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p36. 
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M.D.Meeks, Origin~ of the Thedlogf 6£ Hope, p82. 
E. Bloch, ibid., J86,' 
I 
J. Moltmann, Thedi,pgy of Hope, pp95ff. 
J.A.Kirk; Theologt Encdurtters Revolution (Leicester: Inter-Varsity 
Press, 1980), p62~ 
I 
J, Moltmann; Man:<;:hristian Anthtopdlogy·in.the Conflicts of the 
Present (Lond.on: S.P.C,K., 1974), p54. 
-- I 
See Miguez Bonino'! s chapter on "Hermeneutics, Truth and Praxis" 
in Doing Theology, pp86 ff. It is to be noted, nevertheless, 
that in ·hismode.1.J of the Kingdom, Higuez Bonino is in fact using 
the sort of conceptual pattern to which Moltmann is referring in 
this passage. I 
J B M t Tl · 1 · · · of the World (London: Burns and Oates, 1969), ps6: e z, _,,eo or 
J.A.Kirk, ibid., p67. 
' 
~ee M~guez Bonino/' s reference to Holtmann .and Metz in this regar"I. 
in Doing Theology, pl37. 
D. Bonhoeffer, Etlics, Ed. E. Bethge (London: Collins, Fontana 
Library, 1964), p~96, 
I 






Cf. A. Damas, Dieif:rich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality 
(London: S.C.M.Prrss, 1971), pl54 n.23. 
D. Bonhoeffer, ibid., pl90. (175) Ibid., pl95. 
Ibid •• pl98. I 
Cf. J.D.Godsey~ T~1e_Theology of Dietrick_Bonhoeff~r (London: 
S.C.M.Press, The lPreacher's Library, 1960), p214, -rrthis mutual 
polemical attit,__.Jle witnesses to their shared reality and to their 
I 
unity in the rea.J..ity that is in Christ''. 













J. Miguez Bonino~ Doing Theology, pl33. It is interesting to 
note ~he assessment made. by Kuyper of nineteenth century 
European ChristiJnity when he said that "believers have carried 
on throughout ou~ wh~le century in a dualism over against the 
world and have been all too one-·sidedly spiritual •••• They have 
dared not grasp Jny hj~her than to rescue spiritual life within 
their private ci~cles". (Gemeene Grati~, III, plO). Quoted in 
G. C. Berkouwer, !{ Half Century of Theolo_gy, p186, 
M.D.Meeks, The 01gins of _ _the Theology of Hope, p46. 
(181) J. Miguez Bonino, "Historical Praxis", p269. 
(182) J. Miguez Bonino; Do.~ng Theology, pl37. 
(183) "Historical Prax's", p270. 
(184) Ibid. (185) Ibid., p271. 
(186) 
(187) 
W. Eichrodt; The6l6~y·6f the Old Testa~ent 2 Vols. (London: 
S.C.M.Press, 196]), 1.26. Author's m.;rn emphasis. 
D.S.Russell; Ap6dalyptj_~ Ari.dent and ~lodern, p33. Cf. R.Niebuhr 
Faith and Hist6r)f (London: Nisbet, 1949)),pl20. 
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(188) W. Pannenberg, wilat is Man ? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 
(189) 
p41. I 
Ibid., pll+4. (190) Ibid., pl47. 
Ibid. , pl48, (191) 
(192) J. Migue~ Bonino, Doing Thaology, pl38. 
(193) W. P~.nnenberg, Er.1sic Questions in The6logy 3 Vols. (London: 
s.c.M.Press, 197o=-i973), voT:T~-----
(194) J.C.Scannone, "Theology, Popular Culture and Discernment11 , 
Frontiers of Theology in Latin ~erica, p228. 
(195) J. De Santa Ana~ "The Influence of Bonhc.•effer on the Theology 
of Liberation'', Ecumenical Review (Vol. XXVIII~ No. 2, 
April 1976), ppl88£f; G. Clarke Chapman~ "Bonhoeffer 
and Liberation Theology", unpublished paper (Bethlehem: 
Moravian Co~.lege). 
(196) D. Bonhoeffer,. Letters and Papers from Prison (London: 
Collins, Fontana Books, 1959). 
(197) J. De Santa Ana, ibid., pl90. · 
(198) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, pQS. 
(199) G. Clarke Chapman, ibid. 9 pl5. 
(200) Ibid., p40. (201) Ibid. 
(202) Ibid. 












T II R E E. 
(1) J.Miguez Bonino, D?_;ing ~ology, pl39. 
(2) A more humanistic develo~:uent of this thinking was the 
"New Christendom" approach evolved later by Jacques 
Maritain, True Hl1m2.nism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1938). It allowed a greater autonomy to the politica.1. 
sphere and sought to build a society motivated by 
Christian principles, including ju~~ice, respect for 
the rights of others and brotherhoc~.- For a brief outline see 
· G. Gutierrez, A Theology o} Liberation, p54-·56. 
(3) Ibid., p53. 
(4) Y.11.J. Congar, Christians Active in the World (New York: 
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Herder and Herder, 1968), p71. Quoted ·in G. ~utierre~, ibid., p57. 
See also Congar 1 s other important. work representative of this 
viewpoint.Lay People in. the Church (Westminster: The Newman 
Press, 1965). 
(5) See above p 55. 
(6) A. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Ra?ids: Eerdmans, 1970). 
(7) Cf. H.G. Stoker, Die Stryd om Die Ord2s (PotcheL:;troom: Calv:-/n 
Jubileum Boekefonds~ 1941). 
(8) J.L. Segundo, The Liberation of ~h~ol1Jgy, (Dublin~ Gill & 111;:1.cHillan, 
1977)j pl42 .. 
(10) Rudolph Weth, "La 1 Theologie de la revolution dans la perspective 
de la justification et du voyaumen, iu Discussion sur la 
theologie de la revolution, French translation (Paris: 
Cerf-Mame, 1972), pl20. Quoted in Segundo, ibid., pl43. 
(11) J.B. Metz. L Honnne: Anthropoc2ntr:i.que Chretienne, French trans-
lation, (Paris: Ed. de Cerf, 1971), plll. Quoted in 
J.L.Segundo "Capitalism versus Socialism: Crux Theol0gia11 , 
Frontiers of Th~ology in Latin Arneric:_~, p246. 
(12) J. Moltmann, Religion, Revolution and the Future (New York: Sc:ribner's 
196~ Quoteciiil.J'J:-: Segundo, ibid. 
(13) J.1 .• Segundo, ibid., p247. 
(14) J.M.Bonino, 11Historical Praxis"s p264. 
(15) Ibid., p265. 8imilar criticism of European political theology comes 
from Hugo Assmann who describes it as the "theology of 
affluence1t. "The theology of affluence has created a sea 
of calm around itself, in which it can sit back and flirt 
at a distance with the idea of revolution, but without 
getting its own hands dirty in the procc-:ss 11 • Practical 
Theology of Liberation (London: Search Press, 1975), pl20. 
·cf:---P:-Hebblethwaite--The Christian-Marxist Dialogue and 











described as a "metaphor o:l considerable confusion11 • 
Hebblethwaite interprets the Latin American criticism of 
European theology as a dismissal of those "who simply 
write endless prolegomena to an action that never takes 
place". (Ibid.) 
The problem which the political theologians of Europe face 
3 ~7 11 
is to try to safeguard on the one hand the notion of trans-
cendence whilst emphasizing the responsibility of hu::na.n action 
on the other. Hence we can find Moltrnann saying "Thus Christi-
anity is to be understood as the community of those 1\'hr:- on the 
ground of the resurrection of Christ wait for the king~om of 
God and whose life is determined by this expectationu. 
(Theology of Hope, p326 .) A few pages further on Noltmann 
says "not to be conformed to this world does not mean merely 
to be transformed in oneself, but to transform in opposition 
and creative expectation the face of the world in the midst 
of which one believes, hopes and loves". (Ibid. p330.) 
Metz lays stress on the transcendental nature of future action 
when he says: "Man's experience is that in the precariousness 
of the hominized world - which is ultimately the precariousness 
of his freedom in this world - someone comes towards hiw from 
the future, the God who ordains and foresees everything, who 
has revealed himself in Jesus Christ as the inescapable and 
uncontrollable free future of man and of the world". 
·('Theology 6f the World, p73.\ Hetz however lays greater empha-. ; 
sis than does Noltmann oa the human initiative in eschato1o·-
gical action, as e.g. in the following: "Therefore the hope 
which the Church sets in itself and in the world should be 
creative and militant. In other words, Christian hope 
should realize itself in a creative and militant eschatology. 
Our eschatological espectation does not look for the heavenly-
earthly Jerusalem as that ready-made and existing, promised 
city of God. This heavenly city does not lie ahead of us 
as a distant and hidden goal, which only needs to be rev2aled. 
The eschatological City of God is now coming into existence, 
for our hopeful approach builds this city". (Ibid., p94 .) 
The tension which the European theologians ti'y to hold by 
these apparently equivocal formulations has been described 
by J .H.Loch111an as "the hybris of the Babylonian activists 
and •••• the indolence of the pious passivists". (~Ecountel.::~ 
Marx (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pll51 In vi2w 
of the emphasis laid by both Moltmann and Hetz on human 
initiative in the passages quoted above - and many others 
could be cited in further evidence - the harsh criticism of 
both Miguez Bonino and Assmann seems unjustified. 
(16) J. Miguez Boninq, Doing Theology, pl40-l. See J.A.T.Robinson, !he 
Body (London: S.C.M.Press, Studies in Biblical Theology, 
1962), p80, where the author draw:: attention to the link 
between baptism and the resurrect:on. The bodyts "ulti-
mate d~stination, by incorporation into the Body of Christ, 
is transformation from being a natural body to become a 
a wfAu ·rrveu,.!.-\IJ.."nKo\/ (1 Cor. 15. 44) from a body that is 
merely 1 a living soul', 'r_'lrthly 1 and 'mortal', to one 
quickened by the life-giving Sp:i.rit: of the last~ or heavenly, 
Adam (Rom. 8:11: 1 Cor. 15~ 45-9) from a body of 'J:r .. u:i!ili-
ation' and 'dishonour' to one wholly refashiorn::d to 'the 











able even to subject all tnings unto· himself' (Phil.3.21; 
I Car. 15.43; cf. Col. 3.4). Consequently the process 
of redemption, which is repeatedly described as being 
'unto the praise of God's glory' (Eph. 1-6, 12, 14, 
Phil. 2.11) is equally 'unto our glory' (I s~r. 2,7) for 
Christians are 'the glory of Christ' (II Car. 8.23; cf. I 
Thess. 2.12_;_II Thess. l.10, 12; 2,lLr; Eph. 1.18; 
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Col. 1.27)" See also H.A.Williams Jesus and the Resurrection 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951), p50; H.Conzelmann, 
An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament (Londc.:1: 
·s.C.11.Press, 1969), pl90; J .A. T.Rnbinson, I.D.B. Vol. Ii, 
article on 11 Resurrection in the New Testament", p52; 
O. Cullrnann, IlT'mortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the 
the Body ? (London: Epworth Press, 1958), p28 ff; 
W.G.Kummel, The Theology of the New Testament (London: 
S.C.M.Press, 1974), p237-243: and D.'S.Russell, Apocalyptic 
A1icient ·and Modern,p72 where the continuity and discontinu-
' ity is see~ as originating in the Apocalyptic literature. 
\ 
(17) II Car. 4 .18. However~ cf. the footnote by Miguez Bonino in 
"Historical Praxis" p283, n.10 where he expounds more fully 
the notion of the two 'eons'. 
(18) J. Miguiz Bonino, Doing Theo~ogy, pl41. 
(19) "Historical Praxis:i, p283, n.9. 
(20) Col. 3: 12, 13, 14, 11. 
(21) A~C. Purdy, Int~.I.E'.£..~ter 1 s_D:i.ctionary of the Bible.Vol 3. p'"{03. 
(22) · Doin5 Theology, p141. See 2.lso W.G.Kummel, ibid., p228 where the 
autT1or deals at lengtn with Paul's affirmation that 
"God will reward every man according to his works 11 (Rom.2:6) 
(23) J, Miguez Bonino, Room to be People (Geneva: World Council of 
Churches-;T979), plf7-H.-
(24) Ibid., p49. (25) Ibid., p51. 
(26) Ibid. (27) Ibid., p52. 
(28) Ibid, (29) Ibid. 
(30) Ibid., p53. (31) ·Ibid. 
(32) Ibid., p54. 
(33) Ibid., p55 • Cf. J,A. MacKay, God's Order (:.,ondon: Nisbet, 1953), 
p83, where, cow1nenti°ng on th<=. same passage from Ephesians 
1.9 refE~rred to by Miguez Bonino~, the author says, 
"This means that God has constituted Jesus Christ 
the unifying centre of a vast scheme of unity whereby 
the celestial and terrest>:ial orders, separated as they 
are now by the great gulf between the supernatural and 
the natural, and the greater gulf between the holy and 
the sinful, shall be joined together in a united Common-











creation shall be summed up in Christ, God's will shall 
be done perfectly. His kingdom will have come in the 
fullest sense11 • 
(35) Ibid., p56. (36) Ibid. 
(37) Ibid., p57. 
(38) Doing T?eology, pl42, cf. "Histori.cal Praxis" p273. 
(39) Historical Praxis, p273-4. 
(40) G.B.Caird, "Eschatology and Politics 11 , Biblical Studies in Honour 
· of William Barclay, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 
1976, p8fi-5. ----
319 
(41) D.S.Russell, Apocalyptic Ancient and Modern, p24. This of course, 
is against H.H.Rowley (cf .chII nlO~ who sees one of the 
differences between the prophets and the apocalyptists 
as being that the former look for a future kingdom that 
will arise out of history :i..~. continuity, whilst the 
latter will call for a future that will break into (i.e. 
discontinuity) the present. 
(42) D.S.Russell, ibid., p25. Russell iJ·_:_ustrates this sense of continuity 
further by reference to (a) the use made of apocalyptic 
by the Zealots~ (b) the portrayal 6f the kingdom as 
the final phase of his _,,ry in Daniel, I Enoch and the 
Psalms of Solomon, an~ (c) the use in later apocalyptic 
thought of the idea that the kingdom still belongs to 
this present age and marks the climax of history after 
which there is to be a timeless eternity in heaven. 
(43) Rev. 22:20. 
(44) Rev. 11:17. 
(45) D.S.Russell, ibid., p68. Cf. also the following observation by the 
Czechoslovakian Marxist, Milan Machovec. 11 In spite of 
their diversity the classical parables are nearly .always 
about a ce:rtain process; ripening (Hk. lf:28) growth 
(Mk: 30-2) the working of yeast (Mt. 13: 33 and parallels) 
spring buds (l'll<..13: 28-9 and p2.ra1lels} a se.:irch (Mt .18: 
12~13 and parallels). The common factor is that some.thing 
dramatic is going to happen in the future but that its 
seeds have already been sown". (A Marxist Looks at 
Je~-~' p93). 
(47) H. Berkhof, ibid., pl80. 
(48) 11The Contribution of Faith, Science ~=ind Technology in the Struggle 
for a Just and Sustainable Society"· Anticipation 23 
(Geneva: World Council of Churches, Nove-r;ber 1976); 












(49) W. Pannenberg, Theolcigy·and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1969), ~80. 
(50) W. Pannenberg; Jesus--God and Man (London: S.C.M.Press, 1968), p76. 
See also the- corr.ments by C. Villa·-Vicencio, 11The Theology 
of Wolfhart Pannenberg 11 , J.T.S.A. (September, 1976, No.16) 
p32. The same theme is pursued by Pannenberg in Revelation 
as History, p.i..41 where, speaking of the end being-seen---·--
ahead of t{me in Jesus' resurrection but as being still 
in the future for others, he says: "The witness of the 
New Testament is that in the fate of Jesus Christ the end 
is not only seen ahead of time, but is experienced by 
means of a foretaste. For, in him, the resurrection 
of the dead has already taken place, though to all other 
men this is still something yet to be experienced". 
(51) J. Holtmann, Theology of Hope, p85. 
(52) Ibid., p33. 
(53) See M.D.Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, p43. Holtmann 
himself uses the terminology of continuity and discontin-· 
uity cf. Theology of Hope pl48-150. Speaking on the need 
for a rtovuin c: Vahanian states "In the light of ideology, 
from classless society to valueless ethics, everything 
afflicts .. man with visions of another world. By contrast) 
utopia, like the kingdom is moved by the vision of a new 










The heart of the matter is this: what can trigger such 
a vision is not an event which would be either primal or 
final: it can only be a novum namely that which nature 
could not engender nor h:'.3to;y give birth to". God and 
· Utopia (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), p38. The d(scon--
.tinuity is again emphasized by Vahanian when he says "Apart 
from the fact that the novum encourages what is a.lien t::; 
roan, it is what happ.ens when the human is the event of 
God. Accordingly, the novum is to the eschaton as man is 
to God; and :Likewise signifier. that which, being radi-
cally other, is God in relation to man, a relation which 
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